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ABSTRACT
For the past fifty years social psychologists have 
attempted to understand inherently social phenomena within 
an individualistic and static conceptual framework afforded 
by the Cartesian paradigm. In contrast, contemporary 
traditions of social psychology, especially in Europe, 
reflect the cultural and evolutionary principles of the 
Hegelian paradigm. According to this approach, social 
phenomena are constructed through the coordinated 
activities of inherently social individuals in relationship 
both with each other and with their cultural and physical 
environments. I use this perspective to develop Moscovici's 
theory of social representations and our understanding of 
the dynamics and transformation of social knowledge.
Drawing on recent developments in both the philosophy of 
science and the sociology of knowledge I reject Moscovici's 
distinction between the reified universe of science, which, 
he claims, is devoid of social representations, and the 
consensual universe of common-sense, which is impregnated 
with them. A programme of historical research is reported 
in which I trace the evolution and diffusion of Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations and the emergence of a 
social dimension in the social psychology of groups. This 
study demonstrates the dynamics by which scientific 
knowledge is transformed. These dynamics involve the social 
processes of interaction and communication and are 
characterized both by a delicate balance between tradition 
and innovation, and by an interdependence among individual 
scientists, the community of scientists to which they 
belong and the wider society in which the community is 
embedded. The thesis as a whole has important implications 
for understanding the processes of science and for the 
conduct of research in the social sciences.
To my mother
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PREFACE
Part 1 of this thesis is predominantly theoretical and 
develops Moscovici's theory of social representations. My 
research programme is set out in Part 2 and traces the 
evolution and diffusion of Tajfel's theory of intergroup 
relations.
Whilst both Part 1 and Part 2 may be read independently 
they have been interactive in the development each of the 
other. Together they justify the claim and demonstrate the 
means by which social representations are transformed in 
science.
Moscovici's theory of social representations and 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations both challenge 
traditional, individualistic forms of social psychology. The 
'Hegelian paradigm' has emerged in this thesis as a 
framework in which to both examine and develop social forms 
of social psychology.
I would like to thank Rob Farr for our many discussions 
and his constructive comments on draft chapters; Jan 
Stockdale for her encouragement and support; and my fellow 
Ph.D. students in the Social Psychology Department of the 
London School of Economics with whom I learnt to express and 
clarify my thoughts. I would also like to thank those who 
took part in the research and also my family and friends.
S.Caroline Purkhardt 
September 1990
INTRODUCTION
In developing the theory of social representations, 
Moscovici * s aim is to address issues which relate to modern 
society and culture. There were many important components of 
culture were identified as phenomena worthy of study in the 
formative years of psychology, including language, religion, 
customs, myths, magic and cognate phenomena (Wundt, 
Voelkerpsychologie, 1900-1920). From the theory's inception 
Moscovici identified science as one of the most influential 
forces in modern society, shaping our common-sense 
understanding in everyday life.
In La Psvchanalvse; Son image et son public (Moscovici, 
1961) Moscovici examined the transformation of scientific 
knowledge as it diffused into common-sense, forming a shared 
reality which shaped people's world view and directed their 
interactions with their physical and social environment. At 
one level the study resembles an anthropology of modern 
society, exploring the impact of psychoanalysis on French 
culture and common-sense understandings. At another level, it 
constitutes a study in the sociology of knowledge, tracing 
the diffusion of psychoanalytic theory into different sectors 
of French society.
Several reasons contribute to the appeal of the theory 
of social representations. Firstly, it provides, 
simultaneously, a critique of traditional Anglo-American 
social psychology and an alternative framework within which 
to study social-psychological phenomena. This joins forces 
with the current movement in social psychology to adopt a 
contextualist or constructivist approach as opposed to a 
reductionist or positivist approach. Secondly, it identifies 
a phenomenon which, until now, has been little studied in 
social psychology; that is, the form, content and dynamics of 
consensual beliefs. Thirdly, the theory incorporates and 
legitimizes new sources of data for research. Social 
representations exist, not only in people's minds and in 
their interactions, but also in the cultural products of a 
particular society. These include the media, books and films
as well as the human-made environment in which we live. 
Fourthly, the theory suggests a pluralism of methods, ranging 
from laboratory experiments to interviews, content analysis 
and participant observation. Finally, the theory provides a 
framework in which to investigate important social issues 
and, as a consequence, it has received the support of various 
funding bodies.
The theory of social representations has acquired 
international recognition, instigating a broad range of 
research and critical debate. Much of the early research on 
social representations (1960's-1970's) was conducted in 
France. This included field research investigating social 
representations of health and illness, mental illness, the 
body, children and cities as well as experimental research 
on social representations of particular situations in 
relation to self and to the group. In more recent years the 
theory has been employed by researchers in other European 
countries who have studied social representations of AIDS, 
gender, economic inequalities and intelligence. It has also 
been incorporated into other fields of social psychology, 
including social cognition, attribution theory and intergroup 
relations. Furthermore, although the theory of social 
representations clearly falls within the realm of social 
psychology, it has attracted attention from people in other 
disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, anthropology 
and history. There has by no means been an unconditional 
acceptance of the theory and its related research, but the 
various commentaries and critiques not only facilitate its 
continuing development, they also indicate the import of this 
new and expanding field in social psychology.
Like common-sense, science is fundamentally a social 
activity, situated in a cultural and historical context. 
Furthermore, science offers an ideal object of study for a 
theory that focuses on the transformation of social 
knowledge. Firstly, the science endeavours to provide 
explanations and to extend our understandings of phenomena 
in the world. As a result, there is a continual stream of 
development and change, on a smaller or larger scale. 
Secondly, scientific documents provide a comprehensive
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written account from which to trace the history of change 
and to examine the dynamics of social knowledge.
Whilst the theory, as it stands, sheds a great deal of 
light on the dynamics of common sense, it says little or 
nothing about the dynamics of change within the scientific 
community. I hope to demonstrate that the theory is relevant 
to our understanding of how scientific knowledge is 
transformed. Any new departure presents its problems and this 
is no exception. Not only has Moscovici explicitly rejected 
the existence of social representations in science but there 
are also a number of contradictions and confusions within 
the theoretical writings on the subject. There is also a 
considerable diversity of research on social representations. 
The application of the theory to the dynamics of scientific 
knowledge directly challenges certain presuppositions and 
demands the clarification of various theoretical principles. 
These include the relationship between science and 
common-sense, between the individual and culture, between 
knowledge and the environment, and between stability and 
change. Within this thesis potential resolutions to these 
problems are constructed by drawing on a diverse literature 
and elaborating central distinctions between mechanistic 
(Cartesian) and relational (Hegelian) paradigms within 
psychology and between a positive empiricist philosophy of 
science and a social constructionist one.
The research focuses on the transformation of social 
representations in social psychology and, in particular, on 
the influence of Henri Tajfel (1919-1982) on the psychology 
of groups. This examines not only the diffusion and 
assimilation of Tajfel's ideas to the wider community of 
social scientists but also the construction of a theory of 
intergroup relations within a particular social, cultural 
and historical context. The construction and diffusion of 
social representations involve the same social processes. 
Scientific and lay theories evolve and are transformed within 
their respective communities. They are dynamic in both 
contexts. The detailed analysis of the transformation of 
scientific knowledge provides the grounds for developing 
further the theory of social representations and, in
11
particular, for elaborating the processes of transformation 
involved.
Part 1 of the thesis is largely theoretical, examining 
the theory of social representations within the broader 
context of social psychology as a scientific discipline. Part 
2 presents research on the transformation of social 
representations within social psychology. These two sections 
of the thesis are interdependent: the research informs at 
least some of the theoretical developments in Part 1 and the 
latter provides the foundations for the research presented in 
Part 2. The relationship is a dialectical one.
Before going on to present a guide to each chapter I 
shall outline the general argument which is constructed in 
the course of this thesis. Moscovici developed the theory of 
social representations in order to describe and explain those 
transformations of common-sense knowledge that occur when the 
innovations and discoveries of science diffuse within 
society. In so doing, he made a sharp distinction between the 
reified universe of science and the consensual universe of 
social representations. Furthermore, he emphasized the 
collective or supra-individual nature of social 
representations so as to avoid the individualistic and 
reductionist perspectives which have dominated Anglo-American 
social psychology. However, the research on social 
representations does not always reflect these theoretical 
commitments. Firstly, much of the research has investigated 
the transformation of social representations which are only 
indirectly associated with science, if at all. This means 
that the theory must account for the construction of 
innovations within the consensual universe as well as for 
their assimilation and diffusion. Secondly, much of the 
research betrays the social or cultural focus of the theory. 
This reflects the contradictions and confusions within the 
theory itself, with regard to both its theoretical and its 
methodological commitments.
The implicit difficulties presented by the theory and 
by the research are not exclusive to the field of social 
representations. Rather, they are expressions of the 
fundamental problems which have confronted social psychology
12
throughout its history. These find their roots in the 
divergence between the Cartesian and the Hegelian paradigms 
(Markova, 1982). The Cartesian paradigm endorses a 
mechanistic view of the world in which the individual is 
independent from the environment and from culture. 
Furthermore, it is consistent with a positive-empiricist view 
of science. In contrast, the Hegelian paradigm offers an 
organic or evolutionary view of the world in which 
individuals can only be conceived of in relation to their 
environment and their culture. This requires a different 
approach to the conduct of scientific enquiry.
While the theory of social representations resurrects 
the Hegelian tradition it still reflects certain aspects of 
the Cartesian paradigm. Firstly, the theory fails to provide 
a synthesis of the dichotomy between the individual and 
culture and, in consequence, fails to give a consistent 
account of the dynamics of social representations. I resolve 
this by elaborating a social model of the individual and a 
social-realist view of reality within the Hegelian tradition. 
Secondly, Moscovici's notion of the reified universe of 
science reflects a Cartesian epistemology and a positive 
empiricist philosophy of science which is antithetical to his 
own thesis. Science itself must be conceived of as a human 
and social endeavour in which knowledge is socially 
constructed. Thus, the theory of social representations is 
applicable not only to the transformation of common-sense, 
but also to the transformation of scientific knowledge.
In order to remain consistent with this line of argument 
a Hegelian or constructionist approach is adopted in the 
research reported in this thesis. The research on the 
psychology of groups focuses on the transformation of social 
representations and the interdependence between the 
individual scientist and his or her cultural context. This 
research elaborates the thesis in two ways. Firstly, it 
illustrates that the theory of social representations can be 
applied constructively to the realm of science. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that the study of large-scale social phenomena 
can only be achieved successfully within the Hegelian 
paradigm.
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Chapter 1 constitutes the starting point or ground work 
from which the remainder of the thesis develops. No attempt 
is made at this stage to critically assess the theory. An 
outline of the social psychological perspective adopted in 
the theory of social representations emphasizes the focus on 
culture and social change. This is followed by a structured 
presentation of the theory in terms of the nature of social 
representations, their functions and the processes by which 
they are transformed. Finally, the role of social 
representations in modern society is considered and I 
describe the distinction which Moscovici makes between the 
reified universe of science and the consensual universe of 
common-sense.
This provides the basis for a critical review of the 
heterogenous research on social representations and an 
assessment of related theoretical and methodologial critiques 
in Chapter 2. I argue that investigations which focus on 
representations of social objects, or representations in 
interpersonal interactions, do not reflect the distinctive 
character of social representations. Furthermore, literature 
that stresses the consensual nature of social representations 
as shared bodies of knowledge fails to address their dynamic 
nature and their origins in social life. Research which 
examines the role of social interaction and communication, 
broadly interpreted, is best suited to illuminate the 
maintainance and creative transformation of social 
representations as well as the social reality which they 
form. A definition of social representations must take into 
account all these characteristics. Finally, a discussion of 
theoretical principles in relation to the research 
demonstrates that the theory is applicable to a broad 
spectrum of social-psychological knowledge.
In Chapter 3 the scope of the thesis is enlarged beyond 
the theory of social representations to the disciplines of 
psychology and of social psychology as a whole. In 
particular, I examine how the relationship between the 
individual and culture is conceptualized and how this relates 
to the scientific study of psychological and social 
phenomena. An examination of the historical development of
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psychology and of social psychology shows how the division 
between the individual and culture has been perpetuated 
rather than transformed since the inception of psychology as 
a scientific discipline. This is due, I argue, to a 
commitment to the individualistic and mechanistic principles 
of the Cartesian paradigm and to a positive-empiricist 
representation of science. In contrast, the Hegelian 
tradition of thought provides an alternative paradigm in 
which the individual is both the product and the producer of 
culture. This embraces an evolutionary and constructionist 
perspective which is beginning to be reflected in current 
developments in psychology. This chapter serves three 
distinct purposes. Firstly, it locates the theory of social 
representations within both the historical and the 
contemporary context of social psychology, identifying the 
problems which must be addressed. Secondly, it describes the 
social representations of the individual and of science which 
have dominated the historical development of psychology and 
of social psychology to date. Thirdly, it elaborates two 
contrasting paradigms of research for social psychology which 
provide an essential background for the following three 
chapters.
Chapter 4 is largely a reformulation of the theory of 
social representations. I commence by explicating the 
conflicts and confusions within the theory, focusing on the 
manifest contradiction between the role of the individual 
and of culture and the uneasy tension between the 
prescriptive and dynamic nature of social representations. 
The crucial link which resolves these problems is the 
conception of the individual as a social being within an 
'organism/environment/culture system*. This provides a 
conceptual framework which supports the claim that social 
representations exist not only in our minds but also in our 
interactions and in the cultural environment. It also offers 
a basis from which to construct a definition of social 
reality that avoids both a positive empiricist view, locating 
reality in the external world, and an extreme social 
constructionist view, locating reality in the heads of 
individuals. This reformulation within the Hegelian paradigm
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allows a reassessment of the dynamics of social 
representations. Firstly, the social individual necessarily 
plays a comstructive role in the maintenance and 
transformation of social representations. Secondly, anchoring 
and objectification are essentially social processes but, in 
themselves, they fail to explain adequately the 
transformations in social representations. It is suggested 
that these processes of both assimilation and accommodation 
must be understood in terms of a spiral of transformation 
within systems of social representations.
Chapter 4 deals with the theoretical problems that are 
relevant to any study of social representations. Chapter 5 
focuses exclusively on the relationship between science and 
common-sense, an issue that, surprisingly, has been ignored 
but that is crucial to this whole thesis. Moscovici's 
distinction between the reified and consensual universes is 
not unusual in the social sciences. But his notion of the 
reified universe creates substantial problems for his theory. 
While the theory requires a social constructionist 
epistemology Moscovici's notion of reified universe 
perpetuates an antagonistic, positive-empiricist 
epistemology. By examining developments in the philosophy of 
science it is shown that Moscovici's description of the 
reified universe reflects a 'traditional view' of science. 
This view was challenged by significant advances in physics 
in the early part of this century and gave rise to 
alternative philosophies. In particular, Kuhn (1962,1970) 
propounds an historical, cultural and social-psychological 
approach to the transformation of scientific knowledge. This 
shows many similarities to the theory of social 
representations and, in conjunction with more recent 
developments, offers a social-constructionist philosophy of 
science. This view is supported by parallel developments in 
the sociology of knowledge. The theory of social 
representations thus provides a suitable framework within 
which to study the transformation and evolution of science 
itself. Finally, the arguments presented in Chapters 4 and 
5 are illustrated by reference to Darwin's theory of 
evolution.
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The research conducted in this thesis on the 
transformation of social representations in science 
contrasts, quite strikingly, with traditional modes of 
investigation in social psychology, with reference to both 
its form and its content. In Chapter 6, I discuss the diverse 
methods of research, from experimentation to participant 
observation, which have been employed in the study of social 
representations. Each method is characterized in terms of its 
strengths and weaknesses in exploring various aspects of the 
theory and it is argued that the most suitable approach is to 
develop research programmes which incorporate multiple 
methods of investigation. This is supported by considering 
the methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm in 
contrast to those of the Cartesian paradigm. The former 
focuses on theory construction, adopting an evolutionary 
approach to the qualitative examination of relational 
systems. It is this approach which is adopted in the research 
programme developed in this thesis. The decision to select 
psychology as a scientific discipline for this study is 
supported by both theoretical and methodological'' 
considerations. A variety of techniques are used to select 
and to examine the transformation of social representations 
in the psychology of groups, with particular reference to 
Henri Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. These include 
a questionnaire, an historico-interpretative analysis of 
Tajfel's publications, in-depth interviews with his 
collaborators, an analysis of citation counts and a critical 
review of an extensive literature on group psychology. Each 
method is described giving an account of its use and
development within the research programme.
Part 2 investigates the dynamics and transformation of 
social representations in the social psychology of groups. 
This requires not only a description of a system of social 
representations and its diffusion within a specified
community but also an analysis of the origins of change and
the processes of transformation in the organism/
environment/culture system. In order to maintain the socio- 
psychological and historical perspectives of Moscovici's 
original theory the research focuses on the contributions of
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an influential scientist, in relation both to the scientific 
community and to the broader society, and involves an 
historical analysis of transformations within a specified 
field of study.
Chapter 7 concentrates on the impact of Tajfel's theory 
of intergroup relations on the field of group psychology as 
a whole. The results of a questionnaire study exploring 
social psychologists' views of influential contributions to 
both attitude research and group psychology are reported. 
These show not only that there is considerable interest and 
a greater consensus in the latter field of study but also 
that Taj fel's work has brought about substantial changes in 
the social representations pertaining to the understanding of 
group phenomena. This change is assessed using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods of research. An analysis 
of citation counts shows that Tajfel's ideas have diffused 
quite widely in the social sciences. Although his earlier 
work on social perception, stereotypes and prejudice 
continues to be cited, his work on intergroup relations has 
had by far the greatest impact, especially in Europe. To 
assess the nature of this impact, I examine the historical 
development of group psychology as a field of study and the 
gradual assimilation of Taj fel's research and theoretical 
orientation within the field as a whole. In the past, group 
phenomena were represented as an individual's response to 
small group situations and explanations were provided in 
terms of intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. This can 
be contrasted with more recent developments in group 
psychology and related fields of study which have been 
auspicated by Tajfel's work. Firstly, large-scale social 
processes and intergroup relations in society have become a 
more prominent area of study in social psychology. This is 
due, in large measure, to the respective influences of 
Moscovici and Tajfel. Secondly, much of the literature on 
intergroup relations as well as on intragroup processes now 
presents the group as a theoretically distinctive entity. 
Thirdly, there is an increasing emphasis on the role of 
consensual beliefs and of people's relationships within their 
historical and cultural contexts.
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The following three chapters focus on the 
transformation of the social representations involved in the 
construction of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. It 
is not possible to identify how a new perspective in group 
psychology has evolved without first examining the content 
and structure of the system of social representations during 
consecutive periods. Chapter 8 provides a detailed 
description of Tajfel's work in terms of six phases in his 
academic career. Tajfel started by studying the effects of 
value and categorization on the perceptual judgment of 
physical objects (Phase I) . The theoretical principles 
constructed in this context were then applied to social 
phenomena and, in particular, to stereotypes (Phase II) . This 
led Tajfel to consider the nature of prejudice and to 
elaborate the cognitive aspects of large-scale social 
phenomena (Phase III). Experimental studies on the 
development of national attitudes (Phase IV) and also on the 
role of social categorization in intergroup relations (Phase 
V) gave rise to a number of issues which relating to the 
social context of human behaviour. Finally, Tajfel explicates 
the significance of social identity in intergroup relations 
and the processes involved in social change (Phase VI).
The most striking feature of this evolution is that, 
whilst Tajfel remained a social psychologist throughout, the 
form of social psychology which he espoused underwent a 
radical transformation. In Chapter 9, I trace the major 
continuities and discontinuities across the six phases in 
the development of his ideas. This involves both stability 
and change in the social representations of the individual, 
of the group and of social psychology as a scientific 
discipline. Whilst Tajfel retained both a comparative 
perspective and a functional approach, as the central object 
of his study changed, so to did his conceptions of the 
cognitive, evaluative and motivational components of his 
theory. More significantly, the locus of explanation shifts 
away from individual cognitive processes towards the socio- 
psychological concomitants of people's social context. There 
is also a shift away from a concentration on method and 
empirical enquiry towards the development of theory and its
19
application to social reality. These transformations can be 
explained, at least in part, by examining the emergence of 
problems and their possible solutions through the 
assimilation and accommodation of conflicting aspects within 
the system of social representations. It will be seen that 
the emergence of a social dimension in socio-psychological 
explanations of group phenomena was necessitated by the study 
of large-scale intergroup relations in society.
However, this leaves many questions still unanswered. 
The transformation of a system of social representations 
cannot be understood in isolation from its historical and 
cultural context. In Chapter 10 the concatenation of 
cultural, social and intellectual influences on Tajfel's work 
is examined. These include Tajfel's cultural history and the 
various institutions with which he was associated; his 
collaboration with other social scientists working in the 
same field and the emergence of a European community of 
social psychologists; and the conventions and innovations 
expressed in theoretical writings and research papers both 
in social psychology and in the social sciences more 
generally.
Finally, in Chapter 11, I highlight the implications of 
this research and the arguments elaborated in this thesis for 
the theory of social representations itself, for the 
discipline of social psychology and for our understanding of 
the processes of science. The Hegelian paradigm 
simultaneously supports, and is supported by, the elaboration 
of the theory of social representations, the research on the 
field of group psychology and the application of the theory 
to the dynamics of scientific knowledge.
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PART 1
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
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CHAPTER 1
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
1.1 A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
1.2 THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
1.2.1 Social reality
1.2.2 The symbolic nature of social representations
1.2.3 The logic of social representations
1.2.4 The conventional and prescriptive nature of 
social representations
1.2.5 The dynamic nature of social representations
1.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
1.3.1 The interpretation and understanding of objects 
and events
1.3.2 Enabling communication and social interaction
1.3.3 Demarcation and consolidation of groups
1.3.4 The formation of social identities
1.3.5 Importance in regard to socialisation
1.3.6 Making the unfamiliar familiar
1.4 THE PROCESSES OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
1.4.1 Anchoring
1.4.2 Objectification
1.5 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
1.5.1 The reified universe
1.5.2 The consensual universe
1.5.3 Science and social representations
1.5.4 Causality and explanation
1.5.5 Social representations in modern society
1.1 A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
The theory of social representations is a 
distinctively European form of social psychology which has 
emerged in France. Its earliest formulation and empirical 
research is properly accredited to Moscovici, with the 
publication of La Psvchanalvse; Son image et son public 
(1961). Since then, an ever-increasing number of European 
social psychologists have shown an interest in social 
representations, both in their theoretical writings and in 
their empirical research (Farr,1987b). This has resulted in 
an incredible variety, in both the methods of research 
employed and the fields of application within psychology.
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This will be examined in more detail in the following 
chapter. The present chapter focuses almost exclusively on 
the theory of social representations. However, before 
embarking on a presentation of the theory, it is pertinent 
to outline Moscovici's perspective on social psychology.
As Wells (1987) explicates and Moscovici (1987) affirms,
the theory of social representations reflects a certain way
of envisioning social psychology. Moscovici asserts that it
must be considered, foremostly, a social science with its own
domain and objects of study. Rather than a situation in which
a variety of disciplines and subdisciplines, including
economics, political science, history, child psychology and
linguistics, create their own social psychology it should be
a discipline in its own right, constituting a major science
alongside those of anthropology, economics and sociology
(Moscovici,1990). As a major science it would be a cultural
and anthropological endeavour investigating the problems of
our times in their historical context. This is expressed by
Moscovici on numerous occasions; for example
social psychology is a science of culture and 
particularly of our culture; it is, or should be, 
the anthropology of the modern world.
(Moscovici,1981b,p.iix)
Another theme which is central to much of Moscovici's
thinking is an overriding concern with change, especially
with social change. This is reflected on at least three
levels. Firstly, social psychology should study the evolution
and transformation of social phenomena. It is the
responsibility of social psychologists 'to examine society
"in the making", a perpetual creation of its members,
materially as well as symbolically (Moscovici,1987,p.520).
It would be 'a science of consensual universes in evolution'
(Moscovici 1984b), studying the
transformations from one way of knowing things to 
another way. . . .and what effect these transformations 
have on communication and action
(Moscovici,1982,p.139).
No other discipline is better equipped to study these social 
transformations and innovations.>1<
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Secondly, in order to achieve this, social psychology
itself must be reformulated, its accepted norms and methods
critically reviewed and adapted to studying social phenomena.
A systematic social psychology must be renewed and 
redeveloped so as to become a real science of those 
social phenomena which are the basis of the 
functioning of a society and the essential processes 
generating in it.
(Moscovici,1972,p.55)
Thirdly, social psychology should not be afraid to
develop 'dangerous truths' which have consequences for
society. As a social science it is in a position not only to
discover aspects of social reality (of which we were formerly
unaware) but also to participate in the dynamics of knowledge
in society through which social reality is transformed and
new aspects of society created. To quote Moscovici
as a science of our culture, social psychology 
should and could contribute to criticise a certain 
number of our ideological 'difficulties', whose 
political and human consequences are huge
(Moscovici,1987,p.528).
This view of social psychology is reflected throughout
much of Moscovici's theoretical writings and empirical
research. For example, his work on minority influence
(Moscovici,1985c), which arose out of a critique of the
'conformity bias' in much American experimental social
psychology (Moscovici and Faucheux,1972), studies the role
of active minorities instigating change in the views of a
majority. Other examples include his work on the history of
mass psychology (Moscovici,1985a), and on social
representations (1961,1984b). With regard to the latter
Moscovici has gone so far as to state that
the main task of social psychology is to study such 
representations, their properties, their origins and 
their impact.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.13)
The notion of social, or rather collective, 
representation was originally used by Durkheim, a French 
sociologist. However, within sociology it remained a concept, 
an explanatory device irreducible by any further analysis.
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Moscovici (1961) took up this 'forgotten concept' of 
Durkheim's. Once located within the discipline of social 
psychology, it is transformed into a phenomenon, an object 
of study, the structure and dynamics of which require 
detailed examination. In this respect it is similar to the 
notions of the gene or the atom which were originally 
explanatory concepts in genetics and traditional mechanics 
but became objects of study within molecular biology and 
atomic physics respectively. Once the phenomenon of social 
representations is established as an object of study it is 
possible to investigate its genesis and function in society 
and, with the aid of empirical research, to develop a theory 
of social representations which provides an understanding of 
why and how they are produced and the way in which they 
intervene in social life. Whereas other social sciences may 
refer to social or collective representations it is the 
specific task of social psychology to undertake their
empirical investigation and to develop a theory which would 
constitute a psycho-sociology of our culture. As such, it 
would not be, simply, a psychology of opinions and of
attitudes about objects that already exist but rather a 
social psychology concerned with the evolution and 
transformation of ways of understanding and the impact of 
these changes on social life. No other discipline examines 
these social phenomena as a whole and in the light of their 
specific characteristics. By considering social 
representations as phenomena, social psychology is able to 
elucidate those aspects of our culture which are least 
studied.
Such an endeavour requires methods of investigation and 
theory-building which are adapted to their object of enquiry. 
Any theory requires accurate and rigorous techniques but 
these 'are a function of the phenomena under consideration 
and the course of research' (Moscovici,1987, p.528). The
investigation of social representations, language,
communication, social interaction and all that is entailed 
therein requires methods of observation and detailed 
description of these complex phenomena (Moscovici,1984b). 
Only then are we in a position to build descriptive and
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explanatory theories that allow an accurate and clear
understanding of social representations
Only a careful description of social 
representations, of their structure and their 
evolution in various fields, will enable us to 
understand them and ... a valid explanation can only 
be derived from a comparative study of such 
descriptions.
(Moscovici,1984a,p.68)
The development of a theory should be based on adequate 
observations and on comparative studies that reveal 
regularities and that allow sensible conjectures to be made.
Moscovici is here reiterating Koch's comments on
psychology made in 1959
from the earliest days of the experimental pioneers 
man's stipulation that psychology be adequate to 
science outweighed his commitment that it be 
adequate to man.
(Koch,1959,p.784)
Rather than maintaining an overriding concern for methodology 
and making spurious demands for accuracy social psychologists 
should do justice to the complexities of social and cultural 
phenomena. In order to achieve this they must develop an 
adequate representation of human and social phenomena as well 
as the methods and research strategy appropriate to such a 
task.
For Moscovici, social psychology must not remain 
associated exclusively with its parent discipline of 
psychology, but must establish links with sociology and the 
other social sciences, including anthropology, economics, 
linguistics and history. These suggest alternative approaches 
to research and to theory-building, involving long-range 
studies that examine given phenomena or problems from a 
number of different perspectives, and that provide adequate 
descriptions on the basis of which theoretical breakthroughs 
and scientific discoveries become possible.
Moscovici's views concerning methodology and 
theory-building in social psychology are closely associated 
with his rejection of an objectivist ontology within this 
discipline. On more than one occasion he quotes Merleau-Ponty 
(1969) who suggests that remaining within an objectivist
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ontology restricts one's understanding of a chosen object of 
study, hampering research and limiting the 'growth of 
knowledge' to what we already know (Moscovici 1982,1987).
At this point it would seem appropriate to define, 
precisely, what is a 'social representation'. However, 
although I agree with G. Breakwell (1987), Billig (1987b) 
and others that conceptual clarification is required I do 
not believe that this will be provided by a brief and 
necessarily oversimplistic definition. Any statement 
concerning social representations can only be understood 
properly within the context of the theory as a whole. The 
perspective must be established and a system of related 
concepts must be developed, before a singular statement 
attempting to express the nature, function and process of 
social representations can be attempted. A definition of 
social representation will not be attempted until the next 
chapter, drawing both on the theory of social representations 
and on empirical research.
This chapter will be limited to an overview of the 
theory, as expressed in the writings of those directly 
concerned with social representations, focusing on the work 
of Moscovici. Although Moscovici's style of writing is often 
expansive, touching on a broad range of issues, it tends to 
give a nebulous impression of his general approach rather 
than a clear idea of any theoretical postulates or empirical 
concerns. Taken as a whole, his exposition of the theory of 
social representations contains a number of internal 
inconsistencies and points of confusion. Furthermore, he 
fails to elaborate on fundamental issues which, as yet, 
present unresolved difficulties. These include a 
specification of the nature of reality, the relationship 
between the individual and society, and the nature of the 
reified universe of science. This chapter draws together the 
ideas and postulates expressed in a selection of Moscovici's 
articles in order to give a clear presentation of the theory 
as it stands. However, no attempt will be made to discuss the 
various problems and inconsistencies within the theory 
itself. These issues are addressed in the following chapters, 
in which an attempt will be made to provide further
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explication and amplification of the theory of social 
representations. A series of footnotes, in the current 
chapter, identify some of the problems contained within the 
theory and indicate the chapters in which they are discussed 
more fully. (This method is often used in sociological and 
historical texts, and is adopted here both for the sake of 
brevity and in order to give a clear exposition of 
Moscovici's position).
In order to give a clear presentation it will be 
convenient to distinguish between three different aspects of 
the theory: the nature, the function and the processes of 
social representations. Separate sections will be devoted to 
each aspect. However, it should be understood that these 
aspects are inter-related and inter-dependent; the divisions 
are artificial and they are adopted only for the sake of 
clarity. The nature of social representations supports, and 
simultaneously is supported by, their function in social 
life. These functions, in their turn, are inseparable from 
the processes by which they evolve. A full understanding of 
the phenomenon of social representations can only be gained 
by an appreciation of all three aspects of the theory. 
Furthermore, Moscovici sets a number of boundary conditions 
to the domain in which the theory of social representations 
is applicable. In this respect Moscovici has made a start on 
the task suggested by Billig (1987b) of identifying what is 
not a social representation. Indeed it is the contention of 
the research reported in this thesis that some of these 
boundary conditions (especially that between science and 
common sense) are set rather arbitrarily. A full discussion 
of the theory's range of application, however, will be 
postponed until the following chapter.
1.2 THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Representations are social constructions that form an 
environment of thought which is both conventional and 
prescriptive. As social constructions they assume that humans 
are active perceivers, actively constructing the social 
reality in which they think, communicate and act. Their 
conventional and prescriptive nature ensues from the tendency 
to conceive social representations as autonomous entities
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that constitute our reality. Such a conceptualization
transcends both the distinction between subject and object
and between stimulus and response. This being the case, it is
essential to recognize the significance of the contents of
social representations as well as of their form. Finally,
they are dynamic structures that evolve and are transformed
through communication and through social interaction. These
different aspects of social representations and their
interdependence will be presented below in order to
illuminate the nature of social representations.
1.2.1 Social reality
The frequently adopted quotations from the writings of
Moscovici fail to characterize fully the social nature of
reality. Social representations, for example, are:
'theories' or 'branches of thought' in their own 
right, for the discovery and organisation of 
reality.
(Moscovici,1973,p xiii)
or
a system of values, ideas and practices.
(Moscovici,1973,p xiii)
and also
a set of concepts, statements and explanations 
originating in daily life in the course of inter­
individual communications.
(Moscovici and Hewstone,1983)
These statements can be understood properly only after a 
thorough explication and understanding of the nature of the 
reality in which we live, as conceived by the theory; that 
is, a social reality. Priority is given to the collective, 
social and cultural aspects of reality which exist in their 
own right. This requires some amplification.
Social representations are the constituents of our 
reality. >2< They form an environment of thought which 
simultaneously determines the reality we perceive/conceive 
and direct our responses to it. I have reservations in the 
use of the term 'determine', as this suggests that the social 
representation and the perception/conception of reality are 
two separate entities. They are not. This potential confusion 
may result from an error of translation from French to 
English which has important consequences for the
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understanding of the nature of social representations. The 
social representation is our reality. This involves two 
aspects: firstly, the relationship between stimulus and
response, and secondly, between subject and object.
Firstly, Moscovici states
that to form a representation of something is to 
apprehend stimulus and response at one and the same 
time. The response is not a reaction to the 
stimulus, but, up to a point, constitutes the origin 
of the stimulus.
(Moscovici,1973,p.xii)
Representations shape our perceptions and conceptions 
of an object. I see an object in a particular way only 
because I have a representation of that object. The 
representation, in this respect, is prior to the stimulus. 
Furthermore, a social object is represented in such a way as 
to permit or support any judgment, communication or action 
(Markova and Wilkie,1987). The representation is constructed 
through our interactions with the social and material world 
for the purpose of sustaining those interactions. In this 
respect there is no distinction between stimulus and 
response, and as such one cannot be said to be the cause of 
the other.
Secondly, there is no distinction between the perception
of the subject and the object which is perceived. That is, we
do not perceive an objective reality, rather we perceive a
socially constructed reality.
We are never provided with any information which has 
not been distorted by representations superimposed 
on objects and on persons.
(Moscovici,1984b,p .12)
To explain further, it is not the nature of the object that 
determines our construction of it but our relationship to 
that object; and these relations are social, being dependent 
on our social interactions and communications. This gives 
priority to intersubjective and social links rather than to 
links between the individual as an independent entity and the 
object. Social representations are created by and are 
dependent upon not only the subject, but also their relations 
with others and others' relations with the object. The object 
is understood through the processes of interaction with and
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communication about the object in a social context, that is, 
with other people. Thus representations are created and 
transformed through interactions and communication between 
individuals and groups concerning social objects, which, in 
turn, are determined by their representations (Di 
Giacomo,1980; Abric,1984; Codol,1984).
The social reality in which we live has all the force
and influence of the material world. Social objects and
social relations are just as real, if not more so, as
physical objects.
Through communication, individuals and groups give 
a physical reality to ideas and images
(Moscovici,1984a,p.53)
For example, the social representation of AIDS (Markova and
Wilkie, 1987) is just as powerful and influential in terms
of its related social interactions as objects in the physical
environment. Finally, in that social representations are
shared and strengthened by tradition they constitute a social
reality *sui generis'.
Social representations are * systems * of 
preconceptions, images and values which have their 
own cultural meaning and persist independently of 
individual experience.
(Moscovici,1982,p.122)
Social representations are therefore social in origin and 
refer to social objects; they constitute a reality which 
consists of an environment of thought as opposed to a world 
of objects. Thus reality is social through and through; we 
live in a thinking society and a social reality. >3<
1.2.2 The svmbolic nature of social representations
The significance of adopting the term 'symbolic' in 
preference to 'cognitive' when referring to systems of social 
representations further emphasizes the social nature of 
representations. Cognitive theories attempt to subsume the 
symbolic but the focus of analysis remains on the individual. 
Fundamental to the symbolic are the common meanings invested 
in verbal and non-verbal gestures as these are understood by 
members of a community. The symbolic cannot, therefore, be 
assimilated to the cognitive (Moscovici, 1982,p. 143, footnote) . 
Furthermore, their symbolic character not only distinguishes
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the social from the individual, but also the cultural from 
the physical and the historical from the static. The symbolic 
is supported and made possible by social norms and rules and 
by a common history. It refers to the social significance of 
socially constructed objects. An object is not perceived 
veridically, nor are events conceived as signs. Rather the 
object is both perceived and conceived in terms of a symbolic 
reality. The 'stimulus' and 'response' are links in a chain 
of symbols which express a code and a system of values. The 
distinction between image and reality is thus obliterated. 
This symbolic character of social representations emerges in 
the process of social interaction and communication and is 
predominantly influenced by language.>4< It is here that the 
cultural aspects of social representations are most obvious. 
And it is here that the emphasis on meaning and understanding 
are most apparent (Jodelet,1986).
For Moscovici, a representation has two facets: the
iconic and the symbolic. They lie somewhere between a percept 
and a concept. Percepts 'reproduce the world in a meaningful 
way' in teirms of images while concepts 'abstract meaning from 
the world' (Moscovici,1984b,p.17). Thus social 
representations are a mixture of conceptual and perceptual 
elements, of conceptions, images and perceptions.
An acknowledgement of the symbolic nature of social
representations with all its concomitants - social,
historical and cultural - implies that, as long as we are
studying common sense and everyday thought, it is not
possible to distinguish the form of representations from
their content. Contents make up the substance of our thoughts
and communications and the processes of perceiving and
learning cannot be separated from what is perceived or learnt
within a common culture;
the content not only offers a key to the concretely 
activated formal elements but... these formal 
elements can exert their influence only through this 
social content.
(Moscovici,1984a,p.947)
The content will vary between social groups, cultures and
historical epochs and it is not possible to separate the
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regularities in representations from the processes that 
create them (Jodelet,1984a).
1.2.3 The logic of social representations
Once it is accepted that social representations have 
a logic of their own, then anv system of logic is specific 
to its cultural context. It cannot be assumed that thought 
processes are general and invariant, that is, universal. 
Rather, as the content of a representation differs across 
cultures or changes over time, within the one culture, so 
does its form. The form and content of thinking are closely 
related to the form and content of communications, to 
discussion and agreements between people which are embedded 
in a cultural context. The manner of thinking, as well as 
what we think, depends on the cultural context.
The classic example of this is the law of non­
contradiction which is central to western logic yet of only 
peripheral importance in other cultures. In Western culture 
we tend to accept the law of non-contradiction as a universal 
principle of reasoning and of logic which is independent of 
time and space. It is reflected in the elaboration, 
structuring and expression of our social representations such 
that their contents comprise a unified and coherent system. 
But its influence does not arise from the formal processes of 
thinking; rather its influence derives from social and 
cultural factors which are specific to Western society. This 
is amply demonstrated by anthropological studies of 
non-western cultures in which the law of non-contradiction is 
not predominant. For example, Levy-Bruhl's (192 3) study of 
the Nuer revealed that twins are conceived as birds, but at 
the same time they are not birds. Similarly, Mary Douglas's 
(1975) essays on implicit meanings in Lele culture and 
Evans-Pritchard's work on Nuer religion (1940) and Azande 
witchcraft (1937) illustrate the affinity between culture and 
knowledge.
A comparable example that is more relevant in the 
present context refers to the content and form of cognitive 
and cognitive social psychology. Cognitive psychologists, 
for example Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) have studied 
extensively the errors and biases in reasoning and problem
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solving by adopting a normative model, based on the logic and 
rationality of science. Similarly, attribution theorists such 
as Kelley (1963) have frequently applied a scientific, 
statistical model (ANOVA - analysis of variance) to 
investigate the way in which people make causal attributions. 
But, according to Moscovici, it is inappropriate and 
misleading to apply the positivistic, scientific rules of 
thought to social, consensual knowledge, as the logic or form 
underlying these different contents are also different. The 
•psychological laws' are related to the contents of the 
social representations and hence, to their cultural and 
historical context.>5<
Thus, social representations form an environment of 
thought that constitutes a social and symbolic reality 
constructed by the activity of individuals and groups within 
a cultural and historical context. With this in mind, it is 
possible to understand the conventional and prescriptive 
nature of social representations.
1.2.4 The conventional and prescriptive nature of social
representations
Firstly, social representations 'conventionalize the
objects, persons and events we encounter' (Moscovici,1984b,
p.7). They act on any previously established social object,
or any new object entering into our awareness, constraining
them so that they 'fit' into the categories and systems of
relationships that we already possess (Moscovici, 1961) . Thus,
any object is understood in terms of a symbolic system, which
is conditioned by our social representations and hence by our
culture. Furthermore, we cannot escape from these conventions
of perception and conception.
Nobody's mind is free from the effects of the prior 
conditioning which is imposed by his 
representations, language and culture.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.8)
Secondly, social representations are prescriptive; 'they 
impose themselves upon us with an irresistible force' 
(Moscovici,1984b,p.8). We experience and understand the 
present only in terms of the past, in terms of tradition and 
culture. Our past experiences are active in the experience of
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the present. In many respects the past prevails over the 
present (Jodelet,1986 ; Milgram,1984; Markova and 
Wilkie,1987).
Social representations are thus fundamentally historical 
in nature. All the systems of perception and conception, of 
description and understanding, which circulate within a 
society, are linked to previous systems and they are 
reproduced by the continuity of human cultural and social 
life, and by the language and actions by which they are 
expressed.
1.2.5 The dynamic nature of social representations
As social representations circulate and diffuse 
throughout society their dynamic and plastic character 
becomes apparent. Not only do they communicate between 
themselves, but as they circulate and diffuse through society 
they merge, attract and repel each other, influencing the 
form and content of each other, changing in harmony with the 
course of social life >6<. As new representations emerge old 
ones are transformed or disappear, as do their concomitant 
social objects and relations. Our understanding, our 
perception and the meanings we give events, are continually 
reconstituted and reconstructed.
Thus, social representations are an integral part of 
the social construction of reality. They are at once 
determined by and determine the social processes of 
communication and interaction. They are at once conventional, 
prescriptive and dynamic, evolving and, hence, transforming 
our reality. They are an essentially historical, cultural and 
social phenomena.
1.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
The functions of social representations, inevitably, 
have been indicated in the previous section. However, being 
an important aspect of the theory, it is pertinent to give 
them further consideration.
1.3.1 We have already seen how social representations 
construct and shape reality, determining the meaning or 
significance of social objects and events. Social 
representations thus constitute our reality which is 
fundamentally symbolic and meaningful. As such, they allow
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objects and events to be interpreted and understood. An event 
or object is understood in relation to the whole, ie. to its 
context, as defined by the social representations. Their 
description, classification and explanations are all 
dependent on the social representation which embodies them. 
Social representations contain and define the experience of 
reality, determining its boundaries, its significance and 
its relationships.
In this way reality is both continuous and stable. The 
ambiguity and diversity of life is reduced and the meanings 
of actions are made unequivocal. Social representations 
achieve this by indicating where to find the effects and how 
to choose the causes; by indicating what must be explained 
and what constitutes an explanation; and by setting an event 
in the context of a system of relations to other events. Thus 
they
establish an order which will enable individuals to 
orientate themselves in their material and social 
world and to master it.
(Moscovici,1973,p.xiii)
1.3.2 Social representations enable communication and social
interaction to take place. It is only through shared social
representations and the conventional meanings of language and
action that individuals and groups can communicate with each
other. The social representations provide
a code for social exchange and a code for naming and 
classifying unambiguously the various aspects of 
their world and their individual and group history.
(Moscovici,1973,p.xiii)
The conventional meanings and contents of communications are 
obviously closely associated with language, which provides 
the medium for verbal communication.
Similarly, social representations form the environment 
in which we interact with each other. They imbue our gestures 
with meaning and hence facilitate the 'interpretation' of 
human actions. When individuals or groups share the same 
representations, actions are understood in the same way. The 
action has the same significance or meaning for both the 
actor and the perceiver, giving rise to an exchange of 
gestures which is coordinated. Thus the representation both
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guides the social action of an individual or group and allows 
the actions of others to be understood. However, where 
representations are not shared, for example, between the 
members of two different cultures, the misinterpretation of 
actions is likely to prevail.
It should be noted that the term * interpretation*, as 
used here, does not imply a two-stage process, first 
receiving information or perceiving the action, and then 
giving it a meaning. Interpretation is immediate. The action 
is perceived as meaningful and significant. The action is a 
significant gesture and cannot be understood in any other 
way. This is necessarily so as the social representation 
constitutes our reality.
We can see that there is a two-way influence between
social representations and both communication and social
interaction. On the one hand social representations originate
in communication and social interaction. They evolve in order
to support the purposes and interests of individuals and
groups, orientated towards communication, understanding and
control. Moscovici has actually defined social
representations as
the elaborating of a social object by the community 
for the purpose of behaving and communicating.
(Moscovici,1963,from 
Breakwell,1987,p.4)
On the other hand social representations form the environment 
in which communication and interaction occur. Once the 
historical and dynamic nature of social life is acknowledged 
it is essential to recognize and to understand this two way 
process. >7<
1.3.3 Having explained the relationship between social 
representations and both communication and social 
interaction, it can be seen that social representations also 
function in the demarcation and consolidation of groups (Di 
Giacomo,1980; Doise,1984). Representations which are shared 
by a number of associated individuals provide a stock of 
images and ideas which are taken for granted and mutually 
accepted. The shared meanings of objects and events provide 
a consensual environment of thought for communication and
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social interaction. They serve to consolidate and to maintain 
the group, as well as to provide an identity for the group 
members. Furthermore, it is through our shared reality that 
we form binding relations with others. The consensual 
representation of social objects draws the individual into 
the cultural traditions of the group. As Jodelet 
(1984b,p.372) has expressed, social representations are 
rooted *in the life of groups'.
1.3.4 The role of social representations in relation to 
groups entails a further function of social representations; 
the formation of social identities. Social representations 
form the environment in which we perceive, communicate and 
interact. Our gestures and actions are guided by, and are 
only meaningful in terms of, social representations. Our 
representations shape our relations with others and so 
structure the situation that it conforms to our expectations. 
Our behaviour is constrained and directed by the 
classifications and social representations employed by others 
and by ourselves. The situation is thus created and 
constructed in accordance with our representations. In that 
our identities are drawn from our relations with others the 
influence of social representations is apparent. Our 
identities are social, not only because they are active in 
our relations with others, but also because they originate in 
our relations with others (Duveen and Lloyd,1987) >8<.
1.3.5 Social representations are important in regard to 
socialisation. Infants interact with their parents who, 
themselves, embody the social representations derived from 
their early and adult experiences, from their conversations, 
and their social interactions. The parents interact with the 
infant in terms of these social representations, indicating 
the symbolic significance of the infants' various behaviours. 
Thus it is the meanings or symbolic significance of 
behaviours which are internalised by the infant. They become 
an integral part of the individual and of their interactions 
with others (Duveen and Lloyd,1987). Communications, through 
various forms of social interaction, and the meanings which 
they express, are inter-personal before they are internalized 
to become intra-personal. The individual is absorbed into
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society and into the collective environment of thoughts. This 
applies to the socialisation of an individual or of a group 
moving into a new environment as much as to the socialization 
of infants.
Every member of a group, by birth or otherwise, has 
the group's representation impressed on him or her.
In this way representations infiltrate to the core 
of the individual's personality.
(Moscovici and Hewstone,1983,p.118)
1.3.6 I have left until last what Moscovici sees as the most
important function of social representations; that is, to
make the unfamiliar familiar.
the purpose of all representations is to make 
something unfamiliar or unfamiliarity itself, 
familiar.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.24)
We have seen how social representations order and stabilise 
our social reality and how communication and social 
interactions are directed and understood through them. 
Objects, individuals and events are perceived and understood 
in relation to our social representations. This is as true 
for those events with which we are familiar as it is for 
those events which seem strange (Jodelet,1986).
Moscovici characterises the unfamiliar as that which is 
threatening due to its discontinuity with the past and its 
meaninglessness in terms of our current representations. This 
would occur, for example, when conventions disappear, when 
distinctions between the abstract and the concrete become 
blurred, or when an atypical behaviour prevents a normal 
continuation of social interaction. That is, something is 
unfamiliar when it does not conform to our expectations, 
resulting in a sense of incompleteness or randomness. This 
may occur when we enter a new culture or group, or when we 
are presented with a new object, event or concept. Moscovici 
suggests that the unfamiliar is disturbing because it is
at once there without being there; perceived without 
being perceived.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.25) >9<
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We are aware of unfamiliar objects, events or concepts, only 
in as far as they are visible, similar and accessible but 
they are unfamiliar to the degree in which they are 
invisible, different and inaccessible. What is unfamiliar 
worries, threatens and preoccupies us as it breaks our sense 
of continuity and stability and it also acts as a barrier to 
mutual understanding.>10<
Representation, or, in this case, re-presentation, 
transfers that which is unfamiliar to the familiar. This is 
achieved
by separating normally linked concepts and 
perceptions and setting them in a context where the 
unusual becomes usual.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.26)
The example used by Moscovici is drawn from his study of 
psychoanalysis in France (1961) . Within the social 
representation of medicine and of medical treatment the 
psychoanalyst does not fulfil our expectations and is thus 
unfamiliar. He or she does not prescribe drugs or tell us 
what to do, as would an "ordinary" doctor. Rather, the client 
is expected to do most of the talking and to take an active 
part in the therapeutic treatment. As such the psychoanalyst 
is unfamiliar. However, some people, such as Catholics, 
compared psychoanalysis to the confessional and the 
psychoanalyst to the priest. In this way, the psychoanalyst 
is made usual and familiar. The unfamiliar becomes meaningful 
and significant in our social reality and in our relations 
with others.
Moreover, what is central to the dynamics of social 
representations is that, as the unfamiliar is absorbed into 
the social representations, it alters the structure of the 
relationships and the content of that representation. So 
that, for example, confession becomes a form of 
psychoanalysis. The social significance of confession is thus 
altered and merged with that of psychoanalysis, 
simultaneously affecting associated values and feelings.
The receiving representation will be one that is shared 
by a given group, with its common stock of images, ideas and 
language. It is the representation into which the unfamiliar
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is assimilated, due to some initial association. The content 
of the receiving representation determines the direction and 
the means by which the group comes to terms with the 
unfamiliar. This occurs through the processes of social 
interaction and communication, that is, the unfamiliar 
becomes familiar through its use in conversation, and 
eventually in social interaction, between members of the 
group. In this way its relation to the receiving social 
representation become defined and stabilised and thus it 
becomes part of our social reality.
To summarise, social representations both structure and 
order our reality, giving it meaning and coherence. They form 
the environment in which we communicate and coordinate social 
interaction. Hence they are fundamental to the identity and 
functioning of groups, to the development and maintenance of 
our social identities and they are central to the processes 
of socialisation. Moreover, they allow the unfamiliar to 
become familiar, for new objects and events to be integrated 
into our social realities.
1.4 THE PROCESSES OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Moscovici describes two processes by which the unfamiliar 
become familiar. These are anchoring and objectification. 
Both processes will be described in detail but by way of 
introduction it can be said that anchoring situates strange 
objects in the context of ordinary categories and images, 
that is, into a familiar context. Objectification, on the 
other hand, transforms unfamiliar and abstract ideas into 
something concrete, ie. a concept is transformed into a 
social object. Anchoring makes the unfamiliar object 
meaningful and objectification makes the intangible into 
something real and tangible. Both these processes are closely 
linked to memory and to cultural knowledge and this 
necessitates the inclusion of the historical aspect of social 
representations.
1.4.1 Anchoring
Within the theory of social representations the process 
of anchoring is essential. Firstly, all meaningful 
perceptions and ideas are necessarily anchored in a social 
representation.
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It excludes the idea of thought or perception which 
is without anchor. Every system of classification 
and of the relations between systems presupposes a 
specific position, a point of view based on 
consensus.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.36)
This is another way of saying that social representations 
constitute our reality. We can have no perception or idea 
which is not anchored in a social representation.
Secondly, anchoring gives an object meaning, allows 
events to be interpreted and understood in terms of what is 
already familiar. Thus the unfamiliar is re-presented and 
made familiar, at once transforming the newly integrated 
object and the pattern of relations into which it is 
assimilated.
In this way, pre-existing representations are 
somewhat modified and those things about to be 
re-presented are modified even more, so that they 
acquire a new existence.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.67)
The process of anchoring involves two inextricably
linked subprocesses; classification and naming. Those objects
for which there is neither a category nor a name, although we
have an awareness of them, remain meaningless and
incommunicable. It cannot be described, either to ourselves
or to others, nor can it be evaluated or judged. It is,
therefore, unable to enter into our discourse or to play any
significant part in our interactions. In such respects it is
not part of our social reality.
Indeed, that which is anonymous, unnamable, cannot 
become a communicable image or be readily linked to 
other images.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.34)
In so far as our representations are shared the individual * s 
awareness of the unfamiliar will also be shared. Only once 
the unfamiliar is classified and named does it gain meaning 
and value and enter into the realm of our social relations.
Classification involves comparing the unfamiliar object 
to prototypes that represent a given class and the former is 
defined by its similarity to the latter. Once it is 
classified those features which coincide with the prototypes 
are emphasized. The process of anchoring, of making the
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unfamiliar familiar thus gives precedence to memory, to the
features of a prototype held within a social representation.
It is the social representation, rather than the object
itself, which is predominant. The response is thus prior to
the stimulus; we do not cognise the object, rather we
recognise it. In this way classifying something
simultaneously constrains it. The classification stipulates
which sets of behaviour and rules of action are permissible
in relation to other members of the class. By classifying an
individual, for example,
we confine him to a set of linguistic, spatial and 
behavioural constraints and to certain habits.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.31)
And, in so far as an object is reactive, the classification 
which has been employed will influence it by specifying 
certain demands that relate to our expectations. In this way 
the unfamiliar object itself may actually become more 
familiar.
Classification occurs in one of two ways, either by
particularisation or by generalisation. If we wish to
emphasise the similarity or the typicality of the objects we
will generalise and reduce the differences between the
unfamiliar object and the prototype. If we wish to emphasise
the difference or the abnormality we will particularise the
characteristics of the unfamiliar object. In this way a
value, opinion or social attitude is always involved, such
that we define the unfamiliar object as either convergent
with or divergent from the norm or prototype within which the
object is classified. Thus it is the social representation
involved in the classification and the value which is
attributed to the unfamiliar object, rather than the
similarities and differences per se, that are influential.
To categorise someone or something amounts to 
choosing a paradigm from those stored in memory and 
establishing a positive or negative relation with it
(Moscovici,1984b,p.31)
Once classified, the object is subsequently named. 
Naming places the classified object in a complex system of
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related words; it is given an identity in as far as a 
consensus is established, which is communicable. Naming, 
giving an object a verbal label *precipitates' the object 
such that there are three consequences. Firstly, once named, 
the object can be described and acquires characteristics in 
accordance with the relations the name has with other words. 
Secondly, the named object becomes distinct from other 
objects through its designated characteristics and 
tendencies. Thirdly, the object becomes conventional for 
those who adopt and employ the same name. In this way 
language structures the relations designated to an object. 
Naming not only provides a label by which the object can be 
tagged but also defines its set of relations with other 
objects and events in accordance with the relation the name 
has with other linguistic categories.
By classifying and naming objects within the context of
prevalent social representations the unfamiliar becomes
familiar, its identification specifying its characteristics
and its relations to other objects >1K.
1.4.2 Objectification
The second process by which the unfamiliar is made
familiar is through objectification. By objectification
the unfamiliar and unperceived in one generation 
becomes familiar and obvious in the next.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.37)
Abstract conceptions are transformed into and replaced 
by concrete images or perceptions >12<. We assume that words 
expressing a concept do not refer to nothing. In the words of 
Moscovici, we are 'under a constant compulsion' to give them 
equivalent concrete meanings, to refer them to specific 
objects. Also, we imagine and create non-verbal equivalents 
for the concepts. However, not all concepts can be 
objectified. There are limits to our imagination, constrained 
as it is by the social representations that we already 
possess, and the taboos these entail. Only those concepts 
which can merge with a complex of images or the 'figurative 
nucleus' of a social representation, can be objectified.
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Furthermore, the process of objectification is 
particular to modern societies with a scientific culture. In 
such societies, where science constitues a major authority, 
we have come to think and represent things in terms of 
quantifiable, measurable objects. Representations of abstract 
concepts are transformed into representations of an object. 
For example, the concept of psychoanalysis, such as the 
unconscious and the conscious are merged with our social 
representations of the body. The processes of the mind are 
transformed into the organs of the psychic system. In this 
way, the psychological is merged and assimilated into the 
biological and the concepts of the unconscious and the 
conscious are transformed into objects. Thus attributes or 
relationships are turned into things. This process is also 
evidenced in the transformations of language, by which they 
are expressed. Verbs, adverbs and adjectives, which refer to 
relationships or processes are transformed into nouns. What 
was once a concept is transformed into an object.
It is essential to realise that objectification is an 
active process. By objectifying a process, relationship or 
concept we create objects and invest them with certain 
properties.
Objectification saturates the idea of unfamiliarity 
with reality, turns it into the very essence of 
reality.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.38)
Once transfiguration from a concept to an image has 
taken place, the image is indistinguishable from reality. It 
no longer has the status of a sign but becomes a part of our 
symbolic reality. It acquires an almost physical, independent 
existence which is perceived as having efficacy, something 
which can cause effects. Thus, by the process of 
objectification we create social objects and we objectify 
abstract concepts precisely in order to forget that they are 
a product of our own activity. We perceive our own creations 
but, rather than being a product of our imagination, the 
object becomes something in reality. For example, returning 
to the transformation of language and the tendency to turn 
verbs into nouns we can see that words
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do not merely represent things, but create them and 
invest them with their own properties.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.42)
Several points can be made with respect to the 
relationship between the processes and the nature of social 
representations. It can be seen that anchoring and 
objectification entail the historical and prescriptive nature 
of representations. They are historical in that what is 
unfamiliar is anchored and objectified in terms of what is 
already familiar. They are prescriptive in that they 
constrain those characteristics of the unfamiliar which are 
identifiable, meaningful and employed in social interaction. 
They are also conventional in that individuals share 
representations which are taken as givens and are mutually 
accepted.
Furthermore, they entail the social aspects of the
nature of social representations. Anchoring and
objectification are the processes by which the unfamiliar is
transformed into the familiar, by which social
representations are generated and by which reality is
socially constructed. After all, that reality is a social
construction and that social psychology must take account of
the active, meaning-constructing nature of humans is the
major thesis of the theory of social representations. These
processes do not take place in the minds of individuals;
representations are not the creations of individuals in
isolation. Rather, as we have said before, individuals and
groups create representations, through the processes of
anchoring and objectification, in the course of communication
and social interaction. It is through these social processes
that we establish our physical and social reality.
Thinking is done out loud. It becomes a noisy, 
public activity.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.21)
Finally, the very process of transforming the unfamiliar 
into the familiar underscores the dynamic nature of social 
representations. New concepts and objects are assimilated 
into our social representations, simultaneously transforming 
both the structure and the content of the social
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representations.
In conclusion, the nature and functions of social 
representations support and are supported by the processes 
of anchoring and objectification. Taken as a whole, Moscovici 
has not only established the phenomenon of social 
representations as an object of study in psychology, but he 
has also elaborated the outlines for a theory of social 
representations. Concern extends beyond the description of 
a phenomenon to an investigation of its functions in social 
life and the processes by which it is generated and 
sustained. The theory addresses both the description and the 
explanation of the psycho-sociology of knowledge.
1.5 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Although 1 have suggested that the theory of social 
representations constitutes a psycho-sociology of knowledge, 
Moscovici sets a number of boundary conditions to its realm 
of application. The theory of social representations is 
explicitly designed to account for the diffusion of 
scientific knowledge into common-sense understandings which 
are prevalent in modern society. The demarcation of these 
boundaries involves three related issues: the distinction 
between the reified and the consensual universes, the 
relationship between science and common-sense and the 
differing styles of explanation employed in each universe. It 
will be seen that the reified universe of science and the 
consensual universe of common-sense are characterized by 
distinctive forms of understanding. This distinction 
underlies Moscovici's break with conventional social 
psychology which has inappropriately applied scientific 
thinking in an attempt to describe and to explain everyday 
understanding. The theory of social representations provides 
an alternative approach which accounts for the cultural and 
historical nature of social knowledge.
1.5.1 The reified universe
In the reified universe the world is transformed into 
a system of solid, basic, unvarying entities, which are 
indifferent to individuality and lack identity 
(Moscovici,1984b,p.20). That is, the world consists of 
discrete objects, such as persons, ideas and events,
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independent of individuals' interpretations. The environment 
is indifferent and autonomous from us, independent of human 
collective life. The reified universe is thus a system of 
independent entities devoid of human meaning. In these 
respects, mind is no more than a reaction to reality and the 
objects of the world shape our thought. Within this universe 
we are bounded by a pre-established organisation which is 
generally accepted, along with its rules and regulations. 
Within the organisation individuals are unequal, constrained 
by their prescriptive rights and duties.
In the reified universe ambiguities are overcome by 
processing information. This is done without the involvement 
of individuals and is directed by the organisational 
structure. Thinking within this universe is rational and 
reflective. The precise and objective collection of data 
leads to the negation or confirmation of the conclusions 
which have been derived through logical reasoning. This 
results in a precise and totally unambiguous universe of 
facts, which are valid for all people, in all places and at 
all times.
Within the reified universe the aim is to establish 
a chart of the forces, objects and events which are 
independent of our desires and outside of our 
awareness and to which we must react impartially and 
submissively.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.22)
By rational thinking and the information processing of
objective data, values are concealed and the creation of the
reified universe is ignored. By these means the reified
universe is one of rigour, predictability and control.
1.5.2 The consensual universe
By contrast, in the consensual universe,
society is a visible, continuous creation, permeated 
with meaning and purpose
(Moscovici,1984b,p.20).
The consensual universe is a source of meaning and the 
exchanges and interactions within it are purposive. Humans 
are an integral part of this universe. Mind shapes reality 
and acts upon it. It is bounded by agreements and
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consensus characterised by reciprocal understanding. The
world consists of social objects; these emerge in
conversation and result in a consensual symbolic
understanding of objects and events. Within this universe
individuals are equal and free to acquire any competence
required by the circumstances. The world is ambiguous and
remains so, yet, through conversation, conventions and mutual
acceptance are established. These are first and foremost
influenced by prior beliefs or theories and the interests and
purposes of the group. The consensual universe
restores collective awareness and gives it shape, 
explaining objects and events so that they become 
accessible to everyone and coincide with our 
immediate interests.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.22)
It provides a universe in which we can converse, interact, 
understand and explain.
1.5.3 Science and social representations
It is probably obvious, by now, that the reified 
universe is that of science and the consensual universe is 
that of social representations. The former only exists in 
professional and disciplined spheres and is reflective and 
precise. The latter is associated with everyday life and is 
both spontaneous and creative. It is the outcome of our 
communications and is adapted to our social interactions. It 
both emerges out of and sustains these communications and 
actions.
The world of science is dominated by the use of concepts
and signs. Its validity lies in empirical observation of
discrete entities which function under a set of rules,
independent of society and individuals.
The legalistic truth of science, ...keeps asking for 
proof and, replications and... has more confidence 
in rules than in people.
(Moscovici,1987,p.518) >13<
The world of social representations, on the other hand, is 
a conventional system of symbolic and meaningful objects and 
events and is based on consensual validity.
49
as long as they are shared and circulate, social 
representations have a fiduciary truth value which 
manifests itself in terms both of information 
content and of judgements.
(Moscovici,1987,p.518)
These two universes, the reified and the consensual, the 
world of science and the world of common sense, form two 
distinct types of reality, each with its own logic, limits 
and attributes (Moscovici and Hewstone,1983). They have 
different forms of thinking and a different knowledge of the 
world which require different modes of examination.
1.5.4 Causality and explanation
It has already been said that the reified and 
consensual universes have their own distinctive logic. This 
is most clearly seen in the forms of causality associated 
with each universe and which give rise to such different 
forms of explanation. In the reified universe the effect is 
explained retrospectively by attributing a cause. This I 
shall term 'scientific causality*. This is achieved by 
objective collection of data concerning the behaviour of 
independent entities which are found to co-vary. The 
direction of causality is determined by the sequence of 
events: that is the cause always precedes the effect. In
order to establish causality certain rules must be followed. 
These include non-involvement by observers, repetition of 
correlations and independence from authority and tradition. 
By keeping to these rules the data may be collected and 
processed impartially so that specific effects can be 
associated with specific causes. Scientific causality is, in 
this way, divested of the intentionality and responsibility 
associated with conversation, social interactions and other 
phenomena of the social world. It provides an objective 
causal analysis of events in the world, independent of 
social, cultural and historical phenomena.
The causality associated with the consensual universe 
is more complex, and exists in two forms. These Moscovici 
has termed primary causality, which infers causes, and 
secondary causality, which attributes causes. Both however 
are dependent on our social representations and hence the 
social, cultural and historical context in which they are
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made. For this reason, I shall refer to these as 'social 
causality' . Secondary causality is very similar to scientific 
causality in that effects are explained retrospectively by 
attributing a cause. However, it is an efficient causality 
dependent on our education, language and scientific view. For 
primary causality the situation is rather different. In order 
to explain the sequence of events we infer the intentions or 
the purposes of others. Intentions give rise to certain 
behaviours which are the means to an end. In this way primary 
causality is prospective or teleological.
Both forms of social causality are foremostly dependent
on our social representations. We perceive the events and
designate effects and causes in accordance with our social
representations. Any explanation depends primarily on the
ideas we have of reality which, in turn, is constituted by
our social representations, not only by determining when an
explanation is required but also the form and the content of
that explanation. It is our social representations which
indicate where to find the effects and where to 
choose the causes; what must be explained and what 
explains
(Moscovici and Hewstone,1983,p.11)
1.5.5 Social representations in modern societv
Social representations 'are those of our current 
society' (Moscovici,1984b,p.18); for Moscovici they are a 
'specifically modern social phenomenon ' (Moscovici,1984a, 
p.952-3). Modern society is characterized by a heterogeneity 
of institutions, religions, ideologies, sub-cultures etc. and 
an astounding proliferation of original conceptual systems 
and images, through the development of the sciences. These 
are disseminated throughout society by various and 
increasingly efficient means of communication including the 
mass media, popular books, popular discourse, films, 
television etc. The heterogeneity of society, the development 
of new understanding and the means of communication which 
characterize our modern society, give rise to peculiarly 
dynamic systems of knowledge; that is, to social 
representations. Moscovici, (1982,1984b) even suggests that 
modern society may be remembered as the 'era of
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representations'. This can be contrasted to the more static 
systems of knowledge, found in primitive societies which are 
characterized by their stability and homogeneity. In such 
societies the systems of knowledge are coercive and 
immutable, they not only determine reality but also maintain 
a stable, unchanging reality. The phenomenon of social 
representations is thus a particular mode of understanding 
and communicating which only emerges in modern society. It 
has taken the place of the 'myths' and so-called 
'common-sense' of more traditional societies 
(Moscovici,1984a).
Moscovici conceives social psychology as an anthropology 
of modern culture, a science devoted to the study of thoughts 
and beliefs in the society of our times (Moscovici,1987). 
There are many important components of culture which were 
identified in the formative years of psychology. Wundt 
identified these as language, religion, customs, myths, magic 
and cognate phenomena in his Voelker psychologie (1900-20). 
These cultural phenomena were also emphasized by Durkheim 
when he developed the notion of collective representations. 
Farr (1987b) recognizes the original contribution Moscovici 
has made by including "science" as one of the most 
influential cultural phenomena in modern times.
This forms a point of departure for the theory of social 
representations which is specifically concerned with the 
relationship between scientific knowledge and common-sense 
understanding. Whereas Durkheim was concerned with a full 
range of 'mental formations', practices of thought with their 
own rules taught by a certain discipline and communicated by 
a specific media (Moscovici,1987) , Moscovici is only 
concerned with those 'mental formations' which are associated 
with the diffusion of science into the wider society. The 
reason for this focus becomes apparent by examining the 
changing relationship between science and common sense, as 
conceived by Moscovici (Moscovici and Hewstone,1983 ; 
Moscovici,1984b).
In the past, it can be argued that the dominant 
direction of influence was from common sense to science. 
Common sense comprised the images, mental connections and
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metaphors which were used to talk about and to understand 
events in everyday life. It was a corpus of knowledge which 
arose spontaneously in the course of ordinary communication 
and action, constituting the shared traditions which are 
stored in the language of a society and in the minds of its 
members. This consensual knowledge provided the materials 
which the sciences refined, distilling out contradictions 
and ordering common sense into coherent systems.
However, with the proliferation of the sciences, and
the construction of reified universes, this is no longer the
dominant direction of influence. The sciences of physics,
chemistry, biology, astronomy, etc. as well as the human
sciences such as sociology, anthropology, psychology and
economics, continually produce new theories, information and
events within the reified universe. They provide a stream of
new information which directly contradicts and upsets the
consensual universe or opens up new spheres of knowledge
which neither correspond to nor link up with present social
representations.
the function of present-day science is not to start 
from common sense, but to break with it and upset it 
totally.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.28)
The products of science then diffuse into society 
destroying traditional ideas and understandings. The 
acquisition of scientific knowledge is motivated by *a desire 
to consume, digest and share science', by a curiosity about
how things work, the need to give meaning to one's life and
to attain a competence equal to that of society. The
unfamiliar products of science, its theories, abstract 
concepts, inventions and discoveries diffuse into society 
through communication channels which characterize modern 
society. The mass media, newspapers, specialist magazines, 
and programmes on television flood the consensual universe 
with the products of science. The revolution in 
communications has allowed the diffusion of images, notions 
and vocabularies created by the sciences.
However, this alone is not sufficient for the
dissemination of scientific knowledge through society.
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People's common-sense understanding of scientific theories 
and concepts is distinct from scientific knowledge in the 
reified universe. As the abstract concepts of science diffuse 
into society they are transformed into social objects, 
involved with meaning and symbolic significance. This is 
achieved, as described, by the process of anchoring and 
objectification, without which the reified universe remains, 
to some extent, unreal and meaningless. As these 
transformations occur the scientific concepts become detached 
from their origin in the reified universe and from the 
methods of proof that prevail in that universe. This work is 
largely done by those who specialize in spreading scientific 
knowledge, transforming the unfamiliar into the familiar, 
such that the lay men and lay women, who, as amateur 
scientists (Moscovici and Hewstone,1983), may consume and 
digest the fruits of science.
In this way, links are forged between the purely
abstract sciences and the concrete activities of daily life.
The lay person, as an amateur scientist, possesses a new
common sense, one which has been re-constituted and filled
with images and meanings. This new common-sense constitutes
a mode of understanding and communicating which has
transformed the scientific theories into a shared reality.
They fill our minds and conversations, determining our world
view and our interactions with the physical and social
environment.
Common sense is now 'science made common'
(Moscovici,1984b,p.29).
As a consequence,our ideologies, on a grand scale, 
and our so-called common sense, on a lesser scale, 
are full of ideas, images, words and rules drawn 
from the fields of physics, medicine, psychology, 
economics and so on.
(Moscovici and Hewstone,1983,p.101)
The transformation of scientific knowledge is a 
fundamental aspect of today's common sense and the theory of 
social representations is exclusively concerned with the 
origins and development of its contents, the associated forms 
of communication and its influence on everyday life >14<.
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From the inception, the notion of social 
representations was conceived in order to study how 
the game of science becomes part of the game of 
common sense.
(Moscovici and Hewstone,1983,p.101)
Thus the purpose of social representations is in direct 
opposition to science. Whereas science aims to make the 
familiar unfamiliar social representation re-presents the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. This results in an ever 
changing, dynamic consensual universe as social 
representations are transformed and reconstituted through 
the anchoring and objectfication of scientific information.
Social representations refer to the ideas and images 
originating in the sciences and transformed into the 
consensual universe. These include social representations of 
the universe, the human body, (Jodelet,1984a), health and 
illness (Herzlich,1973), economic activities (Emler and 
Dickenson,1985) etc. which diffuse and circulate throughout 
society and constitute our social reality. Perhaps the prime 
example is Moscovici's original study on the diffusion of 
psychoanalysis in French society (1961). This investigated 
how a scientific theory is disseminated through society and 
transformed into consensual understandings. Moscovici 
describes how the abstract concepts of the scientific theory 
such as neurosis or Oedipus complex are objectified and 
employed in everyday understandings and interactions. He also 
gives the examples of Charisma, the 'split brain* and the 
double helix (Moscovici,1984a), all of which have undergone 
a similar metamorphosis, becoming an integral part of the 
mental and social life within certain sections of society.
It can be seen that science generates social 
representations; they produce the unfamiliar systems of 
concepts and images, which provide the impetus for the 
creation and transformation of social representations. Thus 
social representations are a phenomenon peculiar to modern 
society, consisting of those beliefs which originate in the 
sciences and diffuse through society by particular forms of 
communication.
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FOOTNOTES
>1< p.23 'Science' is used here in the broad sense to include the social sciences as well as the 
natural sciences. However, Moscovici's notion of the reified universe appears to apply to the natural 
sciences only. This confusion is discussed in 5.1.
>2< p.29 In this respect, social representations are as 'coercive' in their nature as Durkheim's 
'social facts'. Such a bold conjecture raises problems, both for the dynamic nature of social 
representations (see Section 4.1) and for the nature of the reified universe (see Chapter 6).
>3< p.31 Although the notion of social reality clearly opposes a positive empiricist definition of 
reality, the definition of social reality remains unclear. This is elaborated in Section 4.2.
>4< p.32 The symbolic nature of reality is expressed more clearly in the writings of Mead and 
Vygotsky. Section 4.2 draws on their work to illuminate this aspect of the theory of social 
representations.
>5< p.34 These contentions reflect the debate between realism and relativism which is elaborated in 
Chapters 3 and 5.
>6< p.35 I do not agree with the idea that social representations are autonomous, communicating 
between themselves independently from individuals. Their dynamic nature is dependent, not only on the 
social interactions between individuals but also the thoughts of individuals. For example, individuals 
such as Copernicus, Einstein and Darwin have been the instigators of some of the most dramatic changes 
in common-sense knowledge. The nature of the individual, and the role he or she plays in the dynamics 
of social representations, are discussed in Chapter 4.
>7< p.37 Both communication and social interaction are rather nebulous terms within the theory of 
social representations. Furthermore, the two-way influence between the structure and content of 
social representations on the one hand and the role of communication and social interaction on the 
other is less than clearly explicated. I return to these issues at various points in the thesis.
>8< p.38 The interdependence between social representations, social identities and groups is discussed 
in Chapter 11.
>9< p.39 Such a statement epitomizes the problem of defining the unfamiliar within a theory which 
postulates that social representations constitute a consensual reality. Furthermore, the unfamiliar 
forms an essential component in the transformation of social repreentations. Chapter 4 deals with 
this problem at some length.
>10< p.40 Although Moscovici suggests that it is the unfamiliar, per se, which is threatening , the 
familiar made unfamiliar can be equally disturbing. This is precisely the role that Moscivici 
allocates to science in modern society, transforming those things which are familiar within 
common-sense understandings into something unfamiliar.
>11< p.44 Moscovici's notion of anchoring is very similar to the Piagetian mechanism of assimilation. 
However, it does not account for the accommodation of the receiving representation to the unfamiliar 
object or event. These ideas are developed in Chapter 4.
>12< p.44 The meaning of objectify is very similar, if not identical, to reify. However, to adopt 
this term would be open to confusion with the 'reified' universe of science.
>13< p.49 By employing the term 'legalistic truth' with reference to science, Moscovici poses more 
questions than he resolves. Presumably this choice is based on the fact that the legal system 
constitutes a formal set of rules. However, on closer inspection it would appear that this system of 
rules is more akin to the consensual universe. Firstly, the legal system provides guidelines and 
constraints for social action. Secondly, it consists of a consensus, which is based on precedents and 
which is founded in tradition. Furthermore, the distinction between the reified and consensual 
universe is not as precise as Moscovici suggests. This will be expanded upon in Chapter 5.
>14< p.54 With respect to the nature and functions of social representations it is difficult to see 
how they can be particular to the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense. These boundary 
conditions to the domain of social representations are challenged in Section 2.4 and Chapter 5.
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TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
2.1 THE SEARCH FOR DEFINITION
2.2 REPRESENTATION
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2.3.2 Representations in interpersonal interactions
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2.3.3.1. Experimental studies
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interaction
2.3.4.1 The socialization of children
2.3.4.2 Experimental studies
2.3.4.3 Intergroup relations
2.3.4.4 Field studies
2.3.4.5 Summary
2.3.5 Representations and social reality
2.4 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY REVISITED
2.4.1 The object of research
2.4.2 Innovation and traditions
2.4.3 Media of communication
2.4.4 Processes of transformation
2.5 NOT A CONCLUSION
2.1 THE SEARCH FOR DEFINITION
The previous chapter goes some way towards explicating 
the theory with regard to the nature, functions and processes 
of social representations and the domain to which they are 
applicable. The present chapter examines the diverse body of 
research on social representations and some of the related 
theoretical and methodological critiques, in order to develop 
a comprehensive, yet coherent, definition of social 
representations.
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Social representation theorists have been accused of 
failing to provide an adequate definition of their central 
concept, that is, of social representations. For example. 
Potter and Litton (1985) have suggested that the lack of a 
precise definition and the concept's current state of 
vagueness has given rise to both theoretical and 
methodological problems. This is further developed by 
McKinlay and Potter (1987) who suggest that the problems 
associated with empirically identifying a social 
representation and testing the hypothetical mechanisms of 
anchoring and objectification are a direct result of this 
conceptual vagueness. Similarly, Eiser (1986) and McGuire 
(1986) claim that the absence of a precise definition 
constitutes a major failing in the theory which precludes 
any substantial progress.
Moscovici, on a number of occasions, (1983,1984a, 
1985b,1987) has argued that the 'vagueness' of social 
representations is a virtue and that it arises by design. He 
suggests that precise definitions would be premature and are 
a requirement of predictive theories, concerning isolated 
mechanisms and the testing of hypotheses by the use of 
limiting experimental procedures. 'We should reject easy 
definitions as vigorously as misleading precision' 
(Moscovici,1987,p.515). In contrast, social psychologists 
should
try to build some descriptive and explicative 
theories that have a wider range and deeper grasp 
of phenomena
(Moscovici,1985b,p.91).
He further suggests that this can be achieved only by careful
observation and description of social representations and by
a comparative study of such descriptions. This would provide
the data and act as a sound basis from which to build an
adequate theory of social representations.
Clarity and definition will be an outcome of 
research instead of being a prerequisite
(Moscovici,1985b,p.91).
The structure and content of any particular social 
representation will only emerge in the course of empirical
58
research and will not be assisted by a priori definitions 
and operationalization. It is evident that, by adopting this 
strategy, Moscovici is concerned that social psychology 
should remain true to its subject matter as opposed to the 
scientific and methodological principles associated with the 
natural sciences. However, the problems associated with 
observation before theory leaves doubts, not that such a 
strategy is appropriate, but rather whether or not it is 
feasible. Any research involves philosophical assumptions and 
a theoretical framework even if these are not clearly 
explicated or developed.
The initial vagueness of the concept of social 
representations is a virtue, not only for the reasons 
suggested by Moscovici, but also because it has allowed a 
variety of researchers working in different fields and 
employing different methods to explore the usefulness and 
possible applications of social representations. This is not 
without its problems but it is not necessary or perhaps even 
possible for any one scientist to provide the definitive 
definition, even if that scientist is the proponent of a 
revolutionary new approach. Rather, the development of a 
theory, within which a central concept such as social 
representations finds its definition, is dependent on the 
community of scientists which take an interest in that 
theory. As Billig (1987a) argues in his rhetorical approach 
we progress as much through negation and conflict as through 
agreement and consensus. The process of research does not 
present us with unquestionable facts, but rather with the 
materials with which to develop arguments and agreements. 
Thus, in contrast to Moscovici, I would claim that it is not 
the results of research alone which will provide the 
foundation for the development of an adequate theory. Rather, 
and perhaps more importantly, it is the arguments and 
conflicts which arise from the broad range of research 
carried out on social representations, something which has 
been enhanced by avoiding a premature and necessarily 
restrictive definition. The theoretical and practical work 
contained within this thesis is a contribution to that 
debate.
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I would go on to propose that there now exists a 
substantial body of research on social representations which 
provides the ground for theoretical clarification and more 
precise conceptual definition. This is not to suggest that 
the research has been free from theoretical preconceptions. 
On the contrary, as the theory has developed a number of 
specific fields of research and different perspectives have 
emerged. This is reflected, not only in the research, but 
also in the reviews and critiques pertaining to social 
representations. The issues addressed in these articles range 
from the identification of the phenomenon of social 
representations to the nature of reality and the proper 
subject matter of social psychology. Billig (1987b) and 
Breakwell (1987) state that conceptual clarification is 
required both to guide empirical research and to forge links 
with other social sciences and, hence, to fulfil the 
intellectual ambitions of social representation theorists. By 
examining some of these perspectives it is hoped to develop 
a coherent and consistent set of theoretical postulates which 
maintain the most important and novel aspects of the French 
tradition. This will clarify and, possibly, overcome some of 
the internal contradictions and confusions which still 
surround the theory.
One of the central debates concerns the social nature 
of social representations. This concern is reflected in 
theoretical papers, review articles, introductory comments 
to research articles and critiques of the theory. Moscovici 
has frequently criticized the individualistic perspective 
which persists in current social psychology. For him, and 
for many of his colleagues, the theory of social 
representations offers an opportunity to develop an 
explicitly social psychology. It is important, therefore, to 
establish what is social about social representations; what 
is added to the term "representations" when it is qualified 
by the adjective "social".
From the previous chapter it will be apparent that 
social representations are social in a number of different 
ways: they refer to social objects; they are shared by
members of a group or they are characteristic of a particular
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society; they originate in social interaction and 
communication; and they are social in function. Researchers 
from a wide variety of theoretical and methodological 
orientations have been attracted to the theory of social 
representations. However, there is no consensus regarding the 
meaning of social representations. It will be shown that the 
different perspectives adopted in research on and critiques 
of social representations emphasize different aspects of 
their social nature and reflect the specific field within 
which the research or critique is developed. This has given 
rise to a number of contrasting interpretations and 
developments.
By examining the ways in which social representations 
have been used in research, I hope to clarify different 
possible meanings of the term 'social* . It will be shown that 
research has characterized representations as being social in 
a number of different ways:
1. with reference to the object being represented;
2. to the social context in which representations arise;
3. to the fact that they are shared by a number of people;
4. to the generis and transmission of representations 
through social interaction and communication; and
5. to the social reality which representations form.
By examining this research and related critiques, it will be 
argued that the determination of 'social' in (1) and (2) 
remain on the individual level and fail to elucidate the 
distinctive features of social representations. (3) goes some 
way towards assessing the consensual nature of social 
representations. However, by focusing on the degree to which 
representations are shared, this research fails to consider 
their dynamic nature and, in the last analysis, can still be 
reduced to the level of individual representations. In 
contrast, (4) and (5) present characterizations which 
illuminate the non-individual nature of representations, 
including their social, cultural and historical features, and 
describe their symbolic, creative and autonomous aspects. An 
adequate definition of social representations must therefore 
emphasize the social nature of representations in the terms 
presented by the latter two bodies of research. Only then
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will it become apparent that the theory of social 
representations provides an alternative perspective to the 
predominant approach in social psychology.
Finally, it will be shown that the domain in which 
research has been conducted extends well beyond the 
boundaries which have sometimes been advocated by Moscovici. 
The theory of social representations is not only applicable 
to the understanding of scientific theories in the consensual 
universe. Rather, it constitutes a social-psychology of 
knowledge which subsumes a broad ranging set of social 
phenomena.
2.2 REPRESENTATION
Before examining in what sense representations are 
social, it is necessary to establish what is meant by 
representation. It is first worth examining the meanings of 
* representation * in common usage. These are expressed in 
definitions given in the Oxford Dictionary. This gives us 
three options:
1. 'To bring clearly before the mind, especially by 
description or imagination; describe as having specific 
character or quality*.
This suggests that representation is an active process by 
which an image or description is brought to the mind of the 
individual, with specific reference to the character or 
quality of that which is being represented.
2. 'Display to the eye, make visible: exhibit by means of 
painting, sculpture, etc; reproduce in action or show, play'. 
By this definition representations lie, not in the mind of 
the individual, but in the objects or events presented to 
the 'eye' of the individual. An object or action reproduces 
or recreates something else which is being represented.
3. 'Symbolize, serve as embodiment of; serve as specimen or 
example of; stand for or in place of, denote by a substitute; 
take or fill the place of, by substitute for in some 
capacity; be accredited deputy for (a number of persons) in 
deliberative or legislative assembly'.
In some respects this is similar to definition 2, in that 
something symbolizes something else. However, in this case 
it is not a matter of re-presenting another object or event
62
but rather taking the place of something else. The clearest 
example is that of a Member of Parliament who represents or 
stands in place of his or her constituents.
'Representation' has also become a central concept in 
psychology, and, more specifically, in cognitive psychology. 
As this is likely to be the dominant way in which 
representation is understood within the Anglo-American 
community of psychologists, it is worth making explicit the 
use and meaning of 'representation' in the context of 
cognitive psychology. According to Gardner (1985) cognitive 
psychology attempts to provide an adec[uate description of the 
structure and mechanisms of representation. The 
representational entities include symbols, ideas, images, 
schemata etc. and these entities are joined, transformed or 
contrasted by various processes.
The centrality of the human mind and of mental 
representation has had a chequered history within psychology. 
Behaviourism had all but eradicated from psychology the 
description and explanation of the states and the contents of 
consciousness. Scientific research was to be limited to the 
observation of overt behaviour in terms of stimulus and 
response links. However a growing disillusionment with 
behaviourist psychology, which failed to fulfil its early 
ambitions, led to the re-emergence of mind or consciousness 
into psychological explanation. In order to understand the 
relationship between stimulus and response, especially with 
regard to individual differences, it was necessary to 
introduce some kind of mediator or intervening variable. 
Psychologists came to consider the representation of 
information within the mind as an essential issue in the 
understanding of human behaviour. During the behaviourist era 
of 1920-1940 mental representation had by no means completely 
disappeared as is evidenced by the concerns of the Gestalt 
psychologists, Bartlett's work on schemata and Piaget's 
research in developmental psychology and genetic 
epistemology. However, it was not until dissatisfaction with 
behaviourism became more widespread that 'mental 
representations' came to the fore. In the early work on 
mental representations research took a number of different
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forms. Gardner (1985) gives us the examples of Miller who 
looked at the structural properties and limitations of the 
representational system; Broadbent and Cherry who focused on 
the transformation of information from the senses to memory; 
and Bruner who was largely concerned with subjects' 
strategies. More recent examples include the work of 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) on heuristics and 
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) who developed the notion of 
mental models and also Tulving's (1972) research on semantic 
memory.
Today, although the need for positing a level of mental 
representations is accepted by most psychologists, the 
variety of approaches and focii of interest relating to the 
exploration of mental representations is even greater. 
Cognitive phenomena which are considered to require an 
explanation at the representational level range from visual 
perception to the comprehension of stories and includes the 
representation of common social situations. Consequently, 
there is a wide variety of different models of 
representation, both in terms of describing their processes 
and the representational entities. Contemporary 
information-processing approaches tend towards the analysis 
of small-scale units and elementary processes, using visual 
characteristics, such as colour and shape, and simple 
perceptual concepts, such as geometric figures, or concepts 
of animals, plants, physical objects, conservation of weight, 
volume etc. (Markova and Wilkie,1987). There are two 
assumptions underlying this work. Firstly, a thorough 
understanding of these molecular units and processes will 
enable the explanation of more complex units and processes. 
This is often termed a bottom-up approach. Secondly, the 
processes of representation are the same irrespective of the 
specific content of the representations (Gardner, 1985).
There has been a reaction against both of these 
assumptions. Increasingly, psychologists have turned to the 
analysis of representations at a more molar level. Rather 
than talking about bits of information, individual percepts 
or single associations, regardless of their meaning or 
context of presentation, cognitive psychologists are
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developing models of schemata, scripts, frames, and other 
inferential and organizing processes. This approach contrasts 
with the former in that it is top-down, taking into 
consideration meanings, expectations and contexts. At the 
same time, attention has been drawn to content- specific 
processes of mental representations. For example, the work of 
Shepard (1982) suggests that physical objects are represented 
in the form of images as opposed to language-like 
propositions and hence are subject to different operational 
constraints. This is supported by the work of Fodor (1983) 
and others which suggests that the form of representation is 
specific to modality; that is there are distinct mental 
representations for verbal, pictorial, musical, gestatory 
etc. contents. However, despite this variety in the 
description and analysis of representational entities and 
processes there is a common underlying notion of 
representation as an internal construct in the mind of an 
individual which stands in place of something else, (usually) 
existing externally to the individual which may, or may not, 
be immediately present. This is perhaps closest to definition 
1 but covers the full range, from the iconic representation 
of a physical object to the symbolic representation of a 
concept, complex phemomenon or event.
Moscovici is well aware of the central place of 
'representation' in the social sciences (1982,p.116). Indeed, 
this is one sense in which we have reached 'the era of 
representations'. Psychology is, once more, a science of the 
human mind. Psychologists no longer talk purely in terms of 
stimulus and response, exchanges of actions and of reactions, 
but refer to the psychological representation of information 
regarding those actions and reactions. However, Moscovici 
goes on to indicate that this reversion to the conscious mind 
in terms of representations does not constitute a (cognitive) 
revolution, but is limited, rather, to the accommodation of 
a behaviourist psychology to the current scientific context 
and to the impetus provided by anthropology, linguistics, 
child psychology and computer science. This reformation does 
not go far enough, for it fails to break with the 
individualistic paradigm predominant in psychology
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(Farr, 1987a) . We may be led to ask if the theory of social 
representations constitutes the revolution that Moscovici 
proclaims, or if it is just a further adaptation of the old 
paradigm. The answer to this question is not immediately 
clear. By examining the meaning of representation, and in 
what way these representations are said to be social, we may 
have a better idea of the theory's status and of any 
revolutionary qualities that social representations may or 
may not offer.
The meaning of representation entailed in the theory of 
social representations is both similar to, and, in some 
important respects, different from, a cognitive understanding 
of representation. It might be considered that mental 
representations are fundamentally perceptual and indeed this 
is often the sense adopted in cognitive psychology. However, 
as Moscovici (1984b) and Jodelet (1984b) explicate, 
representations always have two facets 'which are as 
interdependent as the two facets of a sheet of paper: the 
iconic and the symbolic facets. We know that: Representation 
= image/meaning; in other words, that it equates every image 
to an idea, and every idea to an image'. Thus the percept or 
figurative aspect which reproduces the world in a meaningful 
way, and the concept, or symbolic aspect, which abstracts 
meaning from the world, cannot be separated. They are not 
conceived as two distinguishable elements of the genre of 
representation but they are considered as two aspects of the 
same representation. The concrete image and the symbolic 
meaning go hand-in-hand.
Harré (1984c,pp.928-9) suggests that the common practice 
of translating the French word 'representation' as 
representation does not adequately reflect the meaning as 
conveyed and employed in the French tradition of research on 
social representations. Whereas representation in English 
speaking countries infers a copy or 'similcrum' of a concrete 
object the French tradition implies, at one and the same 
time, a physical likeness or iconic representation and the 
representation of a concept or idea. In this way, it is a 
construction of the represented object, real or imaginary. 
For these reasons, he suggests that a more adequate
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translation of representation would be 'version*. In this 
sense a social representation is a version of the original 
obj ect.
Jodelet (1984b) further contrasts the French meaning of 
representation with its conventional meaning. Representations 
are defined by their contents which refer to a specific 
object. A representation is always of something else, whether 
that object be 'real*, mythical or imaginary. This 
representation can be in the mind of the individual. In this 
sense it can be considered equivalent to the meaning of 
representation in Anglo-American cognitive psychology. 
However, in the French tradition the contents of the 
representations are of paramount importance whereas in the 
latter, even where the specific type of content is considered 
influential, the focus lies on the processes of 
representation. In addition, that a representation is always 
of something else does not preclude the representation being 
outside the minds of individuals (eg. dictionary definition 
2) . For example, a painting is a representation of something 
else, but it is also an object in its own right. Thus the 
representation exists, in some sense, independently of that 
which is being represented. That this sense of representation 
is encompassed within social representations is evidenced by 
much of the field research carried out in France. 
Representations are not only found in the minds of 
individuals but also in the media, (Moscovici,1973), in 
books, films and recreational constructions 
(Chombart-de-Lauwe,1984), and in drawings (Milgram and 
Jodelet,1984), to give but a few examples. Representations 
are thus always of something and exist in their own right 
both as mental representations and as environmental 
representations. That a representation is an object existing 
in its own right is the sense implied by Moscovici when he 
refers to the 'phenomenon* of social representations. They 
are representations of something and, at the same time, are 
objects of study, in fact, the proper object of study for 
social psychology.
A further word needs to be said on the symbolic nature 
of representations. Representation is not the passive
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reproduction or a mirror reflection of the object being
represented. Rather representation has a signifying aspect,
it is a sign or symbol for something else which may, or may
not, be present (see dictionary definition 3) . The
representation not only stands in place of the object being
represented, providing a substitute for that object, as a
politician stands in place of his or her constituents, but
can also add something that was previously absent as it is
independent of that which is being represented, just as the
politician, once elected, may act independently from his or
her constituents.
The symbolic nature of representations entails two
further aspects: the active and creative aspects. Firstly,
representation is a conscious act of thought; it re-presents
the object to the mind in the form of a sign or symbol. That
it is an active process is reflected in dictionary definition
1, that it is symbolic, in dictionary definition 2. Contrary
to some 'straw-man' versions of cognitive psychology the
latter also entails an understanding of representation as an
active process. However, the notion of representation within
the theory of social representations also entails a creative
aspect. The act of representation symbolically reconstructs
another object and, in that it is a symbolic reconstruction
as opposed to a simple reproduction, it is also creative.
the subject is not merely the theatre on whose stage 
are acted out plays that are independent of him and 
pre-determined by the laws of an automatic physical 
equilibrium - no, he is the actor, and often even 
the author of these structurings which he can alter 
as they develop.
(Piaget,from Jodelet 1984,p.364)
As representation is not only an active process but 
also a creative construction, representations are 
inextricably linked to and imply the construction of the 
real. With this in mind the emphasis on the origins and 
transformations of representations is more understandable. 
Representations are not static entities but dynamic, evolving 
structures. It is not the process of representation, as such, 
which is of interest, but rather the process of creating 
representations with reference both to their form and
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content. This creative aspect of representation, I believe, 
lies at the heart of the theory of social representations. 
The theory is, in effect, a social-psychology of knowledge 
which takes as its critical problem the genesis and 
transformation of representations.
One further point requires emphasis. Representations, 
once created, are said to be autonomous. A picture, once 
painted, exists in its own right; a politician, once elected 
is independent of his or her constituents; a scientific 
theory, once published, becomes independent of the scientific 
discipline in which it was created. It is in terms of their 
independence and autonomy that Moscovici claims that 
representations 'appear to us almost as material objects 
...'(1984b,p.12) and impress upon us with all the force of 
the material world.
Both these creative and autonomous aspects of 
representation are not conveyed either in the dictionary 
definitions or in the work of cognitive psychology (although 
they may be inherent). The cognitivist's understanding of 
representation is not contradictory to the French 
understanding , but rather, the former is entailed in the 
latter. However, it is the symbolic, creative and autonomous 
aspects of representations which are emphasized by the French 
school, and constitute much of what is innovative in the 
theory of social representations.
Summary:
1. Representations always have an image or iconic aspect and 
a meaning or symbolic aspect.
2. Representations should be considered phenomena in their 
own right as well as representations of something else.
3. Representations are symbolic.
4. In that representations are symbolic reconstructions they 
involve an active process of thought that is creative.
5. Representations, once created, are said to be autonomous. 
2.3 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
From the exposition of the theory of social 
representations (Chapter 1), it is clear that Moscovici and 
others are committed to developing a social perspective in 
social psychology. The previous section elaborates on the
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ways in which the meaning of 'representation' entailed in 
the theory goes beyond traditional approaches in cognitive 
psychology as well as in cognitive social psychology. 
However, this is by no means a final statement as to the 
nature of the phenomenon and the substantive contents of the 
theory of social representations. In this section I shall 
examine the broad range of research projects which have 
employed the notion of social representations and critically 
examine the various meanings of 'social' which they entail.
2.3.1 Representations of social objects
We have already seen that a representation always 
refers to an object. The term 'social' as applied to 
representation may refer to the object that is being 
represented. In this case they would be individuals' 
representations of social objects whereby 'social' refers to 
the subject matter of the representation and not to the 
representation itself. This is the sense which has prevailed 
in the literature on social perception. Perception is seen as 
an individual's representation of a person or social event. 
Emler (1987) also argues that it is this sense of social 
which is adopted by the constructivists, most notably Piaget. 
It refers to the individual * s attempt to make sense of the 
social environment. The process of representation, and the 
representation itself, maintains its individual character. 
That is, the representation is constructed through the 
interaction between an individual's cognitive apparatus and 
the objective properties of the social environment (not 
through reciprocal actions or social interactions). This 
sense of social is also evident in the social cognition 
literature, whereby the individual is characterized as an 
information-processor with regard to information pertaining 
to other individuals, social events, and social situations.
This sense of social has also been carried over into 
some of the literature and research on social 
representations. Milgram (1984) suggests that this is the 
sense conveyed by Farr and Moscovici (1984b) in their 
invitation for papers, which culminated in the volume on 
Social Representations. Here their expressed concern was with 
'how people "theorise about" or "talk about" the experiences
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in which they participate and how these theories enable them
to construct reality and ultimately to determine their
behaviour. Milgram's interpretation, however, is only
sustained if *people' is understood as 'individuals in
general'. In the same volume, Pailhous (1984) examines the
representation of urban space and the organization of
journeys. However, the research was carried out within the
context of cognitive psychology and is limited to
individuals' spatial representations of a social object.
My second aim,... was to strike a fairly 
un-socio-psychological note on the 
representation of a highly social object
(Pailhous,1984,p.327) 
Here we would be dealing with how individuals theorize about 
their experiences, a topic which has been explored in various 
psychologies already, including social perception, social 
cognition and Piaget's constructivism. Social representations 
theory, thus, would be little more than a relabelling 
exercise, and would fail to constitute a novel approach or 
revolutionary social psychology.
There are at least two reasons why this sense of social 
should not be accepted as the defining characteristic of 
social representations. Firstly, students and proponents of 
the social representations approach have repeatedly claimed 
that it constitutes a novel and even a revolutionary theory 
in social psychology. These claims should not be dismissed 
out of hand. While it may be true that the theory, as it 
stands, fails to fulfil the ambition of these students the 
claim should, at least initially, be given due consideration. 
Secondly, although much of the relevant research has been 
concerned with representation of social objects, for example, 
mental illness (Jodelet,1986) economic inequalities 
(Emler,1987), gender identity (Duveen and Lloyd 1987) and 
groups (Kaes,1984), the nature of the research actually 
carried out indicates that it is not the object which is 
being represented which is essentially social but rather that 
the representation itself is social. Furthermore, social 
representations can be of objects which include physical 
objects, a material or psychic event, an idea of something
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much more complex such as a job to be done, an economic 
event, an organization etc. A number of studies have 
investigated social representations of what, normally, would 
be considered non-social objects; for example, Paris, 
(Milgram,1984), psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1973) and the body 
(Jodelet,1984a). However, there are still a number of ways to 
interpret the meaning of "social” representations. These will 
be explicated by examining the variety of research which has 
been conducted within a social representations approach.
2.3.2 Representations in interpersonal interactions
Representations may be considered social because they 
are socially situated; that is, they arise in a context of 
social interaction, when two or more individuals are brought 
together. The significance of the social context in which 
representations arise is evident in the relatively large 
volume of literature on experimental studies of social 
representations and their relationship to behaviour. However, 
before examining this body of research, in some detail, it is 
worth mentioning a number of other instances in which the 
relationship between social representations and interpersonal 
interaction is discussed.
That representations are socially situated is evident 
in research on groups and group processes. One example is 
Kaes' (1984) analysis of representations of the group (social 
object) and its relation to group processes (social 
interaction) within a clinical setting (social context). A 
number of critiques also focus on the relationship between 
social representations and the social context of research. 
Farr (1977), in his observations on Herzlich's research, 
suggests that the emergent social representation of health 
and illness might be a reflection of the social context of 
the research interview, as opposed to a representation, held 
at the collective level. The social context is also 
emphasized by researchers who are primarily concerned with 
discourse. This is seen, for example, in the work of Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) on discourse analysis and what are 
referred to as linguistic repertoires. The diversity and 
variability of linguistic repertoires are related to the 
specific context and social interactions in which individuals
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find themselves. The expression of social representations 
varies among accounts given in different social settings and 
even within single accounts. Potter goes so far as to suggest 
that, due to the specificity of meaning, in relation to the 
particular context, the notion of social representations 
should be abandoned in favour of linguistic repertoires. 
However, although the role of language should not be 
underestimated, the theory of social representations 
constitutes considerably more than just the use of language 
in social encounters or the linguistic repertoires of 
individuals. Contextual specificity may constitute the 
identification of a problem, but discourse analysis and 
linguistic repertoires do not provide a practical or 
theoretical solution.
There is a considerable body of experimental research 
carried out in the laboratory which has been directly 
concerned with the exploration of social representations. 
(Abric,1971,1984 ; Abric and Kahan,1972; Codol,1974,1984; 
Flament,1984). These studies have focused on the relationship 
between social representations and behaviour and more 
specifically the system of representations and its 
relationship to group structure and activity within an 
experimental setting. They primarily deal with 
intra-individual cognitive activity and the influence of 
inter-individual communications and interactions in an 
artificial social situation. Social representations, in this 
instance, appear to be individual's representations of social 
objects within social interactions.
The vast majority of experimental research has been 
carried out by the Aix-en-Provence group in France. Abric 
(1984) has employed the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in a number of 
experimental studies exploring functional relationships 
between social representations and behaviour. The 'Prisoner's 
Dilemma' is a game situation in which two individuals are 
confronted by conflicting play strategies; one which achieves 
maximum gain for both players and the other which has the 
possibility of increasing differential gain, depending on the 
choice of the other player. The behaviour of subjects was 
found to be dependent on their representations of themselves,
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others, the task and the context. For example, by presenting 
the * other* as either a student or a machine, subjects employ 
either a more cooperative or more competitive game strategy 
respectively. Complementary research by Codol (1984) employed 
small groups in an artificial laboratory situation in which 
subjects* cooperative or competitive representations were 
manipulated by the experimenter.
Another series of experiments has been carried out by 
Flament (1984) which relies on the mathématisation of balance 
given in the theory of graphs. By manipulating the 
instructions Flament and his colleagues were able to show 
that Heider*s (1946) notion of structural balance is not a 
universal psychological mechanism but rather is dependent on 
the representation of the group. Furthermore, by manipulating 
the context of the experiment and the representation of 
members of the group, different representations of the links 
between them were induced. Thus the representation of the 
context and of the group determines the specific 
characteristics of the perceived interpersonal relationships.
This research will be examined in more detail in order 
to illustrate the following point; in so far as research 
emphasizes the social aspects of representations in terms of 
the object being represented or in terms of the social 
context in which representations are used it remains within 
the framework of social cognition and within the approach 
taken by Anglo-American social psychology. As Semin (1985a) 
notes, much of the research employing the notion of social 
representations does not amount to an alternative to the 
dominant mode of social psychology, either conceptually or 
empirically.
It will be argued that the experimental research focuses 
on intra-individual cognitive activity which is characterized 
as social with regard to the object being represented and the 
context of representation. This approach is limited to 
demonstrating the influence of individuals* representations 
on their behaviour and possesses many characteristics of 
American cognitive psychology and cognitive social 
psychology. As such, it fails to charcterize the distinctive 
features of genuine collective phenomena, including their
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social, cultural and historical aspects. Ambivalence towards 
the experimental literature, expressed by several students of 
social representations, further illustrates the erroneous 
characterization of social representations which is presented 
by the laboratory research. An alternative view is that this 
body of research explores the social mechanisms and dynamics 
of social representations, including processes of 
interaction, communication and influence. It is argued that 
these are dependent on the wider culture in which the 
laboratory, subjects and experimenters are situated and that 
the ways in which culture enters into the laboratory need to 
be recognized. In contrast to many sociologically orientated 
researchers, it is suggested that experimental methodology 
can play a useful role in the examination of social 
representations, but that the style of experimenting must be 
a direct consequence of the theoretical framework as opposed 
to a purely cognitive orientation.
Experimental studies have tended to focus on intra­
individual cognitive activity, that is, the individual's 
attempt to organize and structure elements of the 
experimental situation. This can be illustrated by Abric's 
definition of the system of representations.
By representation system we mean the sum total of 
images present in the group and concerning the 
different elements with which the group is faced. 
Individuals confronted with objective conditions 
actually develop an internal perceptual and 
restructuring activity, which must be considered a 
strictly cognitive activity, one which allows them 
to integrate, understand, structure, and give 
meaning to these elements. The product of this 
cognitive activity on the part of each individual 
is what we call a representation. By analysing these 
representations, one can observe certain elements of 
the individual's or the group's subjective - or 
internal - reality.
(Abric,1971,p.313)
Codol is even more explicit when he states that
the relationships of interdependence (between 
representations) studied here are undoubtedly the 
product of intra-individual cognitive processes
(Codol,1984,p.251).
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These representations might be considered social for
two reasons. Firstly, the system of representations analysed
in these experiments are of social objects, including the
task, the group, others and self. For example, Abric (1971)
defines the representation of the task as
the theory or system of hypotheses individuals work 
out regarding the nature of the task, its objects, 
the means to employ to carry out the task, and the 
behaviour conducive to effectiveness.
(Abric,1971,p.313)
Again, the emphasis is on intra-individual cognitive activity 
and the representation of social objects. Secondly, these 
representations are examined in an artificial experimental 
setting. None the less, it is a social context involving 
social interactions between a number of individuals who 
constitute the experimental group and also between subjects 
and experimenter. Thus, in these experiments individual 
representations are examined in a social context.
The study of social representations within an
experimental paradigm which adopts a cognitive perspective
is extremely limited. Experimenters acknowledge the necessary
reduction in the richness of the initial ideas and the
simplification required to operationalize and manipulate the
relevant variables (Codol,1984). It is also acknowledged that
such an approach can only illuminate part of what is
understood by 'social representations *. That part which can
be included is largely restricted to intra-individual
cognitive activity. This is justified on the basis that
social representations incontrovertibly partake of the nature
of cognitive phenomena and that although social
representations are
social forms of knowledge belonging to the cultures 
and groups in which (an individual) is involved,
... in the final analysis it is always individuals 
who convey and articulate them
(Codol,1984,p.240).
There are two points that should be made: firstly, we 
have already noted that social representations can be 
conveyed in the cultural artefacts of a given society; 
secondly, and more importantly in the present context, the 
restrictions which a cognitive and experimental approach
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place on the study of social representations confines the 
analysis to those characteristics which do not distinguish 
social representations from social cognition.
The experiments clearly demonstrate the role of social 
representations in group dynamics within the laboratory such 
that
the effectiveness and structure of the group cannot 
be analyzed exclusively as the basis of the 
objective elements of the situation... The 
representational system interacts directly with the 
objective elements by giving them a specific meaning 
and interpretation in terms of behaviour
(Abric,1971,p.325)
The primary aim of these studies is thus to demonstrate 
the influence of the individual's representation system, on 
the organization and structuring of the objective features in 
an experimental situation and the resultant behaviour and 
group dynamics. There is a remarkable resemblance to the 
concerns of cognitive and social cognitive psychologists 
working within the Anglo-American tradition. Cognitive 
psychologists have long been concerned with individuals' 
perception and/or interpretation of objective phenomena. 
Others, including Deutscher (1984b) and Farr (1984), have 
commented on the similarity of these experiments with the 
work of American psychologists such as Rosenthal (1966) and 
Orne (1962) who explored reactivity, effects of the 
experimental context and experimenter effects. What is 
emphasized by the French experimenters is that these should 
not be considered experimental artefacts but rather are 
naturally occurring features of social interactions which 
should be studied as such.
So long as experimental studies of social 
representations continue to focus on intra-individual 
cognition, and the influence of inter-individual 
communications, they will fail to realise some of the 
fundamental aspects of social representations. When 'social' 
is limited to the object being represented or the context of 
representation, the theory of social representations remains 
what Moscovici has termed a 'private' social psychology. As 
such it fails to characterize the distinctiveness of genuine
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collective phenomena. These phenomena have their own 
structure which is not definable in terms of the cognitions 
or characteristics of individuals. They are related to the 
processes of production and consumption, to the rituals, 
symbols, institutions, norms and values of our society or 
group. They are phenomena with their own history and dynamics 
which cannot be derived from individuals alone. 
(Moscovici,1972). In the last analysis the experimental 
studies still portray an individual psychology of cognition 
as opposed to a social psychology of symbolic representation.
The point to which I am leading is not that these 
experimental studies fail to illuminate at least some aspects 
of social representations but that they fail to reflect those 
features of social representations which distinguish them 
from other cognitive and social cognitive constructs. They 
focus on the subjective, cognitive and phenomenological 
aspects of social representations but do not directly address 
the social, cultural and historical aspects.
This is reflected in the ambivalence towards
experimental studies expressed by some social representation
theorists. Herzlich (1972) has noted the contrast between the
laboratory studies and the field research within the French
school of social representations. Herzlich, amongst others,
considers the theory of social representations and the field
research to constitute a sociological form of social
psychology. However, it is not clear in what way the
laboratory research reflects this sociological approach.
Similarly, Farr (1984) suggests that social representations
operate 'at the level of the scientific community' rather
than within the laboratory
the social nature of representations is more 
directly applicable at the level of a scientific 
theory or of a research paradigm, than at the level 
of a single experiment within such a paradigm
(Farr 1984,p.134).
Representations of science and the laboratory at the level 
of the scientific community would provide a more accurate 
characterization of social representations than anything that 
is carried out within a laboratory. The latter form a 'world
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apart* a world which isolates phenomena from their natural 
social context. Furthermore, experiments are relatively 
a-historical, and any transformation of representations 
induced within the experiment are likely to be minor and 
temporary.
Moscovici (1984b) has also expressed reservations about
the use of the experimental paradigm. Although it may be
suitable for studying simple phenomena that can be taken out
of context and operationally defined, he suggests that it is
unsuitable for the exploration of social representations,
being a social phenomenon stored in our language and created
in a complex human milieu. He states that
the study of social representations requires that 
we revert to methods of observation for the purpose 
of providing a careful description of social 
representations .... A valid explanation can only be 
derived from a comparative study of such 
descriptions....what we require of observation is 
that it will preserve some of the qualities of 
experiment while freeing us from its limitations
(Moscovici,1984b,pp.97,98)
The limitation he is particularly concerned about is the
oversimplification of complex social phenomena required by
the need to operationalize definitions of the significant
variables, and the isolation of specific phenomena and
mechanisms from their natural context. For Moscovici it is
more appropriate to adjust the methods of research to the
complexities of reality as opposed to adjusting reality to
the experimental paradigm. However, Codol emphasizes that
the aim of these experiments is to indicate some of the
mechanisms whereby representations come about. In this case
it is the social processes of interaction, communication and
influence giving rise to the formation of representations
which characterize their social nature.
Representation may be termed "social" less on 
account of whether their foundations are individual 
or group than because they are worked out during the 
process of exchange and interaction.
(Codol,1984,p.251)
But it is not clear that these experiments do actually 
study the social processes involved in the origins of a
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system of representations. Subjects do not come to the 
laboratory as empty-headed, naive individuals. They bring 
with them ideas, values and ideologies which they have 
assimilated from their culture and from their social groups. 
These include representations of social relations, 
cooperative and competetive interactions, of social 
identities and of problem situations. These representations 
do not originate within the experimental context but rather 
are primed by the experimenter's instructions or by 
attributes of the experimental situation. Differences in the 
behaviour of subjects (dependent variable) are shown to be 
greatly influenced by the subjects' representations 
(independent variable). However, manipulation of these 
representations is dependent on the culture outside the 
laboratory, shared by both experimenter and the research 
subjects. For example, manipulation of representation of the 
task is achieved by presenting the same task as either 
'problem-solving' or a 'creative task' (Abric,1971) or as 
'being concerned with deductive and logical thought' versus 
'resolution of problems by several individuals collaborating 
together' (Codol,1974). Codol's study also manipulated 
representation of the group by providing feedback such as 
'This is a very collective group' or 'this is a very
individualistic group'. Similarly, representations of 
opponents in a game situation were manipulated by presenting 
them as a 'machine' or as 'another student like yourself 
(Abric,1976). Thus the laboratory research on social
representations succeeds only because the wider culture 
enters into the laboratory which is still a part of the wider 
society.
Thus, if anything, it is not the social mechanisms by 
which representations are created that are being studied but 
rather the inter-individual processes by which preestablished 
representations are evoked and agreed upon within the
particular setting of the experiment. The system of
representations being examined thus do not emerge within the 
experiment itself but rather are representations prevalent in 
society, ie. widespread beliefs, being related to the 
subject's (and the experimenter's) group membership and
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location in a wider society. Representations are cultural 
phenomena although the particular representations evoked and 
the relationships between them may be influenced by the 
particular social context. What these experiments help to 
demonstrate is that culture enters into and is a part of the 
laboratory. Once culture is recognized to be embedded within 
the laboratory, most notably through the mediation of 
language, then concepts such as schemata, scripts, and 
frames, will be seen to be social phenomena as opposed to 
individual cognitions and the cultural dimensions of this 
research will be made more salient and explicit (Farr, 1987b) .
Despite the limitations associated with the experimental 
paradigm, experiments do have their place in social 
representations research for they provide an analysis quite 
unlike other methods suggested by Moscovici. We would be 
wrong to dismiss a methodology which has been extensively 
developed and utilized and, in some circles, is the envy of 
other social sciences. There is no a priori reason why 
experimental studies should not be included in the variety of 
methodologies which are used for the exploration of social 
representations (see Chapter 6). I would also suggest that 
the limitations of the current experimental investigations 
are not purely a reflection of the experimental paradigm per 
se but also of their specific content. This is illuminated by 
examining the context and historical development of the 
experimental literature now associated with social 
representations.
One of the earliest laboratory studies which is 
frequently cited in this literature was carried out by 
Faucheux and Moscovici in 1968. The experiment explored the 
influence of respondents' representations of their opponents 
in a game situation. The game strategy adopted by respondents 
was dependent on whether or not they had been told that they 
were playing against nature or against chance. However, this 
study does not appear to have been designed within the 
theoretical context of social representation. It was, in 
effect, a reply to an American study conducted within a games 
theory approach which had ignored respondents representations
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as an important variable. It has, since then, been absorbed 
into the social representations literature.
Later experimental work can be seen in the same light, 
having originally been conceived as a critique of American 
social psychology on group dynamnics, conflict studies and 
games theory. These American studies had failed to consider 
the phenomenological and social aspects as well as the 
genesis of groups in their own activity. The laboratory 
experiments of Codol and Abric, in contrast, were 
specifically designed to explore these issues. However, it 
is only through the more recent literature that the link 
between the laboratory research and social representations 
has been made explicit. Furthermore, the actual experimental 
situation employed (eg. Prisoner's Dilemma) and the dependent 
variables measured were the same as the American studies. It 
is not surprising then, that the focus of attention has 
remained on intra-individual cognition and the individual's 
system of representations as opposed to the interindividual 
processes involved in social representations. The problems 
addressed by the experimental research and the consequent 
characterization of social representations are therefore 
quite distinct from other studies.
Farr (1984) suggests that there had been an 'error of 
translation' from the field studies to the laboratory. 
However, it is questionable whether or not any such 
translation was attempted. The laboratory research emerged 
as a critique of American social psychology rather than being 
initially inspired by social representations. The theory and 
language of social representations was adopted at a later 
phase in its development as it provided a useful theoretical 
framework for the investigation of representation. Because of 
this it has remained limited in its exploration of social 
representations and in the characterization of their social 
nature.
This is not to suggest that the experimental paradigm 
is totally unsuited to the investigation of social 
representations. Rather that the style of experimenting 
should be a direct consequence of the theoretical 
orientation. Just as the experimental styles adopted by
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behaviourists contrasted to those of cognitive psychologists,
and the Festingerian's style of experimenting contrasted with
the Hovlander's (Farr,1976), so also the styles of
cognitivists and of students of social representations should
reflect their alternative theoretical approach. Even so, it
still remains questionable whether experimental studies could
ever reflect certain features of social representations,
including their historical, creative and autonomous aspects.
2.3.3 Representations which are shared
Perhaps the most predominant sense of "social" evident
in the remaining research literature is the consensual nature
of social representations. Social representations are social
because they are shared by a number of individuals in a group
or society. This sense of social will be briefly discussed in
relation to the experimental studies. However, it is an
aspect of social representations which is made more explicit
in the intergroup studies (eg. Di Giacomo,1980) and in social
extensions of attribution theory (Hewstone,1989; Jaspars and
Hewstone,1990). Moreover, it is an issue which had been
central in several theoretical and methodological critiques.
This literature is examined below, but it is suggested that
it does not accurately portray the sense of "social" which is
maintained by the theory. A focus on the consensual nature of
social representations implies that they are individual
representations which are shared by members of a group. This
fails to illuminate their supra-individual status, their
dynamic nature and their origins in social life.
2.3.3.1. Experimental studies ; The shared or consensual nature
of social representations is not a feature which is
emphasized in the experimental literature. However, Abric
(1971) in his study of representation of the task states that
To the extent that this representation is shared by 
the whole group it determines a collective 
representation of the given facts of the 
environment, that is a social representation of the 
task.
(Abric,1971,p.313)
This implies that social representations are individual 
representations of a given object which are shared by all 
members of the experimental group. However, it was argued
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that these representations originate in the social milieu 
which extends beyond the laboratory. They are social 
representations which exist in the common culture.
Others have taken the consensual nature of social 
representations as their starting point. This is seen in 
studies of intergroup relations and the social nature of 
attributions.
2.3.3.2 Interaroup relations; Previous studies of intergroup 
relations is one of the few areas of research in social 
psychology in which representations have been treated as 
important. This interest goes back to the work of Sherif 
(1962) and has continued to be significant in more recent 
research (Tajfel, 1978; 1982) . Studies of intergroup relations, 
within the social representations approach, focus on the real 
life social membership of the individuals, and the ideas, 
values and models which are obtained from and shared with 
their social groups. Interactions between groups influence 
the representations group members have of themselves and 
their group, other groups and their members. These 
representations * regulate, anticipate and justify the social 
relations that are thus established' (Jodelet,1984b).
One example of this perspective is research conducted 
by Di Giacomo (1980) on intergroup alliances and rejections 
within a student protest movement. Representation shared by 
the student population about itself, and their potential 
partners, were found to be incompatible with their 
representation of the National Committee and its strategies. 
Thus, although the student population agreed with the aim of 
the movement they did not support the National Committee. The 
incompatability of beliefs, values, symbols and norms shared 
by members of the student population and their representation 
of the National Committee as an outgroup directed and 
justified a lack of commitment to action on the part of the 
student population.
2 . 3 .3 . 3. Causal attributions: Studies of causal attributions 
which have employed the concept of social representations 
also focus on their consensual nature. It is first necessary 
to examine, briefly, the relationship between social 
representations and attributions. It will then be argued
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that, by using social representation theory as a social
extension of attribution, emphasis is placed on the
socially-shared nature of representations. Moscovici (1984b)
suggests that causal explanations and social attribution
always have been crucial to those concerned with social
representations. However, the approach adopted by those
studying social representations can be contrasted with
attribution theorists of the Anglo-American tradition.
Attribution theory has mainly been concerned with how we
attribute causes to people and things in our environment.
Humans are conceived as naive information-processors who
carry out statistical analyses of evidence present in the
environment. Social representationists, in contrast, are less
concerned with the individual's ability to process
information and more concerned with the content of socially
shared knowledge.
Any explanation depends primarily on the idea we 
have of reality
(Moscovici,1984b,p.49).
People making attributions start from a system of social
representations which determine the experiences they have,
the elements of the environment which are taken into account
and the causes which are selected. Social representations
are, therefore, more basic than or fundamental to the
attributions people make.
There can be no attribution without a social 
representation of individuals, collective
relationships, the economy etc.
(Moscovici,1981a,p.X)
That this is the case is clearly indicated by Ichheiser 
in his monograph on 'Misunderstandings in Human Relations' 
(1949) Ichheiser distinguished between the expressions as an 
actor and the impressions of an observer where the latter may 
be considered as social representations dependent on 
socio-cultural symbolic meaning. In order to understand why 
people make certain attributions about others it is necessary 
to take into account the social or collective representations 
of the individual and their expression in representations of 
success and failure, and of responsibility and 
irresponsibility.
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Hewstone (1989), in conjunction with Moscovici (1983)
and Jaspars (1990) has addressed these issues in an attempt
to make attribution theory more social. In so doing he has
emphasized the consensual nature of social representations,
that is, the socially-shared knowledge base which underlies
the process and content of attribution and causal
explanations.
One way in which .... (attribution) theory (can be) 
rendered more social is to consider explanations 
alongside the beliefs that are shared by large 
numbers of people within and between societies.
(Moscovici and Hewstone,1983,p.98)
In order to understand how, when and why, attributions 
are made and where they come from it is necessary to take 
into account the way knowledge about various aspects of 
social life is represented in a society and shared by its 
members. One study which illustrates the relationship between 
social representations and attributional processes examined 
pupils* attributions of success and failure in private and 
state schools (Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee, 1982). It was 
found that their social representations of people and the 
social environment influenced the attributions made. Pupils 
from private schools attributed success or failure to effort 
and ability (personal) whereas state school pupils attributed 
them to luck (environmental). Jaspars and Hewstone (1987), 
note that the role of causal structures in determining 
peoples* attributions has already been highlighted in work 
associated with attribution theory. They see social 
representations theory as a framework in which to study the 
extent to which such causal structures are socially shared 
and how widespread beliefs have an impact on causal 
attributions. Social representations theory thus offers a 
means by which to study beliefs and knowledge of the world 
which are shared by large numbers of people in a group or 
culture. They are thus conceived as socially-shared causal 
structures or collective beliefs. Social representations 
theory, in this instance, is used to provide a social 
extension of attribution theory emphasizing the 
socially-shared nature of representations (knowledge) in
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society. The social psychology which emerges is one which 
relates the individual psychological processes to the 
collective beliefs of a group or society. It thus constitutes 
an attempt to redress the balance between individual and 
social factors as opposed to redefining the problem.
It should be noted that the understanding of 'shared* 
is not the same here as for the experimental studies. In the 
latter 'shared' implied individual representation shared by 
members of a group. In the intergroup relations and 
attributional studies social representations are seen as 
irreducible to a collection of individual representations. 
Knowledge which is shared throughout a society or group 
cannot be reduced to individual perceptions and explanations. 
2.3.3.4.Criticisms: A number of the criticisms of social
representations theory and research have focused also on the 
shared aspect of social representations. The consensual 
nature of social representations has been central to 
criticisms put forward by Potter and Litton (1985). According 
to them, emphasis on the consensual nature of social 
representations is evident in the writings and research of a 
number of people, including Moscovici (1981a,1982), Farr 
(1987b), DiGiacomo (1980), Hewstone et al. (1982) and Jaspars 
and Fraser (1984). Furthermore, it is the consensual nature 
of social representations and their relation to social groups 
which distinguishes them from individual representations and 
from collective representations shared across a whole 
society. Potter and Litton go on to suggest that the degree 
of consensus tends to be over-estimated through the use of 
certain research procedures and that agreement at a general 
level may not be paralleled by agreement at a lower or more 
specific level. Hence they are concerned with the degree of 
consensus and the level at which that consensus exists. 
Breakwell (1987) expresses similar concerns when directly 
addressing methodological problems of social representations 
research:
An essential ingredient of a social representation 
is the ' consensuality': it is shared by a
group/sub-group or category.
(Breakwell,1987,p.11)
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Consensuality gives rise to two problems: establishing the 
relevant groups or categories independently of their social 
representations and deciding the 'degree of consensus* which 
must exist before a social representation can be said to 
exist.
This focus on 'consensuality* is understandable in the 
light of the importance of the 'consensual universe* within 
the theory of social representations. However, I believe it 
does an injustice to the aims and content of the theory as 
a whole and is more a reflection of the methodologies which 
have been employed in research. They assume that the 
individual is the proper source of data collection. This is 
evident in the experimental research which explores 
individual cognitive structures and in investigations which 
have relied exclusively on elicitation of individuals' 
accounts. If the starting point is always the individual then 
the meaning of social becomes limited to those attributes 
which individuals share. Individual representations are then 
those which are not shared by a 'significant* number of 
people; collective representations are those shared by all 
members of society, and social representations are those 
shared by members of a group within a society where some 
divergences exist both between and within groups.
Furthermore, a focus on consensuality is liable to lead 
to similar limitations, which Moscovici criticizes in his 
review of attitude and opinion research (1963) in which he 
states that
Science will not gain much through learning that in 
Minneapolis 12 per cent of the people interviewed 
link centrifugal force and gravitations.
(Moscovici,1963,p.234)
The theory of social representations is not aimed primarily 
at finding out what percentage of a particular population 
share a given social representation, nor the level of 
consensus which can be considered 'significant*.
It is also the shared sense of social which forms the 
basis of Harré's conceptual critique. Harré (1984c) suggests 
that social representations, as currently employed, denote a 
distributive sense of social by which he means individual
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representations which are distributed among members of a
group. He further states that
the role of "the social" ...seems to me to be 
restricted to the influence of social situations on 
the minds of individual human actors.
(Harré,1984c)
Harré disputes the value of restricting the sense of social 
to representations which are shared by a number of 
individuals. According to Harré, the French School fails to 
achieve a truly collective social psychology which recognizes 
the group as a supraindividual entity with attributes which 
cannot be reduced to the attributes of its individual 
members.
In so far as research emphasizes an individual's 
membership of social groups and that social representations 
are shared bodies of knowledge, it goes some way to 
elucidating the particular meaning of social expressed in 
the consensual universe of social representation. Intergroup 
relations depend on the beliefs and values shared by members 
of the respective groups. Individuals' attributions depend on 
socially shared beliefs and causal structures. 
Representations of events and of others in our environment 
must be shared with others to sustain the consensual universe 
in which individuals and groups interact. However, that there 
is a consensual universe does not imply uniformity or a 
precise consensus on every element of a representation. As 
will be seen, their social nature also depends on diversity 
and controversy within and between representations, giving 
rise to their transformation and plasticity. There is a very 
real danger that, by focusing on the consensual nature of 
social representations as shared bodies of knowledge, their 
dynamic nature and their origins in social life will become 
obscured.
2.3.4 Representations, communication and social interaction 
Another sense in which social representations are 
social is that they are socially generated and socially 
sustained. They originate in the social interactions between 
individuals and groups for the purpose of understanding and 
communicating with others.
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The word "social" was meant to indicate that 
representations are the outcome of an unceasing 
babble and a permanent dialogue between individuals, 
a dialogue that is both internal and external, 
during which individual representations are echoed 
and complemented. Representations adapt to the flow 
of interactions between social groups.
(Moscovici,1984a,p.950)
The transmissions and the stability of existing social 
representations need to be considered within the same 
framework as the generation and transformation of social 
representations. A variety of studies have been concerned, 
in one respect or another, with the development and 
maintenance of social representations through the processes 
of social interaction and communication. These include the 
experimental studies, and the field studies, as well as 
investigation of intergroup relations and the socialization 
of children. However, little or nothing is said about the 
forms of communication and social interaction involved in 
the diffusion and transformation of social representations.
2.3.4.1 The socialization of children; Some British studies 
which deal indirectly with this issue have investigated the 
socialization of children and the transmission of 
representations from one generation to the next. Emler and 
Dickinson (1985) examined children's representations of 
economic inequalities and their relation to the child's 
social class and the social milieu in which the child was 
situated. However, as they themselves recognize, many 
questions remain unanswered. In particular, the precise 
influences which produce differences in social 
representations and the processes by which the social 
representations are transmitted are not investigated.
Clearer indications are to be found in the work of 
Duveen and Lloyd (1986;1987) on the development of children's 
social identities and in particular their gender identities. 
This research addresses the transmission of social 
representations from adults to children. It is generally seen 
as demonstrating the conventional and prescriptive nature of 
social representations (see previous chapter) which 
constitute the environment of thought into which children are
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socialized. Social representations exist prior to the child's 
entrance into the social milieu and, therefore, influence the 
child's construction of representations concerning 
themselves, others and objects in their environment as well 
as appropriate actions, thoughts and feelings. Hence, the 
social representations already exist and take on an 
ontological significance in the child's social reality. Emler
(1986) has gone so far as to criticize this work in that it 
fails to characterize the active and constructive aspects of 
social representations. However, this is not entirely true. 
This study is interestingly different in that the development 
and transmission of the social representations of 'maleness' 
and 'femaleness' are traced through interpersonal relations 
with the mother and their behavioural expression in 
interactions with peers. What is important to note here is 
that the transmission and development of social 
representations was illuminated by examining the particular 
interactions with the physical(toys) and social (other 
people) objects in their environment. A child does not simply 
absorb or learn the social representations prevalent in it's 
social milieu. Rather, through it's own activity and 
interactions with others and objects in the environment the 
child actively re-constructs the social representations which 
influence and structure the responses of others to those 
objects and events in their shared environment. In this sense 
Duveen and Lloyd also examine the active construction of 
social representations through the processes of social 
interaction.
However, the theory of social representations is mainly 
concerned with the active construction of social 
representations in the adult world. Mature members of a 
society already live in an environment of thought which is 
constituted by their social representations. Here we would 
be dealing, not with the child's reconstruction of 
representations already prevalent in their social 
environment, but the construction of new representations and 
the transformation of old ones. Such studies would take 
social interactions and the forms of communication as the
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units of analysis in order to illuminate the origins and 
development of social representations in the adult world.
2.3.4.2 Experimental studies ; It might be considered that 
the experimental studies are relevant here in that they are 
concerned with the mechanisms of social representations and 
the relations between social representations and behaviour. 
However, they only demonstrate the influence of social 
representations on behavioural responses rather than the 
dynamic relationship between social representations and 
social interaction. They focus on intra-individual cognition 
taking the unit of analysis to be individual behaviour as 
opposed to social interactions which transform the social 
representations. Another 'pitfall* which needs to be avoided 
is examining the development of social representations in 
similar fashion to concept formation. It is not the 
individual's information-processing which is of importance 
but rather the social interactions between a number of 
individuals and their environment.
2. 3. 4.3 Interaroup relations ; Studies of intergroup relations
have been more successful in shedding some light on the
development of social representation. This body of research
was previously discussed in relation to the consensual nature
of social representations. For example, the actual research
carried out by Di Giacomo (1980) demonstrated the
incompatability betwen the student population's social
representations of itself and its potential partners and
their social representations of the protest movement and its
strategies. This research, in some respects, illuminates the
generation of a social representation of a new social object,
the protest movement. Di Giacomo goes on to suggest that
social representations are more than a system of images
inherited from the culture,
they are the result of a given group's confrontation 
of the objects in its environment with its social 
reference criteria.
(Di Giacomo,1980,p.341)
The student population progressively defined the protest 
committee as incompatible with themselves. These emerging 
social representations had an anticipatory and justificatory
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function in relation to the student population's responses to 
the protest movement, structuring the social relationships 
between the two groups. However, the research itself, does 
not trace the development of the incompatible social 
representations, their elements and their changing 
relationships. Nor does it explore the form of communication 
or the processes of social interaction involved in their 
generation and transformation.
2.3.4.4. Field studies; Before turning to other research 
which illuminates, at least to some degree, the social 
construction of representations, it is important to examine, 
briefly, what is meant by social interaction and 
communication. Social interaction should be considered not 
only to refer to interactions between two or more people; 
they refer also to interactions with the physical and 
symbolic products of human activity. That is to say the 
environment, both in terms of its physical, material 
characteristics and its social, symbolic characteristics are 
important elements of social interaction. Social interaction 
includes inter-action with other people and with the physical 
and social world. Similarly, communication is not restricted 
to 'non-verbal' and verbal communications between two or more 
people in face-to-face interactions. Communication can occur 
through a wide variety of mediators: through written and
pictorial materials, including books, magazines, the media, 
posters, films etc.; through displays such as those found in 
museums and shop windows; through construction of the 
physical environment, for example parks, playgrounds, sports 
facilities, buildings, towns etc; and through single but 
dramatic events, such as dropping an atomic bomb for the 
first time, on a human population. Social representations 
exist not only in the mind but also in the environment. It 
is therefore essential to examine social representations not 
only in cognition but also in the surrounding culture, in the 
products of human activity including the media and the 
objects that constitute the environment in which we live.
The exploration of the contents of the mass media and 
of other cultural objects in our environment is a distinctive 
feature of the field research in the French tradition. These
93
studies illustrate the transformation of social 
representations and explicate the forms of communication 
involved in their transmission and diffusion. In his study on 
the diffusion of psychoanalysis into French society, 
Moscovici (1961), for example, examined the acceptance and 
rejection of psychoanalytic theory in the Catholic and 
Marxist press. These investigations described the 
transformations in the contents of social representations 
which can, in part, be understood by the processes of 
anchoring and objectification.
The content analysis of Catholic and Marxist 
publications implies that the media are an important forms 
of communication between members of its readership, viewing, 
listening group, facilitating the diffusion of a social 
representation of psychoanalysis. It also describes the 
significant difference between the content of the theory of 
psychoanalysis and the social representations of 
psychoanalysis in the media. Moscovici is able to show how 
these transformations relate to the prevalent social 
representation within Marxism and Catholicism. However, the 
social processes by which these transformations come about 
are not examined. Little or nothing is said about the social 
interactions involved in the anchoring and objectification of 
psychoanalytic concepts. Similarly, although other field 
studies attempt to relate the content and transformation of 
social representations to the social, cultural and economic 
circumstances, their origins in social interactions is 
assumed rather than demonstrated. This is seen in Herzlich's 
(1973) investigation of the social representation of health 
and illness. This is a highly informative study which 
provides an excellent description of Parisians' understanding 
of health and illness in relation to their urban environment 
and also developments in medicine and changing doctor-patient 
relationships. However, it does not examine, in any detail, 
the form of communication and the variety of social 
interactions which constitute the means by which the social 
representation is formed. Hence, as a single study, it fails 
to portray the active construction involved in the
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development and transformation of a given social 
representation.
Other field studies have been more successful in 
examining the transformation and diffusion of social 
representations. This includes the work of Jodelet and 
Moscovici on the social representations of the human body 
(1973) and Chombart-de-Lauwe*s study of social
representations of childhood (1984). Jodelet and Moscovici 
traced the evolution and transformation of the social 
representations of the body over a fifteen year period. These 
were related to historical cultural changes and to the social 
circumstances of different groups and their changing roles in 
society. Furthermore, changes in the content of
representations of the body were found to be related to
people's experience of their own bodies. Differences were
related to people's social circumstances and reflected the 
differential cultural diffusion of information. The
transformation of social representation of the body is thus 
shown to be related to the form of communication and to 
people's personal experience of their bodies.
One of the most comprehensive field studies has been 
conducted by Chombart-de-Lauwe (1984) on the social 
representations of children, their transformation and their 
social transmission. One study explored the social 
representations of children in the imagination of adults by 
examining autobiographies and films in which the central 
character is a child. By comparing material produced in pre­
war,inter-war and contemporary literature, Chombart-de-Lauwe 
was able to determine the stability, changes and evolution of 
representations. A similar study analysed novels, comics, 
films and biographies directed at the child. This revealed 
divergences with representations constructed for adults as 
well as changes relating to the structure of society.
A further study was carried out in order to understand 
the social transmission of these representations to children. 
Children aged nine to twelve years were asked to write essays 
comparing media characters with themselves. This revealed 
influences which differentiate children's representations 
from the models offered by adults and relate to
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socio-biological characteristics of the child (age and sex), 
their social situation and their social status.
A completely different domain was studied by exploring 
representations of the child in relation to the built 
environment. The representations of the child held by 
planners, town-planners and architects influence the 
construction of the environment and hence the practices, 
life-styles and representations of children. For example, 
the place of the child in an urban environment is represented 
as either being segregated from or integrated with the 
structure of the community as a whole. These representations 
determine the environment in which children live, the 
activities in which they can engage, and hence the 
representations which they construct. Although much of this 
research explores, in detail, the adults' representations of 
childhood it is adults who create the world in which children 
grow up. From the perspective of the child these are 
confronted as 'social facts' which make up the environment in 
which they live.
By examining a variety of forms of communication, 
including various forms of literature and the construction 
of the physical environment, Chombart-de-Lauwe has 
illuminated the means by which representations of the child 
are socially transmitted and sustained. Her extensive 
analyses also reveal the social transformations of 
representations in three respects: transformations within
literature produced by adults for both adults and children; 
transformations of representations which occur from one 
generation to the next; and also transformations in the 
organization of the child's environment. These complementary 
and continued studies illuminate various aspects of the 
social representations of children; their variations, their 
transformatiuon from one historical period to another and 
their transmission to a new generation.
2.3.4.5 Summarv: Within the theory of social representations 
the understanding of social interaction and of communication 
extends beyond the non-verbal and verbal behaviour of 
individuals. They also involve interactions with and 
communication through the physical and social objects which
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make up the environment in which we live. It has been argued 
that the experimental studies are extremely limited in their 
exploration of the development and transmission of social 
representations through the processes of social interaction 
and communication. Similarly, Di Giacomo's investigation of 
intergroup relations does not directly explore how and why 
social representations come to assume the form they do. In 
contrast, British studies on the socialization of children 
and the field studies carried out in France, are 
complementary bodies of research which illuminate different 
aspects of how social representations are socially generated 
and socially sustained. The British studies illustrate the 
transmission of social representations from one generation to 
another and the social interactions involved in the child's 
reconstruction of those representations. The field studies 
also examine the diffusion and transmission of social 
representations but these tend to focus on the forms of 
communication and transformation in their content over a 
given historical period. These two approaches to the 
exploration of the social development and maintenance of 
social representations need to be combined in order to 
provide a more complete understanding of the social processes 
involved.
2.3.5 Representations and social realitv
We have seen that there are a number of senses in which 
social representations have been considered social. Social 
may refer to the object being represented, to the context in 
which they are expressed, to the social membership of the 
individual, to the fact that they are shared by a number of 
individuals, and to their origins and development in social 
interaction. These various senses of social have been 
emphasized in different bodies of research and relate both to 
the content and the methods employed in that research (see 
Chapter 6) . However, social representations may also be 
considered social in that they constitute a social reality. 
This brings us to the sense of social which was emphasized at 
the beginning of the previous chapter and, I believe, an 
understanding of which is vital for assessment of social 
representations theory.
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Moscovici clearly considers this aspect of social
representations to be of primary importance.
This is so not because it has a collective origin, 
or because it refers to a collective object, but 
because, as such, being shared by all and 
strengthened by tradition, it constitues a social 
reality "sui generi".
(Moscovici,1984b,p.13)
Jaspars and Fraser (1984) also recognize the central
importance of social reality in their comparison of social
cognition (cognitive structures) and social representations.
The latter has implications for social exchange beyond the
interpersonal level and emphasizes the social origins of the
content and structure of representations.
However, these differences do not seem to constitute 
the most important distinction between social 
representations and cognitive structures....what is 
social about social representations is not in the 
first place that such representations are 
representations of social reality, or that they are 
social in origin, but that they are social because 
they are shared by many individuals and as such 
constitute a social realitv which can influence 
individual behaviour.
(Jaspars and Fraser,1984,p.104,italics 
added).
Although central to the theory of social representations 
this point is often lost in research. The experimental 
studies completely fail to characterize this social reality 
as a result of an analysis which remains on the 
intra-individual cognitive level, as previously discussed. 
Investigations of intergroup relations and social 
attributions, in so far as they recognize the supra­
individual nature of social representations, go some way 
towards an understanding of social reality. Out of the 
studies already mentioned, those which incorporate the notion 
of social reality most successfully deal with the 
transmission and development of social representations. The 
studies go some way towards an understanding of how the child 
reconstructs the social reality of the adult world and how 
this social reality is changed and transformed.
What is distinctively European about the French School 
is not that they are concerned with social objects, the
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social context in which individuals and groups are situated, 
or that knowledge is shared, but that social representations 
constitute a social reality. This is not to say that other 
social factors are either excluded or unimportant but that 
they are incorporated in an understanding of the social 
nature of reality. This understanding draws on European 
sociological thinking, and in particular on the work of 
Durkheim. Unlike the experimental studies described 
previously, which emerged as a critique of American social 
psychology, the initial conceptualization and development of 
the notion of social representations arose out of a tradition 
of thinking which is essentially European. As such, it goes 
beyond traditional Anglo-American research by providing not 
just a social extension to this research but an alternative 
paradigm.
Durkheim introduced the concept of collective 
representations into his sociology in order to describe 'the 
system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious 
of itself including religion, law, morals, customs and 
political institutions. This 'conscience collective' is 
embedded in our language, tradition and customs, as well as 
our institutions. Moscovici (1961) refers to the notion of 
collective representations as a neglected and forgotten 
concept which failed to have any great impact on research in 
sociology, anthropology and psychology. Furthermore his aim, 
in part, is to reestablish this forgotten concept as a 
legitimate object of study essential to a truly social 
psychology. He sees the explicit task of social psychology to 
be the study of the nature and genesis of collective 
representations, the knowledge and belief systems which shape 
our social reality.
It has already been said that these representations
constitute a social reality sui generis. That is to say, they
exist independently of individual representations and have
characteristics or attributes which are supra-individual and
cannot be reduced to the individual level.
Social facts are in a sense independent of 
individuals and exterior to individual 
minds. .Society has for its substratum the mass of 
associated individuals The representations which
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form the network of social life arise from the 
relations between individuals... and the total 
society...collective representations, produced by 
the action and reaction between individual minds 
that form the society, do not derive directly from 
the latter and consequently surpass them.
(Durkheim,1974,pp.24-5, 
quoted in Fransella,1984,p.157)
and also
collective psychology cannot be deduced directly 
from individual psychology, because a new factor has 
intervened, which has transformed the psychic 
material, a factor which is the source of all that 
is different and new, namely association.
(Durkheim,1898,pp.273-302, 
quoted in Harré,1984c,p.933)
Hence collective representations do not exist in the 
minds of individuals but rather in their associations, 
communications and social interactions. The well-known adage 
'the sum is greater than its parts' is as good as any; it is 
not the understanding in the mind of any one individual but 
rather it is the understanding provided by the collective, 
for the collective.
Farr (1990a) and Markova and Wilkie (1987) both stress 
the collective nature of representation. In their discussion 
of Aids as a new social phenomenon, Markova and Wilkie 
emphasize the need for a social theory of knowledge as 
opposed to an individualistic epistemology. For them, as for 
Durkheim, collective representations constitute a reality 
which has evolved through the co-operation of a multitude of 
minds over generations. Farr (in press) also emphasizes the 
collective nature of representations in his examination of 
individualism in western culture and its influence on the 
development of psychology. Drawing on the work of Gustav 
Ichheiser (1949,1970) , Farr explicates how the representation 
of the individual exists at the collective level and is 
insidious but pervasive, not only in our social and economic 
life, but also in our legal practices regarding attribution 
of responsibility, (in our attribution of success and 
failure) and also in the historical development of western 
psychology.
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In conclusion, although the experimental literature and 
research on intergroup processes and causal attribution do 
have their place within the social representations approach 
they are not as successful as the field studies and 
investigations into the socialization of children at 
elucidating the social nature of representations. Social 
representations are social, not because they refer to social 
objects or arise in a social context, although these are not 
excluded. Nor is the fundamental sense of social portrayed by 
the intergroup relations and attribution research which 
emphasizes the consensual nature of representation, being 
shared by a number of individuals. Representations are social 
because they reflect a form of social thinking which is 
apparent, not only in our cognitions but also in the social 
and physical environment in which we live. As such, they 
constitute a social reality which is sustained and 
transformed through social interactions and communication. 
This sense of social, which goes beyond an individual 
analysis to include the cultural and historical aspects of 
human life, is more clearly evident in the field studies and 
investigations into the socialization of children.
Drawing on the foregoing assessment of the diverse 
research and the previous theoretical outline, we are now in 
a position to construct a definition of social 
representations. It can be seen that social representations 
constitute the social reality in which we live; they refer 
to the products of social thinking as well as to the material 
and social environment. They are symbolic, autonomous 
entities which are both conventional and prescriptive, 
constructing and shaping the reality with which we interact. 
The various forms of communication allow the diffusion of 
these representations throughout society, and reflect both 
their stability and dynamics. Representations are also 
creative or constructive, being generated and transformed 
through the processes of social interaction and 
communication. This occurs for the purpose of understanding 
and communicating about the events and objects which confront 
us, being directed towards the mastery of our social and 
material world. As such, they form a consensual universe
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which allows the coordination of interactions and the 
socialization of new members into a given society. The social 
significance of representations, both in terms of their 
content and their functions, is thus linked to the social 
context in which they emerge.
2.4 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY REVISITED 
At its inception (Moscovici,1961), the concept of social 
representations was associated with the diffusion of 
knowledge throughout society, and in, particular, with the 
representation of scientific knowledge in a consensual 
universe. However, the wide variety of research, especially 
with reference to the object of study, testifies to its wider 
application. The theory of social representations has been 
employed to explore and to describe socio- psychological 
knowledge which is not directly associated with scientific 
discoveries, concepts or theories. These studies focus on 
non-scientific knowledge, emphasizing the importance of both 
tradition and first-hand experience. This might be considered 
a misapplication of the theory, but an examination of some of 
the theoretical postulates supports a more universal 
conception of social representations. Moreover, tradition and 
first-hand experience play an important part in the diffusion 
of scientific knowledge and in the construction of social 
representations. It will be argued that the dynamic nature 
of social representations and the forms of communication 
associated with their diffusion in society do not provide 
grounds for distinguishing between representations of 
scientific and non-scientific objects.
2.4.1 The object of research
The early field studies conducted in France were 
primarily concerned with the diffusion of scientific notions 
from the reified universe of science into the consensual 
world of common-sense and everyday understanding. It has 
already been mentioned that the first social representations 
study (Moscovici,1961) examined how the scientific theory of 
psychoanalysis diffused into French society. Concepts such as 
'neurosis' and 'complex' became part of people's everyday 
understanding of their own and other people's behaviour. 
Similarly, Moscovici is currently investigating the diffusion
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of Marxism in French society. Another early study which 
reflects this focus explored the transmission and 
assimilation of scientific facts by workers in the chemical 
industry (Ackerman and Rialan,1963).
The interest in common-sense understanding of scientific 
discoveries is also evident in some of the more recent field 
studies. Herzlich's (1973) study on the social representation 
of health and illness illustrates its relationship with the 
historical development of medicine. For example, illness is 
now understood in terms of the invasion of a naturally 
healthy body by external agents such as bacteria or germs. 
Similarly, the social representation of the body and its 
transformation, over time, may also be related to changing 
doctor-patient relationships and to developments within the 
medical profession (Jodelet and Moscovici,1975). Jodelet and 
Milgram (1977) also illustrate how inhabitants' social 
representations of Paris are influenced by the products of 
cartography which may be considered a scientific 
representation of the city.
Other French researchers, however, have chosen objects 
of study which bear only a tenuous link with the products of 
scientific disciplines. The most compelling example in this 
respect is Chombart-de-Lauwe*s extensive investigation of 
social representations of the child (1984). Transformations 
over time, evident in the literary products of French 
society, are not directly related to our scientific theories 
or to the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense 
understandings of childhood. It can be seen that, even within 
the French field work, a diversity of representations have 
been studied.
Both Farr (1990a) and Breakwell (1987) have commented 
on the problem of choosing a suitable object as the target 
of a representation. If social representations theory is 
concerned with the diffusion of scientific knowledge in 
society, it might be supposed that a scientific theory should 
be selected as the target object. However, this does not 
appear to be the major criterion for selecting the target 
object. Firstly, a knowledge of both psychoanalysis and 
Marxism had diffused fairly widely in France during the
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post-World War II era and they have since become salient 
features of French culture. They are consequently socially 
significant aspects of everyday life in France, and are 
represented at many different levels within French society. 
As Farr (1987b) notes, there would have been little point in 
studying their social representations in Britain during the 
same post-war era as neither had become socially significant 
features of British culture.
Secondly, turning to the other major field studies 
mentioned above, although the transformations in their 
respective social representations may be related, directly, 
to scientific theories and discoveries, the object of study 
is not a scientific theory as such. There is not a scientific 
theory of towns and cities, or of childhood. Rather, they are 
socially significant objects which are represented in various 
aspects of French culture and social life. They are present 
in the mass media of communication, in people's social 
interactions and they are often related to debates within 
French communities.
Other research on social representations also indicates 
that the theory is not exclusively applicable to the 
transformation of scientific knowledge into common-sense 
understandings. These include the laboratory studies carried 
out in France, inter-group relation studies and research on 
the socialization of children. As described previously, 
experimental literature focuses on the representations of the 
self, of others, of the group and of the task within an 
artificial situation. These are not usually related to any 
scientific body of knowledge. Furthermore, it may be 
considered that they are only socially significant objects 
within the experimental situation. This is perhaps why Farr 
(1984) suggests that a more suitable level of investigation 
would be to study social representations of the laboratory 
rather than within the laboratory. The experimental 
investigations explicitly attempt to explore the mechanisms 
associated with social representations. As Farr (1987b) 
indicates, this corpus of research is the only direct 
evidence that a person's actions are a consequence of his or 
her social representations. However, it has been argued that
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the significance of these experiments goes beyond a 
demonstrative role as they introduce socially significant 
objects, for example "a computer" or "a student, like 
yourself" (Abric,1976), from the wider cultural context into 
the laboratory. The reasons underlying Moscovici and 
Faucheux*s (1968) choice of "nature" and "chance" as the 
target representations must relate to their social 
significance in everyday life. Thus, experimental researchers 
have selected objects of study which are not necessarily 
scientific in origin but which do play an important part in 
everyday social life. This is also true of the intergroup 
relations studies in which the social representations 
selected for study are of the significant groups within a 
given community. For example, in Di Giacomo's (1980) research 
during a students' protest movement, the relevant social 
representations are of groups associated with the student 
population, such as "workers" and "executives".
The British work on social representations has also
interpreted the theory to be applicable to a wider range of
phenomena than Moscovici first proposed. For example,
children's social representations of economic inequalities,
although they may be associated, in part, with economic
theories, are much more closely associated with the child's
set of social relations, their social class and their general
social milieu (Emler and Dickinson,1985). The traditions of
a society are experienced and internalized by children
through their interactions with the social and physical
objects in their social milieu. Similarly, Duveen and Lloyd
(1987) have employed the theory to explore the socio-
psychological aspects of gender. The social representations
of "male" and "female" are articulated in a system of values,
ideas and practices associated with each pole. The domain of
social representations is thus
no longer a question of the dispersion of a 
scientific theory through society, but with a 
general phenomenon which pervades the whole of 
society.
(Duveen and Lloyd,1987,p.4)
Moscovici's original intent was to elaborate a specific 
socio-psychological concept which was particular to modern
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society and the diffusion of scientific knowledge into 
common-sense understanding (see Chapter 1) . We have seen that 
the domain of social representations has been extended by the 
subsequent research to include a wide range of socio- 
psychological phenomena which often focus on non-scientific, 
socially significant objects. It may be considered that, by 
breaking the boundaries set by Moscovici, the notion of 
social representations is in danger of becoming, merely, a 
general synonym for 'culture' or 'ideology'. Indeed, 
Moscovici warns against identifying social representations as 
a 'general category concerning the totality of intellectual 
and social products' (Moscovici,1976,p.40). However, the 
boundaries propounded by Moscovici in specifying the 
particular domain of social representations are not reflected 
in the theoretical postulates concerning their nature and 
function. This discrepancy is evident from the definition of 
social representations (above) as well as the theoretical 
exposition presented in the previous chapter. Social 
representations are conceived as bodies of social knowledge 
which are orientated towards the practical and social life 
of a given community. As such, they not only refer to 
common-sense understanding of scientific theories but to a 
whole range of practical knowledge found in a given society. 
The wider domain of the theory is thus not only suggested by 
the diversity of the research itself, but also by the 
definition of social representations and by much of 
Moscovici's own theoretical writings concerning their nature 
and function in society.
It may still be possible to distinguish between social 
representations of scientific concepts and other domains of 
socio-psychological knowledge. Firstly, the former exhibit 
a peculiarly dynamic character which breaks with tradition, 
whereas the latter often maintain tradition. Secondly, the 
former are disseminated through society by means of mass 
media communication, whereas the latter are more closely 
associated with people's first-hand experience in their 
social milieux. Thirdly, social representations are 
transformed by specific processes, which may be peculiar to 
the diffusion of scientific knowledge. It will be argued,
106
however, that these do not provide adequate grounds for 
distinguishing scientific from non-scientific social 
representations. The issue addressed here is whether or not 
these contents are sufficiently different to justify the 
specification of different forms or modes of representation.
2.4.2 Innovation and tradition
Some researchers may be accused of selecting 
'collective* rather than 'social* representations as their 
object of study. Collective representations are more 
widespread and permanent elements in the consensual universe 
and home, and they are more normally associated with more 
stable societies. Social representations, on the other hand, 
are dynamic, exhibiting transformations in their content and 
structure, and are peculiar to modern society (see Chapter 
1) . (The distinction between these two forms of 
representation is discussed more fully in Chapter 4) . 
Representations of gender or of childhood are phenomena which 
pervade the whole of society and are steeped in tradition. 
Duveen and Lloyd (1987) acknowledge that a description of the 
gender system corresponds to a collective level of analysis 
which could be pursued through sociological or 
anthropological research. However, they argue that, in order 
to produce a description of how these representations become 
psychologically active in the regulation of social 
interaction, it is necessary to present a social- 
psychological analysis which is afforded by a social 
representations approach.
It may still be argued that these phenomena do not 
exhibit the dynamic characteristics of social 
representations. It will be remembered (from the previous 
chapter) that the discoveries and original theories of 
science produce the unfamiliar concepts which provide the 
impetus for transformations of our social representations. 
Their main function, in this respect, is to break with 
tradition. Representations of gender or of childhood are 
rarely directly influenced by scientific developments. 
Consequently, it might be considered that they express the 
cultural traditions of collective memory, embedded in the 
images and meanings of language and that they do not exhibit
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the plasticity of social representations. However, the 
impetus for change and transformation does not emerge only in 
science; discoveries and innovations are not peculiar to the 
realm of science.
Innovation and the impetus for change are produced in 
other sections of society; in business, marketing, 
advertising, the caring professions, leisure etc., sections 
of society which deal with the practical issues of everyday 
life. Moscovici himself has elsewhere emphasized the 
important role played by minority groups within society in 
changing predominant social representations. Unfamiliar 
concepts and objects may also be imported from other 
cultures: a case in point would be the invasion of Eastern 
philosophies and religions into American culture. The object 
of a representation may thus emerge within the consensual 
universe of ordinary communication and social interaction 
without having migrated from the reified universe of science. 
These provide the unfamiliar objects or events which 
transform our social representations. This is experienced in 
the dynamic nature of the relevant social representations. 
For example, representations of 'male* and 'female* have 
changed dramatically with the rise of the feminist movement. 
Representations of the child have undergone extensive 
transformations during the last twenty years 
(Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984) . It can be seen that these 
non-scientific representations also possess the dynamic 
characteristics of social representations.
From the opposite angle, tradition plays an equally 
important part in the understanding of scientific concepts 
or science-related issues. Moscovici is well aware of the 
role of tradition but, in some respects, he underestimates 
its influence. Two of the field studies conducted in France 
illustrate this point. Jodelet (1986) explored the social 
representations of mental illness in French villages where 
the inhabitants were hosts to a number of ex-mental patients. 
Her investigations revealed the re-emergence of centuries-old 
theories concerning the contagious nature of mental illness, 
and the failure of modern scientific knowledge to enter into 
people's common-sense understanding. Similarly, social
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representations of Paris, (Milgram and Jodelet,1976) reflect 
the historical development of the city. Divisions of the 
urban area are constructed around the historical heart and 
belt of the city. The latter no longer exists in physical 
terms, but is still present in the collective memory and 
socio-spatial representations of the city. Knowledge drawn 
from street maps of Paris produced by cartographers is 
selectively emphasized and distorted to reflect these socio- 
psychological elements. Thus tradition, in terms of the 
historical and cultural understandings of a community, is 
extremely influential in the transformations of social 
representations associated with the products of science.
2.4.3 Media of communication
So far, it has been established that social 
representations which relate to scientific concepts and 
discoveries and those which relate exclusively to socially 
significant objects cannot be distinguished either in terms 
of their dynamic (v.static) nature or with reference to the 
import of tradition.
However, a distinction may still be possible in terms 
of the forms of comunication involved in each sphere. 
Non-scientific representations are dependent on first-hand 
experience and the facticity of events. This is so with 
regard both to the transmission of representations from one 
generation to the next and to the creation and elaboration 
of representations in the consensual universe. Scientific 
theories, in contrast, are pre-existing bodies of knowledge 
which are disseminated through society by the mass media. 
However, on closer inspection, such a distinction is not 
upheld. The elaborations and transformations of non- 
scientific representations can be seen to involve both forms 
of communication. On the one hand, representations of 
maleness or femaleness, of groups within society, or of 
childhood, are intimately involved in everyday social 
interactions. On the other hand, these representations are 
expressed in and disseminated through the media and 
literature of a given society. They are issues currently 
addressed in newspaper articles, books, films, TV programmes 
etc. Similarly, both forms of communication are involved in
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the elaboration and transformation of scientific 
representations. Social representations of Paris are 
constructed and maintained, not only on the basis of 
traditional and scientific understandings, but also on the 
basis of people's first-hand experience of the city. 
Inhabitants' representations will be divergent from 
'foreigners'' representations, who have not lived in and 
experienced the city. Changes in the social representation 
of the body (Jodelet and Moscovici, 1975; Jodelet, 1984a) occur 
not only through the diffusion of scientific knowledge but 
also through knowledge acquired from people's actual 
experience of their bodies in social interactions with 
others.
In his study on the diffusion of psychoanalysis, 
Moscovici describes how unfamiliar concepts are equated with 
the familiar, for example with Catholics' social 
representations of the priest and of confession. On the other 
hand, the theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis are taken up 
and assimilated into people's social representations because 
they answer problems of first-hand, everyday experience. They 
are useful in solving problems concerning the understanding 
of people's behaviour. For example, the concept of neurosis 
allows otherwise unfamiliar and strange behaviours to be 
categorized and labelled. In this way, it appears to provide 
an explanation of otherwise inexplicable actions. The form 
and content of these social representations, and their 
further elaborations and transformations, not only derive 
from the diffusion of unfamiliar scientific concepts in the 
media, but also because these concepts facilitate an 
understanding of events in people's everyday lives. (This 
would further suggest that some scientific theories will not 
readily enter into the public arena of common-sense 
knowledge.)
2.4.4 Processes of transformation
It is not possible to distinguish between scientific 
and non-scientific representations with reference to their 
associated forms of communication. Finally, it is necessary 
to consider the processes by which social representations
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are transformed and elaborated. Moscovici describes two 
socio-psychological processes; anchoring and objectification.
Anchoring reduces threat and unfamiliarity by imposing 
familiar categories and providing linguistic names. Systems 
of social representations provide the familiar categories to 
which unfamiliar objects or events are anchored. It 'excludes 
the idea of thought or perception which is without anchor' 
(Moscovici,1984b,p.36). As Billig (1987b) indicates, this is 
a universal socio-psychological process which applies to any 
unfamiliar concept, object or event, whether it originates in 
the sciences or in the consensual universe. In his rhetorical 
criticism of the universal conception of social 
representations and anchoring, Billig goes on to describe the 
counter-process of 'particularization'. Not only are we able 
to anchor the unfamiliar and represent its similitude with 
familiar objects, so, too, we can negate this process by 
representing something familiar as distinct or unfamiliar. 
Again, the process of 'particularization' is applicable to 
both scientific and non-scientific representations.
Objectification transforms abstract, unfamiliar concepts 
into familiar concrete experiences. This process allows the 
invisible to become perceptible; abstract concepts are 
'materialized' or naturalized, such that they become objects 
existing in the physical and social world. Billig (1987b) 
suggests that objectification is a particular process. It is 
particular to these beliefs which are essentially 
non-religious, and which have originated from abstract 
scientific thinking. Abstract, scientific concepts are 
objectified as they enter into the consensual universe. 
However, objectification can also be seen to occur with 
respect to non-scientific, even religious concepts. People 
create images of God and many religious rituals involve the 
objectification of essentially abstract beliefs. Furthermore, 
there are some abstract concepts from both the reified and 
the consensual universes which belie objectification. Ideas 
of communism or socialism , from the social sciences, and 
notions of relativity or magnetism, from the physical 
sciences, are just as difficult to objectify as consensual 
notions of justice or mercy. Thus, although objectification
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may be particular to a certain class of concepts, the 
division between scientific and non-scientific concepts does 
not appear to provide an adequate classification.
Billig (1987b) also suggests that there is a counter­
process to objectification which he refers to as 
'transcendentalization'. This he associates with religious 
societies in which concrete experience is transformed into 
something which transcends the material world and takes on 
an abstract quality. For example, the invisible presence of 
God is to be observed within the perceptible world of objects 
and events. However, 'trancendentalization' can also be seen 
with reference to the sciences. The world of objects, of 
tables, chairs, of cars and rivers and mountains, we are 
told, is a world of molecules and atoms, of imperceptible 
motion and energy. Again, no longer is the natural world made 
up of discrete objects such as trees and squirrels, or 
factories and roads, rather it is an ecosystem which depends 
on a delicate balance of interdependent relationships. 
Trancendentalization is not the province of religion alone. 
Furthermore, in some cases, common-sense understandings of 
the products of science also involve the negation of 
objectification. For example, computers and machinery are 
often attributed qualities associated with animistic 
behaviour, they have intentions and purposes, are given 
personalized names and are generally not treated as material 
objects. Again, the processes described by Moscovici and the 
counter-processes proposed by Billig do not suggest a clear 
distinction between scientific and non-scientific 
representations.
Thus it is not possible to distinguish between social 
representations of scientific theories or concepts, such as 
psychoanalysis, and social representations of socially 
significant, non-scientific objects, such as 'male' or 
'female', in terms of their mode of representation. This is 
with reference to their dynamic nature; the role of tradition 
and first-hand experience; to the various forms of 
communication involved; and to the processes by which they 
are elaborated and transformed. It is, therefore, neither 
useful nor accurate to limit the application of the theory to
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social representations of scientific knowledge. It is equally 
applicable to other domains of social-psychological knowledge 
and provides a useful framework in which to investigate them.
The boundaries to the domain of social representations 
which were initially proposed by Moscovici appear to be 
rather artificial ones, which are reflected neither in the 
theoretical postulates concerning the nature, function and 
processes of social representations, nor in the empirical 
investigations which have been carried out to date. The 
theory of social representations is applicable to a broad 
spectrum of socio-psychological phenomena and may indeed 
constitute a social-psychology of knowledge. There is no 
doubt that some kind of typology or classification will be 
required but, just as a definition of social representations 
must be derived from empirical research so, too, the 
boundaries of the domain of social representations theory, 
and the classification of representations within that domain, 
should not be determined a priori, without reference to 
empirical research.
2.5 NOT A CONCLUSION
An assessment of the contributions made by the diverse 
fields of research has assisted in constructing a definition 
of social representations and in determining the domain to 
which the theory is applicable. In the course of this 
chapter, some of the internal contradictions and confusions 
regarding the phenomenon and the theory of social 
representations have been addressed and clarified. However, 
a number of substantive issues remain to be resolved. 
Although the fundamentally social nature of representations, 
as depicted by the theory, has been established, it is still 
necessary to determine the distinction between individual, 
social and collective representations. This is related to a 
number of issues. Firstly, there appears to be an uneasy 
contrast between the prescriptive and dynamic nature of 
social representations, which at once determine our social 
interactions and which are transformed by those interactions. 
Secondly, the autonomous and supra-individual nature of 
social representations appears to obviate the role of the 
individual in their transformation. Thirdly, although the
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significance of conceiving a social reality has been
emphasized in both the theoretical outline and the overview 
of research, it is still necessary to explicate what is
entailed in the social construction of reality. Finally, it 
remains unclear whether or not the theory of social
representations is able to provide an integration or
synthesis of the individual and the social which is required 
by the social psychology which its proponents envisage. These 
issues will be discussed in the following two chapters in an 
attempt to clarify the problems and to reformulate the theory 
in order to provide a potential resolutions.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: CHANGING
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND OF SCIENCE IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY
3.1 THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY
3.1.1 Introspectionism and the Positivist's repudiation of 
Wundt
3.1.2 Behaviourism and psychology as a branch of natural 
science
3.1.3 Cognitive psychology: A different perspective 
3.2 THE SHAPING OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
3.2.1 Collective perspectives
3.2.2 Behaviourist perspectives
3.2.3 Cognitive social psychology
3.2.4 From sociological to psychological forms of social 
psychology
3.3 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CULTURE?
3.4 DESCARTES AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF 
INDIVIDUALISTIC (SOCIAL) PSYCHOLOGY
3.5 AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
3.6 THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE DIVIDED
3.6.1 A note on Darwin
3.6.2 A dilemma for social psychology
3.7 THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE
Social psychology is charged with the formidable 
task of integrating the psychological and cultural aspects 
of human life. Psychology focuses on the individual, 
sociology on society and anthropology on culture. The 
objective of social psychology is to provide a perspective 
that embraces individuals in their interactions with one 
another and shows how they relate to the institutional, 
cultural and social structures of society. This objective is 
explicitly endorsed by the proponents of the theory of social 
representations. However, in the previous chapter it was 
noted that there are a number of outstanding problems. In 
particular, it is not clear how the individual can play a
part in the maintenance and transformation of a social 
reality which is, at one and the same time, both prescriptive 
and dynamic. If these problems are to be overcome the theory 
must achieve a conceptual integration between individuals and 
culture.
Firstly, it is important to understand how the 
psychological and sociological aspects of human life came to 
be conceived of in terms of two separate and distinct 
disciplines, namely psychology and sociology. In other words, 
why was there a need for a social psychology in the first 
place? Secondly, once a division between the individual and 
society was established, why is it now necessary to construct 
an integration? In this chapter, we shall go some way towards 
answering these questions by tracing the historical 
development of both psychology and social psychology; by 
examining the philosophical roots and assumptions underlying 
the various approaches; and by exploring contemporary 
developments in social psychology.
It will be seen that the history of social psychology 
manifests an uneasy tension between a thesis which focuses 
on the individual, and its antithesis, which focuses on 
society and/or culture. This tension is perpetuated in 
contemporary fields of social psychology, despite the fact 
that, in the past, there have been a number of attempts to 
construct a synthesis. A crucial component of this debate is 
the social representation of the individual and its close 
association with the social representation of science adopted 
by psychologists.
On the grounds of an empirico-historical narrative and 
a logical analysis, it is argued that a social representation 
of science as a positivistic empirical endeavour demands a 
social representation of the individual which precludes a 
synthesis of the individual and culture. It is argued that 
this approach is rooted in Cartesian philosophy and Newtonian 
physics, which isolates the individual from his or her 
physical and social environment. In contrast, the Hegelian 
tradition of thought provides an alternative paradigm in 
which the individual is both the product and the producer of 
culture. Furthermore, this Hegelian tradition endorses a
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comparative and evolutionary approach to the study of social 
phenomena. This latter approach, at one stage, was prevalent 
within social psychology. Its apogee was the Handbook of 
Social Psvcholoav published in two volumes by Murchison in 
1935. It has since gone out of fashion. In fact, 'progress' 
in social psychology is measured by distance from this 
landmark (Farr,1988). This having been said, the Hegelian 
paradigm is reflected, once again, in various contemporary 
developments in social psychology. In particular, the social 
constructionism of Gergen (1985a,b) and the various 
presentations of social contextualism (Jaegar and Rosnow, 
1988), which have emerged out of the 'crisis' in social 
psychology, are discussed. These provide both a new directive 
for the conduct of enquiry into social phenomena and a 
paradigm for the integration of psychology, social psychology 
and anthropology.
This exposition serves to illuminate the theory of 
social representations in several different ways. Firstly, 
it facilitates an understanding of problems in contemporary 
social psychology; of how they arose and of what would 
constitute a novel approach. The novelty and value of the 
theory can only be assessed within both an historical and 
contemporary context. Secondly, the content of past 
psychologies can provide important material for resolving 
contemporary problems and for indicating new directions in 
which to advance (Billig,1987a). (Both these points are 
relevant to the contents of the present chapter). Past 
works, in which authors have wrestled with the same meta- 
theoretical problems, can shed light on the essential 
components of a social-psychological theory. Thirdly, this 
chapter explores the dynamics of social representations in 
the history of psychology and social psychology. In 
particular, the exposition focuses on social representations 
of the individual and of their relationship with culture and 
to the social representations of science. It is important to 
understand the evolution of these social representations and 
their role in shaping social psychology in the past. We are 
then in a better position to construct a viable synthesis of 
the individual and culture in contemporary social psychology.
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The double use of social representations is fully 
intentional. It refers both to the theory of social 
representations and to social representations of the 
individual and of science within social psychology. This is 
justified by a belief that social psychology as a discipline 
needs to be self-reflexive. The history of psychology to date 
has been more concerned with reflexology than with 
reflectivity. However, psychology is a human science 
conducted by humans and, as such, its theories should apply 
not only to 'the world out there' but also to 'the world in 
here' ie. the world of social psychologists. Furthermore, the 
double use of social representations is consistent with the 
view that the theory of social representations is applicable 
to the 'consensual' and 'reified' 'worlds'.
The scientific discipline of psychology has now entered 
its second century. Although its long past can be traced back 
to the Greek Philosophers (Hearnshaw, 1986) , the world's first 
psychological laboratory was founded by Wilhelm Wundt at 
Leipzig in 1879. The recent centenary gave rise to
reflections on the discipline's past and on its prospects for 
the future. Professional historians of science have begun to 
trace the origins and development of psychology as a
discipline (eg. O'Donnell,1979 ; Asch, 1982) and
psychologists, themselves, have begun to take a greater 
interest in their historical roots (eg. Koch and Leary, 
1985). These are not just the reflective musings of 
psychologists with an interest in history. The past 
constitutes the very foundation from which the present 
emerges: in many respects, it sets the problems and provides 
the context in which novel approaches are assessed. On the 
other hand, the present is the perspective from which the 
past is reconstructed (Mead,1932). When novel events or 
significant changes occur, renewed interest in the past
attempts to locate the novelty in a natural history of 
development. A new version of history is constructed which 
emphasizes both continuities and discontinuities between past 
and present.
The following account builds upon the work of Farr 
(eg.1981a,b,1983,1985,1987a,1990b) and others (Markova, 1982;
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Hearnshaw,1987; Manicus,1986; Secord,1986; Gergen, 1985) who 
trace the historical development of social as well as of 
individual forms of psychology in contrast to more 
traditional histories of the discipline (eg. Boring, 
1929-1950; Allport,1985 ; Jones,1985). The historical 
narrative presented here emphasizes social representations 
of the individual and their relation to social 
representations of science. I propose to show that, despite 
dramatic changes in the orientation of scientific psychology, 
from the study of mind by means of introspection, through the 
empirical study of behaviour to the rationalist study of 
cognition, psychology has not escaped the individualism it 
inherited, at birth, from philosophy.
3.1 THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY
The division between the individual and culture was 
inherent in the verv foundation of psvcholoav as a scientific 
discipline. In 1879, Wundt established the first laboratory 
for the experimental exploration of the contents of 
individual consciousness. This was a form of psychophysics 
which applied the experimental methods of physiology to the 
psychological problems derived from philosophy. By means of 
introspection the individual observed the contents of his/her 
own mind. This was complementary to, but separated from, his 
Voelker- psychologie (1900-1920) which was concerned with the 
study of language, customs, religion, myth, magic and 
cognitive phenomena. The study of these collective phenomena 
required a comparative and historical approach to scientific 
investigations and drew on anthropological reports of diverse 
cultures (Cole,1987). For Wundt, both were essential to a 
science of psychology, and the conclusions from the one 
should be compatible with the other.
Both the experimental psychophysics and the comparative 
Voelkerpsychologie have been influential in the broader 
history of social psychology. The former, with its focus both 
on the individual and on scientific method, can be traced 
through the history of psychology as an experimental science. 
The latter, with its emphasis on social and cultural 
phenomena and on the use of historico-comparative method of
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investigation, influenced the development of social sciences 
other than psychology.
3.1.1 Introspectionism and the Positivists' repudiation of 
Wundt
As psychology became established as an independent 
experimental science in America it was transformed into an 
individualistic and positivistic science. For Wundt, the 
method of introspection was only applicable in the 
observation of the immediate contents of consciousness, that 
is, to the psychic correlates of physical stimulation. The 
investigation of higher cognitive processes, which were a 
product of evolutionary and historical changes, could not be 
accounted for in terms of individual consciousness, since 
they presupposed the reciprocal interactions of a whole 
community or 'volk'. The study of these collective mental 
phenomena was to follow in Wundt's Voelker- psychologie.
However, Wundt's students rejected the restrictions he 
placed on the use of introspection and extended the range of 
phenomena amenable to such investigation to include memory 
and thought. In so doing, they also failed to realize the 
significance of Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie. Danziger 
(1979,1980), shows how this 'positivist repudiation of Wundt' 
was strongly influenced both by the positivism of Mach and of 
Avenarius, and by British associâtionism. These were alien to 
both Wundt's scientific metaphysics and his Kantian 
philosophy. The misunderstanding of Wundt's contribution to 
psychology has been perpetuated by such influential histories 
of experimental psychology as Boring (1929/1950); and Miller 
(1966). They have selected for special attention those 
aspects of Wundt's work which sustain an individualistic and 
positivistic psychology and, in so doing, they have created 
a distorted representation of Wundt's work.
3.1.2 Behaviourism and psvcholoav as a branch of natural 
science
With the rise of behaviourism the science of psychology 
was transformed from the study of mind and human experience 
to the study of behaviour. However, despite the change in the 
object of studv, both introspectionism and behaviourism had
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adopted a positivistic philosophy of science and both were 
essentially non-social.
The method of introspection saw its demise with the 
unresolved 'imageless thought * controversy and was 
successfully superceded by behaviourism. Behaviourists were 
united by their social representation of science and their 
commitment to methodological objectivism rather than any 
substantive theoretical perspective (Mackenzie,1977). Like 
the introspection of Titchener, the behaviourism of Watson 
was dominated by a positivistic empiricism which was 
antirationalist and anti-intuitionist. The use of laboratory 
and experimental research methods was also maintained. What 
distinguished behaviourism from introspectionism was its 
rejection of any entities or processes which were not 
directly and publicly observable. This simultaneously 
broadened the scope of psychology to include the study of 
both animals and infants, neither of which could be 
investigated using introspection, and enhanced the 
methodological sophistication of research.
The social representation of science adopted by 
behaviourists was based on classical theoretical physics, as 
exemplified by Newton's 'Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica' (1687). It involved a mechanistic conception of 
nature in which elementary and independent particles of 
matter operated according to discoverable laws. Laboratory 
experimentation was an ideal method for controlling and 
isolating independent and dependent variables. For 
psychology, a new particle entered into the equation of 
simple cause and effect relationships- the individual. In 
order to be consistent with the social representation of 
science, the individual had to be conceived of as an isolated 
object. in a linear causal mechanism of stimuli and 
responses. Furthermore, statements were only meaningful in 
terms of their operationalization and in terms of their 
verifiable observations. By adopting the methodology of 
physics and its style of constructing the world, 
behaviourists attempted to gain the prestige of the physical 
sciences but, in so doing, they restricted any critical
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assessment of its appropriateness as a model of science for 
the study of human phenomena.
3.1.3 Cognitive psychology: A different perspective
The dependence of behaviourism on a strict 
methodological objectivity hindered major theoretical 
advances and, with a growing dissatisfaction due to its 
notable lack of progress, the dominance of behaviourism gave 
way to the rise of cognitivism. Once again, mind had returned 
to the domain of psychology, this time in the form of 
information-processing and internal cognitive structures. Not 
denying some of its major achievements however, cognitive 
psvcholoav is still inherently non-social and, in many 
respects. still complies with a positivistic social 
representation of science (Markova,1982; Gergen,1982).
The development of cognitive psychology was much 
influenced by both telecommunication engineers and computer 
scientists during and after World War II. Theories of 
cognition reflected the technological developments of the 
time, presenting mechanistic models of mind. More recently, 
the rise of information technology has encouraged a focus on 
artificial , as opposed to natural (human) forms of 
intelligence. With the impetus provided by technology, 
cognitive psychology is now dominated by the 
information-processing metaphor. Mind is located within the 
head of the individual set over against the objects of 
cognition which are located in the environment. Information 
from the environment is processed in a mechanical, linear 
fashion such that the stimulus-organism-response sequence is 
perpetuated in much cognitive theorizing.
The study of language has suffered a similar fate. 
Language constitutes the major medium for speech and 
communication, which is inherently social. However, 
psycholinguists such as Chomsky and Miller, have studied 
language in abstraction from those who use it as a means of 
communication. In this way, the discipline of psychology has 
maintained its allegiance to the Cartesian paradigm and has 
divorced itself from its counterparts in the social sciences.
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3.2 THE SHAPING OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Many disciplines within the social sciences have 
developed their own distinctive forms of social psychology 
(Moscovici,1990). Social psychology has also been influenced 
by sociology and anthropology (Jaspars,1983 ; Cole,1987). 
However, it has come to be more closely associated with 
psychology. In so doing, it has endorsed many of the 
conventional assumptions and research methods of psychology. 
The crucial issue in the discipline's historical development 
has been whether or not social and collective phenomena have 
a reality 'sui generis', which is irreducable to or different 
from individual phenomena. Collective forms of social 
psychology flourished in its early years. But, with the rise 
of behaviourism in psychology, the study of social phenomena 
became dominated by an individualistic and experimental 
approach. Furthermore, despite the emergence of cognitive 
social psychology, the discipline has remained largely a- 
social and a-historical.
The publication of two textbooks on social psychology 
in 1908 is traditionally taken as the formal inauguration of 
the discipline, although there were other relevant 
publications which preceded them (eg.James,1890; Tarde,1898; 
Cooley, 1902; Orano,1902) . One was written by McDougall, whose 
social psychology was based on biological instincts and 
emotions and whose discourse focused on the individual. The 
other was by Ross, a sociologist, who was more concerned with 
the consequence of human relations, and collective behaviours 
such as fashions, customs, public opinion, conventions and 
social conflicts. Although neither of these two perspectives 
provided an effective orientation towards theory and research 
(Pepitone, 1981) , this division between the individual and the 
social aspects of human life persisted. This is evident in 
the historical development of theories and research in the 
study of groups, attitudes and attributions, from 
collectivism, through behaviourism to social cognition.
3.2.1 The Collective perspectives
Prior to the dominance of the experimental method in 
social psychology, European students of collective phenomena 
took the reality of groups for granted. Le Bon (1896),
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reflecting on the French Revolution, suggested that crowds 
were characterized by a mental unity which reflected the 
collective unconscious instincts of the race. The processes 
of deindividuation, contagion and suggestion gave rise to 
crowd behaviour which was to be contrasted with the conscious 
and rational behaviour of individuals. Drawing on the work of 
Le Bon (Moscovici,1985a), Freud developed a psychodynamic 
analysis of collective phenomena such as religion, myths, 
taboos etc. in his Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (1921). 
Similar to Le Bon, Freud argued that people behave 
qualitatively differently in groups because the instinctual 
impulses of the id come to the surface. A significantly 
different perspective was developed by McDougall, in 'The 
Group Mind' (1920). The supraindividual quality of group 
behaviour was maintained; group mind had a reality and 
existence which was independent of and qualitatively distinct 
from that of its individual members. However, this emerged 
out of the interactions or relations between people rather 
than any collective unconscious motives.
The influence of all three writers on more contemporary 
social psychology is apparent respectively in the study of 
collective behaviour (Zimbardo,1970); in Adorno et al.'s 
authoritarian personality (1950), and Dollard et al.'s 
frustration and agression hypothesis (1939); and in the work 
of Sherif (1936) and Asch (1952). However, these have not 
always maintained the collective perspective of the earlier 
students. The dominance of the collective perspective 
persisted in social psychology into the 1930's, but not much 
beyond. This is evident from the contents of the Murchison 
Handbook of Social Psvcholoav (1935) and other publications 
of that decade. But, as behaviourism began to dominate 
psychology in general, American research and theory in social 
psychology increasingly became more and more individualised.
3.2.2 The behaviourist perspectives
F.H. Allport's (1920,1924) apparently persuasive 
arguments against the explanation of crowd behaviour in terms 
of a collective unconscious or a group mind shifted the 
perspective of American Social Psychology to one that was 
individualistic and experimental (Graumann,1986). For
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Allport. collective phenomena could be explained purely in
terms of the individual. The social aspects of human
behaviour were restricted to the influence of others who were
present in the immediate environment.
Social psychology is the science which studies the 
behaviour of the individual in so far as his 
behaviour stimulates other individuals or is itself 
a reaction to their behaviour
(Allport,1924,p.12)
As in the social facilitation experiments (Tripplett,1897 ; 
Allport,1920), collective phenomena such as crowds were 
reduced to the individual in a social situation, where social 
implied no more than the mere presence of others. The 
subsequent distinction between perception and social 
perception or between cognition and social cognition is 
rooted in this individualistic understanding of the 
significance of the social.
3.2.3 Cognitive social psvcholoav
Even before general psychology became dominated by the 
cognitive perspective, social psychology was already moving 
away from behaviourism per se. Farr (1985) shows how 
cognitive social psychology came into being with the 
migration of the Gestalt Psychologists from Germany and 
Austria into the context of behaviourism in the U.S.A. Under 
the influences of the Gestalt Psychologists, including Lewin 
(1951), Asch (1952) and Heider (1958), social psvcholoav 
reverted to the studv of mind and conscious experience. 
Unlike the earlier collective psychologies of Le Bon and 
Freud, cognitive social psychology emphasized the rational 
character of social behaviour.
At its inception, social cognition was conceived of in 
relational terms. For example, Heider (1958) emphasized the 
perspective of the perceiver (P) or self on the behaviour of 
others (0). The subsequent flourishing of cognitive social 
psychology in the U.S.A. maintained the shift in perspective 
from behaviourism to cognition. However, it failed to sustain 
the social or relational approach of the early theorists 
(Farr and Moscovici,1984a). The social representation of the 
individual and of science which were so highly characteristic
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of behaviourism are still evident in much of contemporary 
social psychology (Pepitone,1981; Farr,in press). Social 
psychological questions are reduced to experimental research 
on dyads and interindividual behaviour. Social groups are 
reduced to the immediate or implied presence of others, as 
independent variables which influence the behaviour of an 
individual. In effect, culture and historv remain outside the 
realm of social psvcholoav. Social cognition refers to the 
individual's perception and analysis of information about 
others. Experimental methodology, which dominates research on 
social cognition, is essentially a-historical. Even in social 
psychology the individual is conceived of as a 'thinking 
machine', rather than a social animal embedded in an 
historical and cultural context (Moscovici,1982).
3.2.4 From sociological to psvcholoaical forms of social 
psvcholoav
It can be seen that the historv of social psvcholoav 
exhibits a shift from a collective and comparative approach 
to an individualistic and experimental approach. A particular 
case in point can be found in the study of attitudes. In the 
1920's, Thomas and Znaniecki employed the term 'social 
attitudes' in their study of 'The Polish Peasant in Europe 
and America'. In their insightful article, Jaspars and Fraser 
(1984) show how this inherently social concept became 
individualised. In the Chicago School of the 1920's, social 
attitudes and collective representations were one and the 
same field of study. However, G.W.Allport's review chapter 
(1935) on 'Attitudes' in the Murchison handbook transformed 
them into purely individual representations and individual 
'states of readiness' to respond to environmental stimuli. 
This conception has persisted in more recent theorizing and 
research, including Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance and Fishbein and Ajzen's (1954) model of attitude 
change.
A similar case can be made for the study of 
attributions, although its emergence as a field in social 
psychology and its subsequent individualization did not come 
until later. Ichheiser's (1949) monograph on 
'Misunderstandinas in Human Relations' indicates the role of
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collective representations in processes of attribution and 
person perception. This is still present in Heider*s 
phenomenological approach to * Interpersonal Relations' 
(1958), which contains frequent quotations from Ichheiser. 
However, the contemporary tradition of research on 
attribution theory is rooted in the work of Jones and Davis 
(1965) and Kelley (1967;1973), who individualized 
'attribution' by focusing on an analysis of individual 
cognitive processes in people's knowledge and perception. 
Even the more recent extensions to attribution theory, which 
take into account causal schemata or scripts (Schank and 
Abelson,1972), are still based on a stimuli-response 
construction of the world, and a representation of the 
individual as an independent and isolated identity.
3.3 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CULTURE?
The influence of Wundt's Volkerpsychologie in social 
psychology lasted until the 1930's and is apparent in 
Murchison's 'Handbook of Social Psvcholoav' (1935). Chapters 
in this volume adopt an historical and comparative approach, 
and conceive of the human mind as the product of evolutionary 
and historical change. However, this contrasts quite 
strikingly with the experimental social psychology which 
dominates the more recent series of handbooks edited by 
Lindzey and Aronson (1968/69,1985) (see Farr,1988). In order 
to trace the continued influence of Wundt's 
Voelkerpsychologie it is necessary to turn to other human 
and social sciences, including psychoanalysis, sociology, 
social and cultural anthropology and linguistices (Farr, 
1985,1990b; Cole,1987).
The divide between the individual and the social 
appears to be endemic in many of the human sciences. They 
were treated, originally, as two separate yet related aspects 
in the study of the human mind; they were then separated as 
falling within the domain of two isolated and distinct 
disciplines.
At the turn of the century, the human sciences were not 
separated out into distinct disciplines and many European 
scholars studied a combination of philosophy, psychology, 
sociology and anthropology. At the time , an individual
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psychology often went hand-in-hand with a collective 
psychology. We have seen that Wundt's individual experimental 
psychology was associated with his Voelkerpsychologie. 
Similarly, Freud progressed from a clinical analysis of 
individuals to a 'massenpsychologie' of culture. McDougall 
followed his 1908 publication on 'An Introduction to Social 
Psvcholoav' with his book on ' The Group Mind ' in 1920. 
However, these soon came to separate out into distinct 
disciplines. At the turn of the century, Durkheim made a 
sharp distinction between individual and collective 
representations and proclaimed them to be the objects of 
study of two separate disciplines, respectively psychology 
and sociology. Collective phenomena were 'social facts' which 
could not be reduced to psychological explanations. It was 
the latter which inherited the cultural perspective of 
Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie. By the 1920's the boundaries 
between psychology , sociology and anthropology were well 
established in the institutional structure of most American 
Universities. Again, the influence of the Voelkerpsychologie 
can be traced through Mead to the symbolic interactionist 
tradition within American sociology.
The division between the individual and the social was 
associated closely with methods of research and psychology's 
status as a science. The association between the conception 
of science and the conception of human beings has been 
illuminated by psychologists, social scientists and 
philosophers, who have been critical of the dominant approach 
(eg.Shotter,1975 ; Markova,1982 ; Gergen, 1982). A social 
representation of the individual as a discrete and 
independent entity behaving in response to the environment 
was associated with an experimental method and a social 
representation of science based on Newtonian physics. A 
social representation of the individual, in association with 
others as a member of a collective with its own language and 
culture, required a comparative method which was associated 
more closely with the social sciences.
Social psychologists have been left with the multi­
disciplinary task of integrating psychology, sociology and 
anthropology. However, because the parent disciplines are
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characterized by such distinct approaches the different forms 
of their separation and integration have given rise to a 
great diversity and variety of social psychologies 
(Farr,1985; Jaspars,1983). Despite this diversity, two major 
groupings can be identified; the first focuses on culture, 
traditions, norms, beliefs and skills; and the second focuses 
on the influence of others on the behaviour of the 
individual. Both approaches have been evident throughout the 
history of social psychology but while the former dominated 
its early development it has been the latter approach which 
has guided theorizing and directed most research in the last 
fifty years, especially in America.
Thus, the disciplines of psychology and of social 
psychology were, at their inception, concerned with both 
individual and collective phenomena. With their subsequent 
development in America, these disciplines were transformed 
into individualistic enterprises. This was largely under the 
influence of a positivistic empiricism social representation 
of science, which was first introduced by the American 
introspectionists and then further established by the 
behaviourists. In order to be scientific, psychology had to 
employ empirical methods of objective observation and 
experimentation and its theories had to conform to the 
restrictions of behaviourism, operationalism, and causal 
mechanisms. With the rise of cognitivism, some of these 
restrictions were removed (most notably behaviourism and 
operationalism), but the doctrines of empiricism, 
reductionism, individualism and mechanism proved to be an 
all-pervasive influence on theory and research. The close 
association between psychology and social psychology in 
American institutions led social psychologists into accepting 
the same social representations of the individual and of 
science. Thus, despite their explicit concern for social and 
collective phenomena, social psychological theorizing and 
research has remained a largely individualistic and 
positivistic enterprise.
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3.4 DESCARTES AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC 
(SOCIAL) PSYCHOLOGY
Embedded in the individualistic and positivistic form 
of social psychology are various philosophical presumptions 
which are rarely made explicit. The Cartesian paradigm or 
tradition of thought has structured both behaviouristic 
psychology (empiricism) and cognitive psychology 
(rationalism). Both have inherited the Cartesian dualism 
between mind and bodv and the dualism between the individual 
and culture.
In its emergence as a science, psychologists created 
a divide between psychology and its parent discipline of 
philosophy. However, social psychology and psychology are 
not independent from philosophy nor, for that matter, are 
they independent from physics, mathematics, the biological 
sciences, the humanities and ordinary human experience. In 
failing to recognise their philosophical roots they have 
failed to realize the assumptions which they had inherited 
and the philosophies which would have supported alternative 
psychologies. In her insightful book on * Paradigms. Thought 
and Language *. Markovâ (1982) elucidates the Cartesian 
assumptions which are still inherent in much of contemporary 
psychology and social psychology.
Descartes* scepticism led him to doubt everything but 
the fact that he was doubting. This gave primacy to the 
individual mind which had a number of implications. Firstly, 
Cartesian dualism separates the mind from the body: it
separates the *world-of-consciousness* from the 
'world-in-itself*, the subject from the object, or the knower 
from the known. Secondly, knowledge and certainty are located 
in the minds of isolated individuals. An individual’s mind is 
static and passive in the acquisiton of knowledge through the 
recognition of universal ideas. Consciousness and subjective 
reflection are innate characteristics of the human mind and, 
therefore, are given priority over action and communication. 
Thirdly, knowledge is assessed through predetermined and 
stable external standards, including mathematical and logical 
systems and the laws of nature. And finally, Descartes* 
mechanistic assumptions involved a conception of the world in
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terms of independent and static elements associated by 
invariant laws of cause and effect.
Cartesian philosophy was not the only viable paradigm 
on which to build a new psychology (Markova,1982 ; 
Hearnshaw,1987), but it provided the foundation both for the 
philosophy of mind and for experimental physiology from which 
psychology was born. As psychology gained its independence 
from philosophy and was rapidly transformed from a science of 
mind to a science of behaviour, it appeared that psychology 
no longer bore any relationship to Cartesian Philosophy. 
Introspectionism had adhered to Descartes * conception of mind 
but behaviourism , with its faith in empirical objectivism, 
had banished all reference to mental phenomena. However this, 
in itself, did not constitute a paradigmatic revolution: many 
of the Cartesian principles were embedded within the 
behaviouristic framework.
Most significantly, mind was still separated from 
behaviour. Behaviourism focused on the body and the behaviour 
of the other one. In so doing, they excluded the scientist 
from the process of science. Although the scientist was the 
knower, he or she observed the external world of objects and 
behaviour. On the one hand, mind was an epiphenomenon to the 
object of study. On the other hand, mind, or knowledge, was 
passively acquired by individual scientists as they conducted 
research. Furthermore, they maintained Descartes * mechanistic 
conception of the world. In effect, they failed to realize 
the inherently social character of both their object of study 
and of science itself.
By the time cognitivism emerged as the dominant 
tradition, psychology already had its own history and 
apparently did not need to reflect on its philosophical past. 
However, cognitivism simply shifted the perspective back to 
the mind of the individual whilst remaining within the 
Cartesian tradition of thought. The knower, in this case the 
psychologist's subject, was still separated from the known, 
from the world which is given in an external reality. 
Priority is given to the human mind which, whilst active in 
the acquisition of knowledge, is still isolated from other 
minds.
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Thus both behaviourism and cognitivism fall within the 
Cartesian tradition of thought. They both adopt Cartesian 
principles concerning the relationship between the individual 
(the knower) and the known. They are both adhering to a 
mechanistic conception of the world. Furthermore, neither 
escape from the individualism which psychology inherited at 
its birth.
The Cartesian philosophy was also compatible with 
Newtonian physics and the social representation of science. 
Psvcholoav*s aspirations to the natural sciences onlv further 
entrenched the discipline in the dualisms between mind and 
bodv between self and other and between the individual and 
societv. Nor was this individualistic paradigm challenged by 
collective representations in American culture. Farr (in 
press,1990b) traces the rise of individualism in Western 
culture and its insidious influence on the development of 
experimental social psychology in America. Tajfel (1972) and 
Billig (1976) similarly indicate the influence of 
individualism on the form and content of social psychological 
theories and research on groups. As a consequence, the 
Cartesian assumptions in contemporary social psychology have 
gone largely unnoticed. It is only by examining alternative 
paradigms which adhere to a different set of presuppositions 
that the Cartesian influence becomes apparent. And it is only 
by developing alternative paradigms that a new social 
psychology can be constructed which overcomes the weaknesses 
and inconsistences of the traditional approach.
3.5 AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
There is an alternative tradition of thought in the 
history of social psychology which transcends the dualism 
between mind and body and constitutes a framework in which 
the individual is integrated with the cultural. Here, the 
psychological activity of individuals is conceived of as 
essentially a cultural product and culture as a human 
product. I shall refer to this as the Hegelian paradigm as 
recent developments in social psychology reflect its 
theoretical and methodological principles (see section 3.7).
The Hegelian tradition of thought contrasts dramatically 
with the Cartesian paradigm. Firstly, language, myth and
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customs are cultural products with an objective existence 
which influences the mental functioning of individuals. 
Language is an inherently social phenomenon which is related 
closely to self-reflexive awareness. It constitutes a system 
of gestures and symbols of communication which link the 
psychological processes of associated individuals. The mind 
of an individual is thus part of a trans-individual 
psychological system, and language can express the mentality 
of a nation. By observing the regularities of language and 
cultural change, it is possible, therefore, to draw 
inferences about the evolution of mind and the underlying 
psychological processes of individuals.
Secondly, self-consciousness and reflexion is not 
something that exists in nature, but rather it develops out 
of the mutual encounter of one conscious being with another. 
During interactions, people mutually take the other's point 
of view. It is through this ability to empathize that 
individuals come to be able to take the other's perspective 
towards themselves and attain a reflexive self-consciousness. 
By reconceptualizing the relationship between the individual 
and culture, the individualistic concepts of mind, 
reflexions, and consciousness are transformed into social and 
dynamic concepts. These transcend the dualism between the 
individual and culture.
Thirdly, the dualism between mind and body, between the 
individual and the environment , is transcended by re- 
conceptualizing the relationship between the knower and the 
known. For Hegel, knowledge is acquired through a 'circle 
returning within itself. Humans are not only active in the 
acquisition of knowledge but there is also a circle of 
interaction by which the knowing subject and the object of 
his/her knowing are both transformed. This interactive 
process constitutes a gradual reconstruction of the 'world- 
of-consciousness ' and the 'world-in-itself, which is 
creative. Knowledge is thus interdependent with activity in 
a particular environmental social context. Mind is not given 
priority over action, rather action is intimately involved in 
the development of mind.
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Fourthly, the subject matter of psychology cannot be 
constructed in such mechanistic terms as cause and effect, 
nor can it simply be a science of mind or a science of 
behaviour. What is required is a science of both mind and 
behaviour which goes bevond the individual to studv his or 
her development in the physical and cultural environment. 
Underlying the Hegelian paradigm of thought is an 
evolutionary perspective on the phenomena of mind and 
culture. This necessarily entails an historical approach 
which focuses on the interdependent development of 
individuals and cultures.
3.6 THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE DIVIDED
Although Wundt's psychophysics and his Voelkerpsychologie 
were closely related, the historical development of the 
social sciences saw the separation of the individual from 
society and the entrenchment of a division between psychology 
and sociology. Furthermore, they were part of two contrasting 
paradigms of thought. Within psychology, the Cartesian 
paradigm and the dominance of a positivistic social 
representation of science demanded a social representation of 
the individual as an independent entity set over against the 
physical and social environment. Within some forms of the 
social sciences the Hegelian paradigm, which necessitates an 
historical and comparative form of science, provides a social 
representation of the individual as relational or
interdependent with its socio-cultural environment.
Wundt * s Voelkerpsychologie and the sociological forms 
of social psychology, which are historically and conceptually 
linked to it, fall within the Hegelian tradition of thought. 
Danziger (1963) traces the historical antecedents of Wundt's 
Voelkerpsychologie to the philosophy of Herder (1772) and the 
Voelkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal (1860) . Markova's 
(1983) article on German Expressivism provides a broader 
background to Wundt's treatment of language in the 
philosophies of Herder, Humboldt and Hegel. Hearnshaw (1987) 
traces the philosophical roots further back to Spinoza 
(1962-77), who opposed directly the dualism of Descartes. 
Wundt had separated his psychophysics from his 
Voelkerpsychologie because, although mind was a cultural
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product, consciousness was still conceived of in Cartesian 
terms; consciousness was an individual phenomenon given in 
nature.
3.6.1 A note on Darwin
An early and highly significant influence on the 
development of psychology was Darwin's theory of evolution. 
This paradoxically facilitated the emergence of both 
individualistic psychology through Wundt's psychophysics 
(MacKenzie, 1976) and sociological forms of psychology through 
Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie (Farr,1983). Prior to Darwin's 
theory of evolution, the realm of science encompassed the 
material or physiological aspects of humans but would not 
encompass mind and human nature. Precise experimentation from 
physics, chemistry and even physiology was not applied to the 
study of mind. Darwin's writings not only integrated men into 
the natural order but also showed that it was possible to 
extend dramatically the appropriate units of scientific 
enquiry.
This, in effect, provided the licence for Wundt to apply 
the methods of physiology to the phenomenon of mind. 
Scientific enquiry could be geared to the problems and 
theories of mind and psychology could be included in the 
natural sciences. With the establishment of psychology in 
America, the dominance of positivism instantiated a 
methodological concept of science, which focused on 
experimentation rather than on human nature. Moreover, 
Watsonian behaviourism emphasized the communality between 
man and animals, which virtually ignored the significance of 
language and culture.
Darwin's evolutionary science also provided a model for 
and a legitimization of the Voelkerpsychologie. Darwin's 
science had been content or problem oriented, and had 
broadened the available conception of scientific method. He 
had conducted a major study which was wholly naturalistic: it 
used historical and comparative methods, drawing on an 
eclectic data base. Moreover, his theory of evolution 
employed a variety of explanatory and descriptive terms which 
were not restricted to physiology, chemistry or physics. Once 
established scientific, evolutionary theory legitimized the
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use of a wide variety of evidence in the study of fundamental 
problems about living organisms. Other German scientists, 
such as Humboldt, had used historical and comparative methods 
to study language. In order to study the varieties of culture 
and its relationship to the individual, Wundt's 
Voelkerpsychologie adopted the comparative and evolutionary 
perspective which Darwin had established in the realm of 
science.
3.6.2 A dilemma for social psvcholoav
The two paradigms in which the individual and the 
cultural have been constructed are fundamentally 
irreconcilable (Holmes,1988). Firstly, it is not possible to 
integrate a representation of the individual as independent 
and a representation of the social as relational. Independent 
entities remain essentially the same in the context of 
surrounding change, and they can move freely from one context 
to another without being changed themselves. In contrast, 
relational entities vary in the context of surrounding change 
and cannot move freely: a change in context always involves 
a change in the entity itself. Secondly, a positivistic 
empirical approach to knowledge and to science are 
incompatible with the investigation of relational and 
evolving phenomena. This is because positivistic empiricism 
is dependent on the primacy of independent entities. Only 
then can the known (object) be separated from the knower 
(subject); and only then can facts be identified as objective 
reality. If culture is to re-emerge as an essential aspect of 
social psychology, it is necessary to conceive the cultural 
and the individual in relational terms.
3.7 THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE
The Hegelian tradition of thought has not been well 
represented in the human sciences over the past five decades, 
but I would argue that it is essentially more appropriate for 
the study of social phenomena. The individual and the social 
must both be conceived in relational terms and as 
evolutionary products rather than as givens in nature. The 
integration of the individual and society is dependent upon 
a social representation of the individual as an essentially 
social being. This requires a social representation of
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science which is not tied to the empirical methodology of the 
physical sciences but, rather, adopts historical and 
developmental methods of investigation which are suited to 
the study of human beings in society (see Chapter 6).
In recent years we have seen a return of culture into 
social psychology and an increased interest in societal forms 
of psychology (Farr,1990b; Billig,1982; Markova,1982 ; 
Himmelveit and Gaskell,1990 ; Cole,1987; Moscovici, 
1972,1984b; Tajfel,1984a). Many of these expositions draw on 
writings from the past, reinstating culture to its proper 
place in social psychology. In particular, there has been a 
resurgence of interest in the work of Mead (1920*s; 1934) from 
Chicago U.S.A., and of Vygotsky (1920*s;1929) from the Soviet 
Union of Russia.
Mead and Vygotsky both adopted and elaborated the 
Hegelian paradigm (independently of each other) in an 
explicit attempt to reconcile Wundt's two psychologies. The 
integration of Wundt's individual and social psychology 
required that consciousness be re-conceptualized as a social 
phenomena: thought and self-awareness arise out of culture 
and are inherently social in nature. Although the writings of 
Mead and Vygotsky contain some significant differences, 
their fundamental characteristics are surprisingly similar. 
Both were committed to an evolutionary and historical 
approach in which psychology cannot be divorced from the 
study of culture. Both sought the origins of mind in the 
communicative act. And both emphasized the dialectic 
relationship between language and thought. Both focused on 
symbolic meaning and the means of communication. In the next 
chapter, I shall draw extensively on their ideas to clarify 
and extrapolate some of the central principles within the 
theory of social representations.
Other developments in contemporary social psychology 
indicate a paradigimatic revolution which has important 
implications for the conduct of the social sciences. During 
the 1970's a number of penetrating critiques against 
mechanistic and reductionistic approaches initiated and 
sustained a crisis in social psychology. At the heart of the 
crisis was a loss of faith in objectivity. The work of Orne
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(1962) and Rosenthal (1966) indicated the highly reactive 
nature of laboratory experimentation and led to doubts 
concerning the validity and certainty of such scientific 
investigations. Kelman (1968), amongst others, questioned the 
notion of value-free science and issues regarding the ethics 
of research in the social sciences further destabilized the 
establishment. This gave rise to meta-theoretical analysis 
and debate which challenged the traditional assumptions 
rooted in Cartesian philosophy and positivistic empirical 
science.
Disagreements as to whether or not psychology should be 
considered a natural or a social science are closely 
associated with the different approaches offered by the 
Cartesian and Hegelian Paradigms. This has been at the heart 
of many heated debates within the history of the discipline. 
For example, in the 1970*s, Joynson and Zangwell adopted 
opposing positions with regard to the relationship between 
common-sense and psychology. Joynson propounded the view that 
common-sense constitutes an important source of knowledge 
which can contribute to the development of psychology. In 
contrast, Zangwell rejected common-sense knowledge. For him, 
psychology should be founded in the methods and principles of 
the natural sciences and nothing was to be gained by 
incorporating common-sense understandings.
This debate was resumed in a slightly different form 
with the publication of Gergen*s article on social psychology 
as history (1973). Gergen suggests that there is an ongoing 
relationship between common-sense and psychology. As the 
concepts and theories of psychology diffuse into common-sense 
the nature of the very subject matter which psychology 
attempts to study changes. Moscovici * s own study on the 
diffusion of psychoanalysis within French culture is a case 
in point. The diffusion and assimilation of a new 
understanding of human nature had far-reaching cultual and 
social implications. Similarly, the work of Festinger on 
cognitive dissonance (1975), of Asch on group conformity 
(1956) and of Milgram on obedience to authority (1974) all 
produced counter-intuitive results. However, once the 
scientific knowledge diffuses within a culture, it changes
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people's understanding of themselves and others, their 
behaviour and their social interactions, and hence changes 
the phenomena that psychology attempts to explain. As such, 
psychology cannot develop universal laws or principles which 
apply to all cultures at all times. As culture and society 
change so, too, these changes must be reflected in 
psychological theory.
Psychology, as an experimental science, tended to 
isolate phenomena in the laboratory in order to establish 
universal laws or truths. The scientist attempts to create 
a cultural and temporal vacuum within the laboratory such 
that the relationships found in the experimental manipulation 
may be said to apply to all people at all times. In contrast, 
the psychologist who includes the dimensions of time and 
space recognizes the influence of history (time) and culture 
(space). The very subject matter of psychology, be it human 
nature, mind or behaviour, varies across time and space. At 
any one time, there exists a variety of cultures and 
subcultures, which constitute a different subject matter for 
the psychologist. (This view is reflected in the quartet of 
chapters in the Murchison Handbook (1935) on the social 
histories of the white, red, black and yellow men) . Also, any 
one culture will exhibit changes over time; they have a 
social history, a past and a future which should not be 
ignored. Furthermore, these differences between and within 
cultures must be reflected in psychological theory.
New approaches to psychology and social psychology 
emerged, emphasizing the significance of meaning, the role 
of culture and the socio-historical context of human life 
(eg. Mixon,1971; Harré and Secord,1972; Israel and 
Tajfel,1972 ; Gergen,1982, 1985a,b ; Armistead,197 4 ;
Shotter,1975; Meiser,1976; Strickland et al.,1976; Gould and 
Shotter,1977 ; Meehl,1978; Tajfel,1978 and 1984;
Graumann,1986 ; Gilmour and Duck,1980; Cranach and 
Harré,1982,1984a; McGuire,1983 ; Rosnow and Georgoudi,1986; 
Margolis et al.,1986; Markova,1987 ; Jaeger and Rosnow,1989). 
Despite their differences, these authors display a number of 
common themes, assumptions and principles which constitute a 
revolution in both psychology and social psychology. In
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effect, this revolution reintroduces the Hegelian tradition 
of thought into social psychology.
In an illuminating article, Jaeger and Rosnow (1988) 
outline these contemporary developments under the name of 
contextualism. They emphasize the active role of individuals 
in the construction of social knowledge; the changing nature 
of reality, and the wider socio-historic context. In short, 
all that was presented in the above section as an 
'alternative paradigm for social psychology' could equally 
well be presented under the heading of 'contextualism in 
contemporary social psychology'.
At the heart of this paradigm shift lies a 
transformation in epistemology; that is, the conception of 
the relationship between the knower and the known. One of 
the most consistent and provocative proponents of this new 
epistemology is Kenneth Gergen (1973,1978,1982,1985a,b). 
Knowledge is conceived of as an active, practical and 
constructive affair. As such it is relative to specific 
socio-historical and cultural contexts which evolve and 
transform. Knowledge is thus relative to time/space (see 
Chapter 5) and cannot be divorced from either the knower or 
its context within a particular culture.
This epistemology has important implications for the 
conduct of scientific inquiry (eg.Gergen,1985a,b; Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985; Jaegar and Rosnow, 1988). Behaviourism, by 
limiting itself to the observation of other people's 
behaviour, excluded from its analysis the role of the 
scientist both as a participant in research and in the 
construction of the research situation. This conformed with 
the social representation of science which behaviourists 
adopted from the natural sciences. The reactive nature of 
psychological research could not be formulated within such 
a framework and consequently did not appear to be a problem. 
With the emergence of cognitive psychology it was realized 
that the human subject does not passively respond to a given 
situation; rather, he or she actively construes the situation 
in accordance with his or her beliefs, values and desires. 
This is as true for everyday life as it is for the research 
situation. However, this constructive epistemology was
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restricted to the object of study: an empiricist epistemology 
was maintained with regard to the scientists. But psychology 
is a science in which both the agent and the object of study 
are humans. Both the scientists and the subjects are 
observers and actors in research.
By applying the same epistemology to both the social 
phenomena being studied and the realm of scientific 
investigation itself contextualists have elaborated an 
alternative conception of science which is more in keeping 
with the Hegelian tradition. This self-reflexive approach 
avoids any inherent contradictions between the conception of 
the object of study (ie. people) and the conception of 
science. Such contradictions have been prevalent in the 
social sciences. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to conceive of a science which is independent of its subject 
matter, or how the community of scientists and the community 
which it studies live and function within different forms of 
reality.
Scientists are social individuals who are actively 
engaged in the social construction of scientific knowledge. 
They are participants in the construction and transformation 
of theory and research. Furthermore, science is a human 
activity which is culturally and historically situated. 
Scientists' observations are dependent on their theories and 
theories are relative to the social and cultural milieu of 
which they are a part. Scientific knowledge is thus not 
objective, individualistic and ahistorical; it is perpetually 
open to revision and transformation and can lay no claim to 
certainty. This has far-reaching implications for the 
endeavour of science. Rather than focusing on observation 
theory-testing, prediction and control, the greater emphasis 
is placed on theory construction, understanding, and the 
relational interdependence of phenomena.
The Hegelian paradigm is expressed in apparently diverse 
alternatives in contemporary social psychology, including the 
historical-social psychology, ethogenics, dialectics, 
hermeneutic analysis, discourse analysis and ethno- 
methodology, as well as a more critical analysis of the 
philosophical and meta-theoretical history of social
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psychology (Gergen and Morawski,1980). Moreover, its 
manifestations are not limited to social psychology; its 
principles have also been explored in cognitive psychology, 
life-span development, personality communications, and 
environmental psychology (Rosnow and Georgoudi,1986).
The theory of social representations does not stand in 
isolation from the evolution of social psychology as a 
discipline and the emergence of alternative orientations in 
the human sciences. It is, at one and the same time, an 
initiating force and an expression of this reorientation. 
However, even though social representation theorists propound 
a cultural social psychology, they have not entirely broken 
with its Cartesian predecessors. I propose to show that, 
while it constitutes a powerful and valid critique of the 
individualism of conventional social psychology, Moscovici 
subscribes to a positivistic view of science and this leads 
him to make a false distinction between the world of science 
and the world of common-sense with regard to the role of 
social representations. The theory still reflects certain 
aspects of the positivistic (Cartesian) tradition of thought 
while championing the constructivist (Hegelian) tradition. 
The fundamental differences between these two paradigms 
underlies many of the contradictions and confusions which are 
evident in Moscovici's writings.
The exposition of these contrasting paradigms and their 
expression in the history of psychology and social psychology 
in this chapter has proved to be essential groundwork for the 
following three chapters. In Chapter 4, I will elaborate upon 
the social representations of the individual, and consider 
the letter's integration with culture within the theory of 
social representation. This discussion focuses on the 
dynamics of social representations and the role of the 
individual in their transformation. In Chapter 5, I take 
issue with the social representation of science presented by 
Moscovici and suggest that the theory must adopt a 
constructivist approach to this realm of knowledge. 
Furthermore, I shall argue that, far from being exclusive to 
common sense, the theory of social representations is also 
applicable to the dynamics of scientific knowledge. In
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Chapter 6, I discuss the methodological commitments of the 
Hegelian paradigm and their implications for research in the 
field of social representations.
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The theory of social representations is heralded as a 
revolutionary social psychology which is distinguished by 
its theoretical and methodological approach to social 
phenomena. Much of contemporary social psychology is 
individualistic in orientation and perpetuates an empiricist 
science, as discussed in the previous chapter. This 
individualistic approach is countered by the French tradition 
of research on social representations which reflects the 
ideas of sociological thinkers and, in particular, those of 
Durkheim. But the re-introduction of culture into social 
psychology does not necessarily overcome the dualism between 
the individual and society.
It is argued here that the theory and much of its 
associated research still betrays a tension between the 
psychological and cultural aspects of human life. In so 
doing, it fails to provide an understanding of the dynamic 
nature of social representations. Drawing on writings within 
the Hegelian paradigm this problem is overcome by 
constructing a social representation of the individual as an 
essentially social being. Individuals develop and live in an 
evolving system which embraces both the cultural and physical 
environment. This elaborated theoretical perspective denies 
the social significance of purely individual representations 
and argues against a definition of social representations 
purely in terms of consensual or widespread beliefs. It also 
provides the context in which we can define social reality 
with greater precision. This, in turn, leads to a 
re-assessment of the dynamics of social representations and 
the social-psychological processes involved in their 
transformation. Although these ideas presented here may be 
considered to re-structure the theory in important respects, 
it is hoped that the central aspects of the theory are 
maintained while the more blatant contradictions are 
overcome. Finally, the contribution that the theory of social 
representations can make to contemporary social psychology is 
briefly considered.
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4.1.CONFLICTS AND CONTRADICTIONS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL 
REPRESENTATIONS
The first section of this chapter examines some of the 
major conflicts and contradictions within the theory of 
social representations and proposes some preliminary steps 
towards resolving them. It does not comprise a list of 
problems with suggested solutions. Such an approach is 
neither helpful nor feasible; rather, the difficulties relate 
to the theory as a whole and are reflected in its different 
aspects. It will be seen that the major difficulties arise as 
Moscovici attempts to convert a sociological concept into a 
social-psychological phenomenon, as he tries to integrate the 
sociological or cultural with the psychological to construct 
a social social psychology. Moscovici establishes the 
supraindividual nature of social representations by borrowing 
Durkheim *s sociological concept of collective representations 
and by emphasizing their prescriptive and autonomous 
character. Simultaneously, he asserts the potency of the 
individual in the dynamics and transformation of social 
representations. However, in itself, this does not provide a 
synthesis of culture and of the individual. On the one hand, 
his emphasis on the prescriptive and autonomous character of 
social representations leaves no place for the individual. On 
the other hand, by overemphasizing the potency of the 
individual, both the collective and dynamic character of 
social representations is in danger of being reduced to 
individual cognition.
The dualism between the individual and culture which 
has bedeviled social psychology is perpetrated in the theory 
of social representations. Indeed, it is made even more 
apparent by a theory that attempts to re-introduce cultural 
phenomena into mainstream social psychology. This dualism is 
also evident in much of the laboratory and field research on 
social representations. Three modifications to the theory are 
suggested as an initial step towards transcending this 
dualism. These challenge or re-interpret the theoretical 
principles that deny the dynamic character of social 
representations and the role of the individual in their 
transformation. Firstly, their prescriptive character must be
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conceived of in the context of a heterogeneous and changing 
society. Secondly, their consensual character does not imply 
a purely distributive understanding of social 
representations. Their transformation depends upon the 
conflicts and controversies between people living in a 
heterogeneous society. Thirdly, the autonomous character of 
social representations is rejected. Social representations 
cannot be autonomous from the individuals who together create 
and maintain them.
4.1.1 Intellectual ancestors
Durkheim has been claimed as the intellectual ancestor 
of the French tradition of social representations. It's 
distinctly European character reflects Durkheim*s 
sociological analysis and exploits the notion of collective 
representations, social reality and 'social facts' as 
expressed in his writings. However, despite proclaiming 
Durkheim as an intellectual ancestor, there are a number of 
important distinctions to be made between Durkheim's 
collective representations and the current use of the term 
social representations. Moscovici points out a number of 
differences which emphasize the dynamic character of social 
representations. Also, in a video-taped interview, Moscovici 
has said that he only came to read Durkheim after embarking 
on his study of the diffusion of psychoanalysis in France. In 
this same interview he suggests a close affinity to the work 
of Piaget. Deutscher (1984a), furthermore, examines a number 
of fundamental differences between Durkheim's sociology and 
Moscovici's social psychology suggesting that the concept of 
collective representations has been borrowed in isolation 
from the remainder of Durkheim's writings. This being the 
case, the choice of Durkheim as a sole intellectual ancestor 
is mistaken and so we must look elsewhere for the 
intellectual origins of the theory of social representations. 
By examining these historical and intellectual roots and the 
emergence of social representations as a theory we are better 
able to understand the problems and issues which are 
addressed and the meaning of the concepts which are central 
to the theory.
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That we should look to European thinkers is suggested
by some of Moscovici*s diverse writings. He is concerned that
European social psychologists address the problems of their
own culture as opposed to borrowing the American problems and
conceptions which have dominated theory and research in
social psychology.
It is not just this (European) social reality that 
is shared; for many of us the ideas of, for example,
Marx, Freud, Piaget and Durkheim are of direct 
relevance because they are familiar and because the 
questions that they were trying to answer are also 
our own questions. The critical aspects of our 
social reality including social class structure, the 
phenomenon of language, the influence of ideas about 
society - are issues which have hardly been 
considered by traditional social psychology.
(Moscovici,1972)
There is indeed an affinity with Piaget's work, although 
he does not consider some of the social and cultural aspects 
of social representations. It is possible that Durkheim's 
notion of collective representations was combined with 
Piaget's study of representations in the child's world. 
Piaget studied children's verbalization (a tradition carried 
over in social representations research) to gain some insight 
into the intellectual structures of representations, both as 
to their origins and their development. Other aspects of 
Piaget's work which appear to have been influential are the 
relationship between language and action, the role of 
imagination and the symbolic and meaningful nature of 
reality, and the child's active construction of reality.
Another possible influence is the work of Freud 
(Moscovici,1984a) and the 'interiorization' or 
internalization of culturally-rooted representations. In this 
respect, the theoretical work of both Piaget and Freud has 
been primarily concerned with children whereas social 
representations theory appears to apply the same principles 
to adult thinking. There are other possible influences which 
include Marx, Levy-Strauss, Foucoult, and other 
structuralists.
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4.1.2 Social versus collective representations
We are now in a better position to understand the 
differences between collective and individual representations 
as portrayed by Durkheim and social representations as 
explicated by Moscovici.
a) One of the fundamental differences between Durkheim*s 
collective representations and social representations theory 
is the conceptualization of the relationship between the 
individual and society. Durkheim conceptualized collective 
representations and individual representations as two 
distinct and opposing forms of knowledge. Collective 
representations were explanatory devices in his sociology 
which were irreducible by further analysis. He was concerned 
to establish sociology as a distinct discipline from 
psychology with its own object of study which was irreducible 
to individual psychology. In so doing Durkheim separated 
individual and collective consciousness as the subject matter 
of two distinct disciplines, psychology and sociology.
For example, in his study of suicide he explicates how
collective representations remain in opposition to individual
representations. As the latter proliferate, the former break
down, losing their cohesive and stabilizing power, resulting
in a state of anomie and an increase in the number of
suicides. Individual representations, for Durkheim, led to
the disintegration of society and of moral values, isolating
individuals from social purposes and social regulation.
This opposition between collective and individual 
representations expounded by Durkheim is abandoned 
by social representation theorists in an attempt to 
provide an integration of the individual and society 
to define an object of social psychology which is 
pertinent both to the individual level and to the 
collective level out of which the content has a 
clear social value. The ideal being that it can lend 
itself to a continuous description....
(Moscovici,1979,p.4 from Doise 1984,p.255)
Social representations are phenomena to be studied, 
elucidating their content, structure and dynamics. 
Furthermore, Moscovici is primarily concerned with change in 
modern society. Individual and social representations do not 
function in opposition but have a dynamic inter- relationship
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essential to the transformation of social representations
and, in fact, to all aspects of individual and social life.
Hence, whereas collective representations constitute a
sociological concept and are seen in opposition to individual
representations, social representations constitute a social
psychological phenomenon which is intimately related to
individual representations.
b) This is closely related to a second distinction which
can be made between Durkheim*s collective representations and
social representations, and is one which is emphasized by
Moscovici (1984b). Whereas Durkheim presented a structural
sociology in which collective representations are relatively
static and exist in a stable society, social representations
are dynamic structures which evolve and transform in an
everchanging society.
In Durkheim*s sociology, collective representations are
characterized by their constraining and coercive power on the
members of a given society. Social facts current in a stable
society determine human behaviour. Furthermore, collective
representations, being distinct from, and acting in
opposition to, individual representations, are autonomous and
independent of individuals and groups. Moscovici (1984)
wishes to maintain this characteristic of collective
representations in order to avoid the individual reductionism
which has been prevalent in psychology for many decades. He
states that although individuals and groups create social
representations
once created, however, they lead a life of their 
own, circulate, merge, attract and repel each other 
and, give birth to new representations, while old 
ones die out.
(Moscovici,1984b,p.13: my emphasis)
Collective representations, being independent of and 
autonomous from individuals, are clearly supraindividual 
phenomena with attributes and characteristics of their own.
Moscovici (1984a) also wishes to distance the theory of 
social representations from such a restricting and coercive 
characterization. This is done with reference to the
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relationship between social representations and the 
individual:
we should not be led to underestimate. .. the 
contribution each member of a given society makes 
in creating and maintaining beliefs and behaviours 
shared by all. In other words, what counts is not 
the separateness of individual representations but 
the transformation each individual imposes on group 
representations and the converse.
(Moscovici,1984a,p.950)
Hence, while the coercive nature of collective 
representations are characterized by a one-way relationship, 
imposing themselves on individuals, social representations 
are characterized by a dynamic inter-relationship between 
individuals and the groups or society to which they belong.
4.1.3 The force of society versus the potencv of the 
individual
This poses a substantial problem for social 
representations' theorists. On the one hand , social 
representations are prescriptive, imposing themselves on us 
with irresistible force. The weight of tradition, of 
collective memory, the images and words embedded in language 
'exerts a force against which our mind and conscience is 
powerless' (Moscovici,1984a,p.950). The past, it is claimed, 
prevails over the present. On the other hand, we are told not 
to underestimate 'the autonomy of the present'. Individuals 
are active in the creation and maintenance of social 
representations and play an essential role in the 
transformation and dynamic nature of social representations.
The theory of social representation is, paradoxically, 
in danger of both sociological and individualistic 
reductionism. At one extreme, in attempting to overcome the 
individualistic bias in social psychology, Moscovici has 
borrowed the concept of collective representations from 
Durkheim, almost by direct quotations. Social representations 
are autonomous social facts which are independent from 
individuals; they are external realities which lie outside 
the individual. By emphasizing the prescriptive and 
conventional nature of social representations which act as 
constraints on the perceptions, conceptions and behaviour of
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individuals and groups, Moscovici is in danger of presenting
a sociological thesis which has little or no regard for the
role of individuals. McKinlay and Potter (1987), in their
conceptual critique of social representations theory, suggest
that Moscovici*s historical prescriptive thesis is so strong
that it is totally inconsistent with and denies the
possibility of change and individual involvement.
At the other extreme, the theory can be conceived of as
presenting an individualistic thesis. This has been an
argument presented by a number of critics. We have already
noted that Harré (1984c) considers social representations to
be distributed as aggregate individual representations.
While the assessment of the principle of uniformity 
is surely correct, this use of the concept of "the 
social* is still, in the last analysis, a version 
of individualism.
(Harré,1984c,p.931)
The theory of social representations is often conceived of
as a purely cognitive theory. Fransella (1984) suggests that
for many social representation students it is still a purely
cognitive affair and that the relation between social
representations as a cognitive concept and behaviour is not
clearly indicated.
Similarly, McKinlay and Potter (1987) argue that the
social aspects of the theory are in principle reducible to
individual cognition:-
Social representations theory, as formulated by 
Moscovici, seems to involve a line of argument which 
can offer no reason as to why the social ought to be
regarded as in principle reducible to more basic
cognitive notions.
(McKinlay and Potter,1987,p.19)
This argument is supported by two features of Moscovici*s 
exposition relating to the nature of reality. Firstly, 
although lay men and women inhabit the consensual universe 
which is constituted by social representations, scientists, 
who occupy the reified universe, are able to deliver
non-social, objective knowledge of the world independently 
of social representations. Secondly, unfamiliar objects must 
be perceived by individuals in some way before they are
anchored to a social representation. That is, individuals, in
152
some instances, are able to perceive the world independently 
of social representations. In both instances the acquisition 
of knowledge is reducible to the cognitive activity of 
individuals and there is no reason to accept Moscovici's 
thesis that social representations are in some way 
essentially social.
McKinley and Potter build their argument on particular 
features of Moscovici*s exposition of social representations. 
However, this is perhaps not the most appropriate or 
productive level on which to conduct a theoretical critique. 
The problems they discuss are indicative of a more 
substantial problem which, as yet, remains unresolved. The 
problem to which I refer is the dualism between the 
individual and culture; a dualism which must be overcome if 
the theory of social representations is to provide a 
revolutionary alternative to traditional social psychology.
Semin (1985a) argues that if the social representational 
approach is to avoid a cognitive reductionism then some 
specification of the dialectics between social 
representations and the social psychological processes 
involved in social interaction is required. Parker (1987), in 
his article on 'social representation: social psychologists 
(mis)use of sociology,* suggests that social representations 
theory does not provide a resolution of thesis and 
antithesis. Rather it constitutes the problem in that it 
attempts to deal with both the individual and the social but, 
in effect, reinforces the dualism inherent in the divide 
between psychology and sociology.
4.1.4 Societv and the individual in research on social 
representations
The split between the psychological and the cultural 
can be seen both in the experimental investigations and in 
the field studies. Experimental studies have approached this 
problem from the direction of the individual. The 
psychological is expressed in the exploration of individuals' 
cognitive system of representations, in order to analyse the 
dynamics and development of social representations. On the 
other hand, I have argued that they only manipulate the 
system of representations already in existence. The language
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used by experimenters to manipulate subjects* representations 
is an inherent part of the experimental procedure. Language, 
being a cultural phenomenon, reflects the sociological aspect 
of the research.
The field studies, in contrast, tend to approach the 
individual/culture interface from the direction of society. 
In order to counteract the highly individualistic 
Anglo-American social psychology, many of the French 
researchers have stressed the sociological and Durkheimian 
aspects of social representations to such an extent that the 
role of the individual remains largely unexamined and is 
assumed to be unimportant.
For example, Jodelet and Moscovici (1973) were able to 
trace the evolution and transformation of the social 
representations of the body in relation to social and 
cultural changes by means of a longtitudinal study repeating 
her interviews with a fifteen-year interval. Transformations 
were related to historical/cultural changes and to the social 
circumstances of different groups, their changing roles in 
society and the differential cultural diffusion of 
information. However, although this particular study relates 
the transformations of social representations to people's 
position in society, and hence their relations and 
associations with others, it remains a general and 
descriptive account of changes in the representations over 
space-time. As such, it does not address how the 
transformations are constructed and, hence, does not 
illuminate the active and dynamic integration of the 
psychological with the cultural.
The split between the individual and culture is also 
evident in Herzlich's (1973) study on the social 
representation of health and illness. Individuals were given 
unstructured interviews in order to elicit representations of 
health and illness. The information gathered was then 
aggregated across individuals to present a single, relatively 
coherent social representation. Farr (1984) suggests that 
representation may be qualified by 'social* (as oppposed to 
'collective') as a sign of caution, that is, the 
representation of health and illness does not exist on the
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Durkheimian collective level. However, this implies that the
distinction between the two is purely the degree of their
distribution. Harré would go further than this to argue that
the representations, being elicited from individuals and then
aggregated, may still be conceived of as ultimately
individualistic, psychological phenomena. On the other hand,
Herzlich also shows how the social representations which
people form of health and illness differ according to the
historical epoch within one culture, and its relation to the
history of medicine; and also drawing on anthropological
studies how they differ as a function of culture.
Although field studies include both psychological and
sociological aspects of social representations they fail to
provide a fusion of the two; they succeed in elucidating the
association between the psychological - individuals'
representations - and the cultural - the products of society,
but they do not necessarily provide the synthesis which would
constitute a social psychology to which the theory of social
representations aspires. Semin (1985b) is making a similar
point when stating
To the extent that the "phenomenon" remains
unspecific with regard to the social psychological 
processes which are involved in the production and 
reproduction of social representations, it will not 
be an advance on the type of social anthropology 
which has been extant for many years.
(Semin,1985b,p.94).
Thus, it still remains open to question whether or not 
the theory itself provides a framework in which the 
psychological and the cultural can be synthesized. In the 
previous discussion, concerning the distinctions between 
Durkheim*s collective representations and Moscovici's social 
representations we have seen that this is certainly one of 
the prominent aims of the theory. But, more importantly, it
is absolutely crucial if we are to succeed in providing an
understanding of the dynamic nature of social 
representations. It is their dynamic nature which both 
necessitates and suggests a resolution of the individual and 
culture. However, the majority of studies, even though they
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explore the transformation of social representations, fail to 
elucidate these issues.
4.1.5 The prescriptive and dynamic nature of social
representations
In order to achieve this synthesis, it is first
necessary to establish an understanding of social
representations that allows for both their prescriptive and
their dynamic nature. This can only be achieved if the
historical aspect entailed in social representations theory
is not conceived of as an immutable given, but rather as a
dynamic presence which must, itself, be conceived from a
genetic and historical perspective. Relevant to this issue
is a further distinction, made by Moscovici, between
collective and social representations. For Durkheim,
collective representations exist in a stable society and are
embedded in the subsoil of the society's culture. In
contrast, social representations exist in changing societies.
Moscovici is at pains to restrict social representations to
representations of our current society, to our
political, scientific, human soil, which have not 
always enough time to allow the proper sedimentation 
to become immovable traditions. And their importance 
continues to increase, in direct proportion to the 
heterogeneity and the fluctuation of the unifying 
systems - official sciences, religions, ideologies
(Moscovici,1984b,p.18).
The heterogeneous nature of our society and the rapidly 
expanding forms of communication provide the impetus for 
change.
This has important implications for our understanding 
of the prescriptive nature of social representations. There 
is not just one coherent system of representations, but 
rather a multitude of systems with inconsistencies, both 
within and between them. As people interact with each other, 
these inconsistencies become apparent and present problems 
which require the active reconstruction of the various 
representations. As was alluded to in Chapter 1, the 
prescriptive influence of the past is, itself, dependent on 
social interaction and communication between groups and 
individuals. It is, itself, a dynamic and active process.
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Moreover, unlike people within a stable, homogeneous society, 
these groups and individuals do not possess the same past. 
The prescriptive and dynamic aspects of the theory are thus 
united by the confrontation between different pasts and 
different representations.
Furthermore, it is the dynamic nature of social 
representations which precludes a definition of social in 
terms of the number of individuals who share a 
representation. A purely aggregate or distributive 
understanding of social representations would not sustain 
their dynamic nature nor their supra-individual status. It 
is in the differences, conflicts and controversies, which 
relate to people's pasts, their positions within society, 
their role and duties and their social relations, which give 
social representations their distinctive dynamic character 
and also their supra-individual qualities. These individuals 
and groups with different pasts and their related systems of 
representations come into contact with each other, presenting 
incompatible and problematic representations resulting in 
controversies which provide the initiative to transform the 
relevant representations. It is interesting to note that 
'controversy' can be broken down to contra-version, 'version' 
being Harré's (1984c) preferred translation of 
representation. Moreover, this suggests that Harré's critique 
of the concept of social representations may be indicative of 
methodological and research problems as opposed to 
theoretical and conceptual problems. A proper understanding 
of the dynamic nature of social representations necessitates 
that social representations are characterized as social 
rather than 'distributive' representations.
4.1.6 Social representations are not autonomous
This still leaves a problem with the autonomous nature 
of social representations. The need to establish the 
supra-individual nature of social representations must not 
rely on claims for their autonomy, as this denies the role 
of individuals in the transformation of social 
representations and fails to provide a social-psychological 
thesis.
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Social representations are prescriptive but they do not 
live a life of their own nor give birth to new 
representations on their own - this would be a sociological 
thesis. Rather they are continuously modified by individuals, 
who are involved not only in the creation of social 
representations but also in the maintenance of those 
representations. They are the products of a dialectic 
relationship between the individual and society. Markova and 
Wilkie (1987) have also questioned the usefulness of claiming 
autonomy for social representations. Any characterization 
which assigns agency to collective entities gives a 
mysterious quality to their dynamic nature. It was to such 
collectivist thinking which F.H.Allport so strongly objected 
and which, in opposition, instantiated the individualistic 
approach to social phenomena. Social representations are 
prescriptive but, in contrast to Moscovici, I would argue 
that they are not autonomous.
4.2 THE SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL AND THE NATURE OF REALITY
In the previous section, we examined the expression of 
the psychological and the sociological in the theory of 
social representations. A number of modifications were 
proposed which provide re-interpretations of the main 
sociological principles involved. These modifications give 
voice to the dynamics of social representations and the 
psychological principles of the theory without losing sight 
of their social or supraindividual nature.
However, the crucial component in the integration of 
the psychological with the cultural is the social 
representation of the individual. In order to understand the 
dynamic nature of social representations, which goes beyond 
descriptions of their transformations in relation to social, 
historical and cultural factors, it is essential to explore 
the role and nature of the individual. It is my contention 
that, if the theory is to provide an integration of the 
individual and culture, and, if the theory is to provide an 
understanding of the dynamics of social representations, it 
is essential to elaborate and explicate a social 
representation of the individual as social.
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In Chapter 3, it was seen that the social
representations of the individual as an independent entity
has had a profound effect on the shaping of social 
psychology. In this section, I shall explicate the means by 
which the social representations of the individual can be 
re-socialized. It will be seen that, while some theorists 
have emphasized the importance of language, a much stronger 
argument can be constructed. First, by drawing on the 
writings of Dewey, an organic, as opposed to mechanistic, 
conception of the relationship between the organisms and
their environment, is elaborated. Then, by drawing on the
writings of Mead and Vygotsky, this organic conception is 
extrapolated to include culture. In this way, mind is 
conceived of in evolutionary and historical terms as 
essentially social, existing, not only in the heads of 
individuals, but also in people's social interactions and in 
their cultural environment. Similarly, social individuals 
cannot be conceived of as independent from their culture and 
their social relations.
These developments place the theory of social 
representations firmly within the Hegelian tradition of 
thought presented in the previous chapter. Finally, the 
implications of these developments for our understanding of 
social reality are considered. Reality is neither an external 
given nor a collective illusion; rather, reality is socially 
constructed out of the physical environment within an 
historical and cultural context.
4.2.1 The social representation of the individual
The idea that the ' individual ' and the ' social * are 
indeed social representations is indicated by the diversity 
of their representations in different cultures (Dumont, 1970; 
Kon,1984) and their transformation in different historical 
eras (Foucault,1970; Morris,1972). The significance of these 
social representations within social psychology has been 
discussed in the previous chapter and is also evident from 
the numerous discussions concerning the image of man and its 
place in psychology (eg.Shotter, 1975; Semin,1986).
Again, this issue has been raised within the field of 
social representations itself. Duveen and Lloyd (1986) argue
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that theoretical confusion arises when the constructed and
constructive natures of the categories * individual * and
"social* are ignored. Social representations of the
individual and the social have had an insidious influence on
social psychology. Furthermore, the
representation of the * individual * divorced from the 
"social" is theoretically inadequate. There is no 
pure "individuality" which can be apprehended 
independently of social relations
(Duveen and Lloyd,1986,p.219).
Farr (1987a) develops a similar argument, drawing on the work 
of Ichheiser, in his study of the collective representation 
of individualism and its influence in shaping modern 
psychology.
Even though the representation of the social individual 
presented below is not a consensual representation it is 
still properly considered a social representation. It is a 
dynamic representation of the individual which has its 
origins in the social process and social content of the 
social sciences.
4.2.2 Language and the social individual
The individual human mind is pervaded by the social, 
by the language, traditions and culture of society. Farr 
(1984) suggests that this would be a strong sense of "social" 
which denies the existence of purely "individual" 
representations. One way in which this thesis can be 
developed is by examining the role of language in the 
content, structure and expression of social representations.
All representations are social because language is 
involved in the creation and transmission of social 
representations.
(Farr,1985,p.144)
Moscovici clearly considers language to be of prime
importance; "we think, by means of language", (1984b,p.8).
Language, in a peculiar way, provides the means by which we
structure and express our representations.
It is linked to our common everyday method of 
understanding and of exchanging our ways of seeing 
things
(Moscovici,1984b,p.18).
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It relates both to a language of observation, the expression 
of 'pure fact' and to a language of logic, the expression of 
abstract symbols. Hence it relates both to the perceptual or 
iconic and the meaningful or conceptual aspects of social 
representations. Representations are always of something, a 
particular object, and of some category.
Jaspars and Hewstone (1990) are making a similar point 
in their discussion of the role of social knowledge in causal 
attributions. Central to their argument is that 
any person explanation always implies also a social category 
explanation. An individual is always a member of a social 
category and these two aspects of a person cannot be 
separated neatly. This point can be extended beyond the realm 
of persons to apply to any object. An object is always a 
particular thing and also a thing belonging to one or more 
categories. As Jodelet (1984b) points out, these categories 
which structure and express the representation of an object 
are categories that are drawn from our common culture and are 
embedded in our language. Even where the focus is on the 
individual's system of representations, as in the case of the 
experimental studies, this cultural element is always 
present. We have already seen how the representations are 
brought into the laboratory from the common culture that 
exists outside those laboratories. As Farr (1984) indicates, 
the emphasis on language encompasses the experimental 
research on social representation although it should be borne 
in mind that they do not portray much of what is social about 
social representations.
4.2.3 The socialization of the individual and the 
de-individualization of the social
It has been argued that, in order to understand the 
origins and transformations of social representations, it is 
necessary to construct a synthesis of the individual and the 
social. This can be achieved by conceptualizing the human 
mind and 'individual' thought as a thoroughly social affair. 
By this, 1 mean not just that the human mind is pervaded by 
the social, by the language and traditions of a society, but 
that it is also social in its genesis. The individual's 
psychological processes and the contents of their
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representations are the products (as well as the producers) 
of social processes and cultural phenomena.
This is a stronger line of argument than that presented 
above and denies the existence of purely individual 
representations. In effect, it entails the reverse of 
Graumann's (1986) exposition on the individual psychology of 
groups and crowds in which he states
the individualization of the social is identical
with a desocialization of the individual
(Graumann,pp.100-101)
For social representations theory to overcome individualistic 
reductionism it requires the socialization of the individual 
which is identical with a deindividualization of the social.
The idea that the relationship between the individual 
and society can be understood by propounding the social 
nature of the individual is not new. Much of the discussion 
below draws heavily on the work of G.H.Mead (1934) and 
Vygotsky (1962,1978). Other, more recent, social scientists 
have also drawn on the work of these seminal thinkers in 
addressing this issue, but it is considered here to be worth 
returning to the original sources. However, before 
considering the social nature of the individual it is 
necessary to establish an *organic* as opposed to a 
'mechanistic* conception of the relationship between the 
organism and its environment. Although this presentation 
differs in some respects it draws heavily on Dewey's classic 
article against the use of the reflex arc concept in 
psychology (Dewey,1896).
4.2.3.1 The organism and the environment: Mechanistic
conceptions construe organisms and their environments as 
separate parts in isolation and existing independently of 
one another, such that the characteristics and functions of 
each can be considered irrespectively of their context. In 
psychology, this mechanistic approach is epitomized by 
behaviourism in which causes are located in the environment 
and responses in the behaviour of the organism. As a result, 
the analysis of behaviour has been constructed in terms of a
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sequence of an organism's responses to environmental stimuli 
(S-R).
In contrast, an organic conception construes the 
organism and the environment as a system of mutual influences 
by which the 'parts' all determine one another's 
characteristics and functions. Furthermore, the organic 
system transforms itself qualitatively in a continual process 
of exchange and growth. The organism is not set in opposition 
to the environment; rather, they are interdependent aspects 
of an organic system which function together and define each 
other at every step.
Dewey illustrates this organic conception using the 
example of light. Light is construed, not as a stimulus in 
the environment, but as an act of seeing. Similarly, sound 
is construed as an act of hearing. Seeing and hearing involve 
both the organism and the environment simultaneously and 
interdependently. Furthermore, the meaning and value of 
seeing or hearing are transformed through the action of the 
organism/environment system over time.
This organic conception is difficult to express in 
ordinary language in which the separation of the organism 
and environment is both implicit and insidious. For example, 
the statement 'The child sees the candle' immediately locates 
the seeing in the organism and the candle in the environment. 
Similarly, the action is located frequently either in the 
organism or the environment; the child reaches for the candle 
and the candle burns the child. But the meaning and value of 
both 'reaching' and 'burning' are dependent upon the 
organism/environment system. Furthermore, it is through such 
action that meanings and values are transformed. Rather than 
assuming that the stimulus and response are givens which 
exist in nature it is necessary to examine the genesis and 
development of the organic system over time.
4.2.3.2 The oraanism/environment/culture svstem; So far, we 
have an understanding of the organism in the environment. 
However, when we come to consider the human organism/ 
environment system a third term enters into the analysis - 
that of culture, with all its social and historical 
concomitants. This does not enter as a variable to be
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included in a mechanistic analysis. Rather, it entails a 
qualitative transformation of the phenomena being studied 
and consequently demands a qualitative shift in the 
explanatory principles of psychology. The oganism/ 
environment system is pervaded by the social; by the 
language, traditions and culture of society. Both Mead and 
Vygotsky propounded an organic conception of the organism/ 
environment system which emphasized its evolution or genesis 
in socio-cultural processes. The individual and the 
environment mutually determine each other through the 
activity of the individual in the environment. Objects in 
the environment change as the patterns of activity or 
responses to those objects change. What is distinctive about 
humankind's evolution is that it has been directed through 
intelligent action, made possible by symbolization. In human 
societies, the environment is partly constituted by 
significant symbols, signs and tools of mediation, which are 
themselves constructed in human interaction. Mead emphasizes 
the role of language as a system of symbolic gestures by 
which individuals communicate and develop shared 
understandings of the world in which they live. Vygotsky 
emphasizes the creation of systems of communication or 
cultural elaborations in the environment, such as notched 
sticks, signs and written language. Both emphasize that the 
locus of the mind is not in the individual but rather in the 
significant gestures and cultural artefacts which have a 
shared symbolic meaning for members of a given society.
Drawing on the writings of Mead, the individual is 
conceived of as an essentially social being. Through the 
process of the self, which has its origins in social 
interaction, the individual is able to take the attitude of 
the other in a process of symbolic interaction. Individuals 
adjust to the indications or gestures of other individuals 
in the social process of behaviour. And gestures become 
significant symbols when they have the same effect on the 
individual making it as they have on the individual who 
responds to it. Individuals acquire a communality of 
perspective with others by learning the symbols by which they 
designate aspects of their world. Moreover, the shared
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meaning of a gesture, or significant symbol, is determined 
by the response to which it gives rise within the social 
interaction. Thus, meaning is defined in terms of action and 
involves subject, object and third person or generalized 
other. In other words, meaning is dependent upon the actions 
of the individual, the environment and other individuals.
For Mead, as for Vygotsky, in order to provide an
understanding of human thinking and communication among
individuals it is necessary to understand the origins of mind
in the process of human interaction or what he terms a
* conversation of gestures'.
Mind arises through communication by a conversation 
of gestures in a social process or context of 
experience.
(Mead,1934,p.50)
The existence of mind or thinking is only made possible 
through social interaction. Thinking is thus the 
internalization of external conversations of gestures (social 
interaction) and once internalized as significant symbols 
they have the same meanings for individual members of a 
society or social group.
4.2.3.3 Implications: The implications for our understanding 
of mind and of the individual are quite profound. Mind finds 
its genesis and its expression in the social interaction 
between people in a given environmental context. Furthermore, 
as Vygotsky argues, human society is distinguished by the 
creation of cultural artefacts which exist in the environment 
and which are imbued with symbolic significance. In this way, 
the social development of mind is dialectically dependent 
upon the socially constructed environment. This implies that 
'mind' does not exist purely in the heads of individuals, but 
exists in the social interactions and cultural elaborations 
of society.
In this way, priority is given to the social. The 
individual does not exist independently from his or her 
surrounding culture, as something over and against society. 
Furthermore, the individual is not assumed to be a given in 
nature, prior to any kind of analysis. By adapting an 
evolutionary or historical approach, it can be seen that the
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individual cannot be understood outside the social relations 
and culture of which he is a part. The individual is social 
through and through. At the same time, society is not set 
apart from individuals. It is individuals who together 
sustain and create the social and cultural environment in 
which they live.
Once the origin, function and expression of mind is 
understood in this way the interaction among minds, the 
communication between people and the consensus of meaning on 
which they depend, cease to be problematic. Moreover, it 
transcends the dualisms between mind and body, between 
organism and environment and, more importantly, in the 
present context, between the individual and culture. The 
individual and culture are inextricably interwoven in a 
dialectical relationship, embedded in a socio-cultural 
historical context. The representation of the relationship 
between the individual and the social in terms of an evolving 
organism/environment/culture system provides a framework in 
which to avoid both individualistic and sociological 
reductionism.
If the above argument is accepted then it may well be 
assumed that everything is social and, as a consequence, 
there is no need to have a theory of social representations. 
If the individual's mind is a social phenomenon, then 
cognitive psychologists and individualistic theorists are 
necessarily studying the social processes and social contents 
of mind. The problem is not that these psychologists have 
studied something which does not exist but rather that they 
have failed to realize the evolutionary and social nature of 
their object of study. The framework presented above suggests 
that we look in different directions for solutions to the 
problems of social psychology. It is necessary to examine not 
only the individual but the individual with other individuals 
and their environmental context; to examine not only 
individual cognitive processes, but social cognitive 
processes and the significant context of social interactions 
in the environment; to examine not only behaviour (in the 
broadest sense of the term) at a given time but the evolution
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and transformation of behaviour in its historical and 
socio-cultural context.
It may well come to pass that lengthy expositions of 
the social nature of mind will prove unnecessary. The history 
of social psychology tells a different story. The dominance 
of individualistic approaches to social phenomena demands 
that the 'social* is propounded and explicated every step of 
the way. It must be remembered that this thesis is written in 
the context of modern social psychology. This refers both to 
its argument against the individualization of the social and 
to the reemergence of the social in social psychology.
4.2.4 The social individual in research on social 
representations
Those studies which, to my mind, have elucidated the 
psycho-sociological character of social representations 
ironically examine the development of the child in relation 
to its social and cultural environment. Ironical because 
Moscovici originally wished to investigate the adult world 
of social representations, examining the social diffusion 
and transformation of knowledge, values and life styles; and 
ironic because these studies are often taken to demonstrate 
the prescriptive nature of social representations. An 
excellent example of this work is that conducted by 
Chombart-de-Lauwe (1984) on the social transmission of 
cultural knowledge and values from one generation to the next 
during the socialization of the child. For Chombart-de-Lauwe 
social transmission involves a dynamic process of interaction 
between the child and the various elements of it's 
environment; it is 'a dialectic of psycho-social phenomena'. 
This approach does more than demonstrate the prescriptive 
nature of social representations as it cannot be reduced to 
a simple indoctrination of children. The child plays an 
active role in the internalization of social representations, 
in the reconstruction of the social representations presented 
to them in their social interactions with adults, and in the 
social environments created by adults. This explicitly 
interactional approach addresses not only the role of social 
representations but also their genesis in the organism/ 
environment/culture system.
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Duveen and Lloyd (1986) similarly stress the active role 
of children in reconstructing their social world and in 
assimilating the social representations of their culture. 
Their investigations of social gender identity attempt to 
elucidate how the adults' social representations structure 
the environment in which children develop and regulate their 
activity.
4.2.5 Summarv
I have argued that, in order to understand the 
development and transformation of social representations, it 
is essential to adopt a social social representation of the 
individual. The dynamics of social representations and the 
relationship between the individual and the social must be 
represented within the dialectics of the organism/ 
environment/culture system. This re-presentation avoids the 
static and coercive nature which characterize collective 
representations without denying the prescriptive and 
conventional aspects of social representations. Similarly, 
it obviates the sociological thesis which claims the autonomy 
of social representations whilst simultaneously escaping the 
individualistic thesis, which reduces everything to 
individual cognition.
This places the theory of social representations firmly 
in the Hegelian paradigm of thought. An individual's mind 
cannot be divorced from the physical and cultural milieu in 
which it developed and in which it is immersed. It is both 
the product and the producer of culture and vice versa. Thus, 
social representations are not to be found 'in the air': they 
are located in the heads of individuals; in people's symbolic 
physical actions and interactions with the world; and in the 
symbolic and cultural artefacts in the environment. And, 
wherever there are social representations so, also , there is 
mind. Mind is not simply located in the heads of individuals. 
It is also expressed in our social interactions and in the 
cultural products of society, from books and pictures to 
cities and satellites.
4.2.6 The definition of social realitv
The social representation of the individual within the 
Hegelian paradigm, as presented above, has implications for
168
the definition of social reality entailed within the theory 
of social representations. The theory must avoid both a 
positive empiricist definition which locates reality in the 
external world and an extreme social constructionist thesis 
which locates reality in the heads of individuals. It will be 
argued that the legacy of the Cartesian dualism can be 
overcome by elaborating a social realist perspective in the 
tradition of G.H. Mead.
In Chapter 1, it was claimed that social representations 
are the constituents of our social reality. To recapitulate 
briefly, the theory emphasises the symbolic and meaningful 
nature of reality, constructed through the processes of 
social interaction and communication. In accordance with the 
Hegelian paradigm the stimulus is not conceived of as prior 
to the response and there is no distinction to be made 
between a person's perception of an object and the object 
being perceived. Objects and events are perceived as 
meaningful and significant, being structured by our social 
representations.
This view of reality is a legitimate reaction against 
a positive empiricist definition in which the individual does 
no more than passively perceive the external objective world, 
and in which meaning is either ignored or located in the 
objects and events themselves. However, the opposition to an 
empiricist notion of reality does not, in itself, provide a 
definitive idea of how we should conceive social reality. It 
is also necessary to deny the extreme social constructivist 
thesis which suggests that reality is no more than what we 
believe it to be.
Reality is not located in the heads of individuals: it 
is not purely the subjective reconstruction of an individual 
or, for that matter, the intersubjective reconstruction of 
several individuals. If this thesis were propounded, objects 
would be social creations which only exist in human 
experience: they would be no more than their socially created 
meaning. The untenability of this position is made apparent 
by a simple thought experiment. Imagine the physical world to 
have disappeared. If reality were purely a social 
construction, the absence of the physical world would not
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impinge upon normal life at all. I could still go up the 
stairs to bed, train drivers would still be able to go on 
strike and hostile countries could still go to war. The world 
is but an illusion. This simple experiment demonstrates 
clearly that even if we accept the symbolic and meaningful 
nature of reality its social construction cannot be given 
primacy over the physical world. Wells (1987) presents a 
similar argument, drawing on the philosophical writings of 
Quine (1976). Culture and its assimilations are dependent 
upon (but not determined by) the physical senses of our 
bodies, ie. to light, sound, touch etc. Social reality may be 
imbued with meaning and social significance but it is also 
imbued with physical force. The theory of social 
representations requires a definition of social reality which 
both assimilates the physical with the social and which does 
not dissociate human beings from their environment.
The definition of social reality which avoids these 
pitfalls is provided by Mead (1934). Social reality must be 
conceived of in terms of an historical intersubjective 
objectivity. This can be illustrated by examining Mead's 
understanding of objects and its association with the notion 
of perspective. An object has definite qualities that are 
dependent, both on the physical structure of the organism and 
the physical qualities of the environment (c.f.Dewey, above). 
The significance of an object or symbol is dependent on the 
experience of the object or gesture. The meaning of an object 
or event will be the same when individuals share a common 
perspective. The common perspective is dependent upon both 
the language of significant symbols and the physical 
structure of organisms and their environments. It is not a 
given in nature but rather it is socially constructed through 
ongoing interactions between people in their environment.
The Meadian notion of social reality is the most 
appropriate for the theory of social representations. It goes 
beyond the active observation of the environment inherent in 
much cognitive psychology to the active construction of 
reality within an organism/environment/ culture system. As 
such, it transcends the dualisms between mind and body, 
between the social and the physical and between the
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individual and the environment. Reality is not located in one 
particular element but within relations of a continuously 
changing system. The human individual is not an independent 
entity but a social being that is part of a physical and 
cultural context. He or she is both essentially social and 
essentially physical. Her self-awareness and ability to think 
is dependent on her body and her awareness of her body is 
dependent on her mind (Jodelet,1984). Futhermore, both 'mind' 
and 'body' are dependent on the individual's relations with 
the environment. This environment is not a collection of 
stable and static objects. Rather, it is a dynamic and 
evolving environment of objects and events, imbued with 
meaning and social significance. The environment is made up 
of physical objects with a physical force and is perceived 
through physical media but these exist in a social, cultural 
and historical context from which they cannot be divorced. 
For example, Paris has a physical existence which cannot be 
denied but nor can it be known outside its social and 
historical context (Milgram,1984). In this way, culture 
denotes an objective social reality which is bounded by 
time/space. It can neither be located purely in the heads of 
individuals nor simply in the cultural objects of the 
environment. The former conception individualizes culture 
whilst the latter reifies culture. Rather, culture exists in 
the emerging relationship between people and their 
environment.
It is important to realise that this conception of 
social reality provides us with a broader definition of 
social interaction and communication. 'Social interaction' 
not only refers to interactions between two or more people, 
but also to interactions with the physical and symbolic 
products of human activity. The environment, with its 
material, physical characteristics forming the foundation 
for its social symbolic characteristics, is an important 
constituent element of any social interaction. Similarly, 
communication not only refers to 'non-verbal' or 'verbal' 
communication between two or more people. It also refers to 
communication through written and pictorial materials 
including magazines, papers, posters, films, television etc..
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through displays in museums, shops, exhibitions etc.: and
through the structure of the 'physical' environment, 
including parks, offices, homes etc. (Chombart-de-Lauwe, 
1984) .
A final point needs to be made about the dynamic nature 
of social reality. Not only do relations and meanings evolve 
in the course of interactions but new objects or events are 
created. For example, the sciences not only create new 
concepts or ideas, as was the case for psychoanalysis 
(Moscovici,1961) : they also create new objects which enter 
into our daily lives. The invention of toothpaste was of 
great physical/social significance; the computer has and will 
continue to revolutionize our social realities, the existence 
of atomic bombs and the prospects of nuclear warfare has 
irrevocably changed reality. In more general terms, human 
activity is continuously transforming the environment in 
which we live. We build houses, roads, offices, towns; we 
plough fields, plant forests, build dams; we construct and 
destroy such that not only do the meanings change but the 
physical environment upon which the social environment is 
constructed also changes. Thus, there is not just one 
absolute reality. Social reality is never independent of its 
socio-historical context; that is, it will be different 
depending on one's perspective or one's position in 
time/space, and it will be different depending on the 
environmental and social products of human activity. In
conclusion, we can say that social representations constitute 
our social reality if, and only if, they encompass our 
thoughts and beliefs, our behaviours and social interaction, 
and the environment in which we live. It is not simply that 
the social representations in our minds determine our 
perceptions of the environment and direct our behaviour. 
Rather, it is that social representations originate, evolve 
and exist within the dynamics of an evolving organism/ 
environment/culture system.
4.3 THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
The theory of social representations is, in some 
respects, a social psychology of knowledge. As such, it must 
provide an understanding of the dynamics of social
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representations which is dependent upon individuals. 
Simultaneously, it must describe the processes of 
transformation in such a way that they are dependent upon 
culture. In the previous section we established that both 
the individual and reality must be conceived of as social, 
dynamic and evolving phenomena. This provides a basis from 
which to re-examine the dynamics of social representations 
and the processes by which they are transformed.
4.3.1 The Role of the individual
From our previous discussion we already have some idea 
of the individual * s role in maintaining the prescriptive and 
conventional character of social representations. However, 
Moscovici tells us surprisingly little about the individual's 
role in transforming social reality. The role of the 
individual in the processes of innovation and change is given 
more attention in his writings on minority influence and in 
the sociology of knowledge.
Having established the role of the individual in the 
dynamics of social representations it is then necessary to 
describe, in detail, the actual processes of transformation. 
It is argued that the social processes of anchoring and 
objectification are insufficient, in themselves, to provide 
an adequate account. By giving priority to the past, they 
focus on the accommodation to the unfamiliar and its 
assimilation to the familiar. As such, they fail to describe 
the processes by which social representations are 
accommodated to the unfamiliar. More significantly, it is 
argued that the social construction of the unfamiliar is an 
essential aspect in the transformation of social 
representations, which has not received the attention it 
deserves. In this vein, casting-off and de-objectification 
are proposed as two complementary processes to anchoring and 
objectification. Finally, it is suggested that the processes 
occur within and between systems of social representations. 
The transformation of those systems is represented in terms 
of our previous discussion as an evolutionary process within 
an organism/environment/culture system.
4.3.1.1 The maintenance of social representations: Our 
previous discussion concerning the social individual and
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social reality clarifies the individual's role in the 
maintenance of social representations. We have already seen 
that the prescriptive and conventional nature of social 
representations must be understood in terms of an active and 
dynamic process. Individuals assimilate the social 
representations of their society into their own social 
reality through cooperative activity and the mutual exchange 
of symbolic gestures. Others make symbolic gestures which 
direct the individual's attention to objects or events and 
their socially significant characteristics. Over time the 
communication of symbolic significances becomes 
indistinguishable from perception. Furthermore, in that mind 
is a social mechanism by which one indicates objects, events 
and their characteristics to oneself, perception is also a 
social process. In this way, social reality is collectively 
maintained through continuous interaction within the 
organism/environment/culture system.
4.3.1.2. Minorities, innovation and change; Elsewhere in the 
writings of Moscovici there is a greater emphasis on the role 
of the individual in the processes of innovation and change. 
Both in his work on minority influence (Moscovici, 1976,1985c) 
and in his historical treatise on the origins of mass 
psychology (Moscovici,1985a) Moscovici makes clearer 
indications as to the role of the individual in the dynamics 
of social representations.
Since the mid-1960's, there has been a growing tradition 
of literature and research that has examined the effect of 
minorities on majorities. As yet, this work has not been 
integrated within the literature on social representations. 
It would normally be considered to fall under the rubric of 
group psychology and can be seen as a reaction against the 
'conformity bias' in North American social psychology. But it 
is highly germane to issues concerning the dynamics and 
transformation of social representations. As Farr (1987b) 
notes
this work on minority influence is all of a piece 
with his theory of social representations though he 
himself has not made these links explicit.
(Farr,1987b,p.349)
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The early experimental research (eg. Faucheux and 
Moscovici,1967 ; Moscovici, Loge and Neffrechoux,1969) 
demonstrated the influence of a minority in a group on the 
perceptual judgments of the majority. More recent research 
has examined the behavioural styles of minorities 
(Moscovici,1976; Mugny,1982) and the social and cognitive 
processes of minorities in society (Tajfel,1978). Majorities 
tend to maintain the status quo by perpetuating systems of 
social representations, including the social beliefs, the 
social relations and the environmental structure, which 
sustain their relative position in society. In contrast, 
minorities try to change existing social representations by 
inducing social conflict and instability, emphasizing 
different aspects of the situation, and by proposing novel 
solutions or alternative perspectives. The minority creates 
a new social reality by posing new problems and constructing 
conflict with the social representations of the majority. A 
minority's success in transforming the social reality of the 
majority depends upon their behavioural consistency and their 
ability to negotiate that reality. They must be firm, 
coherent and personally involved consistently over time but 
they must not appear to be dogmatic or inflexible 
(Mugny,1982) . With the diffusion and transformation of social 
representations through space/time a minority can change 
significantly the social reality of a society. For example, 
feminism and, more recently, the Green Movement, have 
transformed radically our social relations, the environment 
in which we live and our perceptions and beliefs.
However, much of the research on minority influence has 
focused on the behaviours of minorities which are more or 
less successful in influencing the majority. Little attention 
has been paid to how minorities themselves establish 
alternative perspectives or the processes by which radical 
social representations emerge. Similarly, the processes by 
which the majority assimilates these novel social 
representations has not been examined in any depth. The 
integration of the literature on minority influence and the 
literature on social representations present social 
psychologists with a field that is ripe for development.
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In Moscovici*s work in the sociology of knowledge the 
individual is seen as a source of innovation and change in 
society. In The Aae of the Crowd (Moscovici, 1985a) he 
describes how new bodies of scientific knowledge came into 
existence. He explores the origins of the theory of 
psychoanalysis and the influence of Le Bon*s mass psychology 
on Freud's collective psychology and the development of a 
more social model of mind. The theory of social 
representations is useful not only for exploring the content 
and diffusion of social knowledge, but also the origins of 
those bodies of knowledge and the individual * s role in the 
dynamics of social representations as a source of social 
innovation and change. Moreover, the theory of social 
representations requires that all these aspects of social 
change be considered together.
4.3.1.3 The transformation of social representations: The
previous discussion also takes us some way towards 
understanding the role of the individual in the 
transformation of social representations. As Farr (1984) 
points out, an individual is, in effect, a minority of one. 
The creative role of individuals in the transformation of 
social representations is most apparent in science. 
Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein and Freud were all individuals 
who constructed new social representations of the world and 
the place of the human in that world. These eventually 
transformed the social reality of whole societies. But every 
individual contributes to changes in social reality, however 
small. Every individual is, to some extent, active and 
creative in breaking with the prescriptive and conventional 
force of social representations. The creative activity of 
individuals, either alone or together, arises in the face of 
a problem. The individual must first develop or construct his 
or her own perspective against the conventional ways of 
thinking, seeing and behaving, and then communicate his or 
her perspective to others. But the creation of new 
perspectives, as well as their diffusion, is a thoroughly 
social process.
The individual * s perception and understanding of the 
world is structured by the social representations extant in
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their society. These constrain the thoughts and activities 
of the individual. But the organism/environment/culture 
system is not perfect. It presents inconsistency, 
contradiction, antagonism and conflict, as well as certainty 
and a sense of the familiar. Problems emerge within the 
system of social representations, in all its aspects. 
Discrepancies between social representations give rise to 
mutually antagonistic responses. This conflict can arise 
between people with different social representations or 
within an individual who experiences antagonisms between his 
or her own social representations. Thus the problem is not an 
individual phenomenon. It arises within the organism/ 
environment/culture system. The problem initiates creative 
thought, novel actions, and the reconstruction of an object's 
symbolic significance. In this way, new ideas and new objects 
arise out of problematic situations.
Problems belong to the history of a human community, 
and their solution is constructed in reflective thought 
which, in its turn, is addressed to the community, or in the 
social interactions and communications within the system. 
These solutions will constitute a new social reality in as 
far as they depart from the conventional social 
representations.
4.3.2 The processes of transformation: Anchoring and
objectification
The theory specifies two processes by which social 
representations are transformed: anchoring and
objectification. These were discussed at some length in 
Chapter 1. To briefly recapitulate, anchoring situates 'the 
unfamiliar' object or event within the context of the 
familiar categories and images of our social representations, 
establishing it within a 'network of meaning'. This involves 
two sub-processes: classification and naming. The unfamiliar 
object is first classified by comparing it with prototypes 
and determining its identifiable and significant features. 
Naming places the classified object in a complex system of 
related words. In this way, the object is said to become both 
meaningful and communicable. Objectification is the process 
by which abstract concepts are transformed into concrete
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images or perceptions. Concepts are merged with complex 
images or 'figurative nucleii* in such a way that 
relationships or attributes are turned into things.
In Moscovici's theoretical formulation it is unclear 
whether anchoring and objectification are to be interpreted 
as individual or social processes. Semin (1985a) suggests 
that they can be readily subsumed under a cognitive social 
psychology which employs the information-processing metaphor. 
However, the processes must be understood as inherently 
social in at least two respects. Firstly, the human mind is 
a social phenomenon and individual thinking a social process 
in that their genesis lies in the social interactions and 
communications among individuals within a society. An 
individual anchors an unfamiliar object and objectifies an 
abstract concept through the internalized conversation of 
gestures, that is, internal thought processes which are 
inherently social due to their origins in social behaviour. 
Secondly, these processes are rarely carried out by 
individuals on their own, but come about through the 
communications and social interactions, when confronted with 
unfamiliar objects or abstract concepts. The first can be 
seen as an internalized 'individual' form of the second, more 
obviously, social means of anchoring and objectifying. Thus 
the processes described by Moscovici do not imply a form of 
cognitive reductionism.
4.3.3 The spiral of transformation
We have established that anchoring and objectification 
are essentially social processes involved in the 
transformation of social representations. However, these two 
processes alone do not provide a sufficient explanation, nor 
do they provide an adequate framework for the study of how 
social representations are transformed. This is responsible, 
no doubt, in part for the dearth of studies which have 
actually employed these concepts. By focusing on how the 
unfamiliar is transformed into the familiar they describe 
only a part of what I shall call the 'spiral of 
transformation'. Anchoring and objectification are restricted 
to the assimilation of unfamiliar objects, events or ideas 
into our social representations. As such, they give priority
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to the past and to the prescriptive and conventional 
character of social representations.
But the transformation of social representations also 
involves the accommodation of familiar social representations 
to unfamiliar objects, events or ideas. Every assimilation of 
an object to a social representation simultaneously involves 
an accommodation of the social representation to the object. 
Conversely, every accommodation is an assimilatory 
modification of the object to which the social representation 
is accommodated. The two aspects of transformation within the 
organism/environment/culture system are simultaneous and 
indisociable (Flavell, 1963). Furthermore, in as far as 
social representations constitute our social reality, it is 
also necessary to examine the construction of the unfamiliar 
out of the familiar. The spiral of transformation is 
elaborated below and it is argued that, rather than 
distinguishing between the unfamiliar and the familiar, it is 
more appropriate to adopt a language which encompasses 
interrelated systems of social representations.
4.3.4 The social construction of the unfamiliar
Unfamiliar objects, events or ideas threaten the 
stability of our social representations and instigate or 
stimulate the social activities involved in their 
transformation. As such, the unfamiliar constitutes a vital 
component of the theory that has not, as yet, received the 
attention it deserves. This is, in part, due to the location 
of the unfamiliar in Moscovici's writings. According to 
Moscovici, the unfamiliar emerges from the reified universe 
of science. Scientists working in a universe of objective 
observation and pure facts produce unfamiliar concepts and 
objects to which lay people must then accommodate into their 
consensual universe of social representations. But such a 
division between the unfamiliar and familiar is unwarranted. 
As was argued in Chapter 2, social representations are also 
transformed in the course of everyday life. For example, 
social representations of children (Chombart-de-Lauwe,1984), 
of our bodies (Jodelet,1984) of Paris (Milgram,1984) and of 
masculinity and femininity (Duveen and Lloyd,1984) are being 
continuously transformed through our day-to-day activities
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and interactions. Unfamiliar and threatening ideas or events 
may also emerge within business, the caring professions, 
leisure, and society itself. Moreover, the heterogeneous 
nature of modern society, along with the pervasive modes of 
communication, means that we are constantly confronted by 
unfamiliar objects, events or ideas from other cultures or 
societies.
Thus, the unfamiliar arises within the consensual 
universe of social representations. In order to understand 
the dynamics of social representations, the unfamiliar cannot 
be treated as a given, as something that requires no further 
explanation. Rather, the theory must embrace the unfamiliar 
within its historical and evolutionary framework such that it 
incorporates the social re-construction of the unfamiliar as 
well as the perpetuation of the familiar. It must encompass 
both tradition and innovation in all their aspects, both the 
continuities between past and present and discontinuities 
between past and present.
Moscovici's specification of the unfamiliar is
untenable. For Moscovici,
the unfamiliar is there without being there; 
perceived without being perceived
(Moscovici, 1987,p.526).
As 'percepts reproduce the world in a meaningful way' it is 
possible that Moscovici intends to characterize the 
unfamiliar as perceptions without meaning. But if social 
representations constitute our social reality and if all 
thought and perception require an order in our social 
representations, then the unfamiliar cannot be set apart as 
something outside our reality. Our very awareness of 
something unfamiliar means that it must be associated with 
our social representations in some way. That is, the 
unfamiliar cannot be totally meaningless, it cannot be 
totally unfamiliar.
This is illustrated both in the diffusion of science 
and in the transformation of social representations within 
society. Common-sense knowledge does not act as a sponge 
which soaks up scientific innovations indiscriminantly. 
Rather, we select those scientific ideas and objects which.
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in one way or another, are useful to us in everyday life. 
That is, they have some connection with what we already know 
or do, or they impinge on our lives in such a way that we are 
forced to take notice. For example, the diffusion of 
psychoanalysis in France is dependent upon its association 
with Catholicism and the use of psychoanalytic concepts is 
dependent on their ability to describe socially significant 
behaviour which is unusual yet familiar. Similarly, social 
representations within society change with the introduction 
of novel connections between what we already know rather than 
something totally unknown. For example, changing the social 
representation of women in sport has largely involved 
breaking the boundaries between femininity and masculinity.
In this way, what was once familiar becomes unfamiliar. 
Indeed, this is the role that Moscovici has given science in 
modern society. Science challenges our conventions, blurs 
distinctions and threatens the continuity of social 
interaction. But it is not only scientists who discover or 
construct the unfamiliar. Any individual or group of 
individuals in society may be a discoverer or innovator, may 
find a new solution to an old problem, or may be confronted 
with a peculiar problem which requires resolution. The point 
is that the unfamiliar and familiar are not worlds apart. The 
familiar at once defines what is unfamiliar and is changed by 
it. Simultaneously, the unfamiliar emerges out of the 
familiar and is familiarized by it. The transformation of 
social representations depends upon these interdependent 
aspects and it is essential that the theory recognizes and 
explicates this interdependence. Only then can the dynamic 
nature of social representations be properly understood.
4.3.5 Processes of transformation; castina-off and 
de-obi ectification
If anchoring and objectification are the two processes 
by which the unfamiliar is transformed into the familiar then 
we should look to the complementary processes of 
'casting-off' and 'de-objectification' (Wells,1984) by which 
the familiar is made unfamiliar. We can select those features 
which make an object distinct and imbue a concrete object 
with abstract qualities. These may be equated with the
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processes of particularizations and transcendentalization 
(Billig,1988) discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas anchoring and 
objectification focus on the conventional and physically 
embodied characteristics of an object, event or idea their 
complementary processes focus on the unconventional and 
relational characteristics of familiar objects, events or 
ideas.
Here we must go a step further and make the unfamiliar 
interchangeable with the familiar. What is familiar in one 
context or to one person will be unfamiliar in another 
context or to someone else and vice versa. If an object, 
which is conventionally seen as distinct, is anchored in a 
social representation, this new association is itself 
unfamiliar. Similarly, an object which is usually given a 
particular symbolic significance becomes unfamiliar in a 
context when that significance is removed. This juxtaposition 
of familiar/unfamiliar can occur in different locations 
within the organism/environment/culture system. Similarities 
and dissimilarities, continuities and discontinuities, 
problems and solutions can occur within or between 
individuals in different environmental and cultural contexts. 
Furthermore, all four processes, anchoring, casting-off, 
objectification and de-objectification, can be involved in 
both the construction and the assimilation of the 
*unfamiliar*.
4.3.6 Svstems of social representations
In order to understand this transformation , it is 
necessary to consider not only one social representation but 
rather a system of social representations. The organism/ 
environment/culture system is imbued with numerous social 
representations which overlap to a greater or lesser extent, 
and the meaning or social significance of any object, event 
or idea is dependent on the network of relationships within 
and between these social representations. Changing the 
relations or meaning of any one element will have 
repurcussions for the whole system. As new associations or 
links are made between two or more elements, either within or 
between social representations, the whole network or system 
of relations must be readjusted.
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The nature of the system and its evolutionary 
transformation can be clarified with an example. In recent 
years, our social representation of the environment has 
changed considerably as the impact of human beings on the 
world eco-system has been increasingly recognized. This has 
restructured diverse systems of social representations in 
all their aspects. It has affected our beliefs, our values, 
our social interactions and our relationship with the 
environment itself. This has involved not only the 
transformation of broad social representations but also the 
creation of associations and conflicts between particular 
elements of those social representations.
For example, trees constitute one element in the social 
representation of the countryside but they have also become 
an element in the world ecosystem and a commodity in the form 
of timber or paper. The destruction of the Amazon Rain Forest 
emphasizes their association. Trees are involved in 
conflicting social representations which must some how be 
reconciled. They are no longer simply part of the countryside 
but are part of a natural balance upon which the very air 
that we breathe is dependent. This enters our daily lives, 
not only through media coverage and communication but also in 
the growing concern for unnecessary waste and the use of 
re-cycled paper. Similarly, the globe no longer consists of 
discrete countries and oceans with particular climates, but 
is an ecosystem in which all the parts are interdependent.
The transformation of these social representations are 
dependent upon earlier transformations associated with air 
and river pollution from industrial waste. These forms of 
environmental hazards were both more local and visible. As 
such, they inspired the creation of a relational 
representation of the environment; that is, the deterioration 
of the environment was related to industrial waste. This 
representation could then be extended to less tangible issues 
including acid rain, nuclear waste and the ozone layer. These 
new social representations are expressed and transformed in 
our daily activities, from the boardroom to the petrol 
station. Moreover, 'green' is no longer just the colour of
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grass. It is a political, social and environmental 
revolution.
A second example is offered by Carl Andre's 'Equivalent 
VIII' familiarly known as the 'Tate Bricks'. We are all very 
familiar with exhibitions of works of art in galleries. But 
the purchase of a pile of bricks as a work of art by the Tate 
Gallery gave rise to great controversy over the nature of art 
and also may have had implications for architecture.
In abstract terms, as an element from one social 
representation is located within another social
representation, it will change the network of relations and 
hence transform the meaning of all the elements involved. 
This creates a route or form in which similar yet novel 
associations and conflicts are created. Eventually they 
transform the social representation as a whole, such that 
previous meanings are forgotten. The system of social 
representations is conceived of here in terms of an
evolutionary process within an environmental and cultural 
context. It should be remembered that the associations and 
conflicts do not simply occur; rather, they emerge in the
processes of thinking, communicating and interacting in the
human/environment/culture system.
It is perhaps unfortunate that Moscovici (1984b) 
entitled his Chapter 'The phenomenon of social 
representations'. No doubt, this was to impress upon the 
readership that social representations have reality and are 
legitimate objects of study for social psychologists. But 
social representations considered as a phenomenon 
over-emphasizes their prescriptive nature and encourages a 
perspective which ignores their context of generation. They 
become things, given in reality which can be measured outside 
their historical and cultural context. This has led some 
social psychologists to ask inappropriate questions, eg. what 
is a social representation, where is it found and how can it 
be measured? But meaning or changing the structure of 
relationships cannot be measured. By objectifying social 
representations themselves, Moscovici has betrayed their 
dynamic nature and the symbolic environment which they 
describe. Social representations are neither 'object' nor
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'process*. Rather, they are the meeting of object and process 
in the activities of social individuals within an evolving 
physical and cultural environment.
4.4. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
In this chapter, we have identified a number of 
important contradictions in the theory of social 
representations which reflect major divergences in the 
history of social psychology. These focus on the problem of 
integrating the individual with society such that neither is 
given priority over the other. The resolution proposed has 
adopted an evolutionary perspective for the re-representation 
of the individual and of social reality. The social 
representation of the individual as a social being who is 
both produced by and producer of society overcomes the 
inherent dualism of Cartesian philosophy. The definition of 
social reality as an evolving social construction which 
exists in the interdependence between mind and environment 
(physical/social) expands the meaning both of social 
interaction and of communication. This provides a framework 
within which the dynamics of social representations can be 
reformulated, such that their prescriptive and conventional 
nature is complementary to (rather than antagonistic to) the 
flexible nature and the active role of individuals in their 
transformation.
This theoretical elaboration of social representations 
is constructed within the Hegelian Paradigm. The social 
representation of the social individual and the definition 
of social reality explicates the dialectic interdependence 
of the individual and society. The organism/environment/ 
culture system reconceptualizes the relationship between the 
knower and the known as an interactive 'circle returning 
within itself. The whole theory adopts an evolutionary 
perspective in order to understand the transformation of 
social representations. Despite some major differences the 
theoretical principles propounded here are in keeping with 
Moscovici's general perspective. They present a social social 
psychology which emphasizes the social, cultural and 
historical nature of human life.
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The theory of social representations, I would suggest, 
is currently one of the most exciting and challenging 
expositions of the Hegelian paradigm in social psychology. 
It has revitalized traditional fields of research in social 
psychology; it has begun to influence related fields of 
research, for example developmental psychology; and it has 
opened up new avenues of research.
The theory has revitalized the earlier historical and 
collective approach to social phenomena. This is apparent in 
much of social psychology and particularly in the field of 
social cognitionw Individualistic conceptions of attitudes as 
cognitive structures or states of readinesss which have 
flourished in North American Social Psychology are challenged 
and overthrown by social representations. The latter, as 
Jaspars and Fraser (1984) and Farr (1989) demonstrate, are 
akin to the notion of social attitudes propounded by the 
Chicago School in the 1920's. They are attitudes which 'are 
shared by many individuals and as such constitute a social 
reality which can influence individual behaviour' (Jaspars 
and Fraser,1984,p.104). Research on social attitudes and 
social representations have also involved studies of the 
content of the mass media of communication. This acknowledges 
their existence in the environment as well as in the mind.
Similarly, attribution as an individual cognitive 
process in interpersonal relationships is resocialized. As 
Ichheiser (1949) had explicated previously and Hewstone has 
currently demonstrated, attributions are dependent upon the 
content and structure of social representations extant in 
society. The interconnection between social representations 
and the psychology of groups has not been fully elaborated, 
but it is clear that F.H.Allport's individualistic conception 
of groups is rejected. Groups are not simply individuals in 
the company of other individuals. A group shares a system of 
social representations which constitutes their social reality 
and distinguishes it from other groups. That is, they have a 
collective reality which emerges out of the interactions and 
relations within and between groups. This perspective is more 
akin to earlier social psychologies of Ross (1908) and
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McDougall (1921) than to the North American tradition of 
group psychology.
Contemporary work in Europe on intergroup relations goes 
some way towards exploring the interrelationships between 
widespread beliefs, group membership and social identity (see 
Chapters 11). Furthermore, the theory of social 
representations should also be able to inform current 
research on social perception, social cognition, 
interpersonal relations and socialization.
The theory of social representations also encourages 
both the study of various phenomena and the use of diverse 
methods of research, some of which are not included in the 
more traditional social psychology. The media, in their 
various forms, are now legitimate objects of study; 
interviews and participant observation are legitimate methods 
of investigation; the modes of historical and cultural change 
are now legitimate fields of concern for social 
psychologists.
There is no doubt that there will always be specialist 
fields within social psychology. Having said this, the theory 
of social representations constitutes a framework which 
permits their integration. It encompasses people's social 
cognition, their attitudes and attributions; it relates to 
their interpersonal relationships and interactions; and it 
concerns groups and collective action. Moreover, the theory 
provides an extensive framework within which diverse yet 
related schools of social psychology can be integrated. It 
goes beyond the social cognition perspective which has 
dominated the last four decades of social psychology to a 
social construction perspective. The former focuses on the 
individual's perception of an external reality whereas the 
latter focuses on the collective interdependence between 
concepts, images and perceptions with the environment. The 
former is still dominated by Cartesian traditions of thought 
that sustain an individualistic approach to social phenomena. 
The latter adopts a Hegelian tradition of thought that 
advocates an evolutionary and cultural approach to social 
phenomena.
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I would also proclaim that the future prospects for the 
theory of social representations extend beyond the boundaries 
of social psychology. The reformulation of the theory's 
epistemological base emphasizes the interdependence of 
culture, cognition and action. As such, it suggests a 
rapprochement between anthropology, psychology and, to some 
extent, biology.
Wells (1987) concludes that a connection between 
cognitive science and social psychology is particularly 
desirable and that the theory of social representation would 
both profit from such a connection and contribute to the 
advancement of cognitive science. Farr (1989) extends the 
boundaries further from cognitive psychology to anthropology. 
Social representations are already present in cognitive 
psychology in the form of scripts, scenarios, plans etc. as 
well as the context and language of research (see Chapter 2) . 
At the other extreme, the theory of social representations is 
an anthropology of modern society which examines the myths 
and content of people's beliefs. In similar vein, I have 
argued in this chapter that all psychology is social 
psychology as individuals cannot be divorced from the culture 
and society in which they live. For example, there is no 
distinction to be made between perception and social 
perception, cognition and social cognition, or between 
behaviour and social interaction.
Many psychologists have argued that psychology cannot 
be an autonomous discipline (eg.Secord, 1986; Moscovici, 1986; 
Koch,1985; Cole,1987): psychology requires an inter­
disciplinary approach which creates and establishes links 
between anthropology, sociology, social psychology, 
psychology and biology. At the end of the day, it is not 
important if this multidisciplinary work is conducted under 
the name of social representations, contextualism, social 
constructivism or something else. What is important is that 
the work is done and, in my opinion, the theory of social 
representations currently constitutes one of the most 
promising developments in this direction.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SCIENCE
5.1 THE REIFIED AND THE CONSENSUAL UNIVERSES REVISITED
5.1.1 Their historical roots
5.1.2 A useful distinction
5.1.3 A two-way interaction
5.1.3.1 The well-established influence of science
5.1.3.2 Social representations in science
5.1.3.3 What should be included in the reified
universe?
5.1.3.4 Problems within the reified universe
5.1.3.5 The myth of the reified universe
5.2 PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
5.2.1 The received tradition
5.2.2 The general theory of relativity and quantum 
mechanics: challenges to the received tradition
5.2.3 The transformation of scientific knowledge
5.2.4 A Kuhnian philosophy of science
5.2.5 Paradigms and social representations
5.2.6 Revolution or transformation: the dynamics of science
5.2.7 The process of science: a social constructionist 
philosophy of science
5.3 THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
5.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
Moscovici is one of the foremost proponents of social 
social psychology: a social psychology that goes beyond the 
individual to embrace culture and meaning; that goes beyond 
the status quo to examine the social construction of reality; 
and that rejects an objectivist ontology in the study of 
social phenomena. I am indebted to Moscovici, amongst others, 
for introducing me to this perspective in which I am, by now, 
thoroughly immersed. But, while acknowledging this debt, I 
also take issue with Moscovici * s views concerning the 
relationship between social representations and science. 
Moscovici does not push his social thesis of knowledge to its 
logical conclusion, that all knowledge is socially 
constructed. In failing to do so, he not only creates a 
number of substantial theoretical problems, but also excludes 
social representations from the realm of science. In this
chapter it will be argued that, far from being exclusive to 
common-sense, the theory of social representations is also 
applicable in the realm of science. This is supported and 
elaborated upon by drawing on recent developments in the 
philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. It is 
thus claimed that the theory of social representations 
provides a suitable framework in which to study the 
transformation and evolution of science itself.
5.1 THE REIFIED AND THE CONSENSUAL UNIVERSES REVISITED
In this section I shall review briefly the relationship 
between the reified universe of science and the consensual 
universe of social representations as presented by Moscovici. 
In contradiction to Moscovici, it is suggested that not only 
does science transform common-sense, but also that social 
representations in society enter into science. But the 
present critique goes much further. It is argued that, rather 
than constituting two distinct universes of reality, the 
reified and consensual portray two contrasting
epistemologies. The former embraces a positive empiricist 
epistemology whilst the latter exemplifies a social 
constructionist epistemology. Both epistemologies can be
applied to both science and common-sense. Moscovici broke
with traditional social psychology by insisting that the 
study of social phenomena requires a social constructionist 
approach. It is argued here, however, that the
constructionist approach should be applied to both 
common-sense and science.
On numerous occasions (eg. Moscovici,1984b, 
1987,1988,Moscovici and Hewstone,1983), Moscovici 
distinguishes between the reified universe of science and 
the consensual universe of social representations. These were 
described at length towards the end of Chapter 1 and it is 
clear that, for Moscovici, they constitute two contrasting 
forms of reality. The former is a world of objective truth 
and certainty that is indifferent to context and culture. The 
latter is a created world of symbolism and meaning dependent 
on its historical and cultural context. In the former, 
thought is rational and based on observation. In the latter, 
thought is social and rooted in interaction and
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communication. (This is not to suggest that social thought 
is irrational, only that it is different from so-called 
absolute rationality). It is clear that Moscovici wishes to 
differentiate science from social representations and 
common-sense. But the contrast between these two realms is 
presented in a cavalier fashion, with no justification for 
its acceptance or any considerations of alternative 
perspectives.
This distinction continues to be employed by researchers 
and theorists (eg.Farr and Moscovici,1984b) in the field, 
although some critics have briefly questioned the 
plausability of the reified universe (Jahoda G.,1988; 
Palmonari, 1988) . In this chapter, it will be shown that there 
are a multitude of reasons why Moscovici * s notion of the 
reified universe should be rejected. But, before presenting 
these arguments, it is worth examining the historical 
antecedents of this distinction and the role it plays within 
the theory of social representations.
5.1.1 Their historical roots
The obvious place to look for the historical antecedents 
of Moscovici's distinction between these two universes is in 
Durkheim's sociological writings. Durkheim (1915) postulated 
a dichotomy between the profane and the sacred, which 
constituted completely different ways of knowing about the 
world and, in many respects, contradicted each other. The 
profane consisted of objective knowledge which was 
independent of context or culture. It characterized 
industrialized societies and was epitomized by scientific 
truth which expressed the world as it is and, as such, could 
falsify magical and mythological beliefs. The sacred was 
socially constructed knowledge which was context and culture 
dependent. This also applied to industrial societies but was 
epitomized by primitive and religious societies (Lukes, 1973) . 
Douglas(1975) suggests that Durkheim maintained this 
distinction for two reasons. As in the cultural anthropology 
of that time, he believed that primitive and civilized 
societies were utterly different; they were literally worlds 
apart. He also believed in objective scientific truth which
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could not be challenged by his sociological thesis on the 
social determinants of knowledge.
Moscovici, in a peculiar way, both challenges and 
maintains these assumptions. In effect, he shifts the 
boundaries but does not obviate the distinction. He 
challenges Durkheim's thesis by proclaiming the theory of 
social representations to be an anthropology of modern 
culture, focusing on the consensual universe and its place 
in modern, 'civilized* societies. Furthermore, as a social 
psychology, it denies the legitimacy of objective scientific 
truth in the study of social phenomena. On the other hand, by 
including the reified universe within the theoretical 
framework, Moscovici maintains both a belief in 'the world as 
it is ' and a clear demarcation between science and 
common-sense.
Moscovici is by no means alone in proposing the 
existence of distinct forms of knowledge. Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) distinguish between non-social and social reality; 
Vygotsky (1952/1978) contrasts scientific and spontaneous 
concepts; and Mead (1934) discusses the differences between 
knowledge and information. All these theorists propound a 
constructionist perspective for the study of social phenomena 
and consider science to be a special realm of interest. But 
Moscovici goes a step further by suggesting that science and 
common-sense constitute two different realities.
5.1.2 A useful distinction
Why should Moscovici preserve a model of science which 
is not only antagonistic to his own constructionist approach 
but is also largely discredited? The only reason I am able to 
suggest is that the distinction between the reified and 
consensual universes provided the context in which social 
representations were first defined. It identifies 
simultaneously the phenomenon of social representations as an 
object of study and defines the boundaries of the theory's 
application. The theory of social representations focuses on 
the transformation of the concepts and signs produced in the 
reified universe as they diffuse into the consensual 
universe. Social representations are science made common.
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According to Moscovici (1984), World War II marks a 
watershed in the changing relationship between the reified 
and consensual universes. Prior to World War II the direction 
of influence was from common-sense to science. Knowledge 
which had emerged in the consensual universe was clarified 
and modified by the sciences in the course of research and 
debate. Since World War II, the direction of influence has 
been reversed. Science now modifies common-sense. The 
sciences have become more refined and more removed from 
common-sense and their products have to be assimiliated into 
the consensual universe as they impinge upon daily life. Some 
of the most dramatic examples include the products of nuclear 
science, biophysics and biochemistry.
This characterization of the relationship between 
science and common-sense has encouraged a re-appraisal of 
the nature of common-sense understanding. It is no longer 
static and all-encompassing, or unquestioning and irrational. 
It is a dynamic system of representations which is modified 
and adapted to a changing world. It has also identified the 
common-sense understanding of science as a new object of 
study for social psychology.
5.1.3 A two-wav interaction
The relationship between science and common-sense is 
not as simple as Moscovici suggests. It will be argued that 
there is a two-way interaction between the reified and 
consensual universes which persists in contemporary society. 
The sciences most certainly transformed the consensual 
universe prior to World War II and common-sense is by no 
means impotent in the reified universe today. A further 
difficulty is encountered in identifying those theories and 
disciplines which are constituents of the reified universe. 
This makes any clear demarcation between the two universes 
problematic and raises questions as to how they interact. 
Both these issues are elaborated upon below.
5.1.3.1 The well-established influence of science; Many of 
the social representations which are now taken for granted 
originated in the sciences well before World War II. The most 
dramatic of these have involved the re-conception of 
mankind's place in the universe. The earth is no longer
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thought to be flat nor to lie at the centre of the universe. 
With the discoveries of astronomy and the Copernican 
revolution these conceptions were transformed; for centuries 
it has been known that the earth is round and but one sphere 
that revolves around the sun. Similarly, man was once set 
apart from the rest of nature, closer to God than to the 
natural world. But, with the Darwinian revolution , man was 
seen to be but a small part of the natural order. Again, with 
regard to Mosocivi's study of psychoanalysis, Freud's major 
impact on common sense understandings of consciousness 
occurred prior to World War II, during his own lifetime. No 
doubt there are many other instances in which the sciences 
transformed the consensual universe prior to World War II , 
but these will suffice.
5.1.3.2 Social representations in science; In contemporary 
society, the reified universe is by no means separated 
completely from common-sense. Social representations which 
are prevalent in society are embedded in the content and 
progress of science. The following examples tend to be drawn 
from periods which extend into the early and middle 20th 
Century, largely because contemporary studies of this nature 
are hard to find. It is easier to identify the social 
representations in science when they diverge from one's own 
social representations. But there is no reason to believe 
that today's science is any more 'pure'.
In psychology, social representations of science and 
of the individual which were prevalent in society have had 
a dramatic impact on the structure and content of research 
and theory. These implicit social representations of the 
individual and society in psychology and social psychology 
tend to go unnoticed because they reflect the social 
representations prevalent in society. For example, the social 
representation of science as an objective empirical endeavour 
in search of truth has persisted in psychology, despite the 
fact that it had long been abandoned by physicists, not least 
because it has been the dominant representation of science in 
the consensual universe. Also, the contrast between Russian 
and American psychology, reflects the divergent social 
representations in their respective cultures. In Russia, the
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individual is determined by his or her social activity within 
a social system. This is reflected in Russian psychology, in 
which cognition is studied within its social context 
(Strickland, 1984). Similarly, Luria's contribution in The 
Historv of Psvcholoav through Autobioaraohv focuses more on 
his laboratory than on himself. In contrast, the strong 
individualism of American society has led to the 
psychological study of the individual set apart from his or 
her social relations and environment. The insidious power of 
these social representations is highlighted by the 
transformation of originally socially-oriented theories as 
they reached America from Europe (see Chapter 3) . For 
example, Farr (1976) elucidates how psychologists, as 
scientists, commit the 'fundamental attribution error'. 
Attribution to individuals, as opposed to situations, rides 
on the back of the collective representation of the 
individual (Ichheiser,1949). This occurs, not only in lay 
circles, but also within psychology. For example, in the 
study of individual differences in ability, personality or 
attitudes, the variance is invariably attributed to the 
individual.
Social representations in the consensual universe not 
only enter into the construction of psychological theory; 
they also structure our methods of measurement and the 
interpretation of results. In The Mismeasure of Man (1981), 
Stephen Gould gives a brilliant exposition of the influence 
of social representations and social values in the 
measurement and definition of intelligence. Since the 
acceptance of Darwin's evolutionary theory the social 
representations which supported racial and sexual 
distinctiveness as part of the natural social order were 
maintained through scientific, as opposed to religious, 
argument. So-called objective measurement techniques, 
statistics and ranking procedures were designed and employed, 
not so much to generate new theories, but more to confirm a 
priori representations and prejudices.
The possibility that statistics reflect the social 
representations of society is explored similarly by MacKenzie 
(1981). In his study of British statistics and its
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development from 1865 to 1930, MacKenzie reveals its intimate 
connection with the eugenics movement and the social 
interests of the professional middle classes. He elucidates 
how Pearson and Bateson constructed different statistics and 
different biologies to defend opposing representations of the 
social order. Furthermore, it appears that not even 
mathematics can escape the consensual universe. Dickson 
(1979) argues that the formal characteristics of calculus 
correspond to representations of the material world and the 
labour process in a capitalistic society.
Thus, social representations of the consensual universe 
provide assumptions about individuals, society and the 
environment which are incorporated into science; they 
influence the questions asked, the evidence sought, and the 
interpretation or conclusions which are accepted. I would 
suggest also that contemporary society, with its ever 
increasing rate of change, frequently initiates developments 
in the sciences. Social movements such as feminism, 
anti-racism and environmentalism set new agendas for 
scientific investigation, both in terms of what is studied 
and what are acceptable solutions.
5.1.3.3 What should be included in the reified universe? The 
range and diversity of scientific disciplines presents a 
further problem for Moscovici*s distinction between the 
reified and consensual universes. At first sight, it appears 
perfectly clear that all sciences fall within the reified 
universe. But science itself is not so clearly defined. There 
seems to be general agreement that physics, chemistry and 
biology are sciences, but what about sociology, anthropology 
or geography? In particular, it is uncertain whether or not 
the discipline of psychology should be considered a member of 
the reified universe.
On the one hand, when discussing the influence of 
science on the nature and content of common-sense in modern 
societies, Moscovici refers to a broad selection of 
disciplines ranging from physics and chemistry to 
anthropology and sociology and even including psychoanalysis 
and Marxism. All these disciplines are considered to fall
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within the reified universe of science, producing theories 
and concepts which are alien to the consensual universe.
On the other hand, he argues that the principles of the
reified universe cannot be applied to the study of social
life and human meaning. If psychologists are to study the
consensual universe of social representations they must
employ a different framework and different methods from those
adopted in the natural sciences. He claims that it is a
mistaken endeavour to use the methods and assumptions of
science in the study of social phenomena. The theory of
social representations and the conception of social reality
which it enshrines is
incompatible with a positivist conception of science 
and a behaviourist approach to reality
(Moscovici,1982,p.115).
Rather than starting with precise definitions and narrow 
hypotheses which identify specific causes and effects, the 
development of a theory should be based on observational and 
comparative studies which reflect the complexities of social 
and cultural phenomena. Although we are left in some doubt as 
to the proper location of the social psychology envisioned, 
it would appear that it would not conform to the principles 
of the reified universe.
This confusion is exacerbated by Moscovici*s choice of 
appropriate objects of study for the theory of social 
representations. Those sciences which he has studied have 
been explicitly rejected by some scientific communities. The 
Vienna Circle, for example, did not accept either 
Psychoanalysis or Marxism into the realm of science. 
Furthermore, I suspect that the majority of scientists, 
today, would argue that they are not true sciences, as they 
do not conform to the generally accepted standards and 
criteria of science. I have suggested that the selection of 
psychoanalysis and Marxism was based on practical, rather 
than theoretical, grounds. In order to conduct an empirical 
investigation of social representations, Moscovici had to 
select those theories or sciences which were widely diffused 
within French culture.
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similarly, there are other disciplines such as geography 
and history, which must be considered. Like the natural 
sciences, they have produced ideas which have diffused into 
common-sense. If the influence of these disciplines is to be 
excluded from the realm of social representations it would be 
necessary to establish the criteria which differentiate them 
from other disciplines which fall within the reified 
universe.
5.1.3.4 Problems within the reified universe; Not denying 
the initial appeal of Moscovici's distinction between the 
reified and consensual universe, its continued usefulness is 
highly questionable. Rather than providing a coherent 
framework for the theory of social representations, this 
distinction engenders confusion and creates unnecessary 
theoretical complexities.
Firstly, it is difficult to make any clear demarcation 
between the reified and consensual universes. Secondly, the 
relationship between science and common-sense involves a 
two-way interaction. Not only do the products of science 
enter into the consensual universe but social representations 
also enter into the reified universe. This creates the 
difficulty of explaining how two distinct universes of 
reality interact and influence each other. In Chapter 4 we 
discussed the difficulties associated with Moscovici*s 
conception of 'the unfamiliar*. How do the unfamiliar 
products of science enter into the consensual universe? The 
reverse process is also problematic. How can social 
representations of the consensual universe enter into the 
reified universe of science? Thirdly, it would be necessary 
to establish how the lay person is denied access to the 
reified universe: why is it that the lay person is dependent 
upon and embedded in a consensual universe whilst the 
scientist is not?
Fourthly, in Chapter 2, I argued that the dynamics of 
social representations is not dependent on the reified 
universe. The theory applies equally well to the 
transformation of social representations which are not 
associated with the products of science. Fifthly, in Chapter 
4, I argued that the social construction of the unfamiliar
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must be included in a theory which purports to explain the 
dynamics of social representations. This being the case, it 
is detrimental to hive off the unfamiliar into a different 
realm of reality. Moscovici's conception of the * reified 
universe* is thus neither an essential nor a useful component 
of the theory. Moreover, it actually creates problems for a 
dynamic, social constructionist thesis.
5.1.3.5 The mvth of the reified universe; The reified and 
consensual universes do not constitute two distinct 
realities; rather, they embody two alternative and 
contradictory epistemologies. On the one hand, individuals - 
namely scientists - acquire knowledge independently through 
the passive and objective observation of events occurring in 
an external reality which is itself made up of independent 
causes and effects. This approach to knowledge was described 
in Chapter 3 as *positive empiricism*, founded in the 
assumptions of Cartesian philosophy. On the other hand, 
individuals - namely lay people - actively construct 
knowledge through social interaction and communication in a 
cultural and historical context. Furthermore, the 
environment, the social individual and culture form a dynamic 
and interdependent evolving system (see Chapter 4) . This 
approach to knowledge, which I have called * social 
constructionism*, is founded in Hegelian philosophy (see 
Chapter 3).
In Chapter 3 we discussed the profound effect which the 
Cartesian philosophy and positive empirical epistemology have 
had on the historical development of social psychology and 
psychology more generally. It was also argued that the 
Hegelian paradigm and a social constructionist epistemology 
provide an exciting alternative, not only with regard to the 
object of study (eg.common-sense) but also for the conduct 
of social psychology itself.
Moscovici goes some way towards revolutionizing social 
psychology by insisting that the study of social phenomena 
requires a social constructionist approach. However, for 
reasons discussed above, he does not apply these same 
principles to science itself. This is a mistake. Not only 
does it create the difficulties outlined in the previous
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section, but it also stands at odds with recent developments 
in the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. 
Science is a human endeavour and, like common-sense, is 
better conceived in terms of dynamic social representations 
than in the a-social and static terms of the 'reified 
universe'.
5.2 PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
In this section, I shall provide a brief overview of 
developments in the philosophy of science from the received 
tradition of positive empiricism to the social
constructionist perspective which focuses on the process of 
science and its transformation. It will be seen that it is 
the traditional view of science that Moscovici adopts in his 
description of the 'reified universe'. However, this view was 
challenged by significant advances in physics, namely the 
General Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. This 
encouraged the development of alternative philosophies, most 
notably by Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. The present 
discussion focuses on the writings of T.S.Kuhn
(1962,1969,1970) who propounds an historical, cultural and 
social-psychological approach to the understanding of 
scientific knowledge and its transformation. It will be seen 
that this approach bears many similarities to the theory of 
social representations. World views are comparable to social 
representations in their prescriptive and conventional
characteristics and paradigms are comparable to social 
realities. It is also argued that the dynamics of science 
should not be conceived of as revolutionary paradigm shifts 
but rather as a gradual transformation that integrates
tradition and innovation. Finally, it is suggested that those 
philosophies, which include the scientist in the process of 
science, embrace a social constructionist approach to 
science, which is commensurate with the 'consensual universe' 
in the theory of social representations.
5.2.1 The received tradition
The received tradition of positive empiricism in the 
philosophy of science presented a normative or ideal model. 
According to this view, scientific knowledge starts with the 
accumulation of sensory facts acquired through neutral
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observation. The scientists' beliefs, attitudes or subjective 
state play no part in these observations, providing an 
objective basis from which universal laws and theories are 
derived by induction. The truth or falsity of these laws are 
then evaluated by deducing predictions and testing them 
against new observations.
This philosophy of science emerged out of 17th Century 
science and, in particular, the science of Galileo and 
Newton. Galileo was the first to give primacy to observation. 
In contrast to both religious faith and to the Aristotelian 
tradition, which relied on pure reason to work out the laws 
of physics, Galileo conducted experiments with different 
weights to discover that they fall at the same rate. 
Similarly, the telescope enabled Galileo to observe that 
there were two moons which revolved around Jupiter, not the 
earth. These observations presented a direct threat to the 
established orthodoxy, showing that the sun, rather than the 
earth, lay at the centre of the solar system. Furthermore, 
Newton used these observations as the basis of his laws of 
motion, which were explicitly stated in his Principia 
Mathematica (1685) (Hawking,1988). The philosopher Francis 
Bacon, along with his contemporaries, argued that scientific 
knowledge must be built on observations of the natural world 
and not teleological or transcendental explanations. The 
facts speak for themselves.
5.1.2 The general theorv of relativitv and Quantum mechanics: 
challenges to the received tradition
The success of scientific theories, and in particular 
Newton's theory of gravity (which remained unchallenged for 
three centuries), gave no reason to doubt the positive 
empiricist philosophy of science. However, Einstein's general 
theory of relativity (1915) not only constituted a revolution 
in theoretical physics but it also challenged the traditional 
view of science.
Newton believed in absolute time which was separate 
from and independent of space. But studies by Roemer and 
Maxwell on the propagation of light showed that light 
travelled at a fixed speed. Einstein was the first to suggest 
that this implied that there was no such thing as absolute
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time. Time is not completely separate from and independent of 
space but is combined with it in space-time (Hawking,1988). 
This revolutionized thought on how the world was conceived. 
In Newtonian physics objects have shape, mass and volume, 
which can be changed as a result of physical interference. 
For the general theory of relativity these properties no 
longer exist but become relations between objects and a 
reference frame. Furthermore, these relations can be changed 
without physical interference by changing from one reference 
frame to another (Chalmers,1982 ; Feyerabend,1975). This is 
the essence of Mead's notion of social reality which he 
derived from Einstein's notion of relativity and was 
discussed in the previous chapter.
This revolution had two related consequences for the 
philosophy of science. Firstly, if there can be two radically 
different theories which describe the world of planets and 
stars, then scientific theories and laws are not pure 
extensions of observation. This has come to be known as the 
theory dependence of observation or the underdetermination of 
theory. Science does not start with observations because they 
are preceded by theory and because observations are fallible. 
Observations do not speak for themselves. Secondly, 
observations are not independent of the observer's frame of 
reference or perspective, that is, they are relative to 
his/her position in space-time.
For example, the motion of a ping-pong ball bouncing on 
a table in a moving train will be different for a person 
travelling on the train and someone standing on the track. 
For one, the ball will be bouncing straight up and down; for 
the other two consecutive bounces would appear to occur 
several metres apart. This illustrates the fact that there 
is no such thing as absolute space. Einstein showed that 
there was no absolute time either. In other words, objects 
cannot be observed as independent facts because they are 
dependent on their relations with other objects. Moreover, 
the observations of the relations between objects is 
dependent on the observer's position in space-time. Both the 
dependence of observation on theory and the significance of 
perspective contradicts the independence of the known from
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the knower (see Chapter 3) , a fundamental assumption of 
positive empiricism.
A further difficulty for the positive-empiricist 
philosophy of science was presented by Heisenberg's 
Uncertainty Principle (1926). In order to predict the future 
position and velocity of a particle, one has to be able to 
measure its present position and velocity accurately. But, 
with advances in quantum mechanics, this was shown to be 
impossible. In order to make these measurements, it is 
necessary to use at least one quantum of light which disturbs 
the particle and changes its velocity in a way that cannot be 
predicted. In other words, the object of observation is 
affected by the very means of observation in a way that 
cannot be predicted accurately. Quantum mechanics introduces 
an unavoidable element of unpredictability or randomness in 
science (Hawking,1988).
The underdetermination of theory, the significance of 
perspective and the uncertainty principle challenged the 
traditional view of science. Firstly, observation alone does 
not provide a firm foundation for scientific knowledge. 
Secondly, there is no absolute reality: objects can only be 
understood in terms of their relations with each other and 
not as independent entities. This principle also encompasses 
the observer, such that the known cannot be independent of 
the knower (cf. Chapter 3) . Thirdly, with the loss of 
certainty, the doctrine of scientific determinism could not 
be maintained as an ideal goal for science. Science itself is 
relative. The model of psychology as a branch of natural 
science was based on a 19th-century view of physics - if 
experimental psychologists took Einstein seriously then all 
of psychology would be a social science since 'man' is both 
the agent and object of investigation.
5.2.3 The transformation of scientific knowledge
A positive empiricist philosophy clearly did not 
correspond to the realities of science. By focusing on the 
context of justification for universal laws and the 
rationality of science it failed to realise how scientific 
knowledge changes. Furthermore, by insisting on the 
independence of observation it failed to reflect the very
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principles of science that it set out to explain. The demise 
of a positive empiricist philosophy of science culminated in 
the development of alternative philosophies which emphasized 
the growth and transformation of scientific knowledge and 
took into account background knowledge and historical 
context.
One of the vanguard philosophers in this movement was 
Karl Popper. According to Popper (1968;1969), science 
progressed through a series of conjectures and refutations. 
The relative merits of competing theories are assessed, not 
in terms of observational proof but, rather, in terms of 
their falsifiability and their novel predictions. This 
approach again provided a normative model of science, the 
influence of which is still apparent in psychology. But, for 
the same reasons that scientists cannot prove a theory, they 
cannot falsify it either. As a philosophy of science it 
failed to overcome the problems associated with the 
dependence of observation on theory. Science was still meant 
to be an objective and rational endeavour, *a process without 
a subject*, independent of the scientists who made it. 
Furthermore, although Popper frequently refers to the history 
of science , his philosophy fails to give an accurate account 
of the historical transformation of scientific knowledge 
(Chalmers,1982 ; Kuhn,1962,1970).
5.2.4 A Kuhnian philosophv of science
I have mentioned Popper briefly because it would be 
improper not to do so. But, of greater significance in the 
current context, is the work of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn started 
his academic career as a physicist but soon turned his 
attention to the history of science. In so doing, he was 
confronted by material which radically undermined his basic 
conceptions about the nature of science. In his book entitled 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) , Kuhn develops 
a philosophy of science which is more in keeping with 
historical evidence. The main features of this work have 
important implications for our understanding of science.
Firstly, theories are represented as part of a complex 
structure as opposed to a collection of refutable statements. 
Secondly, Kuhn adopts an historical and evolutionary
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approach, describing the progress of science in terms of 
successive periods. Thirdly, he emphasizes the role of 
sociological and psychological factors. Together, these 
portray science as a human endeavour in which people identify 
and solve problems, construct meanings and change the world.
Kuhn describes the growth of science in terms of 
successive periods: pre-science leading to normal science, 
then crisis and revolution, then a new normal science etc. 
Pre-science is characterized by numerous theories and total 
disagreement over fundamental theoretical assumptions as well 
as the kind of observational phenomena that are relevant. 
This is replaced by normal science, when a single paradigm 
structures and directs the activities of a scientific 
community. As the number and significance of the anomalies 
relating to this paradigm increase, normal science gives way 
to a state of crisis. This is resolved with the emergence of 
an alternative paradigm which attracts the allegiancies of an 
increasing number of scientists and constitutes a scientific 
revolution. Once accepted, this alternative paradigm 
structures and directs a new period of normal science.
5.2.5 Paradigms and social representations
Below, I will describe Kuhn's ideas about the nature 
and role of a paradigm in normal science. It will be seen 
that paradigms share many of the features of social 
representations. Firstly, the tenacity of a paradigm in 
normal science portrays the prescriptive and conventional 
characteristics of a social representation. Both constitute 
a framework or environment of thought which structures a 
person's observations and guides his or her behaviour. 'The 
thinking society' (Moscovici,1984b) here is the community of 
research scientists rather than that of lay folk. Secondly, 
initiation of students into the scientific community involves 
the active learning and application of a paradigm's concepts, 
laws and theories just as an individual's socialization into 
society depends upon social interaction and communication. 
Thirdly, scientific knowledge is transformed through the 
identification of anomolies and the process of discovery, 
just as social representations are transformed by 'the 
unfamiliar' becoming familiar and through innovation.
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Furthermore, a paradigm is expressed not only in the 
activities of scientists but also in the structuring of the 
research environment, and in their text books and journals. 
These correspond to the media that convey social 
representations. Indeed, Moscovici frequently employs the 
terms *paradigm' and 'theory' in his descriptions of social 
representations, despite his categorical denial of their 
existence in the 'reified universe'.
Although the nature of a paradigm belies precise 
definition, it's typical components can be described in 
general terms. These include general metaphysical 
assumptions, explicit theories and laws which are applied to 
a variety of situations using standard instrumental 
techniques. It also contains general methodological 
prescriptions which guide analysis of the relationship 
between the paradigm and nature. Within the scientific 
community, the paradigm provides a framework for the 
identification of legitimate problems, the employment of 
appropriate research methods and the interpretation of 
observable phenomena. Paradigms constitute a consensual view 
of the world which coordinate and direct the theoretical and 
experimental activities of the scientists involved in its 
elaboration.
The various components of a paradigm are not always 
explicitly articulated, but are expressed in the research 
activities of scientists. Individual scientists thus acquire 
knowledge of a paradigm by solving standard problems, 
performing standard experiments and eventually doing research 
in close association with a skilled practitioner within a 
given paradigm. Students literally have to learn where to 
look and what to see through their social interactions with 
skilled practitioners and with the environment.
Kuhn portrays normal science as a problem-solving 
activity. Presupposition of the paradigm gives scientists 
the confidence to explore esoteric problems on the assumption 
that it is capable of sustaining their solution. This having 
being said, the paradigm will remain sufficiently imprecise 
and open-ended, leaving room for further research. Moreover,
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it is able to withstand various unsolved problems and 
anomalies which do not 'fit'.
Before going on to discuss Kuhn's ideas about crises 
and revolutions it is worth considering anomolies in a little 
more detail. An anomaly arises with the awareness or 
recognition that nature somehow violates the paradigm-induced 
expectations. Anomalies are thus similar to what Moscovici 
has called the unfamiliar. Although Kuhn stresses the role of 
nature while Moscovici stresses the role of sciences in the 
production of unfamiliar concepts, these two aspects of 
anomalies are not distinct. Just as Moscovici stresses the 
interdependence of image and concept, Kuhn emphasizes the 
interdependence of fact and theory . With reference to our 
earlier discussions this accommodates the theory dependent 
nature of observation. Similarly, just as Moscovici 
highlights the transformation of scientific knowledge as it 
enters into the realms of the consensual universe of lay 
folk, Kuhn stresses the adjustment of the paradigm required 
to assimilate anomalies. Discovery involves more than the 
simple addition of a new fact to the conceptual system; it 
demands the restructuring of conceptual categories such that 
nature is seen in a different way. There is thus no clear 
distinction between discovery and invention. Furthermore, 
discovery and invention cannot be attributed to an individual 
at a given moment. Rather, it is a complex process which is 
structured by and restructures the paradigm. 'Anomalies 
appear only against the background provided by the paradigm' 
(Kuhn,1980,p.65) and discovery/invention involves both 
experimentation (interaction with the environment) and 
assimilation (thinking and restructuring) over time. It 
entails
the previous awareness of anomaly, the gradual and 
simultaneous emergence of both observational and 
conceptual recognition, and the consequent change 
of paradigm categories and procedures often 
accompanied by resistance'
(Kuhn,1970,p.62).
5.2.6 Revolution or transformation; the dynamics of science 
In this section, I will discuss Kuhn's ideas about the 
emergence of a crisis and the revolution of a science. These
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ideas further emphasize the similarity between paradigm and 
social representations. Both denote 'world views' or 'frames 
of reference', constituting a social reality for the relevant 
community. Both depend upon psychological and sociological 
factors which cannot be described in terms of the 'reified 
universe'. And both are transformed through the processes of 
interaction and communication. However, there are also 
substantial differences between Kuhn's paradigms and social 
representations with regard to their dynamics. Kuhn describes 
paradigm shifts as dramatic and discontinuous events which 
demand a 'gestalt switch' in world views. This contrasts with 
the dynamics of social representations which involve the 
gradual transformation of content and structure. In contrast 
to Kuhn, it will be argued that there is not a clear 
distinction between normal science and revolution but rather 
that, even in normal science, there is an ongoing balance 
between tradition and innovation.
Although a paradigm can withstand a number of anomalies 
they will eventually lead to crisis and revolution. This will 
depend on the number of anomalies, their persistance, their 
association with social needs and their relation to 
fundamental aspects of the paradigm. The accumulative force 
of anomalies gives rise to a state of crisis in which there 
is a loss of confidence in the paradigm and 'pronounced 
professional insecurity'. As this persists, scientists turn 
to argument and debate over the fundamental theoretical 
assumptions and relevant observational phenomena, giving rise 
to philosophical and metaphysical dispute. The seriousness of 
a crisis deepens when a rival paradigm emerges. This lack of 
consensus encourages the articulation of the old paradigm: 
what was once implicit is made explicit in the face of 
alternative viewpoints. It is at this juncture that science 
exhibits extraordinary dynamics and undergoes revolution. The 
new paradigm, according to Kuhn, 'emerges all at once, 
sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man 
deeply immersed in crisis'. Adherents of the new paradigm 
undergo a 'religious conversion' or 'gestalt switch' as they 
change their allegancies from the old to the new paradigm.
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This dramatic and discontinuous character of revolution 
will be challenged below but first it is worth looking at the 
nature of competing paradigms. Kuhn depicts revolutions as 
changes in world view. After a revolution, scientists are 
living in different worlds. This does not imply that 
scientists are transported to a different planet, but that 
the world is seen as made up of different things. They may 
look in the same place with the same instruments but they 
will observe different phenomena. Observations are not fixed 
by the nature of the environment and perceptual apparatus. 
They are not given in immediate experience or communicated in 
a neutral observation- language. What a person sees depends 
not only on what he or she looks at, but also on what he or 
she looks for. This will depend on his or her paradigm or 
frame of reference, which is gained through social 
interaction and communication. Furthermore, the paradigm 
legitimises different problems, makes new kinds of data 
relevant and suggests different modes of investigation.
Kuhn elaborates on his conception of paradigms as world 
views by drawing on evidence both from psychology and from 
the history of science. His examples focus on change in 
meaning which relate to both perception and conception. It 
involves both change in relations within the paradigm and the 
paradigm's relation to the environment. In other words, 
changing the meaning of one item has repercussions for the 
meanings of related terms and experience. Although the same 
terms may be used by competing paradigms their meanings will 
not be the same. For example, by postulating that the sun was 
not a planet but a star, the Copernican revolution changed 
the meaning of 'planet', which had repercussions for the 
distinction between various celestial bodies. It transformed 
the conceptual system such that our experience of the solar 
system was also transformed.
It can be seen that paradigms constitute the social 
reality for a community of scientists just as social 
representations constitute the social reality for the lay 
person (as defined in Chapter 4) . They are a frame of 
reference in which meaning is defined and in which problems 
are identified or legitimized and they also constitute the
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world of things. As such, competing paradigms offer 
alternative social realities in which scientists do science.
This is frequently referred to as the incommensurability 
of competing paradigms which has important implications for 
our understanding of science. Firstly, it is not possible to 
choose between paradigms on the basis of neutral 
observations. Observation is always structured by and imbued 
with meaning from the perspective of a given paradigm. 
Secondly, there are no purely logical grounds on which to 
make a rational choice between paradigms. Different paradigms 
embrace different metaphysical assumptions, standards of 
evaluation etc. Supporters of one paradigm will not accept 
the premises of the alternative paradigm and hence do not 
have to accept its conclusions. Seen in this light, the 
transformation of science cannot be described within the 
terms of the 'reified universe* or a positive empiricist 
philosophy of science.
Unlike previous philosophies of science, Kuhn's account 
of 'paradigm shifts' emphasize the importance of 
psychological and sociological factors in the growth of 
science. This applies not only to the emergence of new 
paradigms but also to the processes by which revolutions are 
resolved and a new normal science instantiated. According to 
Kuhn, a new paradigm emerges first in the minds of one , or 
at most, a few individuals. These will be scientists whose 
attention is focused on crisis-provoking problems and who 
usually are either so young or so new to the field that they 
are less socialized and, hence, less committed to the old 
paradigm. But a scientific revolution requires the 
abandonment of one paradigm and the adoption of a new one, 
not just by a minority of scientists, but by the relevant 
scientific community as a whole. This is achieved through the 
social processes of argument, debate and persuasion.
Those arguments that appear to be most persuasive depend 
on the comparative problem-solving ability of the alternative 
paradigm. This is particularly true if the new paradigm can 
resolve those anomalies that instigated the crisis. However, 
these are not the only considerations. It is rarely the case 
that an emerging paradigm immediately improves on its
210
predecessor. Indeed, those scientists committed to the old 
paradigm will produce convincing counter-arguments resisting 
the change to an alternative world view.
Furthermore, the incommensurability of paradigms hampers 
communication and debate between opposing factions. Other 
considerations which are equally, if not more, influential 
are less obvious. Scientists may be persuaded by the 
aesthetic appeal of the new paradigm, being 'simpler' or of 
'greater beauty'. The new paradigm may be more applicable to 
a pressing social need. Scientists may also come to believe 
that it offers greater potential for future research.
Paradigm shifts and the transformation of social 
representations, at least in some respects, display the same 
characteristics. It may well be that the criteria, values and 
content of arguments will vary across different sciences and 
in different spheres of life. But, just as the transformation 
of social representations is dependent on socio-psychological 
factors, so, too, is the revolution of scientific knowledge. 
Many of the major 'scientific revolutions' are discoveries of 
a social-psychological nature. That 'man' as a species was 
not created separately from other species (Darwin); that the 
earth is no longer the centre of the universe (Copernicus); 
that what is in consciousness is finite in relation to the 
unconscious (Freud); that space and time are not independent 
dimensions (Einstein). Furthermore, they all involve a change 
in the relationship between the knower and the known. The 
transformation of scientific knowledge is not dependent upon 
logic nor pure observation any more than it is upon 
common-sense. Kuhn, like Moscovici, emphasizes the 
interdependence of individuals, the scientific community, 
their paradigms and the environment in which they work.
Despite these fundamental similarities, Kuhn's writings 
proclaim a special regard for science which distinguishes 
normal and revolutionary science from pre-science and, for 
that matter, from common-sense. The main distinguishing 
characteristic of normal science is that a single paradigm 
guides and coordinates the activities of scientists. It 
provides a single framework for communication and interaction 
within the community of scientists, who share the same world
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view. Alternative paradigms emerge only once a crisis is well 
established. This contrasts with pre-science in which 
different and incommensurate world views proliferate, 
hindering communication and coordinated research activity. 
Given the primacy of a single paradigm in normal science, 
extraordinary or revolutionary science is conceived of in 
terms of a dramatic and discontinuous event. Firstly, this 
separates tradition from innovation into successive periods 
in the growth of scientific knowledge. This is clearly at 
odds with my account of the transformation of social 
representations in which tradition and innovation are 
inextricably interwoven in a continuous and gradual process 
(see Chapter 4). Secondly, Kuhn's account fails to give any 
clear idea of how alternative world views are created. While 
Moscovici left the construction of the unfamiliar to science, 
Kuhn leaves the construction of new paradigms to individual 
scientists who mystically achieve an alternative world view. 
Thirdly, other philosophers of science, most notably Lakatos 
(1970) and Feyerabend (1970), have argued that Kuhn's account 
is at odds with the history of science which cannot be 
divided into successive periods of tenacity and 
proliferation.
These problems are overcome if we consider the 
prescriptive and conventional aspects of science in 
continuous interaction with the creative and innovatory 
aspects of science. Alternative paradigms do not emerge only 
after a crisis is established. Rather, they are always 
present and play an important part in the growth of 
scientific knowledge. It is not the central paradigm that 
alone determines the problem-solving activities of 
scientists, but also the clash of ideas between alternative 
views. These may come from within the discipline or from 
other fields, sustaining critical discussion and argument as 
a normal part of scientific activity. This adjustment to 
Kuhn's original thesis integrates the role of tradition and 
innovation in the growth of scientific knowledge and further 
emphasizes the similarities between paradigms and social 
representations.
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5.2.7 The process of science; a social constructionist 
philosophy of science
The writings of philosophers such as Kuhn, Lakatos and 
Fayerabend have encouraged the development of a new approach 
in the philosophy of science. This approach focuses on the 
processes of science from the perspective of the scientist in 
an historical and evolutionary framework. Rather than 
restricting philosophy to the * context of justisfication' 
this approach also embraces 'the context of discovery*, with 
all its historical and psychological concomitants 
(Nersessian, 1987b) . It is concerned not only with the 
products of science but also with how knowledge is produced 
(Shapero,1987). Such a philosophy requires both an historical 
overview and a detailed analysis of the development and 
transformation of science (Nersessian, 1987b; Kuhn,1988). 
Only then can philosophers understand the processes by which 
problems are structured, theories formulated and solutions 
accepted or rejected by the community. Only then can 
philosophers understand the processes by which meanings are 
established and changed. Furthermore, within this approach, 
reality is conceived of in terms of relative objectivity or 
historical realism, a conception comparable to social 
constructionism. It thus becomes apparent that the theory of 
social representations is applicable in the realm of science 
and provides a social-psychological framework in which to 
examine the transformation of science.
In his more recent work, Kuhn (1988) has identified two 
aspects of historical analysis both of which are essential to 
the philosopher. Historical narratives of changes in 
scientific knowledge provide a source of data from which 
philosophers construct an understanding of science. However, 
prior to this, it is necessary to 'regain the past', to 
re-establish the meanings and concerns confronting the 
scientists involved. In other words, it is necessary to adopt 
the perspective of the scientist to re-discover the 
intellectual tradition, to reconstruct the contradictions or 
problems, and to research the scientists's solutions.
Nersessian (1987a), Shapero(1987), Giere (1987) and 
others have argued similarly that philosophers have tended
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to contrast former conceptualization with later versions 
without analysing the periods of transition between theories. 
In order to understand the transformation of science, it is 
necessary to examine how new concepts emerge and are 
subsequently altered, raising new problems to be resolved, in 
a gradual process of theory change. The creation of a 
scientific concept takes place within frameworks of beliefs 
in response to specific problems
which are theoretical, experimental, methodological and 
metaphysical. The meaning of a new concept is thus always 
founded in the meaning of its predecessors and is better 
understood in the dynamics of meaning-change and its context 
of use rather than in the necessary and sufficient conditions 
of a static definition. This evolutionary approach applies 
both to the substantive issues addressed by a particular 
theory and to the broader notions of observation, 
explanation, criteria for evaluation, methodology and the 
goals of a scientific discipline.
By including the scientist in the process of science
and by focusing on beliefs, meaning and creativity , these
philosophers narrow the gap between our understanding of
science and our understanding of cognition, and the
achievement of knowledge, more generally. To quote Nersessian
the cognitive mechanisms at work in the 
meaning-making dimensions of science cannot be 
fundamentally different ie. different in kind, from 
those we employ in non-scientific and 
science-learning contexts .... any adequate science 
of cognition must also take the data from the 
analysis of science into account in its formulation 
and this has not been done to any significant extent
(Nersessian,1987a,p.164).
Science is conceived of as a human endeavour in which 
individuals, who have internalized the language and beliefs 
of their community, contribute to and evaluate knowledge. 
Science, like any other activity, is a culturally and 
historically situated activity which is ongoing and 
open-ended, always open to revision and change. This does 
not imply an extreme relativism or extreme social 
constructionism. Such a position could not explain the
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phenomenal success of the sciences, nor could it explain the 
transformation of science. Rather, it expresses a reality 
which is founded in the organism/environment/culture system. 
This is expressed in the philosophical writings by terms such 
as 'historical realism', 'contextual objectivity', 
'evolutionary naturalism', 'relative objectivity' etc. It is 
a human reality founded in the biological and cultural 
inheritance of the species; a reality which does not separate 
the internal, subjective world from the external objective 
world. The cultural environment is not distinct from the 
natural environment, nor the mental from the material world. 
It is a form of social reality that embeds the individual in 
culture; the scientist, like any other individual, is
a personification of nature through participation
in, and an expression of, a culture
(Grene,1987,p.73).
The conception of science as a cultural phenomenon makes it 
no less real. What it does do is to include the scientist 
and the scientific community in that reality.
In conclusion, it can be seen that science should be 
conceived of as a human endeavour and, far from being a 
reified universe, it is a culturally and historically 
situated activity. Scientists, as scientists, are both the 
product and the producers of science just as individuals are 
both the product and the producers of culture. Thus, the 
theory of social representations, as an expression of the 
social constructionist paradigm, can be applied to the realm 
of science. In short, all that is true of the 'consensual 
universe' is also true of science.
5.3 THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
Parallel developments in the sociology of knowledge 
similarly suggest that the theory of social representations 
is applicable to science. In general terms, this field is 
concerned with 'the relationship between human thought and 
the social context within which it arises' (Berger and 
Luckmann,1984,p.16 (1st edition,1966)). It addresses the 
variety of knowledge in different societies and the processes 
by which knowledge is socially established as real. This
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section is not intended to provide an overview of the diverse 
approaches which have been adopted or to debate the various 
perspectives on the social construction of science. However, 
reading the theoretical and research papers in the sociology 
of knowledge convinced me that science could be legitimately 
characterized in terms of social representations. I also 
believe that the theory of social representations would 
provide a useful framework for the integration of at least 
some of this material.
This section commences by looking briefly at the overlap 
between social representations studies and the sociology of 
knowledge. This is followed by a discussion of the social 
processes involved in the construction of scientific 
knowledge, including the influence of institutions and 
society more generally; the socialization of novices into the 
scientific community; and the processes by which scientific 
knowledge is transformed and diffused within the community. 
Finally, it is argued that reification is the final stage in 
the social construction of reality and does not differentiate 
science from society. Furthermore, it is suggested that the 
similarities between science and other cultural enterprises 
far outweigh their differences.
One of the most important books in the sociology of 
knowledge has been The Social Construction of Reality by 
Berger and Luckmann (1966). This treatise is concerned 
explicitly with the social construction of reality in 
everyday life and shares many features with the general 
approach expounded by Moscovici in his theory of social 
representations. Farr (1987b) even suggests that several 
studies within the field of social representations are 
themselves empirical contributions to the literature on the 
sociology of knowledge. For example, in La Psvchanalvse 
(1961), Moscovici traces the diffusion and transformation of 
an existing body of scientific psychology into French 
culture. Similarly, in The Age of the Crowd (1985) he 
examines the use of Le Bon's Mass Psychology by political 
leaders such as Hitler and Stalin. In so far as these leaders 
acted on the basis of Le Bon's ideas, his mass psychology was 
a science which 'created history', transforming the nature of
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the world in which we live. Furthermore, Moscovici has not 
been interested exclusively in the diffusion and 
transformation of scientific psychology as it becomes part of 
common-sense understanding. He has also examined the origins 
and impact of theories within science. For example, in The 
Age of the Crowd. Moscovici analyses Le Bon's influence on 
the development of Freud's second, more social psychology. 
Similarly, in the preface to La Psvchanalvse. Lagache notes 
that Moscovici was interested in the origins and diffusion 
of psychoanalysis within the community of psychoanalysts. It 
was only due to their lack of cooperation that this aspect of 
the problem was not studied. Some studies, in particular the 
work of Restivo (1984) and Trasweek (1984) have actually 
employed the concept of representations in studying the 
dialectic relationships between scientific knowledge and the 
social environment. Farr (1984) has also argued that the 
proper place to look for social representations in laboratory 
studies is at the level of the scientific community. For 
example. Behaviourism, as a social representation, affects 
the layout of psychology laboratories and structures the 
social interactions within the research process.
Moscovici himself does not attempt to integrate this 
work on science with the theory of social representations. 
This is possibly due to the fact that he wishes to maintain 
the distinction between the reified and consensual universes. 
For him, studies of science examine the reified universe 
whereas studies of common-sense understanding of science fall 
within the consensual universe. However, studies in the 
sociology of knowledge discussed below make it clear that 
these are part of the same enterprise.
Rather than entering into the debate on the proper 
research programme for the sociology of knowledge or the 
various approaches which have been used, I shall focus on 
those studies which illuminate the social construction of 
scientific knowledge. Many of these studies were inspired by 
the writings of Kuhn as well as historians of science. A 
central assumption is that social truths cannot be contrasted 
with objective rational truth; that culture is not separate 
from nature; and that science is not, in some way, a-social
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or a-historical. The sociology of scientific knowledge, for
most of its proponents, is not simply trying to demonstrate
the social influences on objective knowledge but, rather,
that scientific knowledge is a social construction.
By rejecting the traditional distinction between social
and scientific knowledge the role of convention, of the
social processes of negotiation and argumentation and of the
influence of society are shown to be inherent aspects of
science. The world of science is also a world of meaning and
social significance, dependent on the collaboration of
scientists and some degree of consensus with regard to
theory, subject matter, problem formulation, methods of
investigation and interpretation. Science is fundamentally
a social activity, situated in a cultural and historical
context; the roles of tradition and innovation are as
important in the transformation of knowledge within the
sciences as they are in the transformation of common-sense
understandings.
Perhaps the first and most traditional approach in the
sociology of knowledge is concerned with the influence of
society in general and social institutions in particular upon
the development of scientific ideas. For example, the work of
McKenzie (1981) and Restivo (1984) discussed at the beginning
of this chapter demonstrate the influence of social goals on
the creation and acceptance of scientific theories.
 social interests affect (scientific knowledge)
at the organisational level, as well as at the most 
basic level of the development and evaluation of 
theories and techniques. Scientific knowledge is 
constitativelv social because science is 
goal-oriented and because the goals of science are 
sociallv sustained.
(Restivo,1984,p.73,emphases in original).
Others have focused on the institutional and organizational 
influences on the development of scientific knowledge. For 
example, Ben-David and Collins (1966) investigated ths social 
factors in the origins of psychology as a new scientific 
discipline. The fundamental ideas for experimental psychology 
had been available in Germany and elsewhere for some time. 
However, it's development did not occur until there was both
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an intellectual interest and the potential for gaining
intellectual identity. As a physiologist, Wundt was unable to
achieve recognition and, accepting the philosophy chair in
Leipzig, integrated the methods of physiology with the
problems of philosophy.
The sociology of knowledge has not restricted its
interest to the influence of society on science. More
recently, there has been an increasing focus on the social
processes by which scientific knowledge is constructed (eg.
Latour and Woolgar,1979; Barnes and Edge,1982; Knorr-Cetina
and Mulkay,1983). Much of this work adopts a similar approach
to that adopted in the theory of social representations.
Scientific knowledge is portrayed as systems of
representations which are products of, sustained by and
embody social practices. These practices
integrate psychological and biological states and 
processes, social relations and activities, and 
material things and processes
(Restivo,1984,p.86).
In other words, scientific knowledge is a product of the 
organism/culture/environment system. For example, Traweek 
(1984) indicates how physicists* conceptions of time and 
space are interdependent with their social realities, from 
the mechanical functioning of the detectors, to the social 
relations and beliefs in the scientific community and on to 
the wider cultural and physical environment.
The organism/culture/environment system is also evident 
in discussions of socialization into the scientific 
community. This is emphasized by Barnes (1983) in his 
writings on the conventional character of knowledge. 
Socialization involves interacting with competent members of 
the community and the environment, in both formal and 
informal settings. Meanings and conceptual networks are 
established through communication with authoritative teachers 
in conjunction with the indications of experience in the 
physical environment. For example, a learner classifies an 
object or event as C, whereas the teacher classifies it as 
C2, a concept not yet available to the learner. Through 
instances of object or event A and the corresponding
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indications of the teacher , the learner comes to distinguish 
between C and C2. In this way, the learner is introduced to 
the conventions of the community and is taught how to make 
original contributions within the limits of its cognitive, 
technical and social norms (representations).
Furthermore, socialization is a dynamic and an ongoing 
process which continues to be effective throughout a 
scientist's career. This is evident from studies which have 
approached science as a social system. These focus on the 
social relations and social norms which structure scientific 
activity (Hagstrom,1965; Mulkay,1972). Scientific behaviour 
is seen in terms of gifts or social exchange in return for 
recognition. Scientists present papers at conferences, send 
them to colleagues, publish articles in journals and write 
books as a means of communication and diffusion of their 
work. This is done in order to receive recognition from the 
relevant scientific bodies through citations, invitations to 
lecture, (invitations to edit journals), honorary degrees, 
society membership, prizes and eponymy (Merton,1957). 
Recognition is allocated in accordance with the evaluated 
quality of the research which, in turn, is dependent upon the 
representations shared by the community. This encourages the 
selection of problems, methods and solutions which conform to 
the status quo.
The transformation of scientific knowledge similarly 
depends upon social processes in the scientific community. 
Innovation, negotiation and communication depend upon the 
social relations amongst scientists in conjunction with their 
interactions in the environment. Hagstrom (1965) and Mulkay 
(1972) elaborate on Kuhn's framework by emphasizing the role 
of social exchange and recognition in both maintaining social 
control (conventional and prescriptive characteristics) and 
encouraging innovations. In particular, Mulkay argues that 
intellectual migration and modification of existing 
techniques and theories to different problem areas have 
brought about some of the most radical innovations in 
science. For example, the migration of Delbruck and others in 
physics, which lacked opportunities for development, into 
biology, led to the emergence of molecular biology, a
220
successful and innovative field, which encountered little 
opposition (Mullins,1968).
Mulkay's account of the social process of innovation 
focuses on social control and social relations within and 
between scientific networks. In so doing, he underplays the 
role of the environmental context and the actual research 
process in the social construction of innovations and the 
transformation of scientific knowledge. Scientific research 
is an important aspect of innovation and is in many ways 
similar to socialization. Within the research process 
scientists indicate to others the problem and proposed 
solution, adjusting their representations to accommodate new 
relations with objects or events in the environment. However, 
in the frontiers of research the conventions have not been 
pre-established. Scientific observations, the conduct of 
research and theoretical interpretation must be negotiated 
through the rhetorical processes of argument and persuasion.
Consensus, at whatever level, is a social accomplishment 
(Knorr-Catina and Mulkay,1983). For example, Collins (1982) 
identifies the disagreement and negotiations involved in the 
replication of experiments on gravity waves. The 
establishment of facts is only achieved through the 
linguistic, conceptual and social interactions of the 
scientists concerned. Similarly, Kuhn (1982) argues that 
measurement is not as precise as the textbooks suggest, but 
is dependent upon * reasonable agreement* as to what is and 
is not acceptable. The rhetoric of science is perhaps more 
apparent at the level of theoretical and metatheoretical 
debate. Martin (1979) shows how the technical assumptions, 
selective use of evidence, selective use of results, and the 
style of reference are associated with the scientists' 
general perspective and presuppositions. These relate both 
to the scientific community itself and to the concerns of 
the wider society as a whole.
Negotiation takes place through the face-to-face 
interactions of scientists working together on research 
projects, at informal meetings and at lectures and 
conferences. Negotiation also occurs through the medium of 
written communications, be they letters, journal articles or
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books. Such forms of communication are often described in 
terms of the diffusion of scientific knowledge. However 
'diffusion' is not a simple process of contagion, whereby 
information is shared. Rather, it is part of the social 
construction process, in which meanings are negotiated and 
consensus continually challenged, established and reconfirmed 
(Knorr-Catina and Mulkay,1983) . In order to understand the 
growth of scientific knowledge some sociologists have focused 
on the use of scientific literature and the patterns of 
communication. An analysis of citations reveals the 'life' of 
papers and gives some indication of their impact on the 
community. In particular, innovations which have been 
accepted by the community can be identified and their history 
of diffusion analysed. Also, citation patterns reveal the 
structure of scientific communities; 'problem networks' 
(Mulkay,1972) or 'invisible colleges' (Crane,1972), and the 
extent of cross- fertilization between research groups, or 
between different fields. Crane (1972) adopted this approach 
in her study of 'invisible colleges' and found that the 
pattern of diffusion reflected the structure of the 
scientific community, the perspectives adopted by 'problem 
networks' and the social processes involved in the growth of 
scientific knowledge. Although, in itself, this method is 
extremely restricted, it provides a useful addition to the 
above mentioned qualitative studies which focus on the 
content of scientific knowledge and the social processes by 
which it is transformed.
These studies, taken together, illuminate the social 
construction of scientific knowledge. The influence of 
society, the processes of socialization, the role of 
convention, the social processes of exchange and negotiations 
are inherent aspects of science. The world of science is a 
dynamic world of meanings and social interactions, of 
consensus and disagreements, of tradition and innovation. In 
short, science is essentially cultural. It does not consist 
of a reified universe, divorced from history, culture and 
social beliefs. Science is carried out by scientists who are 
social beings interacting in, learning and creating a social 
world. There is only one sense in which science can be
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considered to be reified and this is as the end product of
social construction. Berger and Luckmann (1966) describe the
reifications of social reality as
the apprehension of the products of human activity, 
as if they were something other than human products 
- such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, 
or manifestations of divine will. Reification 
implies that man is capable of forgetting his own 
authorship of the human world and, further, that 
the dialectic between man, the producer, and his 
products, is lost to consciousness.
(Berger and Luckmann,1984,p.106, 
emphasis in original).
Moscovici has ironically reified this process of 
reification to create a universe. But this ignores the social 
construction of reality in science. Scientific facts are 
constructed through scientists' social activities. Even when 
scientists apprehend the world in reified terms they continue 
to produce it (Latour and Woolgar,1979). Moreover, 
reification is by no means a distinguishing characteristic 
of science. Reification exists in common-sense and is just 
as evident there as it is in science.
5.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
Both the philosophy of science and the sociology of 
knowledge suggest that science should be conceived of as a 
human and social endeavour in which knowledge is socially 
constructed. The growth of scientific knowledge is not 
characterized by the accumulation of facts through objective 
observation, the induction of universal laws and the 
deduction of testable hypotheses. In order to understand the 
transformation of paradigms, theories and research, it is 
necessary to adopt an historical and evolutionary approach 
which takes into account the sociological and psychological 
factors in the production of scientific knowledge. The work 
involved in science is carried out by people working in a 
scientific community which itself is located in a cultural 
and historical context. The products of science cannot be 
divorced from the producers nor can people, in their capacity 
as scientists, be divorced from the products of the 
scientific community. Scientists are social individuals who 
actively engage in the perpetuation and transformation of a
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social reality which is at once prescriptive and dynamic. The 
world of the scientist is imbued with meanings which are 
learned, sustained and changed though social interaction and 
communications. Scientific knowledge is no more and no less 
than scientists' beliefs, which themselves are an expression 
of the ongoing interdependence between scientists, their 
cultural context and their environment.
The theory of social representations provides a social 
psychology of knowledge which is manifestly appropriate for 
the study of scientific knowledge. Social representations 
constitute a reality which is constructed through the social 
activities of individuals interacting and communicating 
within an historical and cultural context. This reality is 
essentially social and dynamic, both in its conventional and 
prescriptive character and in the origins and diffusion of 
innovations. Furthermore, social representations are not 
simply consensual beliefs about the world, rather they 
embrace individuals' beliefs, people's actions and 
interactions with the world, and the cultural products of 
those interactions.
It is worth summarizing our discussion concerning systems 
of social representations in Chapter 4. It will be remembered 
that the transformation of social reality involves three 
interdependent aspects: the established system of social
representations which is both prescriptive and dynamic; the 
social construction of the unfamiliar out of this system of 
social representations; and the constructive accommodation of 
the system to form a changed social reality. These aspects 
are interdependent in that 'the familiar at once defines what 
is unfamiliar and is familiarized by it'. Simultaneously, the 
unfamiliar emerges out of the familiar and is familiarized by 
it' (Chapter 4, mine). The ongoing dynamism is sustained 
through the social processes of thinking, communicating and 
interacting in the organism/environment/culture system. 
Changing the relations or meaning of any one element will 
have repurcussions for the whole system, creating novel 
associations and conflicts, and eventually restructuring the 
whole system of social representations.
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The development of this theoretical framework has been 
necessitated by the need to account for the dynamics of 
scientific knowledge. This involves an understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge and the environment (ie. the 
object of study) ; between the individual and his or her 
community; between different specializations or fields of 
research in science; and between common-sense and science. 
The theoretical framework can thus be further illuminated by 
taking a particular example of scientific creativity which 
has had a profound effect on contemporary reality. I refer, 
here, to Darwin's theory of evolution; to its origins in 
Western thought, to its creation by Darwin, to its subsequent 
transformation in scientific communities and to its diffusion 
into common-sense.
Gruber (1974) illuminates the origins and development of 
the Theory of Evolution in his highly readable book entitled 
'Darwin on Man: a psvcholoaical studv of scientific
creativitv'. In this book he specifically rejects two popular 
approaches to the explanations of innovation. The first 
focuses on the societal forces and objective conditions which 
bring about innovations. An individual's thoughts and actions 
are seen simply as a reflection of society. This approach 
externalizes and depersonalizes creativity such that the 
individual plays no active role, being wholly determined by 
the prevailing Zeitgeist. The second approach focuses on the 
individual and tends to attribute innovations to unconscious 
and non-rational thought. By ignoring the influences of 
society, this approach internalizes and desocializes 
creativity. In contrast, Gruber argues for an approach which 
integrates the societal and individual aspects of creativity. 
Throughout his study, Gruber reveals the interdependence 
between Darwin and his social and intellectual milieu. The 
creative process cannot always be conceived of in terms of a 
single act, a sudden insight or the solution to a single 
problem. Scientific creativity, more often than not, involves 
the gradual construction of an alternative perspective. 
Gruber shows how the theory of evolution emerged through the 
gradual development of a new perspective as Darwin 
continually adjusted and reconstructed his beliefs. It was
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a person striving to construct a new synthesis, a 
new way of looking at many problems, a new point of 
view
(Gruber,1974,p.4).
Furthermore, this creative process 'must be seen as rooted 
in its total human context* (Gruber,1974,p.6) , in the 
relationship between the individual, the environment and the 
social and intellectual milieu.
Gruber schematizes Darwin's changing world view in terms 
of five stages shown in Gruber's diagram. This
transformation of Darwin's evolutionary thought was related 
to the environment and to his intellectual and social 
context. Rather than giving a general historical survey, 
Gruber explores this in the personal terms of Darwin's life. 
In his adolescent years, he assimilated the 'family 
Weltenschaung' and, in particular, ideas from his 
grandfather, Erasmus. Those which were most significant refer 
to the conception of nature, struggle, adaptation and change; 
to the nature of scientific work, invention and education; 
and to social and ethical issues. These were elaborated upon 
through his education at Edinburgh and Cambridge where he was 
influenced by a number of teachers.
The gradual emergence of a new perspective was founded 
in the context of his family and University education, but 
required a further one and a half decades to reach 
publication. These years were taken up by the integration of 
his experiences on the Beagle Voyage and his observation in 
the archipelagos; the assimilation of Lyell's ideas on 
geology and, in particular, the conception of the physical 
world as continuously changing over a period of two million 
years; and the development of what Gruber refers to as the 
conservation schema and the equilibration schema. In 
particular, the conception of a changing world populated by 
well-adapted but unchanging organisms posed a dilemma which 
was not resolved until Darwin, inspired by the writings of 
Malthus (1826), transformed ideas of natural selection from 
a conservative to an evolutionary force. Darwin's active 
search and enquiry, his social and intellectual context and 
his experiences in the world all played an essential role in 
the creative process.
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Gruber's Diagram
A. 1832 and before: T he Creator Jias made an 
organic world (O) and a physical world (P) ; O 
is perfectly adapted to P.
B. 1832-1834: T he physical world undergoes 
continuous change, governed by natural laws as 
summarized in Lyell’s Principles of Geology. In
>  p other respects, B resembles A.
C. 1835: The activities of living organisms con­
tribute to the evolution of the physical world, as 
exemplified by the action of the coral organism 
in making coral reefs. In other respects, C re­
sembles B.
D. 1836-1837: Changes in the physical world 
imply changes in the organic world, if adapta­
tion is to be maintained; the direct action of the 
physical milieu induces the appropriate biologi­
cal adaptations. In other respects, D resembles C.
E. 1838 and after: The physical and organic 
worlds are both continuously evolving and inter­
acting with each other. The Creator, if one 
exists, may have set the natural system in being, 
but He does not interfere with its operation, 
standing outside the system.
(Copied from Gruber,1974,p.127).
Darwin's changing world view.
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The ideas of evolution and natural selection with which 
Darwin was working were well established, at least within 
his immediate circles. But, as Darwin searched, selected and 
re-organized his material, these ideas appeared and 
re-appeared in slightly different forms, taking on a new 
significance within the changing structure of his argument. 
That which is important is not so much an original idea, but 
the creative syntheses of various ideas into a coherent and 
intelligible system of representations.
Whilst his family and teachers played an important role 
in initiating the creative process there were other societal 
and personal factors which restrained the construction of a 
novel perspective. In particular, Darwin was aware that his 
ideas challenged religious orthodoxy and, from the experience 
of others who had violated the majority view of the world, 
had reason to fear persecution if his ideas on evolution 
became known. On the one hand, this repressed the free 
exploration and expression of his early evolutionary ideas; 
on the other hand, it also served to encourage the search for 
further materials to support his argument. Similarly, the
difficulties encountered by Darwin in communicating a novel 
and ill-defined perspective encouraged the development of a 
coherent and justifiable theory.
Following the publication of The Origin of Species 
(1859), the diffusion of Darwin's evolutionary perspective 
gave rise to ' a revolution in every mode of thought and 
feeling*. It transformed our thinking about the animal and 
plant kingdoms, about the place of human beings in the world 
and about 'the scheme of things' in the cosmos. Oldroyd 
(1980) illuminates the breadth and depth of influence on 
intellectual thought in his comprehensive book entitled 
'Darwinian Impacts; an introduction to the Darwinian
Revolution'. In particular, he explores the consequences of
'Darwinism' from the public reception of 'The Origin of
Species' to its diffusion into various spheres of thought. 
Not only has it radically changed biological theory but it 
has also transformed areas of sociology, politics, theology, 
philosophy, psychology, anthropology, literature and music.
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Beyond this, the evolutionary perspective has entered 
into our common-sense understandings in many spheres of life. 
This refers not so much to lay knowledge of the theory of 
evolution, but to people's understanding of the natural 
world, of social and political phenomena and of how things 
change. As Farr has suggested (personal communication), the 
Darwinian Revolution is an apt subject for investigation 
within the framework of the theory of social representations.
The mistake which has been made in the theory of social 
representations, and which has frequently been made 
elsewhere, is the perpetuation of a distinction between the 
creative process and the diffusion of that which has been 
created. Rather, the creation of a theory and its subsequent 
diffusion are part and parcel of an ongoing process of 
transformation. In terms of Einstein's relativity theory the 
distinction depends upon one's point of reference in 
time/space. There is always a tendency to select points of 
radical and influential change as the node of creativity and 
then to conceive of any subsequent transformation in terms of 
that creation. However, just as Gruber argues that there is 
no one step which is more crucial than any other in the 
development of Darwin's evolutionary perspective, so too, 
there is no one point which can be selected out in a 
continual process of change, when we consider the 
transformation of social representations.
This can be illustrated by taking different points of 
reference within the Darwinian Revolution. If I select Darwin 
as my point of reference I would describe ideas on natural 
selection, evolution and the creation of the natural order in 
terms of social and intellectual influences. I would then go 
on to describe the influence of the theory of evolution in 
terms of its diffusion and subsequent transformation. 
However, if I take as my point of reference a later stage in 
the continual process of change, the world of Darwin becomes 
part of the social and intellectual influences. What is 
important to realise here is that those who are influenced by 
the theory of evolution are also creative in constructing new 
syntheses which assimilate and transform Darwin's ideas. Each 
individual, within and as a part of their environment, must
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go through the creative process of breaking with what they 
know and reconstructing their perspective (Markova,1987).
In some ways, this is precisely Mbscovici's point when 
he emphasizes the creative and transformative character of 
social representations as the products of science diffuse 
into common-sense. What he fails to realize is that the 
psychologist or anthropologist or, for that matter, Darwin 
himself, are at least as creative as the lay person in the 
construction of a new perspective. Both Gruber (1973) and 
Piaget (foreword in Gruber,1974) liken the creative process 
in science to the child's active construction and 
reconstruction of the social world. In both spheres, a new 
perspective is created through interacting with and changing 
the environment. The theory of social representations 
highlights the same constructive and transformative processes 
in the social world of the adult lay person.
With the insights provided by the work of Moscovici, 
on the one hand, and writings in the philosophy and sociology 
of science on the other, I have attempted to reveal the 
similarities between the adult's active reconstruction of the 
social world and the scientist's creation of a new 
perspective in science. Indeed, the theory of social 
representations illuminates the transformation of knowledge, 
which is the hallmark of science, whilst, simultaneously, 
studies in the transformation of scientific knowledge 
illuminate the theory of social representations.
The domain of social representations has been one of the 
major issues addressed in this thesis. For Moscovici, social 
representations are science made common. However, closer 
examination of the theory and associated research has shown 
this restriction to be ill-founded. In Chapter 2, it was 
argued that the theory applied to the dynamics of 
common-sense regardless of its association with science. 
Social representations of scientific theories or concepts 
cannot be distinguished from social representations of 
socially significant, non-scientific objects. This applies 
to their dynamic nature, to the roles of convention and 
experience, to the various modes of communication and to the 
processes of transformation. In this chapter, it has been
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argued that the theory also applies to the dynamics of 
scientific knowledge. Science, like common-sense, constitutes 
a social reality that is constructed by social individuals in 
an historical and cultural context. The theory of social 
representations thus provides a social-psychology of 
knowledge which applies to the dynamics of both common-sense 
and science. Moreover, the interactions between science and 
common-sense can only be understood if they are conceived of
in the same terms. This applies both to the influence of
common-sense social representations in science and to the 
understanding of science in common-sense. Finally, the social 
constructionist paradigm and the theory of social 
representations provide a framework in which to study the 
social-psychology of science.
The understanding of science will necessarily require 
a multi-disciplinary approach including sociology, 
anthropology, psychology, history and philosophy. As yet, 
social psychology has made little contribution to such a 
science of science. However, the theory of social
representations, as explicated above, provides us with the 
opportunity of making considerable progress in this
direction.
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CHAPTER SIX
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH: FROM EXPERIMENTS TO 
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
6.1 METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE
6.2 RESEARCH METHODS FOR STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
6.3 THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: ITS CONTENT AND STRUCTURE
6.3.1 The questionnaire
6.3.1.1 Questionnaire sample and administration
6.3.1.2 Questionnaire design
6.3.1.3 Analysis 1:Identifying influential 
contributors by rank
6.3.1.4 Analysis 2:Identifying influential 
contributions by content analysis
6.3.2 Historico-interpretative document analysis of 
Taj fel * s work
6.3.2.1 The historical dimension
6.3.2.2 The use of documents
6.3.2.3 Constructing the past
6.3.2.4 Problems with content analysis
6.3.2.5 An historico-interpretative analysis
6.3.3 In-depth interviews
6.3.4 Analysis of citations
6.3.5 A critical review
In this chapter, the focus of discussion shifts from 
theoretical and meta-theoretical issues to issues of 
methodology and research practice. Although I here provide 
a separate chapter on methodology this does not imply that 
I consider it to be a separate domain of concern. Meta-theory 
and methodology, theory and method, are interdependent 
aspects of the scientific enterprise. In Chapter 1, I 
presented Moscovici*s theory of social representations as a 
social form of social psychology. In Chapter 2, we examined 
research which has been conducted under the auspices of this 
theory and considered its implications for the definition of 
social representations. In Chapter 3, we distinguished 
between the Hegelian and the Cartesian paradigms. These have
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been two major traditions of research in the history of 
psychology and social psychology. In Chapter 4, we explored 
how to overcome the contradictions and confusions within the 
theory, whilst emphasizing the role of the social individual 
in the dynamics and transformation of social representations. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, we challenged Moscovici*s distinction 
between the reified and consensual universes by drawing on 
recent developments in both the philosophy of science and the 
sociology of knowledge. It will be seen that the contents of 
these chapters are all relevant to the present discussion 
regarding the most appropriate methodology and research 
practices for an examination of social representations.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In 
the first section, I consider the contrasting methodological 
implications of the Cartesian and Hegelian paradigms. It will 
be argued that, whilst the Cartesian paradigm privileges the 
experimental method, the Hegelian paradigm demands other 
methods of research that take account of the relational, 
constructive and evolutionary character of social phenomena. 
In the second section, I examine the diverse research methods 
which have been used to study social representations. These 
include experimentation, questionnaires, an analysis of 
contents of the mass media and of interview transcripts, 
multi- dimensional scaling and factor analysis,
observational techniques and ethnomethodology. It is argued 
that these are complementary methods, each of which can be 
employed to illuminate different aspects of social 
representations. Hence, it is important to develop research 
programmes that adopt a multi-method approach.
In the third section, I focus on my own research 
programme, emphasizing the rationale for an integration of 
the different methods employed. The primary aim of this 
research is to examine the dynamics and transformation of 
social representations in science. This requires an 
historical or evolutionary analysis of a scientist's 
contribution in relation to his/her scientific community and 
to the broader society. This is achieved through a 
qualitative analysis of published scientific texts, 
supplemented by a questionnaire, a number of interviews and
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a quantitative analysis of citations. The unusual character 
of this research gives rise to a number of methodological 
and theoretical issues which are discussed more fully. They 
concern primarily the use of an historical/evolutionary
analysis of texts and a focus on an individual's contribution
to a particular field of science.
6.1 METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE
Since its early adoption as the primary method of 
investigation in the 1930*s, experimental methodology has 
enjoyed an unrivalled hegemony in social psychology. Despite 
various critiques which have challenged this approach (see 
Chapter 3) , it has remained the dominant mode of
investigation. Chapters and books on methodology continue to 
focus on experimentation (eg. Manstead and Semin,1990; 
Greenberg and Folgar,1988) and experimental reports dominate 
the most prestigious journals. Rather than adopting 
alternative methods of research which are now available many 
social psychologists have concentrated on developing new and 
more complex experimental designs in order to overcome 
problems associated with experimenter effects, demand 
characteristics, ecological validity and social or cultural 
context effects (eg. Campbell and Stanley,1963 ; Webb,
Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest and Grove, 1966,1981; 
Boise,1986). A second, equally pervasive influence, has been 
the preference for quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, 
research. It is almost as though scientific research is 
synonymous with quantitative research (for example, see 
Lindzey and Aronson,1985). In contrast, the theory of social 
representations does not privilege any particular method of 
research. It has encouraged the use of various research 
methods, ranging from experimentation to participant 
observation, and including both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. These contrasting methodologies reflect the 
divergent perspectives offered by the Cartesian and Hegelian 
paradigms (see Chapter 3). Each paradigm endorses a 
particular world view which directs both the theoretical and 
methodologial activities of scientists (see Chapter 5) . 
Although these issues have been dealt with at length in 
previous chapters they will be discussed here in order to
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illuminate the divergent implications of the Cartesian and 
Hegelian paradigms in regard to the formulation of research 
problems, the appropriate methods of research and the 
construction of acceptable solutions.
The methodological commitments of the Cartesian paradigm 
favour the experimental method of research. The manipulation 
of independent and dependent variables in a controlled 
environment depends on the conception of phenomena as 
discrete and independent entities. For example, attitudes are 
studied independently of perceptions, cognitions, beliefs or 
emotions, and message content is studied independently of 
other environmental variables. Of even greater significance 
is the duality which this methodology establishes between the 
individual and the environment. The individual is envisioned 
as a stable, inert entity influenced by environmental 
stimulation. Thus, the experimenter manipulates the 
environment and observes the response (S-R psychology). 
Furthermore, the independence of entities justifies a 
reductionist approach whereby the relations between phenomena 
can be reduced to their simplest form . In this way, the 
experimenter 'discovers' basic cause-effect relationships 
between the variables (determinism) and can postulate various 
intervening mechanisms (S-O-R psychology).
These methodological commitments cannot be accommodated 
within the Hegelian paradigm. Entities are not independent 
but are interdependent or dialectic, such that a single 
entity can only be considered in association with related 
entities. As these relationships change the essence of the 
entities involved also change. Thus, a people's attitudes are 
dependent upon their individual perceptions, cognitions, 
beliefs and emotions. Furthermore, there is a unity between 
the individual and the environment. The individual can only 
be understood as a purposefully functioning unity which 
embraces the environment. This unity is achieved through the 
individual's activity and participation within the 
environment. This requires a reconceptualization of the 
methodological commitments such that reductionist and 
mechanistic explanations are avoided. In general terms, there 
must be a commitment to structural and comparative analyses
235
of phenomena that incorporate the historical and cultural 
milieux.
The Cartesian paradigm also favours data collection over 
theory construction. This is endorsed by the positive- 
empirlcist epistemology whereby the scientist is considered 
to be an objective observer of nature. This perspective on 
the process of science is rejected by the Hegelian paradigm. 
Science is a social activity in which scientists actively 
construct knowledge and, in so doing, transform both 
themselves and the world in which they live. Observation is 
an activity that depends upon theory and is effective within 
the system being studied. That is, both scientific knowledge 
and the phenomena being studied are essentially interactive 
- they are both active and reactive. This perspective takes 
into account the theory dependent nature of observation, 
indeterminacy and reactivity as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Theory construction thus plays a central role within the 
Hegelian paradigm.
Finally, the historical and evolutionary character of 
the Hegelian paradigm means that a new dimension must be 
taken into account in research - the dimension of time. This 
is not an important dimension within the Cartesian paradigm: 
as entities are stable and enduring, change is limited to 
quantitative redistribution. It is not surprising then that 
the methods of research adopted within the Cartesian paradigm 
are unsuitable for studying the transformation of phenomena 
over time. For example, experimentation only provides 
knowledge of temporarily truncated sequences of events. The 
length of experiments is reduced to a minimum in order to 
eliminate contaminating variables. If we wish to study the 
creation and development of new things and new ideas then we 
need to develop alternative methods of research.
The theoretical commitments discussed in the previous 
paragraphs have a number of implications for the research 
strategies and the methods of research adopted within each 
paradigm. Within the Cartesian paradigm the aim of science 
is to discover universal principles that exist in nature. 
This relies upon the quantitative analysis of stable 
relations between independent entities. Furthermore, there
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are methodological commitments to prediction, hypothesis- 
testing, validity, replication and control. Within the 
Hegelian paradigm the aim of science is to construct 
understandings of a dynamic and open-ended system. This 
relies on the qualitative analysis of changing inter­
relationships between interdependent entities. The meaning 
of concepts or the essence of things cannot be described in 
mathematical terms. Furthermore, the conventional criteria 
for trustworthiness are inappropriate within the Hegelian 
paradigm. Alternative criteria for the evaluation of research 
must be constructed. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that 
credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability are more appropriate criteria. Alternatively, 
Gergen (1984) emphasizes the role of empirical research in 
the construction and development of theories. Research should 
clarify, demonstrate, illustrate and vivify theoretical 
statements.
In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that the dominance of 
the Cartesian paradigm has resulted in a social psychology 
that is both individualistic and static. This applies to 
research as well as to theory. By relying on experimentation 
as the primary method of investigation social psychologists 
have produced a discipline that is both a-cultural and 
a-historical. We know a great deal about individuals behaving 
on their own in strange situations but very little about 
ongoing social activity within its natural context. This does 
not mean that we should abandon experimentation altogether as 
has been suggested by some social psychologists (eg. 
Harré,1979). In Chapter 2, I showed how experimental research 
on social representations can be interpreted within the 
Hegelian framework. Similarly, Markova (1982) describes 
experimental research on perception, cognition and 
mother-child interactions that is conducted within the 
Hegelian paradigm. Doise (1978) also shows how experimental 
studies of intergroup relations can incorporate cultural 
factors. However, in order to establish a social psychology 
based on the theoretical principles of the Hegelian paradigm 
we need not only to adapt traditional methods of research but 
also to develop new ones, especially with respect to the
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historical dimension (Gergen and Gergen,1984). These would 
include the scientist as an active participant in research. 
They would incorporate the historical, cultural and social 
context; deal with the qualitative or meaningful nature of 
phenomena; and examine the transformation or evolution of 
phenomena over time. Some possible options will be examined 
in the following section. However, it would be premature to 
specify the methodological commitments of the Hegelian 
paradigm. As Markova (1982) points out, the Cartesian 
paradigm has developed during the last three centuries and 
research methods in psychology within this paradigm have been 
continually refined for over a century. The current status of 
the Hegelian paradigm within social psychology suggests that 
we should continue to explore various methods of research 
while attempting to identify their relative strengths and 
weaknesses.
6.2 RESEARCH METHODS FOR STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
One of the distinguishing characteristics of research 
on social representations is the diversity of methods which 
have been employed. This has given rise to considerable 
debate within the research community (Breakwell and Cantor, 
1990). Moscovici claims that 'the study of social 
representations requires that we revert to methods of 
observation*, for the purpose of providing a careful 
description of their content, structure and evolution. Yet, 
in order to understand the evolution of social 
representations, it is also necessary to study the 
social-psychological processes of transformation. Description 
and explanation are both essential components of 
understanding. Parker (1987) argues that the social- 
constructivist orientation of the theory has been betrayed 
by the choice of individualistic methods. Farr (1990) 
similarly suggests that many of the methodological debates 
have arisen because British social psychologists have 
inappropriately applied positivistic (Cartesian) principles 
of research.
It is possible that the use of such diverse methods as 
experimentation and participant observation reflects a lack 
of consensus in regard to the meta-theoretical commitments
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of the theory. Thus some researchers have continued to use 
Cartesian methods whilst others have adopted Hegelian 
methods. If this is so then I would wish to distinguish 
between those methods which are and those which are not 
appropriate for the investigation of social representations. 
However, in the light of the previous discussions (Chapter 2; 
Chapter 6, previous section) this is not the most 
constructive critical approach. The methodological 
commitments of the Hegelian paradigm do not dictate the use 
of particular methods to the exclusion of all others. 
Different methods of research provide the investigator with 
an array of tools that are more or less useful for different 
purposes. It will be argued here that an eclectic approach is 
advantageous as no single method is able to address all 
facets of social representations. Only by developing research 
programmes which adopt a multi-method approach can we provide 
descriptions of the content and form of social 
representations, examine their behavioural aspects, explore 
their association with groups, inspect their role in 
socialization and understand their dynamics and the processes 
by which they are transformed.
Much of the research conducted in the field of social 
representations was reviewed in Chapter 2. There the emphasis 
was on the meaning of the word 'social* as a qualifier of the 
word representation. The aim of the present discussion is to 
provide a summary which focuses on specific research methods 
in order to identify their particular strengths and 
weaknesses in the investigation of social representations. 
The following methods will be considered: experimentation, 
questionnaires, multi-dimensional scaling, observational 
studies, participant observation and content analysis of 
interview transcripts and media. Finally, the use of 
complimentary data sources and research methods in the study 
of social representations is discussed.
Experimental studies of social representations (eg. 
Abric,1984; Codol,1984; Flament,1984) were discussed at
length in Chapter 2 and the arguments presented in this 
previous context will not be repeated here. Most of the 
experimental investigations have focused on intra-individual
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cognitive processes and the role of interpersonal 
communication in the construction of social representations. 
It was argued that these studies employed the traditional, 
Cartesian mode of experimentation. The adaptation of the 
experimental method to the Hegelian methodology is no easy 
task, but it is one which is worthwhile. As Markova points 
out
(laboratory experiments) are a necessary part of a 
psychological investigation because they enforce a 
specific and exact kind of human conduct which 
otherwise would not be available for investigation.
One ' s experience is dependent upon one's relation to 
the world and laboratory techniques are traps in 
which individual experience can be tested against 
social reality in the amplified form
(Markova,1982,p.197).
Experiments conducted within the Hegelian paradigm would 
account for the use of language in the research context and 
the role of the researcher in construction of experimental 
situations and in the interpretation of events (Mackenzie, 
1977). The experimental method provides a means by which to 
illuminate the relationship between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal processes in the laboratory and social 
representations extant in the culture of society. For 
example, we could examine how individuals assimilate new 
information into their social representations; how 
interpersonal communications, arguments and debates 
facilitate or restrain their transformation; and how social 
roles and group memberships affect their reconstruction. Such 
studies cannot profitably be conducted in isolation for two, 
related, reasons. Firstly, other methods of investigation 
need to be employed in order to examine the content and form 
of social representations, the consensus and divergence which 
exists between and within groups, and the diffusion and 
evolution of social representations in society. Secondly, the 
Hegelian paradigm and the theory of social representations 
are committed to the 'definitional sanctity of the whole* 
(Gergen,1984). Individual objects or events derive their 
social meaning from their position within the whole over 
extended periods of time. Isolated fragments are significant 
only in relation to their extended context. Thus, it is
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necessary to base experimental investigations on ideas that 
have emerged from research which addresses the social, 
cultural and historical aspects of social representations. 
Experimentation would no longer be used to generate 
foundational elements, rather it would be used to clarify, 
demonstrate, illustrate or vivify theoretical understandings 
which had been gained from studying social representations in 
all their complexity.
It might be thought that questionnaires constitute an 
ideal method by which to determine people's social 
representations before entering into the laboratory. However, 
although the questionnaire has been a popular method in 
social psychology, it has rarely been used within the field 
of social representations (Moscovici,1961). This is because, 
within the Hegelian paradigm, there are a number of problems 
relating to the traditional modes of constructing and 
analysing questionnaires.
Typically, questionnaires are designed to elicit 
people's opinions or attitudes using various scaling 
techniques. Likert scaling is the least appropriate for the 
study of social representations. In constructing the 
questionnaire the research assumes that all respondents 
together with the researcher share a common representation 
of the objects being evaluated. Furthermore, although the 
correlations between response indicates the co-occurrence of 
evaluations associated with the social representation they do 
not reveal the content or the structural interdependence of 
elements in the social representation. Thurstone scaling is 
less problematic in that the procedures employed in 
constructing the questionnaire are dependent upon judges 
sharing a common representation (Thurstone,1928; Jaspars and 
Fraser,1984). However, this does not overcome the structural 
limitations. Questionnaires concerning the attributes of 
social objects frequently rely on data reduction techniques 
such as factor analysis. The emergent factors are dependent 
upon the limited set of attributes that were entered into the 
data set, the aggregation of data across respondents and the 
investigator's interpretation of the results. Thus the
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apparent content, structure and consensus do not necessarily 
correspond to the respondents' social representations.
Open-ended or unstructured questionnaires are more 
appropriate as they give respondents greater freedom to 
express their beliefs. However, this requires alternative 
forms of data reduction and organization, most typically some 
form of content analysis (see below). Such questionnaires 
provide a means to assess the consensual aspects of social 
representation; their relationship with different groups of 
respondents; and their relationship with reported behaviour. 
However, they do not address the issues of communication and 
social interaction, nor do they illuminate the dynamics and 
evolution of social representations.
In comparison to questionnaires which employ 
quantitative methods of investigation and analysis, 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a more appropriate method 
for the exploration and description of social representations 
(Di Giacomo,1980; Farr and Stockdale, 1987; Purkhardt and 
Stockdale, 1990) . Although it suffers from some of the same 
limitations as questionnaires in regard to the processes of 
communication and social interaction, it is more appropriate 
than traditional scaling techniques, as it provides a 
descriptive, structural model of social representation. 
Rather than eliciting unidimensional, evaluational judgments 
on specified attributes of social objects, MDS does not 
specify the attributes or dimensions on which the social 
objects are judged. Judgments of similarity between the 
elements of a social representation are used to reveal its 
structure, typically in two, three or four dimensions. These 
dimensions are identified on the basis of respondents' 
judgments of the elements' attributes by using multiple 
regression analysis. Thus, MDS allows the quantifications and 
interpretation of the content and structure of social 
representations which are naturally circulating in society 
without manipulating or constraining respondents' judgments. 
Furthermore, it is not assumed that there is a consensual 
representation. The measure of goodness-of-fit between the 
group stimulus space and the respondents' judgments provides 
an indication of the degree of consensus within a group.
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Also, if subject parameters are included in the MDS, 
variations in the representational structure between groups 
can be examined. Moreover, MDS can provide some insight into 
the transformation of social representations. By repeating a 
MDS analysis on different occasions changes both in the 
relationships among social objects and in the salience of the 
various dimensions can be revealed.
In contrast to multidimensional scaling, which focuses 
on the consensual aspects of both the content and structure 
of social representations and their association with 
different groups, observational techniques focus on the 
expression and development of social representations through 
peoples' social interactions with objects in their 
environment. Such studies are conducted both in the 
laboratory (Duveen and Lloyd,1986) and in natural settings 
(Jodelet,1983). Observational studies in the laboratory have 
been greatly facilitated by the use of video tapes which 
allow multiple viewings of sequences of interaction. As with 
experimentation, this method has conformed, typically, to 
Cartesian principles of research. In this case, the 
researcher divides the interactions into small fragments and 
then counts the frequency and length of their occurrence. 
These are then added together in order to reform the pattern 
of social interaction and communication. However, 
observational techniques in the laboratory can also be 
adapted to the Hegelian paradigm (Markova,1982). In this 
case, the researcher focuses on the mutual structuring of 
communications and the natural components of interactions. 
This can be achieved by asking knowledgeable respondents to 
give a detailed description of the interactions. 
Alternatively, the researcher can repeatedly view the 
material until the appropriate categories or units of 
analysis emerge. These can be modified during the process of 
enquiry such that there is an ongoing dynamics with the 
object of investigation.
Participant observation is traditionally the research 
method of anthropologists and symbolic interactionists. 
However, as the theory of social representations falls within 
the Hegelian paradigm it has become an appropriate method of
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investigation for social psychologists as well (Jodelet,1983 ; 
Farr,1990). Observations of interactions with the environment 
are made in their natural setting with the researcher being 
an active participant in those interactions. The research 
does not attempt to make detached, objective observations of 
the behaviour of others. By his or her involvement in the 
social interactions the researcher becomes aware of their 
significance or meaning within the relevant social 
representations. Thus, the interpretation of events does not 
occur as a postscript to objective observation of truncated 
sequences of behaviour; rather, interpretation and 
observation are integral aspects of the researcher's 
activities in ongoing sequences of interaction. However, due 
to the pragmatic drawbacks associated with this method of 
investigation, particularly with reference to the 
researcher's commitments and the time required, and to the 
difficulties of presenting the study in an acessible form, 
it has been only occasionally employed.
In contrast, content analvsis is frequently used within 
the French tradition of research on social representations. 
It has been employed, in various forms, to analyse the 
contents of interviews (Herzlich,1973 ; Jodelet, 1984; Emler 
and Dickinson,1985; Markova and Wilkie,1987), and of various 
media (Moscovici,1961; Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984 ;
Milgram,1984). The different forms of content analysis will 
be discussed in more detail in the following sections since 
they are pertinent to my own research.
In general terms content analysis is similar to the 
observational methods discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Instead of observing people's behaviour, the researcher 
observes or, more accurately, listens to what people say, 
reads what people write and views people's pictures or films. 
Interviews are usually semi-structured or unstructured in 
form as this avoids the researcher imposing his or her own 
representations on those of the informants during the 
interview. The various forms of the media, including books, 
articles, newspapers, magazines, films, comics, posters, 
drawings, radio and TV programmes, constitute an extensive 
'non-reactive' archive of information on social
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representations (Farr,1990). Such material may be considered 
to be less reactive than the interviewing of people. However, 
it should be remembered that this material is usually 
produced for a particular audience. Furthermore, the 
investigator is always a participant in the research process. 
The social representation does not exist purely in the 
research object. Rather, in order to reveal the content, 
structure and dynamics of a social representation the 
research must continually interact with the object of 
investigation, be it through talking with people, or reading 
and re-reading texts.
Content analysis can be used to illuminate many aspects 
of social representations. More than any other method it 
takes seriously the role of language in the construction and 
communication of social representations. In this respect, it 
is similar to ethnomethodology: spoken and written accounts 
not only describe objects, actions, events or situations but 
are also a constitutive part of these actions or events 
(Harré and Secord,1972; Potter and Wetherell,1987). Content 
analysis offers a means of studying the expression and 
communication of social representations through language and 
through cultural artefacts in the environment. It is also 
ideally suited to reveal the content and structure of social 
representations and the consensus and divergence within and 
between groups. Longtitudinal (Jodelet,1984) and historical 
(Chombart- de-Lauwe,1984) studies using content analysis 
demonstrate how it can also be employed to illuminate the 
social construction and transformation of social 
representations across time.
So far, we have noted the strengths and weaknesses of 
various research methods which have been employed in the 
study of social representations. However, perhaps the most 
significant feature of the more substantial research projects 
is that the investigators have employed a number of 
complementary data sources and research methods in order to 
describe and explain the features of a particular social 
representation (Moscovici,1961; Jodelet,1983, Jodelet and 
Moscovici,1975 ; Chombart-de-Lauwe,1984). They involve the 
use of both qualitative and quantitative analyses to explore
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the content of social representations, their evolution and 
transformation, their role in behaviour and social 
interactions and their relationship to social and cultural 
circumstances.
One of the earliest studies was carried out by Moscovici 
(1961) on the diffusion and transformation of psychoanalysis 
within France. This study employed the more traditional 
techniques of opinion polls and surveys, as well as 
structured and unstructured questionnaires, in order to 
determine the transformations that had been brought about 
during the social reconstruction of a scientific theory. 
These methods were complemented by a content analysis of 
media articles on psychoanalysis with particular reference to 
two distinct groups: the Catholic and the Marxist press. By 
this comparative study it was possible to show that anchoring 
and objectification of different aspects of the theory are 
directly related to social representations already prevalent 
in these two groups.
While this study primarily focuses on the content of a 
social representation other studies have attempted to relate 
the content and transformation of the relevant social 
representation to the social, cultural and economic 
circumstances, and also to explore the relationship between 
social representations and behaviour. For example, Jodelet 
(1983) explored the social representation of mental illness 
in French villages where the villagers acted as hosts to a 
number of mental patients. Through a variety of methods, 
including participant observations, interviews and 
questionnaires, she was able to show that social interactions 
with mental patients were directly related to the villagers' 
social representations of mental illness and its association 
with traditional representations of disease and contagion.
Jodelet also completed a comprehensive study of social 
representations of the body in conjunction with Moscovici 
(1975). By means of a longtitudinal design, in which a series 
of in-depth interviews were repeated with a fifteen year 
interval, it was possible to trace the evolution and 
transformation of the social representations of the body in 
relation to social and cultural changes, as well as their
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relationship to actual or intended behaviour. A content 
analysis of the interview material, in which individual 
statements were re-grouped according to their thematic 
content and a-posteriori categories, was complemented by an 
analysis relating to the sources of information from which 
representations evolved. Both of these analyses allow 
statistical comparisons betwen groups and over time. These 
were then related to historical cultural changes and to the 
social circumstances of different groups and their changing 
roles in society. Other methods which were used in 
conjunction with the content analysis include a word- 
association task which explored the semantic field related 
to 'body* and a check list task by which subjects indicated 
the four circumstances in which they were most aware of their 
bodies. The results of these studies revealed changes in the 
content of representations of the body which related to 
people's experience of their own bodies and reflected 
differential cultural diffusion of information and its 
resultant transformations, in relation to people's social 
circumstances. This study clearly demonstrates the value of 
both qualitative and quantitative analyses in investigating 
the social and historical aspects of the theory of social 
representations. The use of a number of complementary methods 
highlights the central importance of culture in our 
understanding of socio-biological phenomena.
Similarly, Chombart-de-Lauwe (1984) also used a number 
of complementary approaches to investigate social 
representations of children, their transformation over time 
and their social transmission. Social representations of 
children in the imagination of adults were explored by 
thematic content analysis, semantic analysis and structural 
analyses of novels, autobiographies and films in which the 
central character is a child. The stability, changes and 
evolution of representations were determined by comparing 
material produced in pre-war, inter-war and contemporary 
literature. A further two studies focused on speeches, 
lectures, charters of and interviews with town planners in 
order to discover the implicit representations of children 
in the structuring of their physical environments. The second
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study analysed novels, comics, films and biographies directed 
at the child, again adopting a longtitudinal design. A 
quantitative content analysis revealed that these 
representations were not only divergent from those 
constructed for adults but also had evolved in relation to 
society.
In order to understand the social transmission of these 
representations to children a further study was carried out. 
Children aged nine to twelve years were asked to write essays 
on media characters who represented their ideal model and the 
model with whom they identified, and to compare these models 
with themselves. This revealed influences which differentiate 
children's representations from the models offered by adults. 
The results also show variations in relation to the 
socio-biological characteristics of the child (age and sex) , 
their social situation and their status. By using a variety 
of sources and complementary methods, Chombart-de-Lauwe was 
able to explore the genesis of the social representations of 
children, their variations, their transformation from one 
historical period to another and their transmission to a new 
generation through a dialectic psycho-social process. 
Furthermore, this study illustrates the prescriptive nature 
of representations and the role of adults' social 
representations of children in shaping the child's reality.
Within the Cartesian paradigm the adoption of a multi­
method approach might be justified in terms of the 
accumulation of knowledge from multiple data sources. A more 
sophisticated justification could be given in terms of 
triangulation, whereby the use of multiple data sources and 
various research methods offers the opportunity to validate 
findings by systematically comparing the research results 
(Fielding and Fielding,1983). However, these justifications 
fail to take into account the process of research as defined 
by the Hegelian paradigm. Different methods are particular to 
specific research problems. Within a research programme 
complementary methods are employed to examine different 
aspects of the research object and to overcome the problems 
and limitations associated with any one particular method or 
data source. For example, it is not so much that an
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experimental study can be used to validate the results of a 
content analysis but, rather , that the results of one 
investigation are used to formulate research problems and to 
inform the design and interpretation of a complementary 
investigation. Furthermore, it is not possible to 
predetermine the structure and content of a research 
programme, for the very reason that it is not possible to 
predict the outcome of research. There is little point in 
carrying out research when we already know the answer. 
Rather, research focuses precisely on the unconfirmed, where 
there are contradictions and conflicts to be resolved. This 
is achieved through the meaningful and on-going interaction 
between the researcher and the object of his or her research. 
The research programme thus emerges and evolves during the 
process of research. It involves a set of complex and dynamic 
relations among theory construction and transformation, 
formulation of research problems, the design of research, the 
various sources of data and methods employed, the objects of 
investigation, the active participation in research, the 
negotiation of meanings and the interpretation of research 
findings etc.
In the following section I describe my own research 
programme, making explicit the rationale behind research 
decisions, the coherence of the various methods adopted and 
the reformulation or modifications that were required in 
relation to the object of study. Frequent reference is given 
to the content of the research as this formed an essential 
component in the development of the research programme.
6.3 THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME; ITS CONTENT AND STRUCTURE
The aim of the research is to examine the dynamics and 
the transformation of social representations in science. This 
involves not only a description of a system of social 
representations and its diffusion within a specified 
community but also an analysis of the origins of change and 
the processes of transformation in the organism/environment/ 
culture system. A detailed examination of the content, 
structure and evolution of scientific knowledge in a 
particular field should improve our understanding of both
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the processes of science and the dynamics of social 
representations.
The theory of social representations has informed and 
guided this research with respect to the issues addressed 
and to the structure of the research. Two fundamental 
characteristics of the theory are the socio-psychological 
perspective (the social dimension) and its historical 
perspective. The former focuses on the relationship between 
the individual and his or her culture, whilst the latter 
emphasizes the evolutionary aspects of social representations 
in terms of their genesis, their diffusion and their 
transformation within a particular social context. Both these 
dimensions need to be taken into account by the research. For 
this reason, it was decided to conduct an historical analysis 
of the transformation of social representations in a 
specified field of study, focusing on the contributions of an 
influential scientist in relation both to the scientific 
community and to the broader society.
In particular, the research focuses on Henri Tajfel's 
contribution to the psychology of groups in relation to the 
community of social psychologists, social scientists and the 
broader society in order to understand the transformation of 
social representations in this field of study. A number of 
alternative research strategies were considered but rejected 
on theoretical grounds. For example, a comparison of the 
similarities and differences between various social 
representations of the group presented by different theories 
in time/space would not, of itself, achieve an understanding 
of the dynamics of social representations. In order to 
address how and why social representations emerge and evolve 
it is necessary to trace the continuities and discontinuities 
over time within particular intelllectual and social 
contexts. Furthermore, the transformation of the social 
representations of the group in social psychology cannot be 
considered in isolation from social representations of the 
individual, the conventions of social psychology, of 
methodology etc.. Consequently, the research cannot simply 
focus on the social representations of the group but must
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consider a whole system of interrelated social 
representations of which the former is a part.
Two aspects of Taj fel * s contribution need to be 
considered; the construction and the diffusion of his theory 
of intergroup relations. Moscovici's original study examined 
the diffusion of psychoanalysis within French culture. 
Likewise, my research involves establishing an in-depth 
understanding of the theory's structure and content and then 
tracing its diffusion and transformation within the community 
of social scientists, identifying and explaining the 
differences that emerge in various sections of that 
community. That one should examine the diffusion and 
transformation of social representations within the 
scientific community is justified by arguments presented in 
Chapter 2 and in Chapter 5. Social representations are 
transformed not only by the diffusion of scientific knowledge 
into common-sense, but also by the diffusion of social 
representations within a community. This applies equally to 
both the 'folk* community and the 'scientific' community. The 
same arguments, along with those presented in Chapter 4, show 
that it is also pertinent to examine the construction of 
social representations; in this case, the origins and 
evolution of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. The 
spiral of transformation demonstrates that the construction 
and diffusion of social representations are but two aspects 
or views of the continual ongoing dynamics of transformation. 
This was illustrated with reference to Darwin's theory of 
evolution (1859) in the previous chapter. With reference to 
Tajfel's work, examining the construction of the theory 
focuses on the assimilation and accommodation of social 
representations into an inter-connected and coherent system. 
Examining the diffusion of Tajfel's work focuses on the 
assimilation of elements from Tajfel's theory into other 
systems of social representations, for example those relating 
to intragroup behaviour. In order to understand the 
significance of Tajfel's contribution in transforming social 
representations within the psychology of groups it is 
necessary to look at both aspects.
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It might be argued that this research strategy is in
danger of individualizing social representations: by focusing
on the contribution of a single scientist the research
endorses a 'Great Man' theory of science. This would be an
over-simplistic interpretation of the research strategy and
antithetical to my thesis. In Chapter 4, it was argued that
the re-socialization of the individual is equivalent to a
de-individualization of the social. The individual scientist
is here as an essentially social being in a particular social
and historical context. Furthermore, in order to be
consistent with the social-psychological thesis it is
essential that a study of the transformation of social
representations goes beyond a 'history of meanings'. It is
thus inefficient to examine changes in the psychology of
groups without reference to the contributions of individual
scientists. The study must deal explicitly with the
socialization of the individual and the creativity of
individuals; with the influence of society on the individual
and the influence of the individual on society; in sum, with
the dialectics of the individual and his/her culture.
This is indeed Tajfel's own thesis:
social psychology can and must include in its 
theoretical and research preoccupations a direct 
concern with the relationship between human 
psychological functioning and the large-scale social 
processes and events which shape this functioning 
and are shaped by it.
(Tajfel,198la,p.7)
It might be argued, also, that a study focusing on the 
contribution of a single scientist, in a particular field of 
study, will tell us little about the processes of science or 
the processes of social representations. Such a critique, 
however, is founded on the Cartesian principles of 
universels, particulars and generalization (Markova, 1982). 
Generalizations are universal, unrestricted and stable 
scientific laws which ignore particular variations. However, 
within the Hegelian paradigm particulars are expressions of 
universels, and generalizations are always indeterminate, 
unstable and relative to the social and historical context. 
For this reason, it is appropriate to conduct a detailed case
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study which examines the interdependent relationships among 
the elements of a system of social representations within a 
particular social and historical context and their 
transformation over time. Emergent generalizations would be 
those that engender understanding within the theoretical 
framework. Comparative studies with the dynamics of social 
representations in other sciences and in common-sense would 
show how far these generalizations are transferable to other 
contexts. Such comparative studies are outside the scope of 
this project. They require the coordinated activity of 
scientists working within the same general framework and 
would be the product of the research community.
The decision as to which science to examine is an 
important one. Few researchers in the field of social 
representations elaborate on the reasons underlying their 
own particular studies. There are a number of theoretical 
and methodological considerations which suggest that 
psychology constitutes a suitable discipline for empirical 
investigation.
Firstly, social representations are most accessible for 
investigation during periods of conflict and change. The 
history of psychology has seen frequent and heated debates 
between alternative perspectives (see Chapter 3). These have 
taken many forms, with regard to the most appropriate 
paradigms, theories and methods for the study of human 
behaviour. For example, there have been shifts in perspective 
from empiricism, to rationalism, to constructivist 
approaches; debates about the relationship between psychology 
and common-sense; disagreements regarding the most 
appropriate way to deal with the reactive nature of 
psychological research - these are but a few examples. Such 
conflicts are reflected in the construction of theories and 
the conduct of research. Thus, the discipline of psychology 
offers excellent material for a study which focuses on the 
transformation of social representations.
Secondly, psychology is relatively accessible to me as 
a research student, both in terms of data sources and in 
terms of understanding its concepts and its methods. As a 
participant in the research process it is advantageous to be
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able to draw on implicit knowledge of and my experience 
within the community of psychologists. Furthermore, it 
provides an opportunity to further my interest in conflicts 
and alternative perspectives within the discipline of 
psychology.
Thirdly, few in-depth investigations of psychology have 
been carried out. The philosophy of science has notoriously 
selected illustrative examples from the natural sciences, and 
in particular from physics. Similarly, the vast majority of 
studies in the sociology of knowledge have focused on the 
natural sciences, and it is only recently that the biological 
sciences have attracted increasing attention. While there 
have been a number of 'internal histories' of psychology (eg. 
Boring,1950; Miller,1986; Hearnshaw,1987), books on the 
history of behaviouristic (Mackenzie,1977) and cognitive 
approaches (Gardner,1985) and numerous reviews of particular 
fields, there are few studies which present a detailed 
analysis of the transformation of a psychological theory and 
its related fields of research. Miller's book on the 
obedience experiments (1986) and Cartwright's analysis of the 
risky-shift experiments are two exceptions, although both 
focus on research controversies. Historians and philosophers 
of science are beginning to take an increasing interest in 
the human sciences, including psychology (Ash,1983; 
Mackenzie,1977 ; 0'Donnell,1979 ; Shotter,1975). Furthermore, 
psychologists are becoming more aware of their own past. The 
celebration of psychology's centenary in 1979 instigated a 
look-back into the role of psychology in the past and 
speculation about its possible futures. An increased 
awareness of where psychology has been, its successes and its 
limitations, provides guidance and direction for the future 
development of the discipline.
The methods of research which might be used to study 
the transformation of social representations in psychology 
were not immediately apparent. It was a continuous struggle 
to avoid falling back on the safety of conventional and 
formalized methods. However, these would have been 
inappropriate as they neither address the central research 
issues nor reflect Hegelian methodological commitments.
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Whilst the influence of conventional approaches is apparent, 
especially in the early phases of the research, a commitment 
to the theoretical questions meant that the methods of 
research had to emerge directly from the research problems in 
relation to the phenomena being investigated. It was of 
constant concern, in the initial phases of the research, that 
these methods of investigation lacked formalization and did 
not conform to conventional means of analysis and 
presentation. These difficulties diminished as I became more 
involved in the research and realized that the methods I was 
using allowed me to construct important and interesting ideas 
on the transformation of social representations. Formalized 
procedures and conventions of research can only be 
established through the social process of science over time. 
By presenting an explicit account of the research procedures, 
why they were used and how they were reformulated within an 
evolving research programme, this research forms part of that 
process.
The first research problem was to select a field of 
study within psychology and, within that, to identify a 
limited period of significant development. Rather than 
examining broad-ranging transformations in the history of 
psychology, the demarcation of a specific field and a limited 
period of research which has undergone substantial change 
permits a more detailed analysis of the dynamic 
interrelationships within the organism/environment/culture 
system and the transformation of social representations. 
Rather than making an arbitrary selection myself I decided 
to draw on the social representations within the community 
of psychologists. The significance of a contribution is 
largely dependent upon its successful communication and the 
reaction of others to that contribution. A number of data 
sources could have been used including citation counts, 
review articles and interviews with psychologists. However, 
I decided that a questionnaire was the most suitable method 
as this would provide both quantitative and qualitative 
information on influential contributions in particular fields 
of psychology. On the basis of this questionnaire I decided
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to focus on Henri Tajfel's contribution to the psychology of 
groups.
The second research problem was to describe the content 
and structure of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations and 
to analyse the transformations of social representations 
involved in its construction. This was achieved by conducting 
a detailed historical analysis of his publications and by 
conducting interviews with Tajfel's colleagues who had been 
directly involved in the theory's development. Both these 
methods of investigation will be described in more detail 
below.
The third research problem was to assess the impact of 
Tajfel's work in the community of social scientists. An 
analysis of the Social Science Citation Index was used to 
indicate the frequency with which Tajfel's publications were 
cited. However, in order to examine the transformation of 
social representations, it was also necessary to review 
qualitative changes in the structure and content of the work 
of others in the psychology of groups, and in social 
psychology more generally. Due to the expansive scope of such 
an endeavour this was done in the form of a critical review, 
examining historical developments in the psychology of 
groups, general texts on social psychology, specific texts on 
group psychology and subsequent developments which have 
emerged directly from Tajfel's work.
6.3.1 The questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed to sample the views of 
psychologists concerning the most influential contributors 
in two fields of research in each of cognitive and social 
psychology; memory and problem-solving in cognitive 
psychology and attitudes and groups in social psychology. It 
included a series of semi-structured and open-ended questions 
regarding influential figures in the historical and in the 
contemporary eras of the specified field, the content of 
their contributions and the consequences of their 
contributions (see appendix 6.1).
The design, administration and analysis of the 
questionnaire reflects the original research plans which have 
been changed subsequently. Firstly, it was intended to
256
conduct a comparative study of two contrasting fields in 
psychology. However, gaining the depth of knowledge required 
to understand just one field takes considerable time and 
effort. Although focusing my energies on a single case study 
forfeits the advantage of a comparison across fields it 
avoids the disadvantages of conducting a relatively 
superficial analysis. Secondly, I considered that the results 
of the questionnaire would allow me to examine and compare 
psychologists' social representations of their own field of 
study. In accordance with this, the original report of this 
study constituted an independent chapter. However, while it 
was possible to assess the consensus of opinion (or lack 
thereof) in the two eras of the different fields, with regard 
to both who had been influential and the substance and 
consequence of their contributions, it was not possible to 
gain a clear undersanding of psychologists' social 
representations. This may, in part, be due to the design of 
the questionnaire and its location within the research 
programme. In order to explore social representations (the 
original intention) it was important to avoid imposing my own 
ideas on the respondents. Moreover, respondents would be more 
knowledgeable about their own fields of study than I could 
possibly hope to be. For these reasons, I adopted a 
relatively unstructured questionnaire design. This not only 
created problems for the analysis of the questionnaire but, 
in some respects, also restricted the usefulness of the 
information gained. On reflection, questionnaires are not a 
good instrument for making initial explorations of social 
representations, even if they are unstructured in their 
format.
Despite its limitations, the questionnaire still plays 
an important part in the research programme. In particular, 
it formed the basis upon which the work of Henri Tajfel in 
the field of group psychology was selected for further 
investigation. The results also supported the thesis that 
the theory of social representations could be applied 
profitably to the development of scientific knowledge.
6.3.1.1 Questionnaire sample and administration; One of the 
notorious problems posed by postal questionnaires is their
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poor response rate. The sampling procedure and the 
administration of the questionnaire were aimed at maximizing 
the rate of return. Respondents needed to be reasonably well 
informed with regard to the specified fields of interest 
within cognitive and social psychology. Rather than 
distributing the questionnaire through psychology departments 
in universities and colleges it was decided that there were 
a number of advantages in using membership of the two major 
psychological societies as the basis for selecting the 
sample. Firstly, it allowed the selection of psychologists 
with an expressed interest and knowledge in cognitive or 
social psychology. Secondly, it was possible to send the 
questionnaires addressed personally to the members. All 
questionnaires were accompanied by an introductory letter and 
a stamped addressed envelope. Questionnaires concerned with 
social psychology were sent to all members of the social 
section of the BPS (668 members). Questionnaires concerned 
with cognitive psychology were sent to all members of the 
cognitive section of the BPS (480 members) and to all members 
of the Experimental Psychological Society (432 members). The 
latter were included as they form an important part of the 
psychological community and may reflect different concerns 
from those of the members of the BPS (see Table 1) . BPS 
questionnaires were included in the regular BPS mailing 
packages sent to section members. Questionnaires were sent 
independently to members of the E.P.S..
6.3.1.2 Questionnaire design; The questionnaire consisted of 
two sections: Section A focused on the biographical details 
of the respondents and Section B aimed to elicit respondents' 
representations of influential contributions in specified 
fields of research. For our present purposes it is only 
necessary to outline the structure of Section B for the 
social psychologists.
Respondents first selected either the field of attitudes 
or the field of groups. They were then asked to list, in rank 
order, who they considered to be the five most influential 
figures in the history of their specified field; to outline 
what they considered to have been the major contribution of 
the person identified as the most influential; and to state
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the major consequeces of this contribution. Similar questions 
were asked with regard to contemporary research in the same 
field. Finally, respondents were asked to state the methods 
of research which they considered to be the most profitable, 
and to indicate publications which they considered to have 
been of particular importance. 'Influence* is taken to be 
understood in its common usage, meaning to direct, to affect, 
or to have power over something. Thus, in this case, an 
influential figure is someone who has directed or affected 
the specified field of interest.
6.3.1.3. Analvsis 1: Identifvina influential contributors 
bv ranks ; A separate list of all the names of influential 
figures who were mentioned by at least one respondent was 
compiled both for attitudes and for groups. In terms of 
individual respondents the first-named contributor is 
considered to be the most influential. Taking the sample as 
a whole, the level of influence that a contributor is 
perceived to have had in the field is associated with the 
level of consensus among respondents. Consensus for each 
contributor can be directly assessed by the percentage of 
respondents who mention a particular contributor (regardless 
of the rank order specified by individual respondents). The 
contributor can be considered to be more influential in the 
field if the level of consensus is higher rather than lower.
Three methods of calculation were used to assess the 
level of influence. Frequency of mentions as the most 
influential (method a), frequency of mentions (method b) and 
weighted ranks (method c) . Results using methods b and c were 
very similar so only methods a and b will be described here. 
Method (a): Frequency of ranked mentions
The frequency of mentions was calculated separately for each 
of the five rank positions, using procedure univariates in 
SCSS. Further analysis, based on method (a), was restricted 
to the first rank order, that is, those figures mentioned as 
the most influential by respondents. This analysis was 
important as all the written responses and the content 
analysis is with reference to those figures who are 
considered to be the most influential by the individual 
respondents. (The phrase 'most influential' is used in the
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text with reference to perceptions, both of individual 
respondents and of groups of respondents. Where 'most* is 
underlined, the former is indicated).
Method (b): Frequency of mentions
Level of influence was calculated purely on the basis of the 
frequency of mentions without taking into account the rank 
order. The percentage of respondents who mentioned each 
contributor was then calculated for each field.
6.3.1.4 Analvsis 2: Identifvina influential contributions bv 
content analvsis: Content analysis was employed to examine 
the written responses about the contributions of influential 
figures and their consequences or implications. Content 
analysis is considered to be a systematic, objective and 
quantitative method for the observation and measurement of 
variables of communication (Kerlinger, 1986); for making 
reliable and valid inferences from texts in the context of 
communication (Krippendorf,1980 ; Weber, 1985). Its supposed 
advantages over other methods are that it is unobtrusive, the 
measurement iself is non-reactive, it allows both qualitative 
and quantitative examination of material and it is sensitive 
to the context of communication. Although this method 
attempts to deal with the symbolic meaning of communications 
with the framework of sender, message, receiver, it can be 
seen that it is largely designed to fulfil the methodological 
commitments of the Cartesian paradigm. It was not until I had 
used content analysis and had attempted to examine 
transformations in social representations, using this method, 
that I became aware of its limitations (these are discussed 
with reference to the historico-interpretative text 
analysis).
This having been said, the basic procedures of content 
analysis are used here in order to organize and summarize 
the written responses to the questionnaire. As part of this 
procedure, it is necessary to devise a coding frame that 
provides a rigorous means of data reduction. This can be 
done, either on the basis of theoretical or practical 
concerns and constructed, a priori, before examining the 
material to be analysed, or constructed on the basis of the 
material itself. In this case, the latter method was
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employed. The universe of the content to be analysed 
consisted of psychologists' written responses. For this 
study, the unit of analysis was defined in terms of words, 
phrases, or sentences expressing a single meaning. The coding 
frame, which must consist of mutually exclusive categories, 
had a hierarchical structure such that major categories are 
divided into a number of sub-categories.
The initial coding frame was based on a subset of 
responses selected from the whole sample. These responses 
were used to construct a single coding frame which could be 
applied to all three fields involved in the analysis (memory, 
attitudes and groups). The construction of a coding frame was 
hampered by both the diversity and the similarity contained 
in the responses. On the one hand, the material was extremely 
diverse, containing a huge range of both objects and 
descriptors. On the other hand, there was a noticeable 
similarity in descriptive terms and phrases.
The coding frame and subsequent analysis was simplified 
by listing theories or objects of research, separately from 
the main analysis. This strategy still permits the particular 
contributions of the influential figures to be identified 
whilst simultaneously allowing a meaningful coding frame to 
be constructed. The coding frame (see appendix 6.2) consists 
of 18 major categories with up to eight sub-categories, there 
being a total of 46 coding categories. The same coding frame 
was used to analyse the contributions for both the historical 
and contemporary eras in each of the three fields, memory, 
attitudes and groups. The frequency of occurrence for a 
particular sub-category represents the number of respondents 
who mention that category concept. Thus, the data within each 
concept category is independent, but is related across 
concept categories and also across questions. Given the final 
role of the questionnaire within the research programme a 
simpler content analysis would probably have sufficed. But 
the difficulties encountered in constructing the coding frame 
and interpreting the relations between mutually exclusive 
categories proved to be a significant factor in the remainder 
of the research programme.
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6.3.2 Historico-interpretative document analvsis of Taifel's 
work
The historico-interpretative analysis of Tajfel's work 
constitutes a major part of the research programme. This 
method of analysis is rarely used in social psychology and 
differs, in important respects, from the forms of content 
analysis previously employed in research on social 
representations. In the present discussions the value of an 
historical analysis of published documents is considered 
within the theoretical framework of social representations 
and related issues previously discussed in this thesis. It 
is argued that content analysis does not provide a suitable 
instrument by which to investigate the dynamics and evolution 
of social representations in this research. In order to 
examine the changing structure of relations in a system of 
social representations it is necessary to develop an 
interpretative or qualitative style of analysis. Because this 
lacks formalized rules of procedure the development of the 
analysis and the form of presentation are described in some 
detail.
6.3.2.1 The historical dimension: Throughout this thesis we 
have emphasized the significance of the historical dimension. 
The theory of social representations epitomizes the social 
construction and evolution of knowledge. It provides a 
conceptual framework for understanding the emergence of 
traditions and innovations in an ongoing dynamics between 
stability and change (see Chapters 1 and 4). The historical 
dimension is implicit in any theory which addresses evolution 
and change. This is an essential component of the Hegelian 
paradigm and the constructivist perspective in the social 
sciences (see Chapter 3) . It is also central to the growth of 
scientific knowledge and the process of science. Scientific 
knowledge is the product of continuous human activity in its 
cultural and historical context (see Chapter 5). The 
historical dimension must therefore be included in the study 
of social representations. This can be achieved in two ways: 
by conducting a longtitudinal study, observing the 
expressions and development of social representations as they 
occur; or by conducting an historical study, in which the
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researcher reconstructs the continuity of development from 
available material.
The latter approach offered pragmatic advantages in the 
context of this research. Firstly, and most importantly, the 
time period recommended for the completion of Ph.D.'s is 
relatively limited (three to four years). By adopting the 
historical approach the time period which could be studied 
was considerably extended. Secondly, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to recognize substantial contributions as they 
are actually occurring. It might be possible to identify an 
emergent controversy but it is impossible to predict its 
outcome. By adopting the historical approach it was possible 
to select a contribution which had a profound impact on the 
changing structure and content of the relevant system of 
social representations.
6.3.2.2 The use of documents : Publications in scientific
journals and books constitute excellent documentary material 
for such an historical approach. Furthermore, the theory of 
social representations explicitly incorporates the cultural 
products of human activity within its theoretical framework. 
Social representations are expressed not only in what people 
say or do but also in what people write or produce. Moreover, 
the articles, chapters and books which scientists write form 
an essential component in the social process of science. They 
constitute one of the most important forms of creativity, 
communication and social interaction within the community.
Within social psychology, methods of documentary 
research are rarely discussed in any detail. In recent years, 
however, there has been an increasing interest in content 
analysis (Chapman,1989) and discourse analysis (Potter and 
Wetherell,1987) within the discipline. It is frequently 
suggested that the advantages of studying documents is that 
it is an unobtrusive and non-reactive form of research. 
However, these are not the only advantages, if they should be 
considered advantages at all. Bailey (1978) lists several 
other advantages including the availability of material on 
inaccessible subjects, the possibility of historically 
sequenced studies, the high quality of social communication 
and the relatively low costs of such research. Both Bailey
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(1978) and Platt (1981) elaborate on the difficulties 
associated with documentary research. These involve 
authenticity and availability of material, sampling, truth 
status, interpretation, comparability and presentation. 
Within the context of the current research scientific 
publications provide a primary (as opposed to secondary) 
source of documentary material which is authentic, available, 
historically sequenced and of high quality. As such, these 
written accounts permit a detailed examination of the 
stability and change over extended periods of time. This 
makes possible a study of the dynamics of social 
representations, elucidating the content and process of 
change, within the confines of a Ph.D. thesis.
Documentary research does have its limitations. Firstly, 
it is necessarily restricted to an analysis of verbal 
communication. There is thus no direct observation of the 
activities of scientists actually doing research even though 
a written account of these activities is frequently given. 
Secondly, publications are formalized, public forms of 
communication which do not necessarily reflect the oral 
sub-culture of the research community. Conventions of 
publication and the assumptions of authors about their 
readership will affect the structure and content of their 
written accounts. However, within the theoretical context of 
social representations, this is not as problematic as it 
might at first appear. The reactivity of an author's account 
to their social context is part of the social process of 
science and the changing style and content of publications, 
including the arguments and justifications presented, provide 
highly relevant information about the transformation of 
social representations.
Problems associated with sampling, interpretation and 
presentation will be considered in relation to the research 
procedures discussed below. But, before moving on, it is 
worth considering the truth status of such research. 
Documents are frequently used as a source of data on the 
matters about which the author is writing (Platt,1981). In 
fact, this is the usual way in which scientific publications 
are treated, in reviews of a particular field of study.
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within the context of this research, I might focus on whether 
or not what is written tells us the truth about intergroup 
relations. Alternatively, documents can be used to make 
inferences about matters which are not directly addressed 
(Platt,1981). I might make inferences about the context in 
which publications are produced and the conventions of the 
scientific community. Although these appear to be distinctive 
approaches in documentary research neither position accords 
with the theory of social representations or accurately 
describes the approach adopted here. This point can be 
elaborated upon with reference to discourse analysis (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987), an increasingly popular, sociological, 
approach in social psychology which has also been used in the 
study of science (Potter and Mulkay,1982; Gilbert and 
Mulkay,1984).
Discourse analysis exemplifies the second, inferential, 
approach to the study of spoken or written accounts. It 
focuses on the context, variability and constitution of 
accounts and the role of language or 'linguistic repertoires' 
in the active construction of diverse social worlds. For 
example, in the study of science discourse analysts do not 
seek to describe and explain the nature of scientific action 
and belief. Rather, they focus on how the accounts of 
scientists are organized to portray their actions and beliefs 
in contextually appropriate ways (Gilbert and Mulkay,1984). 
In other words, the account itself is the object of study and 
they do not attempt to describe the reality beyond it. While 
this approach takes accounts seriously, it inadvertently 
reflects the Cartesian dualism between mind (language) and 
reality, in this case adopting a behaviouristic or 
positivistic perspective on language! This appears to me to 
be a peculiar perversion. Discourse analysis separates what 
scientists say or write from that which they are talking or 
writing about, and focuses on the former. But, if discourse 
is active in constructing social worlds and in social 
interaction, then it must refer to objects, events, 
situations and actions in reality. Indeed, this is what 
language is for. Meaning is not simply dependent upon systems 
of relations within language but on relations within the
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organism/environment/culture system (see Chapter 4) . This is 
particularly important when we wish to understand and explain 
transformations of social representations. Changes in meaning 
and language usage do not occur through rhetoric alone, but 
through interactions with the physical, social and cultural 
environment. Within the theoretical context of social 
representations the form and content of scientists' written 
or oral accounts cannot be separated from the scientists' 
actions and beliefs relating to the object of study.
6.3.2. 3 Reconstructing the past; Before attempting to conduct 
an historical analysis of successive transformations in a 
system of social representations, it is first necessary to 
become intimately familiar with the contents of the documents 
that constitute the empirical data for the study. A complete 
listing of Tajfel's publications was compiled by searching 
the Social Science Citation Index, the Psychological 
Abstracts, and the reference listings in Tajfel's own 
publications, as well as the more recent publications of 
others, closely associated with his work (see Appendix 6.3). 
I then collected copies of nearly all the articles, chapters 
and books which had been written or edited by Tajfel and 
which had been published in the English language. While 
several of Tajfel's articles were published in journals 
employing foreign languages, the vast majority of these are 
versions of articles published in English. Where articles or 
chapters had been published in more than one location, the 
publication which had received most citations was selected. 
I then organized and read most of the publications in 
chronological order. This was an important research decision. 
Rather than first reading Tajfel's publications on the theory 
of intergroup relations, his retrospective accounts of the 
development of his work, and the account of his work by 
others, it was important to become familiar with his earlier 
work in its own right. This assisted in regaining the 
perspective of the scientists involved at the time in which 
the research was carried out. Furthermore, it was important 
to avoid the Whig fallacy, by which the past is reconstructed 
in terms of the victorious outcome. In the case of this 
research, it was important to become aware of the
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discontinuities and contradictions as well as the 
continuities in the development of the theory of intergroup 
relations.
All publications dated before 1979, which have been 
cited (see section 6.3.4), were included in the subsequent 
analysis. However, on the basis of the first reading it was 
apparent that this selection did not include a number of 
publications which contained important developments in 
Tajfel's work. For obvious reasons, these were also included 
in the analysis (see Appendix 6.3). These publications were 
then reread, making brief notes on their content. While these 
notes assisted in organizing and structuring the material the 
original publications were always examined at every step of 
the analysis. Following this, I attempt to list, in 
chronological sequence, the first mention of a particular 
idea and the major themes of each article. This served to 
give me a feel for the transformations in Tajfel's work, but 
it was not taken further, not least because it is difficult 
to pinpoint when a concept first emerged, or at what point a 
new concept can be differentiated from its predecessor.
I attempted to devise a way in which the analysis could 
be carried out in terms of the processes of transformation 
specified by Moscovici in the theory of social
representations. In many respects, this has been a neglected 
issue in past research. The role of anchoring and
objectification is rarely explicated in research on the 
transformation of social representations. The inadequacy of 
their theoretical specification is, no doubt, in part to
blame. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the
current research would be structured around these concepts 
as they stand. It might be possible to select particular 
examples which illustrate each process but this would not 
provide an understanding of the changing structure of 
interrelationships within the system of social 
representations (see Chapter 4) . Similarly, I had thought 
that it would be possible to identify conventions and 
innovations, or to identify and trace the development of 
central concepts such as social identity and the social 
mobility-social change continuum, or to trace the emergence
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and transformation of ideas about social psychology as a 
discipline. However, such an approach would again do an 
injustice to the complexity and interdependence of their 
evolution. The main problem was to find some way of 
structuring the research that was true to the material 
itself, to the research goals and to the theoretical 
framework.
6.3.2.4 Problems with content analvsis; It was suggested 
previously that content analysis reflects the methodological 
commitments of the Cartesian paradigm. It provides a 
technique for analysing documents which conform to the 
traditional methodological criteria of quantification and 
hypothesis testing. As such, it is an unsuitable method for 
a detailed analysis of the transformation of social 
representations. This can be illustrated by examining some of 
the difficulties I encountered in my research. The major task 
in content analysis is designing a suitable coding frame. 
This could have been developed in terms of themes in a 
cyclical process, moving between the construction of a coding 
frame and the material being analysed. By doing this on the 
basis of a subset of the publications and then applying it to 
the remainder the reliability of the analysis could be 
evaluated. I could then count the frequency with which each 
theme occurred and also the lines or pages devoted to each 
theme. However, it became apparent that such a procedure 
would not enable me to meet my research goals. Firstly, a 
content analysis would violate the content and structure of 
the publications. Themes are not dealt with as separate units 
in the text. Counting frequencies of occurrence would not 
reveal the meaning or functional significance of the themes 
or categories. At this stage, it was far more important to 
understand the interdependent relations between categories 
within a complex whole, than to conform to the methodological 
rigour of an established and accepted technique 
(Holway,1989). Secondly, a content analysis would not 
illuminate the processes by which social representations are 
transformed. A single coding frame used to compare the 
content of publications at different times relies on purely 
quantitative changes. It fails to realize the qualitative
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significance of changes in structure and content within a 
complex whole. Even the use of different coding frames, which 
is problematic, would not illuminate the continuous 
development and evolution of social representations, or the 
processes of assimilations and accommodation involved in 
their transformation. Thirdly, selecting a subset of 
publications to test reliability would only serve to leave 
gaps in the social construction of social representations and 
would violate the ongoing processes involved in their 
transformation.
6.3.2.5 A historico-interpretative analvsis; In order to 
understand the transformation of social representations the 
analysis of the documentary material must preserve the 
integrity of the system of social representations and the 
interdependent transformation of elements within that system. 
This can only be achieved by adopting a qualitative or 
interpretative approach. Unlike other research methods in 
social psychology, there are no formalized procedures which 
can be followed step-by-step. Kuhn (1962/1970) and Bailey 
(1978) liken the research process to the ethnographer 
studying alien cultures. Perhaps the most famous study of 
this kind is the classic study by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) 
who carried out an interpretive analysis of personal letters 
written by or to Polish immigrants in the U.S.A. Such an 
interpretative analysis requires reading and rereading of the 
publications, moving backwards and forwards through the 
articles, following up initially vague ideas, dropping those 
that do not work, and continually structuring and 
restructuring the material.
The content and structure of the social representations, 
the changing patterns of relationships and the significance 
of components within the system as a whole only emerge 
gradually. Potter and Wetherell (1987) identify two closely 
related phases in this process. Firstly, there is a search 
for pattern in the data. Gradually, the consistency or shared 
features of accounts and the variability or differences in 
the content and form of accounts can be explicitly 
structured. In this research, this amounts to examining the 
continuities and discontinuities across time. Secondly, the
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functions and the consequences are analysed. This is 
interpreted slightly differently from Potter and Wetherell 
whose focus remains on the accounts themselves. Here, we are 
concerned with the functions and consequences of components 
in the changing structure of relationships within the social 
representations. This includes the emergence of problems, 
the construction of solutions and the social and intellectual 
influences in the transformation of social representations.
The aim of this analysis is to construct a legitimate 
and fruitful account of the way in which components fit 
together in the changing pattern of the whole. Such a model 
describes and explains, not by the invocation of general 
laws, but by the construction of a coherent understanding 
which is internally consistent with and takes account of the 
available data, in all its richness and variability.
The presentation and validation of the 'results' is 
intimately associated with the research process. The 
presentation must allow the reader to assess the researcher's 
interpretations. This requires the inclusion of quotations 
and a detailed description of the material, followed by a 
natural history of the conclusions and an account of the 
processes of inference and interpretation. In some cases it 
is possible to shorten the report by explicating the 
theoretical principles and then presenting illustrative 
examples. However, in this research, the material constitutes 
the topic itself and the theoretical principles emerged from 
the analysis. Furthermore, in order to present a coherent 
account of the types and processes of transformation, it was 
necessary to follow through the sequence of development in 
detail.
The validation of the analysis depends, firstly, on the 
coherence of the constructed account regarding the 
transformation in the content and structure of the system of 
social representations. This, in turn, is dependent on the 
material itself, the ability to identify continuities and 
discontinuities, the extent to which the account can explain 
emergent problems and the construction of new solutions. 
Secondly, Tajfel's retrospective accounts, the interviews 
with relevant participants (see section 6.3.3) and the
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summaries of Tajfel's work presented in chapters or books on 
integroup relations (see section 6.3.5) provide alternative 
sources of data. These must be assessed with respect to the 
research account. Compatability with the alternative data 
lends support to the research account. Divergences with the 
alternative data must either be assimilated into or explained 
by the research account. Thirdly, the validity of the account 
can be assessed in terms of its fruitfulness. The account 
should be able to generate fresh solutions to problems in the 
field of social representations. Finally, these solutions 
should assist in the analysis of other systems of social 
representations. Whilst the research programme as a whole 
addresses these various forms of validation the degree to 
which the account is able to generate theoretical solutions 
which can then be employed successfully in the analysis of 
other systems of social representations can only be assessed 
in the light of future developments in the field.
The historico-interpretative documentary analysis of 
Tajfel's work is presented in four stages. These are, in 
reality, inseparable but they provide an essential structure 
for the purposes of analysis and presentation. The first 
stage presents and examines the content and structure of the 
system of social representations at successive phases in its 
development. The second identifies the major continuities and 
discontinuities which are evident in the changing system of 
social representations. The third stage elaborates on this 
analysis, tracing the emergence of problems and the 
construction of solutions which constitute transformations in 
the various social representations relevant to the psychology 
of groups. Finally, in the fourth stage, the intellectual, 
social and cultural components involved in the construction 
of a theory of intergroup relations are examined.
6.3.3 In-deoth interviews
We have already seen that the in-depth interview is a 
research method frequently employed in the study of social 
representations. There is also a long tradition of 
interviewing in social studies of science (eg. Merton, 1956; 
Hagstrom,1965 ; Collins,1975 ; Cohen,1977; Mackenzie and 
Barnes,1979). Interviews are employed as an instrument for
271
assessing features of scientists' interactions and 
understandings in a particular field of research. In order 
to deal with the complexity of the social processes involved 
in scientific research, interviews are typically unstructured 
or open-ended, providing complex accounts from which the 
investigator can reconstruct past events.
In this study, interviews were conducted with social 
psychologists who were colleagues of Taj fel and who were 
directly involved in the construction of the theory of 
intergroup relations. John C. Turner, Rupert Brown and 
Michael Billig were selected on the basis of their 
collaboration with Henri Tajfel, their subsequent work 
relating to the field of groups and their accessibility. 
Although it would have been ideal to interview Henri Tajfel 
himself, this was, sadly, no longer possible.
The interviews were conducted in the later stages of the 
documentary analysis of Tajfel's publications. Individual 
interview schedules were designed on the basis of this 
analysis in conjunction with a reading of the interviewees' 
more recent work. Questions addressed the nature of group 
psychology before Tajfel's work, the development of Tajfel's 
work in collaboration with his colleagues, the direction of 
their own research and the assimilation of Tajfel's work into 
the broader community of social psychologists (see Appendix
6.4) . The schedules were employed as a flexible framework for 
the interviews which lasted from one to two hours. Each 
interview was taped and then transcribed verbatim. It was 
originally intended to analyse these interview transcripts 
independently from the documentary analysis of Tajfel's 
publications. However, it was decided that this was 
inappropriate as the interviews were based on and informed 
the latter analysis. The interview material is thus presented 
in conjunction with the historico-interpretative analysis of 
Tajfel's publications, using quotations to justify inferences 
and to illustrate interpretations regarding the 
transformation of social representations. Furthermore, the 
interview material proved to be especially informative with 
regard to the role and functioning of the social community in 
the construction of a theory of intergroup relations.
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Potter and Mulkay (1982) have recently criticized this 
form of analysis, emphasizing the variability in scientists* 
accounts which is largely dependent on the social context of 
the interview itself. While my analysis goes beyond the 
interview context to make inferences about the activities and 
beliefs of scientists (see discussion in previous section) no 
attempt is made to create a spurious consensus. As Potter and 
Mulkay suggest, there is variability both within and between 
accounts. This variability is a significant part of the 
social process of science and must be reflected in the 
analysis.
6.3.4 Analvsis of citations
The analysis of citations has been one of the
traditional methods employed in the social study of science.
In particular, the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)
provides an invaluable source of quantitative data on the
impact and diffusion of publications in the social sciences.
As Garfield, the editor of the SSCI, claims
Science historians, or anyone interested in tracking 
the genesis and development of a theory, a discovery 
or a general area of research, will find the new 
cumulation to be an indispensible resource
(Garfield,1988,
Current Contents,vol.20,no.27)
The recent initiative by the University Grants Committee to 
assess research on the basis of citation counts has given 
rise to considerable debate regarding their use, validity 
and limitations (Furnham,1989; Chapman,1989; Newstead,1989; 
Rushton,1984 ; Rushton and Endler,1979). Many of the 
criticisms focus on the issue of research quality which fails 
to be reflected by citation counts. While research quality is 
a major concern of this research programme taken as a whole, 
no attempt is made to make inferences about the quality of 
Tajfel's research on the basis of citation counts. Rather, 
the citation analysis in this research indicates the 
importance or impact of Tajfel's various publications. The 
reasons for this impact and the quality of research can only 
be evaluated with reference to the content of both the cited 
and citing publications.
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other limitations which have been elaborated on are more 
pertinent. Many citations of Tajfel's publications are in 
books but these are not included in the SCCI. Also, some 
journals are not included in the SSCI. Citations are listed 
under the first-name author only; publications in which 
Taj fel was not the primary author are thus not included in 
the analysis. A single citation denotes a cursory mention as 
well as repeated references to a single publication. All 
these factors lead to an underestimation of the impact of 
Tajfel's work. The authors* decision to include a particular 
reference in their articles reflect complex social processes. 
Well known publications may be cited with little more than a 
superficial knowledge of the contents. Informal contact and 
research networks may influence the author's decision to 
include one rather than another reference. An author may cite 
more recent research which was directly influenced by 
Tajfel's work without accrediting Tajfel's publications. 
Again, these may positively or negatively affect the citation 
counts.
Other problems relate to the structure of the SSCI. 
Authors' names are often listed with varying initials or
spellings. Fortunately, this was not the case with Henri
Tajfel. However, cited publications are frequently entered 
in a variety of forms. This is particularly true of 
abbreviations of journal and book titles. There are also 
occasional errors of entry regarding the year, volume number 
and page numbers. On the basis of a knowledge of Tajfel's 
publications these problems can be overcome by scanning 
neighbouring lines of the index and summing the citation 
counts appropriately.
Despite its limitations the data base contains 
information which is pertinent to many research issues. In 
particular, Garfield (1986) suggests that it can be used to 
trace the development of a theory and its subsequent
extensions. Although citation counts using the SSCI appears 
to be a relatively simple way to assess the impact of 
research this was not found to be the case. Restrictions in 
the access to the data base make any detailed research 
extremely difficult. Firstly, the costs incurred in
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conducting on-line searches severely constrains the time that 
can be spent exploring the data base. Secondly, variations in 
data entry means that the data base must be thoroughly 
examined before any operations are carried out. Thirdly, the 
operational capacity of the on-line SSCI is very limited. For 
example, it is not possible to * simply ask* how many times 
Tajfel has been cited, which authors cite Tajfel most 
frequently or which journals have the highest frequency of 
citations.
In view of these problems it was decided to conduct an 
informative but relatively simple analysis of citations. This 
was carried out at an early stage in the historico- 
interpretative documentary analysis. The on-line SSCI was 
used to:
1. Determine the total number of articles published between 
1972 and 1988 which have cited one or more of Tajfel's 
publications (first-author only). It should be noted that 
the summing procedure does not count the total frequency of 
citations.
2. Determine the number of citing articles per year.
3. Determine the citation count for each cited publication. 
(This refers to the number of articles which cite a single 
publication one or more times).
4. Determine the immediacy or latency of impact for eight 
frequently cited publications.
The published SSCI was used to:
5. Identify the journals in which Tajfel's publications are 
cited and determine the citation count for each journal 
during the 1981-1985 period.
6. Examine the distribution of citations for the eleven most 
frequently cited publications in the three journals which 
contained the highest number of citations.
The results from this analysis are interpreted by drawing on 
a detailed knowledge of Tajfel's publications.
6.3.5 A critical review
A critical review is rarely, if ever, considered a 
method of research in social psychology. While I do not wish 
to argue that it is a research method as such, it does 
constitute a valuable component in the social process of
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science. Within the context of this research I shall employ 
this approach to locate Taj fel's theory of intergroup 
relations within its broader historical and theoretical 
context. This simultaneously provides both a qualitative 
analysis of the assimilation and diffusion of Tajfel's work 
within the community of social psychologists and an 
examination of Tajfel's influence on the transformation of 
social representations in the psychology of groups.
Before continuing to outline the form of this critical 
review, it is important to clarify a point of terminology. 
Throughout this and subsequent chapters I refer frequently 
to Tajfel's theorv of interaroup relations. This is not meant 
to imply that Tajfel developed and established this theory 
alone. On the contrary, the historico-interpretative analysis 
shows that it was a collaborative affair, dependent upon the 
coordinated social activity of a group of social
psychologists working together, on various forms of 
communication and interaction within and between fields of 
study and various disciplines in the social sciences, and on 
the wider cultural and historical context. However, I needed 
some way of identifying the body of work which has been the 
central focus of this research. 'A theory of intergroup 
relations' is too vague, especially as other theories, which 
have attempted to address the problems of intergroup 
relations, enter into the analysis. The conventional forms in 
which this body of work is identified are also
unsatisfactory. The label 'Social Identity Theory' emphasizes 
a single theoretical principle at the expense of other
theoretical principles and reflects subsequent developments 
of the theory. The theory must also be distinguished from 
earlier stages in its development. In view of this, it is 
important to adopt a label which explicitly refers to 
intergroup relations. While I have some misgivings about
calling it 'Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations' it 
served to distinguish this body of work from its earlier and 
subsequent developments as well as other theories in the 
field.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of theoretical 
utility is the degree to which others incorporate, adopt or
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apply the theoretical principles in the course of their 
scientific activities. In this research, the manner in which 
Taj fel * s work has been incorporated into the work of others 
is assessed by examining the content of books and chapters on 
the psychology of groups and in social psychology more 
generally. Obviously, some form of selection is required. 
This is based on the theoretical concerns of the research and 
dependent, to a large extent, on direct references to 
Tajfel's work. A variety of books were included in the 
review. First of all, the transformation of Tajfel's theory 
of intergroup relations is evaluated by examining books and 
chapters which have been written by those social 
psychologists who were directly involved in the theory's 
earlier development. These include publications on intergroup 
relations, on group processes more generally, on social 
cognition and on the social psychology of language. These are 
closely associated with books and chapters written by 
'second-generation' authors which are also included in the 
review. Secondly, there are a number of specialist texts on 
group psychology which are not included in the above 
category. These are examined to explore the assimilation of 
Tajfel's work by other social psychologists. Thirdly, general 
texts in social psychology are examined to inspect the 
treatment of intergroup relations as a topic and the 
assimilation of Tajfel's theoretical principles into other 
fields of study.
Finally, the influence of Tajfel's work on the changing 
content and structure of group psychology as a whole is 
assessed. This requires looking at the historical development 
of group psychology before Tajfel and his collaborators 
developed the theory of intergroup relations. In contrast to 
the earlier qualitative analyses this draws on secondary as 
well as primary sources. Other social psychologists have been 
involved in and concerned with the study of groups for many 
more years than myself and I cannot hope to acquire their 
depth of knowledge about the historical development of this 
field in a short space of time. Furthermore, the history of 
group psychology is intimately involved with the development 
of social psychology as a whole. The aim of this section of
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the review is to identify the general trends of development 
in the psychology of groups and to demonstrate how these 
trends have been influenced by Tajfel's work.
In this chapter we have considered what should be 
studied and how the research should be conducted in relation 
to the theory of social representations and the 
methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm. In the 
third section of the Chapter I have outlined the development 
of the research programme and described the methods of 
research which are employed. It is hoped that the 
difficulties encountered in designing and presenting the 
research will guide and assist the development of research 
methods which can be used to explore the various aspects of 
social representations. The research itself has played a 
significant part in the development of the theoretical 
arguments already presented in previous chapters. It also 
provides the inspiration for further developments which are 
discussed in the final chapter of the thesis.
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7.1. SELECTING INFLUENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN A FIELD OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY
The first research problem was to select a field of 
study in social psychology and to identify a significant 
period of theorizing and research which had brought about 
substantial developments in the field. The selection of the 
work of Henri Tajfel and his collaborators in the field of 
group psychology was primarily based on the results of the 
questionnaire, but was also influenced by a number of 
pragmatic decisions which will be discussed below. The 
rationale, design and analysis of the questionnaire was 
presented in Chapter 6. The purpose of this section is to 
summarize the results of the questionnaire and to highlight 
the reasons for the final selection. These include the
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relative response rates for the fields of group psychology 
and attitude research; the level of consensus in the 
respondents representations of each field; and the perceived 
content of the influential contributions.
Who do social psychologists consider to be the most 
influential figures in the past and present fields of group 
psychology and attitude research? What is the perceived 
nature of these respective contributions to social 
psychology? It will be remembered that respondents listed, 
in rank order, those psycholgists whom they considered to be 
the five most influential figures in the history of the 
field; outlined what they considered to be the major 
contribution of the person identified as the most 
influential; and stated the major consequences of this 
contribution. Similar questions were also answered in regard 
to contemporary research in the same field. Of the sixty- 
three members of the BPS Social Psychological Section who 
completed the questionnaire , twenty-seven (43%) chose 
attitude research and thirty-six (57%) chose group 
psychology.
The quantitative and qualitative analyses on responses 
regarding influential figures and their contributions will be 
presented together for each field, before making any 
comparisons. It should be borne in mind that all statements 
regarding the influence of particular contributors refer to 
their influence as perceived by the respondents. Similarly, 
the analysis of contributions and their consequences is 
always with reference to respondents' representations of 
those contributions. This is not always stated explicitly in 
the text, as it is too cumbersome to refer continually to 
influential figures as perceived by the respondents. Each 
section identifies the most influential figures in either the 
historical or the contemporary era, on the basis of the two 
rank-order analyses. This is followed, in each case, by a 
presentation of the content analysis, identifying the major 
contributions to, the consequences of, or implications for, 
the field.
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7.1.1 The field of attitude research
Influential historical figures; Festinger and G.W. Allport 
are perceived as being the most influential figures in the 
history of the field of attitudes. Festinger is mentioned by 
52% of respondents and Allport by 49%, followed by Likert, 
Thurstone, Fishbein and Azjen, and Hovland (Histogram 7.1). 
Respondents are also more likely to select Allport (6) and 
Festinger (5) as the most influential figure, followed by 
Thurstone and Likert (3 and 2) (Appendix 7.1).
Historical contributions and their consequences: All four 
main contributors are seen as initiators of research, 
although their contributions were very different. G.W. 
Allport provided a definition of attitudes which formed the 
foundations for American experimental social psychology. 
Thurstone and Likert initiated and developed methods for the 
measurement of attitudes. Festinger provided an integrative 
theory which both renewed and dominated experimental 
psychology. However, the contributions of Allport, Thurstone 
and Likert, although influential, are also seen as having had 
negative consequences, supporting an overly individualistic 
and restrictive approach in attitude theory and research. In 
contrast, Festinger is presented in a positive vein 
throughout, having developed and broadened the field. 
Influential contemoorarv figures; Fishbein (41%), McGuire 
(37%) and Ajzen (30%) are the most frequently mentioned 
figures in the contemporary field of attitudes, followed by 
Moscovici (19%) and Eiser (15%) (Histogram 7.2). Fishbein 
(6.5) and Ajzen (3.5) are also more likely to be selected as 
the most influential figures. It is interesting to note that, 
although McGuire is frequently mentioned (method b), not one 
respondent selected him as the most influential (method a). 
This contrasts with Moscovici where 4 out of the 5 
respondents selected him as being the most influential 
contemporary figure in the field of attitudes (Appendix 7.2) . 
Contemporarv contributions and their implications: 
Fishbein and Ajzen and Moscovici are represented as two 
contrasting streams in the contemporary field of attitudes. 
Fishbein and Ajzen's influence is associated with the 
construction of a testable model which allows behaviour to
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be predicted from attitudes. In contrast, Moscovici's 
contribution is seen in much broader terms, with reference 
to a reconception of attitudes and a re-orientation of the 
whole field towards a more social framework. The contribution 
of McGuire, which is never selected as the most influential, 
appears to be his comprehensive reviews of the field rather 
than the establishment of a model or a reorientation of the 
field.
7.1.2 The field of groups 
Influential historical figures in groups: M. Sherif (75%), 
Lewin (58%), Tajfel (50%) and Asch (44%) are all considered 
to have been influential figures in the history of group 
psychology, with at least 40% of respondents mentioning each 
of them (Histogram 7.3). After these four figures, the 
percentage of respondents mentioning particular influential 
figures drops by half to below 20%, for Bales, Festinger and 
Turner. With this in mind, it is surprising that Sherif is 
only named by three respondents as the most influential 
figure (Appendix 7.3). Tajfel (9) and Lewin (8) are more 
frequently named as the most influential figures in the 
history of group psychology, even though Sherif is the most 
frequently mentioned contributor.
Historical contributions and their consequences: Although
Lewin is associated with Field Theory and Tajfel with Social 
Identity Theory, both are considered to have laid the 
foundations for a reorientation in group psychology and to 
have inspired further research in the area. Lewin*s influence 
is considered to be more far-reaching, providing the 
foundations for the majority of subsequent developments in 
social psychology, including Tajfel's work. Tajfel is more 
clearly associated with a European tradition of social 
psychology. Both focused on the relationship between the 
individual and the group and, in general, are considered to 
have advocated a more social, group-oriented approach. 
Influential contemporarv figures; There are three 
contributors who stand out as the most influential figures 
in the contemporary field of group psychology. These are 
Turner (47%), Moscovici (44%) and Tajfel (39%) (Histogram
7.4). Following these, with a considerable decrease in the
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frequency of mentions, are Billig (22%) , Rupert Brown (16%), 
Reicher (14%), Bales (8%) and Mugny (8%). Of those 
contributors named as the most influential, Tajfel (7), 
Turner (6) and Moscovici (6), are the only ones named by more 
than one respondent (Appendix 7.4).
Contemporary contributions and their implications: The
contributions of Tajfel and Turner are closely associated, 
relating to Social Identity Theory , self-categorization and 
intergroup relations. Turner is primarily credited for
developing the work initiated by Tajfel. However, it is not 
clear what association or dissociation there is between 
Moscovici and Tajfel or Turner, even though Moscovici is 
considered to have inspired and re-orientated the same field
of research. Notably, there is little mention of the
individual in Moscovici's work which focuses on minority 
influence in relation to the majority. In contrast, the
individual-social dualism appears to be a central theme in 
the work of Tajfel and Turner.
7.1.3 Comparing Attitude Research and Group Psychology
Overall, respondents showed a preference for group 
psychology as opposed to attitudes. This may reflect the 
level of interest in each field within the community and 
suggests that group psychology is alive and well, at least 
in Great Britain.
There is a notable difference in the level of consensus 
between these two fields of social psychology. Responses 
regarding group psychology exhibit far greater agreement. 
This is reflected both by the percentage of respondents in 
each field who mention the most influential figures and also 
the percentage of contributors named by one respondent. 
Although the number of contributors who stand out as being 
highly influential in each era are equivalent, there is a 
greater consensus for groups than for attitudes. This is 
shown by the percentage of respondents who mention the most 
influential figures, being 15-25% higher for groups in the 
historical eras and 5-10% higher for groups in the 
contemporary eras. The greater variability for attitudes is 
also reflected in the percentage of contributors named by one 
respondent, which indicates a lower level of agreement among
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attitude respondents for both the historical (Attitudes 38, 
Groups 26) and contemporary (Attitudes 36, Groups 31) eras. 
This is despite the fact that the total number of named 
contributors is not substantially different. The written 
responses also indicate that there is a more coherent body 
of work in group psychology than in attitude research, 
reflecting differences in representations of the distant and 
recent history of these two fields.
The content analysis also reveals a number of important 
similarities and differences between psychologists' 
representations of the two fields. In attitudes research, 
influential figures are seen as laying the foundations for 
subsequent development. In group psychology, influential 
figures both establish and maintain important bodies of work 
and inspire further research in the area. A re-orientation or 
re-focusing of the field is commonly mentioned in both 
attitudes and groups, but is more common in the latter. Both 
fields contain mentions of cognitive perspectives and both 
show a high level of concern for research and research 
related issues, especially with reference to the historical 
contributions. Furthermore, contributions in both fields are 
associated with theory and practice in applied psychology.
There are also a number of notable differences in the 
major concerns of the two fields. Attitude research still 
appears to be dominated by American social psychology, 
whereas contemporary influences in group psychology have a 
distinctively European character. Representations of attitude 
research portray an increasing concern for science-related 
issues such as definition, model construction and 
predictability. In contrast, representations of group 
psychology focus on the relationship between the individual 
and the social and are more concerned with an integration 
between the sub-discipline of psychology and the development 
of an inter-disciplinary approach.
Finally, group psychology and attitude research are not 
completely distinct fields of research. This applies not only 
to the historical contributions, which might be expected to 
have diffused more widely, but also to contemporary
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contributions, which have influenced and integrated aspects 
of both fields.
7.1.4 Past and Present
The demarcation between the historical and the 
contemporary eras in group psychology and attitude research 
is far from clear. Firstly, figures mentioned in one era are 
frequently mentioned, by the same or different respondents, 
in the other era. The decision to select a contributor as an 
historical or as a contemporary influence may depend on the 
respondents' relevant points of reference. The choice will 
depend on how far back the history of a field is seen to 
extend, on how recently the contemporary figures have been 
influential and the relationship between the two. Secondly, 
the central issues presented in respect of historical 
contributions are often the same issues which emerge in 
contemporary contributions. For example, in attitude 
research, the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is 
of great significance, while in group psychology one of the 
central themes is the relationship between the individual and 
the group.
The past influences the present in as far as historical 
contributions demarcate the boundaries of a field and 
establish the central issues which shape subsequent 
developments. This is so even when those developments are in 
direct opposition to those contributions, for example the 
reaction against individualism in group psychology. Equally, 
the present influences the past. Psychologists' 
representations of the past are dynamic reconstructions that 
are influenced by current developments and concerns. This is 
reflected both in the selection of influential figures and in 
the descriptions of their contributions. The past cannot be 
divorced from the present.
The results also lend further support to the thesis that 
the theory of social reprsentations can be profitably applied 
to the development of scientific knowledge. In general terms, 
contributions are influential because they have re-orientated 
the field or because they have provided the foundations for 
subsequent research. This underlines two central issues in 
the dynamics of social representations. Firstly, the
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development of scientific knowledge is not presented in terms 
of discourses about reality but rather in terms of the social 
processes of science. The significance of a contribution 
depends upon the reaction of the scientific community. 
Secondly, the dynamics of scientific knowledge is presented 
in terms of change and stability. On the one hand, the 
influential contributions are those that have brought about 
a change of focus within the field, which have provided a new 
perspective on an old problem or have re-formulated the 
problem; and have inspired research and introduced novel 
methods of exploration. On the other hand, influential 
contributions are those which bring stability; which provide 
a framework within which other psychologists collaborate; and 
which meet the standards of the research community.
7.1.5 Selecting Henri Taifel's Contribution in the Field of 
Group Psvcholoav
The psychology of groups offered a more promising field 
of social psychology for investigating the transformation of 
social representations. With reference to the questionnaire 
results, the respondents showed a preference for group 
psychology. There is also a greater consensus amongst 
respondents regarding the influential contributors in both 
the historical and the contemporary eras. Furthermore, the 
content analysis reveals a greater coherence in respondents' 
representations of group psychology in which there has been 
a consistent endeavour to re-oreintate the field. The 
selection of group psychology was also based on the relative 
merits of specific contributors. On the strength of the 
contemporary contributions mentioned, it would have been 
possible to select the work of Fishbein and Ajzen on
attitudes and on the prediction of behaviour, especially as
Fishbein is also mentioned frequently in the historical era. 
However, a stronger case can be made for selecting the
contribution of Taj fel on Social Identity Theory and 
intergroup relations. Firstly, Tajfel ranks in the first 
three most frequently mentioned contributors, for both the 
historical and the contemporary eras. Secondly, he is 
selected by respondents as the most influential contributor 
in both eras. Thirdly, the most frequently mentioned
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contributor in the contemporary era is Turner, who is seen as 
further developing the work of Tajfel.
There were also practical and theoretical reasons for 
this selectcion. Firstly, although Tajfel was Polish, most 
of his academic years were spent in Britain. Furthermore, 
many of his colleagues are currently working in British 
Universities. This meant that it would be possible to 
interview those who had worked with him or had been personal 
friends of his.
Secondly, from the questionnaire results, it was clear 
that his work was relevant not only to group psychology but 
also to other areas of social psychology, including 
perception, attitudes, attributions and social cognition more 
generally as well as to social comparison, social identity 
and social influence. Thirdly, he had been an influential 
figure in European social psychology and, coupled with his 
recent death, it is possible that other social psychologists 
would be interested in the evolution and development of his 
work. Fourthly, there appeared to be at least some 
connections between the theoretical interests of this thesis 
and the work of Tajfel, especially with reference to the 
relationship between the individual and the social. While 
this is not an * objective' reason for selecting Tajfel, I am 
sure it had at least some influence in my choice of research 
material.
It should be remembered that, at this stage, I had 
little knowledge of Tajfel's work but, in retrospect, I 
believe it to have been a fortunate choice. Most of his 
publications were reasonably accessible and a few of his 
writings offered retrospective accounts of his career as a 
social psychologist. Furthermore, his life before entering 
into academia and his intellectual career in psychology have 
been quite dramatic. He started his research by studying 
individuals' perceptions of the sizes of coins and ended up 
developing a theory of large-scale intergroup relations. 
Moreover, in collaboration with others, including Moscovici, 
he played a central role in establishing an alternative, 
European tradition of social psychology.
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7.2.*WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE GROUP IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?*
FIFTEEN YEARS ON
We now appear to be passing through a period of 
transition during which both the content and 
methodology of past research are being reevaluated, 
and from which new trends are likely to
emerge......It is suggested that social
psychologists are responsive to the mood of the 
times, and that recent social and political 
un(up)heavals presage a revival of the 
collectivistic approach.
(Steiner,1974,p.94)
In 1973 Ivan Steiner gave the first annual Katz-Newcomb 
lecture at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and published a revised 
version in the Journal of Experimental Social Psvcholoav in 
1974, under the title which 1 have borrowed to head this 
section. In this article, he contrasts a 'group' approach 
with an individualistic approach. In the 'group' approach the 
individual is seen as an element in a larger system and 
causes are located in the collective actions of others. In 
the individualistic orientation the individual is seen as a 
system in his or her own right and causes are located within 
the individual. In the terms of this thesis these reflect the 
Hegelian and Cartesian paradigms respectively (see Chapter 
3) .
Steiner's argument was that social psychology in the 
40's had looked both to the individual and to the group for 
explanations of human behaviour but that by the 60's it had 
become less concerned for larger social systems and 
increasingly individualistic in orientation. He suggests, 
optimistically, that by the late 70's the group will rise 
again, in response both to changes in society and to the 
crisis in social psychology. Fifteen years on, Steiner's 
original prediction was correct, but the return of the group 
in social psychology happened not in the U.S.A. but in 
Europe. In particular, the social group returned with the 
work of Henri Tajfel and his associates in the form of a 
theory of intergroup relations, more commonly known as Social 
Identity Theory.
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7.2.1 Four levels of explanation in social psychology
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the division between 
the individual and culture was inherent in the very 
foundation of psychology as a scientific discipline in the 
contrast between Wundt's experimental psychophysics and his 
Volkerpsychologie. Moreover, the conflict between the 
individual and the social, between the Cartesian and the 
Hegelian paradigms, has been endemic in social psychology 
throughout its history. This is as true of the psychology of 
groups as it is of any field in social psychology.
Doise (1978,1986) has articulated this dilemma in terms 
of four levels of explanation in social psychology. The 
intrapersonal level of analysis (Level 1) focuses on the 
internal mechanisms by which the individual organizes his or 
her perceptions, evaluations and behaviour. The interpersonal 
and situational level (Level 2) examines the dynamics of the 
relations between individuals in a given situation at a 
particular moment. The positional level (Level 3) makes 
explicit the effect of differences in social positions or 
social states which exist prior to a particular interaction. 
The ideological level (Level 4) deals with a society's 
systems of beliefs and representations, values and norms, 
which validate and maintain the social order. Doise (1973) 
first elaborated on these four levels with reference to the 
psychology of groups and they will be used here as a 
framework for examining the historical transformation of 
group psychology.
However, it should be noted that they do not represent 
four distinct levels of psychological or social functioning. 
They are, rather, levels of articulation adopted by different 
social psychologists. In the past, there has been a tendency 
to differentiate individual and social approaches. For 
example, Hearnshaw (1987) makes a distinction between the 
influence of others on the behaviour of an individual and the 
socialization of the individual. Similarly, Hogg and Abrams 
(1988) distinguish between the individual in the group and 
the group in the individual. Social psychological research 
tends to focus on one or two levels and theories tend to be 
articulated at a particular level. Instead, Doise argues that
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the dominant trend in American social psychology has been to 
provide explanations at Levels 1 and 2 whereas the 
distinguishing characteristic of trends in European social 
psychology has been the introduction of Levels 3 and 4 into 
its theories and research. There is always the danger that 
Doise's framework will lead to the separation of the 
intrapersonal from the interpersonal and the positional from 
the ideological. But this is not its intention and Doise is 
quite explicit about this. All four levels are continuously 
and simultaneously expressed in social life.
It should be clear from the arguments presented in 
Chapter 3 that the Hegelian paradigm provides a better 
framework than the Cartesian paradigm for the articulation 
of all four levels. It should also be clear, from the 
arguments presented in Chapters 1 and 4, that social 
representations are not confined to Level 4 but, rather, 
operate also at the interpersonal and positional levels.
7.2.2 The rise and fall of group psvcholoav
In the years leading up to World War II social 
psychology was dominated by research on attitude measurement 
(McGuire, 1986) . This having been said, group psychology still 
prospered during the 1920's and 1930*s, but was largely 
restricted to the interpersonal level of analysis. Two main 
strands of research can be identified. Research on social 
facilitation examined how the presence of others affected an 
individual's performance (eg. Allport,1924 ; Moede,1920;
Dashiell,1935). Studies on problem-solving and 
decision-making examined the differences between individuals 
working alone and individuals working together in dynamically 
interacting groups (Bechterer,1932). Steiner (1974) points 
out that these studies focused on the decisions or products 
generated by small ad hoc groups. The study of large-scale 
social groups was left, on the whole, to sociologists who 
focused on particular ethnic groups, describing the group's 
historical development, its cultural traditions and its 
changing political and economic relations with other groups 
(ie. Doise's Levels 3 and 4).
In the years following World War II the Great Depression 
gave rise to an increased interest in group processes and a
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burgeoning field of research in group dynamics. The 
atrocities of the war needed to be understood by those who 
had survived them. Inflation, unemployment and poverty in a 
deteriorating economy, along with nationalistic and class 
antagonisms, shifted the focus of the social psychology 
community from attitude measurement to the study of groups 
(McGuire,1986). As a result, the 40*s and 50*s saw a tenfold 
increase in the publication of research on groups (McGrath 
and Altman,1966). The area of group dynamics was inspired, 
largely, by Kurt Lewin and his associates. Lewin's work 
reflects his sustained ambition to integrate individual and 
social approaches in social psychology and to bring theory 
and practice closer together. It was not sufficient to look 
at individuals alone or groups alone; it was necessary to see 
individuals as members of social groups.
His influence in the field of group psychology is 
reflected in the results of the questionnaire (above). 
Furthermore, it will be seen that many of Tajfel's concerns 
were similar to those of Lewin. Lewin's academic career 
started in cognitive and developmental psychology but shifted 
to social psychology when he was forced to emigrate from 
Germany to the U.S.A. In 1935 he published an article 
entitled 'Psychosociological problems of minority groups' in 
which he examined the relationships between Jews and non-Jews 
in different social contexts. Throughout the rest of his 
career he addressed problems of cultural change, of conflicts 
in face-to-face groups and of intergroup conflicts on a 
larger scale. As Director of the Research Centre for Group 
Dynamics at M.I.T. he attracted a large group of 
collaborators who subsequently became extremely influential 
in their own right. Notably, these included Bavelas, 
Cartwright, Deutsch, Festinger, Kelley, Lippet, Schachter and 
Thibaut.
Although many of Lewin's ideas could be located at the 
positional and ideological levels of analysis much of the 
research in group dynamics was conducted ,in effect, at the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of analysis. Firstly, 
Lewin's field theory emphasized the individual's life space, 
focusing on the individual's perspective in the group and
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changes in the individual's attitudes, knowledge and skills 
in relation to other members of the group. Secondly, the 
Lewinians demonstrated that group phenomena could be studied 
in the laboratory. But, in so doing, they legitimized and 
popularized the study of ad hoc groups in artificially 
controlled conditions which led to the ignoring of positional 
and ideological factors. Little attention was given to 
sequences of collective actions, or to the creativity of 
individuals in groups.
The individualistic tendencies of group dynamics is 
further demonstrated by the research undertaken by Lewin's 
colleagues. Festinger offers a particular case in point. At 
an early stage in his career he studied the informal 
processes of communications within groups (1950); he 
subsequently developed his theory of social comparisons at 
the interpersonal level (1954); and then went on to focus on 
the intrapersonal processes of cognitive dissonance (1957). 
Similarly, Game Theory and work on the Prisoner's Dilemma 
(Deutsch,1949), Social Exchange Theory and studies of 
interpersonal power relations (Thibaut and Kelley,1959) 
reduced the study of groups to the study of dyads with little 
or no reference to the social context.
The tradition of small group research continued during
the 50's and early 60's , but by now it was thoroughly
immersed in individualistic social psychology. Thibaut and
Kelley (1959) published a book entitled The Social Psvcholoav
of Groups in which nine of the fourteen chapters describe
research on dyadic relationships. This is justified in terms
which are reminiscent of Allport's reductionist arguments.
Because the existence of the group is based solely 
upon the participation and satisfaction of the 
individuals comprising it, the group functionalism 
becomes an individual functionalism. The ultimate 
analysis then is in terms of the vicissitudes of 
individuals as they try out various adaptions to the 
problems confronting them.
(Thibaut and Kelley,1959,p.5)
The analysis of complex relations is thus based on their 
understanding of the dyad without ever articulating the
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positional and ideological levels in their theoretical 
framework.
We assume that if we can achieve a clear 
understanding of the dyad we can subsequently extend 
our understanding to encompass the problems of 
larger and more complex social relations.
(Thibaut and Kelley,1959,p.6)
Cartwright and Zander's volumes on Group Dynamics : 
Research and Theorv (1953,1960,1968) include sections on 
groups and group memberships, pressures to uniformity in 
groups, power and influence in groups, leadership and 
performance of group functions, motivational processes in 
groups and structural properties of groups, all of which deal 
with intragroup or interpersonal and intrapersonal processes. 
This was not atypical. The many reviews of small group 
research tell very much the same story (eg. Thibaut and 
Kelley,1954 ; Riecken and Homans,1954; Hare,1962; Hare, 
Borgatta and Bales,1955; McGrath and Altman,1966). 
Experimental studies either explored group phenomena from 
the perspective of the group member (ie. the subject) in the 
Lewinian tradition or examined the reciprocal interpersonal 
interactions in the group from the perspective of an observer 
(ie. the scientist). In effect, they were studies, either of 
the individual in social situations, or of the group as a 
system of (interpersonal) social interaction (Hare et 
al.,1966). The relative positions of groups in society or the 
idelogies and social representations extant in society were 
not considered.
By the 1960*s group psychology was on the decline as a 
result of both 'internal' and 'external' factors 
(McGuire,1986). The early years of the group dynamics 
movement were characterized by its integration of theory, 
research and practice, but by the 1960's small group research 
was dominated by sophisticated empirical studies lacking any 
unifying theory (McGrath and Altman,1966). Furthermore, the 
relative tranquility of the Eisenhower years combined with an 
increased focus of attention on individuals. Individuals, 
rather than groups, appeared to be the active units of 
society and attitudes, dissonance and individualistic
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approaches to social perception were the vogue topics of 
research. Group psychology did not disappear. Blumberg et al. 
were able to publish a two-volume work on * Small Groups and 
Social Interactions' (Blumberg,Hare,Kent and Davies,1983). 
Topics such as the risky shift and group polarization 
attracted a lot of attention, not least because it 
demonstrated that the group was more than the sum of the 
individual parts (Cartwright, 1971). But, overall, the study 
of group phenomena did not prosper.
7.2.3 Group psvcholoav at the crossroads?
During the same period in which group dynamics 
prospered Muzafer Sherif, like Lewin, was attempting to 
integrate psychological and sociological approaches to group 
phenomena. Much of his research efforts focused on the 
problems of intergroup relations and, in so doing, he moved 
against the current of mainstream social psychology which 
stressed the importance of individual and interpersonal 
relations. Intergroup relations had distinctive properties 
which differentiated them from processes at the 
inter-personal and intra-personal levels. In his many 
publications on intergroup relations (eg. Sherif and 
Wilson,1953 ; Sherif and Sherif ,1953; Sherif, 
Harvey,White,Hood and Sherif,1961; Sherif,1967) and in his 
volumes on social psychology (eg. Sherif and Sherif, 
1948,1956,1969; Rohrer and Sherif,1951; Sherif and Wilson, 
1957) Sherif argued consistently for an interdisciplinary 
approach which could integrate internal factors such as 
motives, past experience and organismic state, with external 
factors such as groups, culture and cultural products, within 
a single framework for the study of social behaviour. Towards 
the end of his career he also showed an increasing interest 
in change, with reference to conflicting groups, minority 
groups and social movements. Social phenomena had to be 
studied within an interdisciplinary framework that addressed 
the individual and interpersonal levels as well as the social 
context.
This having been said, much of the experimental research 
conducted by Sherif and his colleagues is articulated at the 
interpersonal level. These will be discussed in more detail
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in a later chapter, in relation to the development of 
Tajfel's work. But it is worth noting here that, in general 
terms, they deal with interactions between individuals 
belonging to different groups but not necessarily occupying 
different positions in society. Furthermore, Sherif*s 
approach to the study of groups had little impact, at the 
time, on general trends in social psychology. If Sherif was 
right to entitle two of his books as Social Psvcholoav at the 
Crossroads (1951) and Group Relations at the Crossroads 
(1953) it appears that most social psychologists travelled 
straight ahead.
7.2.4 The re-emeraence of group psvcholoav
McGuire (1986) argues that, during the 1965-1985
period, social psychology was dominated by social cognition
and more recently that studies on the structure within
systems of attitudes has been flourishing. Similarly, Jones
(1985) gives little indication of the re-emergence of group
psychology. So, we are still left wondering whatever happened
to the group, in the '70's and the '8O's.
Was Steiner right in forecasting that
social psychology in the late '70's is going to look 
a lot like social psychology in the late '40's, 
better of course, but groupy once more
(Steiner,1974,p.106).
Although in a more recent article Steiner suggests that the 
group has not returned (Steiner,1983), I believe the answer 
to be yes. While this might seem overly optimistic, there 
are reasons to believe that group psychology and the social 
dimension are alive and well, at least, in Europe.
Two strands of group psychology, Moscovici's work on 
minority influence (1985c) and Tajfel's work on intergroup 
relations (1982a) are flourishing. As was mentioned in a 
previous chapter, the work on minority influence was a 
reaction against a bias towards conformity in small group 
research. This has been usefully extended by Mugny and others 
to consider the influence of minorities in society. However, 
for reasons explained earlier with reference to the results 
of the (questionnaire study, I shall focus my attention here
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on the work relating to intergroup relations and Social 
Identity Theory.
The re-emergence of the social group in social 
psychology has been, predominantly, a European affair. As we 
already know, Moscovici and most of his colleagues are based 
in France. Tajfel and his associates, for the most part, 
worked in Britain. Both were highly influential in 
establishing a European tradition in social psychology 
(Moscovici,1972 ; Tajfel,1972a,1979a,1981a). The waxing and 
waning of research interests is associated frequently with 
the mood of the times (Steiner,1974; Jones,1985; McGuire, 
1986). The flowering of group psychology in Europe can be 
associated with the mood of nations. Both Moscovici (1972) 
and Tajfel (1976a,1979b) articulate this in terms of social 
mobility and social change. The ideology of social mobility 
has been a powerful force in American society, supporting 
the belief that individuals are not constrained by their 
group memberships and can move freely through the various 
structures of society. American social psychology, in 
consequence, has provided explanations of social behaviour 
at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. In contrast, 
European societies show a greater predominance of a social 
change ideology. If individuals want to change their position 
in society they can only do so as members of their social 
groups. Class differentials, minority groups and social 
movements are expressly the ideology of social change. Thus, 
European social psychologists have begun to pay greater 
attention to positional and ideological levels of 
explanation.
7.3. TAJFEL'S THEORY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS; A SUMMARY
The re-emergence of concern for large-scale social 
phenomena was already occurring in the late 60*s. But this 
work did not provide a framework for integrating the four 
levels. For example, Moore's chapter in the 1969 edition of 
the Handbook of Social Psvcholoav (Aronson and Lindzey) on 
social structure and social behaviour deals with the 
psychological and sociological aspects of social behaviour 
as dependent and independent variables. Milgram and Toch's 
chapter on collective behaviour in the same volume does
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address social movements but most of the chapter is dedicated 
to an examination of the physical characteristics of crowds 
and a description of psychological or sociological theories 
of crowd behaviour. One of the major strengths of Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations is that it addresses all four 
levels of explanation, from the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal to the positional and ideological in an 
integrative framework.
Indeed, Doise first developed his ideas about four 
levels of explanation in social psychology on the basis of 
the work on intergroup relations and category differentiation 
that was inspired by Tajfel (Doise, 1978) . The fact that 
Tajfel wrote the foreword to the English editions of Doise*s 
work and Moscovici wrote the preface to the original French 
edition gives some indication of the interdependence between 
Doise's, Tajfel's and Moscovici's contributions to social 
psychology.
Tajfel emigrated to England in 1951 and began his 
academic career with experimental studies in the 
psychophysics of perception. He soon began to apply the same 
principles to issues in social perception and, in particular, 
to the study of social stereotypes. This led, in turn, to an 
examination of the cognitive objects of prejudice in the 
context of large-scale intergroup relations and the study of 
nationalism and its development in children. Tajfel then 
returned to the laboratory in order to conduct his, now 
famous, experiments on the role of categorization in 
intergroup behaviour. From this basis in social cognition 
Tajfel, in collaboration with his colleagues, who included 
Billig, Turner, Brown, Breakwell, Giles and Bourhis, 
developed a theory of intergroup relations which addressed 
the social psychological aspects of intergroup conflict and 
social change.
Tajfel believed firmly that it was the job of social 
psychologists to address issues arising in the social 
realities of the contemporary world and that it could only 
achieve this by adopting levels of enquiry and explanation 
that went beyond the intra-personal and inter-personal 
levels.
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Social psychology can and must include in its 
theoretical and research preoccupations a direct 
concern with the relationship between human 
psychological functioning and the large-scale social 
processes and events which shape this functioning 
and are shaped by it.
(Tajfel,1981a,p.7)
Tajfel achieved this integration of the psychological 
functioning and large-scale social processes in his theory 
of intergroup relations. While Doise explicates the 
articulation of the four levels in experimental research on 
intergroup behaviour, I shall describe how they are 
articulated and integrated in Tajfel's theory of intergroup 
relations.
The intrapersonal level of explanation is expressed in 
Tajfel's definition of group membership from the perspective 
of the actors or participants. An individual is a member of 
a group because she categorizes, evaluates and identifies 
herself as a member of a group. However, these intrapersonal 
components cannot stand on their own. Firstly, they are 
dependent upon a consensus, both within groups and between 
groups, for their development and maintenance (Level 4) . 
Secondly, the expression of subjective group membership is 
inter-dependent with the social situation. Social situations 
which force group behaviour will enhance the significance of 
group membership and group membership will influence the 
meaning or perception of different social situations (Level 
2) .
The interpersonal and situational level of explanation 
is emphasized in a number of theoretical components. We have 
just noted that group membership is interdependent with 
various social situations. This is also related to the 
interoersonal-interaroup continuum which distinguishes social 
interactions between individuals as individuals from social 
interactions between individuals as members of the same or 
different groups. While 'intergroup' appears to denote a 
different level of analysis, in itself, it does not refer to 
positional and ideological factors. Ideally, Doise's 
interpersonal level should also encompass the dynamics of 
relations established by individuals as members of a group in
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a given situation. It will be seen, however, that this 
continuum is closely associated with the social 
mobility-social change continuum (Level 4).
The social-psychological processes of group 
differentiation are also articulated at the interpersonal 
level. Social identitv refers to those aspects of an 
individual's self-image which derive from his/her group 
membership. These are constructed and maintained by making 
social comparisons of one's own group with other relevant 
groups. This process is dependent upon the social 
categorization of people into different groups. Differences 
between the groups are either created or accentuated in order 
to gain a positive social identity. While categorization 
might be considered to be a cognitive, intrapersonal process, 
the interdependent processes of social categorization, social 
identity and social comparison locate individuals in society 
in relation to their own and other groups (Level 2).
The positional level of explanation is elaborated by 
considering the functioning of group membership and of the 
social-psychological processes of group differentiation in 
the context of intergroup relations in society. Tajfel 
describes how consensuallv superior groups preserve and 
enhance their socio-psychological distinctiveness and how 
consensuallv inferior groups gain consensually valued 
attributes, re-evaluate attributes of their own group or 
create new attributes in order to achieve a positively valued 
distinctiveness. These processes are exemplified in the 
genesis and functioning of relative deprivation.
The ideological level of explanation is included within 
the theoretical framework in terms of the consensual beliefs 
extant in society. These consensual beliefs play an essential 
role in intergroup relations. Firstly, we have already seen 
that group membership is dependent on the consensual 
categorization and evaluation of different groups in society. 
Secondly, consensual beliefs about the structure of society 
will affect the occurrence and the type of intergroup 
relations. This is expressed in terms of the social 
mobility-social change continuum described above. Intergroup 
relations depend upon an ideology of social change in which
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people believe that they can only change their position in 
society as a member of their group. Furthermore, the 
particular forms of intergroup behaviour and social change 
depend upon consensual beliefs about the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy and the stability or instability of the 
relations between their group and other groups.
This brief summary does not do justice to the 
integrative character of Tajfel's theory of intergroup 
relations. Nor does it do justice to Tajfel's collaborators 
and associates. It's primary aim is to demonstrate that the 
intrapersonal, interpersonal, positional and ideological 
levels of explanation are articulated within a single 
framework. A more detailed presentation of the theory will 
be given when we turn to an examination of Taj fel ' s thinking 
and its development (in particular, see Chapter 8, Phase VI) ; 
and the contributions of his colleagues will be described in 
Chapters 9 and 10.
7.4. THE IMPACT OF TAJFEL'S WORK
What impact has Tajfel's work had in social psychology? 
In particular, has group psychology re-emerged as an 
important field of study and, if so, what form does it take? 
Which of Tajfel's ideas have successfully diffused and been 
assimilated by the wider community of social psychologists? 
To answer these questions I shall resort, firstly, to the 
safety of numbers. An analysis of the Social Science Citation 
Index provides some indication of the impact of Tajfel's 
work. Which publications have been cited most frequently? 
When and where have they had their largest effect? I shall 
then examine the development of Tajfel's theory in the work 
of his associates and other social psychologists. To what 
extent do these developments articulate all four levels of 
explanation? Finally, I shall comment on the present status 
of intergroup relations as a field of study and assess the 
place of the social dimension in social psychology.
7.4.1 A quantitative analvsis usina the Social Science 
Citation Index
Tajfel's work has received considerable attention in 
the community of social scientists. Between 1972 and 1988, 
884 articles cited one or more of Tajfel's publications.
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(This refers to articles and books for which Tajfel was the 
first author or editor). During this period there was a 
general increase in the frequency of citations, indicating 
a growing awareness of his work (see Graph 7.1). This could 
be explained, in part, by an increase in the number of 
articles, chapters and books which were published by Tajfel. 
By 1972 he had written 25 articles, 5 chapters and one book; 
by 1988 there were 46 articles, 16 chapters and 6 books 
(where Tajfel is first-named author/editor only). However, 
there is a higher rate of increase in the citation count 
between 1981 and 1985, which may well be due to the impact of 
a few particular publications.
In order to analyse the citation count in more detail 
the frequencies of citation for each article were obtained. 
Table 7.1 presents a list of publications which have been 
cited in descending order of citation counts. Of the first 
fifteen publications in this list eleven were published since 
1970 (inclusive) and are concerned directly with the 
development of a theory of intergroup relations. The notable 
exceptions are three articles on social perception and 
Tajfel's chapter on cognitive aspects of prejudice. Tajfel's 
early work on psycho-physics (total of 113 citations) and 
issues in social perception (total of 157 citations) has 
received notable acclaim. This, I believe, is largely in 
relation to the functioning of classification and value in 
the accentuation of differences between groups of stimuli and 
their role in the formation and maintenance of social 
stereotypes (see Chapter 8, Phases I and II) . It will be seen 
that this work is articulated largely at the intrapersonal 
level of explanation. Tajfel's chapter on 'Cognitive Aspects 
of Prejudice' (total of 79 citations), published in three 
separate locations, is, perhaps, even more notable, being a 
single work of interest. By this time, the theoretical 
principles are articulated at the interpersonal level, 
although some reference is given to positional and 
ideological factors (see Chapter 8, Phase III).
It is surprising to me that Tajfel's writing on the 
development of national attitudes in children has received 
little attention (total of 27 citations) even though he was,
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Table 7.1: Citation counts for Taifel*s cited publications
Citations Author(s)________ Year Title of Publication
1972-1988
203 Tajfel(ed.)
142 Tajfel & Turner
140 Tajfel,Flament,
Billig,Bundy
114 Tajfel
88 Tajfel
79 Tajfel
64 Tajfel
64 Tajfel
60 Tajfel
59 Tajfel & Wilkes
53 Tajfel
52 Tajfel
51 Tajfel
48 Tajfel(ed.)
42 Tajfel & Billig
1978 Differentiation between 
social groups ; studies in 
the social psychology of 
interaroup relations
1979 An integrative theory of 
intergroup conflict
1971 Social categorisation and 
intergroup behaviour
1970 Experiments in intergroup 
discrimination
1981 Human groups & social 
categories;studies in 
social psvcholoav
1974 Social identity &
intergroup behaviour
1969 Cognitive aspects of 
prejudice
1972 Experiments in a Vacuum
1982 Social psychology of 
intergroup relations
1963 Classification and
quantitative judgment
1972 La categorisation sociale
1959 Quantitative judgment in 
social perception
1969 Social & cultural factors 
in perception
1982 Social identitv &
interaroup relations
1974 Familiarity and
categorisation in 
intergroup behaviour
33 Taj fel 1957 Value and the perceptual 
judgment of magnitude
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Table 7.1 cont.
Citations Authorfs^  
1972-1988
Year Title of Publication
22 Taj fel,Sheikh, 
Gardner
21
18
18
17
12
Taj fel
Tajfel
Tajfel
Tajfel & Fraser
Taj fel
Tajfel & Jahoda
1964 Content of stereotypes & 
the influence of 
similarity between 
members of stereotyped 
groups
1984 The social dimensions;
European developments in 
social psvcholoav
1978 The social psychology of 
minorities
1981 Social stereotypes & 
social groups
1978 Introducing social 
psychology
1979 Indiyiduals & groups in 
social psychology
1966 Development in children 
of concepts & attitudes 
about their own & other 
nations
9 Tajfel,Jahoda, 1972
Nemeth,Rin,Johnson
Devaluation by children 
of their own national & 
ethnic group:two case 
studies
Taj fel 1959 The anchoring effects of 
value in a scale of 
judgments
7 Tajfel & Dawson(eds.)1965
5 Tajfel & Wilkes 1963
Tajfel
Taj fel,Richardson, 
Everstine
Tajfel
Disappointed guests
Salience of attributes & 
commitment to extreme 
judgments in the 
perception of people
1959 A note on Lambert's
Evaluation Reactions to 
Spoken Language
1964 Individual consistencies 
in categorizing: a study 
of judgmental behaviour
1969 Cognitive aspects of 
prejudice
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Table 7.1 cont.
Citations Authorfs) 
1972-1988 
4 Tajfel
Taj fel 
Tajfel
Tajfel
Tajfel
Year Title of Publication
Tajfel 
Taj fel 
Tajfel & Winter
1969
1970
1972
1974
1975
Tajfel & Cawasjee 1959
1979
1982
1963
Tajfel,Richardson, 1964 
Everstine
Bruner & Tajfel 1961
Taj fel,Nometh,Jahoda,1970 
Campbell,Johnson
Tajfel & Moscovici 1976
The formation of national 
attitudes; a socio- 
psychological perspective
Aspects of national & 
ethnie loyalty
Some developments in 
European Social 
Psychology
Intergroup behaviour, 
social comparisons & 
social change
The exit of social 
mobility & the voice of 
social change: notes on 
the social psychology of 
intergroup relations
Value and the 
accentuation of 
judged differences
Human intergroup 
conflict: useful & less 
useful forms of analysis
Psychological conception 
of eq[uity; the present & 
the future
The interdependence of 
size, number and value in 
young children's 
estimates of magnitude
Individual judgement 
consistencies in 
conditions of risk taking
Cognitive risk & 
environmental change
The development of 
children's preference for 
their own country: a 
cross-national study
Renaissance of old myths 
in social psychology: 
peculiar misnomers
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by this time, an eminent figure in social psychology (see 
Chapter 8, Phase IV). In particular, his chapter on the 
formation of national attitudes, published in an 
interdisciplinary volume which was edited by Sherif (1969), 
has been cited only four times. This is surprising in that 
it is the first occasion on which Tajfel argues for a 
social-psychological perspective that goes beyond the 
inter-personal level of explanation (see Chapter 9).
The publications which have received by far the most 
recognition, however, focus on the study of intergroup 
relations. This can be divided into two phases; the 
experimental studies on the role of categorization in 
intergroup behaviour (see Chapter 8, Phase V) and the 
subsequent development of a theory of intergroup relations 
(see Chapter 8, Phase VI). The first series of experimental 
studies, in what has come to be known as the 'minimal group 
paradigm', were published in similar form in Scientific 
American (Tajfel,1970a) and the European Journal of Social 
Psvcholoav (Tajfel,Flament,Billig and Bundy,1971). These 
studies had a huge impact in the field of group psychology 
and elsewhere (114 and 139 citations respectively). Part of 
the reason for this influence was the unexpected nature of 
the experimental results. The experiments purported to show 
that categorization alone could produce intergroup 
differentiation. This was explained in terms of a generic 
group norm. Thus, at this stage, the explanation of the 
experimental results was expressed in terms of intrapersonal 
cognitive processes and ideological norms. The actual results 
were neither anticipated by the researchers nor in accord 
with the ideas of others about why groups discriminate 
against other groups. They challenged accepted ideas about 
intergroup behaviour and, as such, they spawned a whole 
series of studies that attempted to replicate, refute and 
develop the research. A further reason for their 'success' 
was that they provided a clear demonstration of the role of 
cognitive processes in group behaviour and, for this reason, 
are often referred to in the literature on social cognition. 
Finally, they are associated closely with the subsequent
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development of Social Identity Theory and are referred to 
frequently as the initial impetus for these developments.
The total number of citations to Tajfel's writings 
focusing specifically on these and related experiments is 
296. However, this is an underestimation of their impact. 
Firstly, directly related experiments were conducted and 
reported on by Tajfel's colleagues. Secondly, a number of 
Tajfel's publications on the theory of intergroup relations 
give a detailed account of the experiments and psychologists 
who cite these latter publications frequently make reference 
to these experiments.
The two publications which have received most attention 
give a full account of the theory of intergroup relations. 
'Differentiations Between Social Groups: studies in the
social psychology of intergroup relations' (203 citations) is 
an edited volume. The first part consists of three chapters, 
in which Tajfel presents a detailed account of the theory and 
its perspective. Only 25 citations refer directly to these 
chapters. However, citations of other chapters are not 
included in the citation count. Furthermore, unlike many 
edited volumes, the chapters in this book reflect a common 
approach and most of them derive from a common theoretical 
framework. Thus, the extremely high number of citations of 
this volume, clearly indicate the impact of Tajfel's theory 
and general approach. This is also supported by the high 
citation count of Tajfel and Turner's chapter (1979) which 
focuses exclusively on the theory of intergroup relations 
(142 citations). If one takes all of Tajfel's publications 
which present the theory and related research (between 1972 
and 1982) the citation count is even more impressive (total 
of 708 citations) . (This does not include 88 citations to 
Tajfel's book on 'Human Groups and Social Categories' as this 
presents a compilation of previously published material 
throughout his career).
Clearly, the work of Tajfel and his associates has had 
considerable impact in the social sciences. The form of this 
impact, however, is still unclear. Some indication is given 
by the relative differences in citation counts for those 
publications which emphasize the social dimension in group
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psychology (and social psychology more generally) and those 
publications which focus on the theory and research. Only 
16.5% of citations refer to the former category and of these 
64 (9%) refer to Tajfel's chapter on 'Experiments in a
Vacuum' (1972). Other publications in this category, 
including 'Exit and voice in intergroup relations' (1976) 
and 'The Social Psychology of Minorities' (1978) have 
received very little attention. On the other hand, Tajfel's 
most recently edited volume - The Social Dimensions: Europe's 
developments in social psychology (1984) has already received 
some acclaim (21 citations). Further comment on the fate of 
the positional and ideological levels of explanation must 
wait until we look at the content of more recent 
developments.
The Social Science Citation Index can also give us some 
idea of when and where the theory of intergroup relations had 
had an influence. Graphs 7.2 and 7.3 present the citation 
counts for eight publications from 1972 to 1989 bi-annually. 
These were selected from the fifteen most frequently cited 
publications with a view to representing most phases of 
Tajfel's academic career. On the basis of these publications, 
it can be seen that his early work on social perception and 
his chapter on the cognitive aspects of prejudice had had a 
relatively low but continuing impact in social psychology 
(Graph 7.2). Citation profiles for the two articles reporting 
the experimental research on intergroup relations show that 
they had an immediate impact which was sustained at a higher 
level than his previous work throughout this period. However, 
the most dramatic citation profiles belong to the two most 
frequently cited publications - Differentiations between 
social groups (Tajfel,1978) and An integrative theory of 
intergroup conflict (Tajfel and Turner,1979). These had an 
immediate and impressive impact which increased steadily for 
six to eight years. It appears that the rapid increase in 
total citations to Tajfel's work between 1981 and 1985 is 
almost entirely due to these two publications. While the 
number of citations for these two publications has declined 
since 1985, this does not indicate a decline of interest in 
the research, theory or general approach. Rather, other
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related publications have become more popular. For example, 
Tajfel's 1982 chapter on the social psychology of intergroup 
relations has received notable attention during this latter 
period. Furthermore, the 1971 article reporting the 
experiments on intergroup relations has received increasing 
attention in recent years (Graph 7.3).
There are interesting comments to be made about the 
distribution of citations in different journals and hence 
the predominant media of diffusion. Tajfel's work is cited 
in over a hundred different journals, spanning a wide range 
of interests during the 1981-1986 period. Although the 
majority of citations occur in journals of psychology and 
social psychology there are also a significant number in 
the disciplines or field of human relations, linguistics, 
education, sociology, political science, anthropology and 
human geography (Table 7.2). It was suggested earlier that 
the re-emergence of the social group has been predominantly 
a European affair. This is supported partly by the 
distribution of citations. The two journals which contain 
the highest number of citations during this period are the 
European Journal of Social Psvcholoav (EJSP) (93) and the 
British Journal of Social Psvcholoav (EJSP) (67). However, 
the American Journal of Personalitv and Social Psvcholoav 
(JPSP) (53), also contains a relatively high number of 
citations to Tajfel's work.
Further analyses were carried out in order to establish 
differences in the citation pattern for these three journals 
during the period 1966-1988. Differences in citation counts 
across the three journals for the eleven most frequently 
cited publications are presented in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.2: Citation Counts in different journals for
1981-1985 period
Journal Citation Count
European Journal of Social Psychology 93
British Journal of Social Psychology 67
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53
Annual Review of Psychology 18
Australian Journal of Psychology 16
Journal of Social Psychology 15
Gruppendynamik-Zeitschrift fur Angewandte
Socialissenschaft 12
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 11
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 11
Human Relations 11
Zeitschrift fur Socialpsychologie 11
Social Science Information 10
Psychologie 9
International Journal of Psychology 7
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 7
International Journal of the Sociology of Language 6 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 6
Bulletin of British Psychology 6
Journal; Cross-culture 6
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 6
Annee Psychologique 6
Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive 6
American Psychologist 6
Journal of Psychology 5
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 5
Anthropological Linguistics 5
3 Journals with 4 12
10 Journals with 3 30
26 Journals with 2 52
50 Journals with 1 50
Total number of citations 558
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Article
Tournais
JPSP
1966-1988
BJSP EJSP
Citations Rank Citations Rank Citations Rank
Tajfel 1959 9 2 5 3 14 1
Taj fel&Wilkes 12 1 1 3 11 2
1963
Tajfel 1969 12 1 5 3 8 2
Tajfel 1970 21 1.5 2 3 21 1.5
Tajfel et al. 19 2 11 3 41 1
1971
Israel&Taj fel 2 3 8 2 12 1
1972
Tajfel 1974 3 3 5 2 9 1
Tajfel(ed.)1978 11 3 24 2 33 1
Taj fel&Turner 13 3 16 2 24 1
1979
Tajfel 1981 3 3 9 1.5 9 1.5
Tajfel 1982 5 3 6 2 13 1
Total citations
110 92 195
It can be seen that Tajfel's work on social perception 
and prejudice had as much impact in the JPSP as it did in the 
EJSP. However, it should be borne in mind that this work was 
completed before 1971 which was the first year that the 
European Journal of Social Psvcholoav was published. It is 
somewhat surprising, then, that the BJSP has relatively low 
citation counts for these papers. The American publications 
of the experimental research on intergroup differentiation 
(Tajfel, 1970a) has had an equal impact in the JPSP as in the 
EJSP. However, the European publication of these experiments 
has had twice as much impact in the EJSP, when compared with 
the JPSP. This trend is accentuated in the diffusion and 
assimilation of Tajfel's later work on the theory of 
intergroup relations. These later publications are cited more 
frequently in the European and British journals of social 
psychology than in the American JPSP. Furthermore, it is 
clear from the citation counts that the European Journal of
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Social Psychology is the main medium for the diffusion and 
assimilation of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations.
The analysis of the SSCI shows that Taj fel ' s 
publications are frequently cited. His earlier work on social 
perception, stereotypes and prejudice continues to be 
referred to but it is his later work on intergroup relations 
which has had the largest impact, especially in Europe.
However, in order to analyse the assimilation of Tajfel's 
ideas into the psychology of groups, it is necessary to 
examine the form and content of the work of other social 
psychologists. It will be seen that the study of intergroup 
relations has become an accepted field of study in social 
psychology. Furthermore, the approach which is advocated in 
the theory of intergroup relations has been applied to a 
number of other fields in social psychology. However, certain 
aspects of the theoretical framework have received greater 
attention than others. Whereas the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal processes postulated by Tajfel are frequently 
described and are developed within different theoretical
contexts the positional and ideological levels still remain 
to be elaborated. This can be seen, both in the study of 
intergroup relations and in more recent developments of the 
social identity approach.
7.4.2 The assimilation of a social-osvcholoaical approach
During the 60's and 70*s intergroup relations received 
scant attention in general texts on social psychology and, 
apart from Sherif's publications, specialist books on group 
psychology focused on small group research at the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of explanation. In 
the late 70's and early 80*s, Tajfel and his associates
published a number of volumes which began to redress the
balance. These include Billig's book on Social Psvcholoav 
and Interaroup Relations (1976) and three edited volumes 
entitled Differentiation Between Social Groups; studies in 
the social psvcholoav of interaroup relations (Tajfel, 1978), 
Interaroup Behaviour (Turner and Giles,1981) and Social 
Identitv and Interaroup Relations (Tajfel,1982). Other books 
which appeared during this period include Lanauaae. Ethnicitv 
and Interaroup Relations (Giles,1977) , The Social Psvcholoav
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of Interaroup Relations (Austin and Worshel,1979) and 
Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Interaroup Behaviour 
(Hamilton, 1981) . These books presented theoretical approaches 
to and research on intergroup relations, much of which was 
associated with Tajfel's approach outlined above, and 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. This work 
has diffused into the wider social psychology community, and 
is represented in the Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey 
and Aronson, 1985), books on group psychology and various 
introductory texts in social psychology.
In previous editions of the Handbook (Lindzey,1954 ; 
Lindzey and Aronson,1968/1969) the topic of intergroup 
relations had been dealt with in terms of the applied social 
psychology of prejudice and ethnic relations 
(Harding,Proshansky,Kutner and Chein,1954,1969). The authors 
claim that these chapters reflect the majority preoccupations 
of social-psychological research in this area. They focus on 
the development and determination of intergroup attitudes and 
prejudice, covering psychoanalysis, sociological, 
developmental and personality approaches. In effect, they 
present individualistic and sociological accounts of
prejudice without considering the social psychology of 
interrelations between two or more groups or the role of 
social identification in intergroup relations.
This can be contrasted with Stephan's chapter on
Intergroup Relations in the current edition of the Handbook
(Lindzey and Aronson,1985), which explicitly presents a
social-psychological analysis.
Intergroup relations from the social psychological 
perspective consists of the systematic study of
relations between individuals as they are affected 
by group membership.
(Stephan,1985,p.599)
Tajfel's work on categorization and intergroup relations is 
presented in a number of sections in the chapter. However, 
this is coloured by Stephan's emphasis on the cognitive
approach to intergroup relations and laboratory and field 
experiments, focusing on the individual's cognition and 
information processing in intergroup situations.
Categorization is first presented as an intrapersonal process
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whereby differences between groups and similarities within 
groups are accentuated with regard to characteristic traits 
associated with group stereotypes. The role of categorization 
in the production of 'ingroup-outgroup bias' is discussed 
with reference to Tajfel's experimental studies on minimal 
groups (Tajfel,1970a) and it is suggested here that there are 
two classes of explanation. One is purely cognitive, focusing 
on categorization (Doise,1976; Dion,1979). The other 
incorporates motivational factors in terms of social identity 
(Tajfel,1972a,b). Stephans presents a brief but clear 
description of the social psychological processes involved 
- social identity, social comparison and categorization - at 
the interpersonal level but fails to consider the positional 
and ideological aspects of the theory and related research. 
These would have been particularly relevant in the section on 
'changing intergroup cognitions and behaviour' especially 
with reference to Tajfel's ideas on social creativity, groups 
of unequal status and minority groups. Furthermore, the 
concluding comments lament the lack of work on the role of 
social beliefs and the low ecological validity of research. 
It appears that Stephans failed to assimilate the important 
contributions that European research has made in illuminating 
the social and cultural content of intergroup relations. This 
omission not only reflects the traditions of the field but it 
is also detrimental to the diffusion of knowledge on the 
positional and ideological aspects of intergroup relations.
Unfortunately, this is not atypical. Hedy Brown's
(1985) presentation of the theory focuses on the minimal 
group experiments and the explanation of results in terms of 
social identity and social comparison. She goes on to 
describe the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup 
behaviour, and personal and social identities but does not 
discuss their relationship with ideologies of social mobility 
and social change or the relative positions of groups in 
society. Mullen and Goethals (1987) do not include a chapter 
on social identity theory and intergroup relations in their 
edited volume on 'Theories of Group Behaviour'. However, 
Goethals and Barley's chapter on social comparison theory 
extend their discussion by considering social comparisons
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across groups in terms of social identity. Again, they focus 
on the interpersonal level of explanation without elaborating 
when intergroup rather than interpersonal social comparison 
will be made, nor the various forms they might take. 
Similarly, Rijsman (1983) examines the links between 
Festinger's approach to personal social comparison 
(Festinger,1954) and Tajfel's approach to categorical social 
comparison (Tajfel,1978a), emphasizing the social 
psychological processes involved (Level 2). He even argues 
that Tajfel's analysis is inadequate as it does not consider 
the relative status of groups or the occasions when 
intergroup rather than interpersonal comparisons will be 
made. This is blatantly not the case; these problems are 
addressed at the positional and ideological levels in 
Tajfel's theory, but are not referred to by Rijsman.
Others have focused on the process of categorization, 
with reference both to intergroup behaviour and to social 
cognition. Doise et al. (1978) and Deschamps and Doise (1978)
explain intergroup behaviour in terms of category
differentiation without reference to social identity. 
Papastamous (1983) emphasizes the role of category
differentiation in strategies of minority and majority
influence without reference to Tajfel's elucidation of social 
change. Wilder (1986) focuses on how the members of groups 
categorize situations in intergroup encounters and how it 
affects their behaviour towards each other. Similarly, 
McGuire's chapter on attitude and attitude change and Markus 
and Zajone's presentation of the cognitive perspective in 
social psychology (both in Lindzey and Aronson,1985) describe 
categorization as an individual process without reference to 
its social concomitants.
The positional and ideological levels of explanation 
clearly have not become an integral part of social psychology 
taken as a whole. The conventional focus on the intrapersonal 
and interpersonal levels of explanation has been maintained 
by selectively assimilating only those aspects of Tajfel's 
work which are articulated at these levels. But do not 
despair. The positional and ideological levels of explanation 
have been assimilated in some quarters of social psychology.
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This applies both to American and European texts on social 
psychology and to specialist texts in group psychology.
7.4.3 The assimilation of the social dimensions of interaroup 
relations
It would be extremely surprising if Tajfel and Fraser's 
Introducing Social Psvcholoav (1978) did not present a social 
perspective on group psychology. It would be less surprising 
if other introductory texts ignored the social dimensions. 
But happily this is not always the case. Roger Brown (1986) 
dedicates a whole chapter to Taj fel's theory of intergroup 
relations identifying it as a distinctively European product. 
He suggests that it is the only theory that can provide a 
satisfactory account of ethnocentricism and hostility. 
Furthermore, he gives a comprehensive and accurate 
presentation of the theory, embracing all four levels of 
analysis and their integration. While such a detailed account 
is rare, other social psychologists have also attempted to 
familiarize their students with the individual and the social 
aspects of the theory. Deaux and Wrightsman (1984) integrate 
the work of others on intergroup relations with that of 
Tajfel to include an analysis of people's perception of 
ingroups and outgroups, status differentials and social 
beliefs. Howitt et al.'s chapter on groups and intergroup 
relations (1989) emphasizes the socio-cultural factors in 
intergroup relations in terms of Tajfel's theory. It is 
somewhat surprising that, in the concluding chapter of this 
book, Tajfel's theory is categorized as having social 
referents, adopting a group perspective but elaborating on 
non-social concepts. The social psychological processes 
necessarily depend upon the individual, but they can only be 
properly understood with reference to the social context and, 
as such, they are social concepts.
Roger Brown (1986) and Deaux and Wrightsman (1984) are 
both popular American introductions to contemporary social 
psychology. Howitt et al. (1989) is a recent British 
publication which is more likely to be read by students on 
this side of the Atlantic than in the U.S.A.. Hewstone et 
al's Introduction to Social Psvcholoav (1988) presents a more 
advanced text with a distinctively European flavour. The aim
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of the editors was to provide a text for students and 
researchers in both Europe and America. The fact that Tajfel 
is cited in the author index more frequently than any other 
social psychologist is evidence of his impact within the 
European tradition. In particular, Rupert Brown's chapter on 
* Intergroup Relations' offers a formidable review of the 
theoretical concepts, related research and its subsequent 
developments. Hopefully, this will serve to fill the gaps 
created by Stephan's restrictive social-psychological account 
of intergroup relations (see above). That intergroup 
relations is now an established field of study in European 
social psychology is also indicated by the contents of The 
Social Dimension: European developments in social psvcholoav 
(Tajfel,1984) . Part VI is dedicated to intergroup relations, 
consisting of eight chapters dealing with such diverse topics 
as categorical differentiation, group perceptions, sex role 
stereotypes, similarity and attraction, political economy, 
bargaining and negotiation, second language acquisition and 
social justice.
A number of specialist texts on group psychology have 
also incorporated and developed Tajfel's work. These tend to 
be written or edited by Tajfel's immediate associates and 
their colleagues although there are some exceptions (eg. 
Brewer and Kramer,1985; Pettigrew,1989 ; Wilder,1986; 
Ng,1982). While some of this work has remained within the 
original framework, much of it has used Tajfel's theory of 
intergroup relations as a basis from which to develop new 
ways of addressing related fields in social psychology. 
Although there is a consensual goal to understand how 
intragroup and intergroup dynamics mutually influence each 
other there is a divergence in perspective as to how this 
can best be achieved.
One perspective is epitomized by the work of Rupert 
Brown. In his view, Tajfel's theory is useful for the study 
of intergroup relations but it does not provide a general 
theory of groups. The alternative approach is epitomized by 
Turner and his colleagues who have transformed Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations into the 'self-categorization' 
theory which deals explicitly with intragroup processes.
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These developments which have emerged directly out of 
Tajfel's work will be examined below.
The first perspective is reflected in Brown's book 
entitled Group Processes: Dynamics within and between groups 
(1988) . The contents of the book as a whole reflect Tajfel's 
general approach, emphasizing the dialectics between theory, 
research and practice on the one hand and individuals and 
their social context on the other. Similarly, much attention 
is given to the importance of social identity and social 
comparison processes. However, Brown adopts an eclectic 
approach drawing on diverse theoretical traditions to deal 
with various aspects of group processes. In particular, 
Tajfel's theory says little about processes going on in the 
group; for example, on leadership, on status relations within 
groups, and on social influence. Furthermore, Brown believes 
that students reading the book should be exposed to 
perspectives other than those of Tajfel. Thus, it is only in 
the final chapter that Brown explicitly focuses on Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations in all its dimensions. Much of 
this research was conducted by Brown and his associates (eg. 
Brown and Wade,1987; Brown and Abrams,1986; Brown and 
Williams,1984 ; Deschamps and Brown,1983; Brown and 
Deschamps,1980).
This research initially aimed to develop Tajfel's theory 
of intergroup relations by deriving hypotheses and conducting 
experimental and field research to test particular tenets and 
to refine the theory. For example. Turner and Brown (1978) 
experimentally manipulated beliefs about relative superiority 
and stability of reasoning skills for Arts and Science 
students. They found that low status groups only seek 
positive distinctiveness when their position was both 
unstable and illegitimate whereas high status groups seek 
positive distinctiveness when their position is unstable but 
legitimate. They then went on to examine the applicability of 
the theory in different social contexts, maintaining their 
focus on intergroup relations. For example, Oaker and Brown
(1986) examined the intergroup relations between nurses in 
specialized or general fields of nursing and Brown and 
Williams (1984) examined the strength of social
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identification in subgroups of workers in a bakery factory. 
Applying the theory in research on real social groups has 
encouraged the maintenance and articulation of the positional 
and ideological levels of explanation, extending our 
understanding of intergroup conflict and cooperation (see 
also Hewstone and Brown,1986; Street,Kruglanski, Bar-Tal and 
Hewstone,1986).
Unlike the early experimental studies in this tradition 
the more recent research has examined empirically the effects 
of status differentials and social beliefs in intergroup 
relations. Other social psychologists, in various locations, 
have similarly applied and developed the theory in the 
context of intergroup relations. For example. Van Knippenberg 
(1984) has also examined the effects of legitimacy and 
stability in intergroup relations involving unequal status. 
Where Dutch university and polytechnic students agreed that 
the former had higher 'scientific* status the groups 
developed evaluative dimensions which justified the 
inequality while simultaneously maintaining the subordinate 
group's positive social identities on the basis of different 
characteristics.
Ng has explored the effects of power and status 
differences between groups on social identity and intergroup 
discrimination (Ng,1982,1984). Whereas secure status reduces 
the need to discriminate against the outgroup, secure power 
enables the superior group to employ greater discriminations. 
This research has extended the theory to include the effects 
of equity as well as status, stability and legitimacy. Others 
have integrated aspects of Tajfel's work on intergroup 
relations with their own particular concerns. For example, 
Mugny (1982) has integrated ideas about social identification 
into his work on minority influence. Similarly, Pettigrew and 
Brewer have developed the links between social identification 
and relative deprivation. Also, Hewstone (1983,1984) has 
incorporated these ideas into his extension of Attribution 
Theory. Finally, Schonbach (1981) employs the social identity 
approach in his study of education and intergroup relations.
In some respects this body of work, taken as a whole, 
is restrictive and in other respects it is expansive. It is
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restrictive in that it largely confines the application of
the theory to its original domain of intergroup relations.
It is expansive in that it illuminates the integration of
interpersonal processes with positional and ideological
dimensions postulated in the theory. I will go on to argue
that other developments of the theory show the reverse trends
(see especially Turner,1987; Hogg and Abrams,1988). These
developments are expansive in that they reconstruct the
theory in order to apply it to other domains of social
psychology and, in particular, to intragroup relations.
However, they are restrictive in that they emphasize
cognitive processes at the interpersonal level at the expense
of positional and ideological considerations.
7.4.4 Other fields of application
The developments of Tajfel's theory which we have
looked at so far have focused on the analysis of intergroup
relations and social change, highlighting the means by which
individuals achieve a positive social identity as members of
their groups in relation to other groups. However, one of the
hallmarks of the theory's contemporary standing is the vigour
with which it has been extended into different areas of
social psychology. These include psychological group
formation, group cohesion, social attraction, social
influence and conformity, social cooperation, group
polarization, crowd behaviour, attribution theory and the
social psychology of language.
Much of the excitement of the theory lies in the 
fact that it has proved so readily applicable to 
such a wide variety of problems and fields. Social 
identity processes are beginning to emerge as major 
and persuasive aspects of human social psychology, 
with a relevance that extends way beyond the 
conventional and artificial limits of intergroup 
behaviour or group interaction.
(Turner,p.xi-xii,in Hogg and Abrams,1988)
These diverse developments have been brought together 
in an integrated and comprehensive exposition by Hogg and 
Abrams (1988) . At the heart of this work lies the conviction 
that the concept of social identity can furnish social 
psychology with a better understanding of intra- and inter­
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group processes. In each chapter Hogg and Abrams contrast 
traditional individualistic approaches to social phenomena, 
which emphasize the 'individual in the group*, with the 
social identity approach which focuses on the 'group in the 
individual'.
The central tenet of this approach is that belonging 
to a group is largely a psychological state which is 
quite distinct from that of being a unique and 
separate individual, and that it confers social 
identity, or a shared/collective representation of 
who one is and how one should behave.
(Hogg and Abrams,1988,p.3)
In Chapter 2, they present a comprehensive exposition 
of Tajfel's theory and the context in which it emerged. The 
exposition articulates all four levels of explanation in 
terms of categorization, social comparison, social identity 
and social structure in the integrative framework first 
developed by Tajfel. However, these are differentially 
emphasized in the theory's application to specific research 
areas in social psychology. While the chapters on intergroup 
behaviour and language, speech and communication reflect the 
theory in all its aspects the chapters on intragroup 
behaviour, stereotypes and ideology, social presence and 
social performance, collective behaviour, conformity and 
social influence do not achieve the same degree of 
integration. This is not surprising in as much as the 
authors, quite naturally, draw on the work of other social 
psychologists who have adapted the theory to suit their own 
interests. It will be seen below that many of these 
developments emphasize those aspects of the theory which are 
articulated at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. To 
rectify this bias the authors incorporate theoretical 
research work which focuses on the position and ideological 
levels of analysis. For example, social representations 
(Moscovici,1984b) and ideology (Billig,1982,1984) are 
included in their discussion of stereotypes, and research on 
minority influence (Moscovici, 1976; Mugny,1982) is included 
in their discussion of conformity and social influence. But 
this body of work has been relatively independent from the 
social identity approach in its evolution and Hogg and Abrams
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do not achieve the unification of the intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, positional and ideological levels which 
characterizes the original theory.
There are two major developments of Tajfel's theory of 
intergroup relations which have not yet been discussed in 
any detail. These are self-categorization (Turner,Hogg,Oakes, 
Reicher and Wetherell,1987) and the social psychology of 
language (Giles,1984; Giles and Street,1985). While both of 
these have emerged directly from the original theory they are 
now all established as independent areas of study. 
Furthermore, they are substantially different theories in 
terms of both the social-psychological perspective adopted 
and the problems which they address. Tajfel's primary concern 
was the study of intergroup relations and real social 
conflicts and his work was orientated towards the 
social-psychological aspects of large-scale social phenomena 
in relation to sociological, political and economic 
considerations. In contrast, self-categorization theory 
focuses on why and when individuals behave as group members 
and the cognitive processes involved in psychological group 
formation. Furthermore, this work has tended to look inwards 
to social psychology, addressing traditional research 
problems from a new perspective.
By applying the principle of the original theory to 
intragroup processes the proponents of self-categorization 
theory claim to have rediscovered the social group, 
elaborating a social-psychological theory of group behaviour. 
The theory attempts to integrate group psychology and social 
cognition, transcending the distinction between the group, as 
a particular realm of social behaviour, and the individual, 
as the basic unit of social interaction. By placing social 
identification at the heart of intragroup processes, 
self-categorization theory demonstrates how group processes 
are fundamental to self-perception, social cognition and 
social interaction. Social behaviour is conceived of as an 
emergent property of interdependent individuals and the group 
is seen as having both a socially and psychologically causal 
role. This perspective has provided a framework within which
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to challenge conventional, individualistic approaches to 
intragroup behaviour.
The central difference between traditional and self­
categorization approaches to group phenomena lies in the 
distinction between interpersonal and intragroup 
explanations. The former explains group processes in terms 
of the relation and products of interpersonal influence such 
that the group does not constitute a distinctive theoretical 
entity. In contrast, the latter argues that actions as group 
members are psychologically different from actions in terms 
of personal self. That is, the group constitutes a 
distinctive social-psychological process. Identification with 
the ingroup is achieved through self-categorization and is 
fundamental to the processes of social influence, social 
cohesion, social cooperation and group polarization.
Turner (Turner et al.,1987) argues that social influence 
is a psychologically distinctive intragroup process as 
opposed to an interpersonal process. Social norms and values 
are conceived of as emergent properties of psychological 
group formation. This is presented in terms of 'referent 
informational influence' as opposed to a trade-off balance 
between informational and normative influences (Deutsch and 
Gerard,1955; see also Hogg and Abrams,1988). People first 
categorize and define themselves as members of a distinct 
social category. They then learn the stereotypic norm of that 
category and assign these norms to themselves. As their 
category membership becomes salient they conform to these 
group norms. Thus, an individual's group membership or 
self-categorization mediates the influence of other members 
of the group.
Hogg applies the same principles to psychological group 
formation. Hogg argues that group cohesiveness has
traditionally been defined in terms of interpersonal
attraction but that this fails to account for the distinctive 
social-psychological nature of group processes. Group
formation primarily depends upon a process of
self-categorization or social identification, such that group 
'belongingness' is a cause rather than a product of group 
cohesion.
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Oakes explores the problem of category salience and 
argues that perceiving individuals as group members is not 
due to an irrational bias of stereotyping, but, rather, is 
a function of the reality of groups and the identification 
of individuals with them. Similarly, Wetherell demonstrates 
that group polarization is a function of ingroup 
identification and of the relationship between the ingroup's 
initial distribution of opinions and the salience of 
ingroup-outgroup categorizations.
However, despite the apparent rediscovery of the social 
group, I would argue that self-categorization theory is still 
essentially individualistic. It not only fails to articulate 
positional and ideological factors which had become an 
integral part of Tajfel's social-psychological perspective 
but, in so doing, it also reduces the group to the cognitions 
of individuals. While its proponents do not necessarily lose 
sight of the social context in their research the theory 
itself is largely articulated at the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal levels of explanation (This, despite the fact 
that Turner laments the current reemergence of the 
traditional dichotomy between psychological reductionism and 
sociological reductionism (Turner,Interview)).
As Turner himself states,
self-categorization theory makes use of and develops 
two concepts taken from an earlier theory of 
intergroup behaviour developed by Tajfel and myself: 
the concept of social identity itself and the 
assumption of an interpersonal-intergroup 
'continuum' of behaviour.
(Turner,1987,p.viii)
As can be seen from their earlier summary of Tajfel's theory 
in terms of Doise's four levels of explanation in social 
psychology, these two theoretical constructs emphasize the 
interpersonal level.
The central principle of self-categorization theory is 
the self-concept. This is conceived of as the cognitive 
representation of the self in terms of self-categorization 
at three levels of abstraction: human identity based on
inter-species comparisons; social identity based on 
intergroup comparisons and personal identity based on
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interpersonal or intragroup comparisons. In order to
encompass all these aspects of identity self-categorization
is defined as
cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of 
stimuli as the same in contrast to some other class 
of stimuli
(Turner,1987,p.44).
While 'social identity' originally referred to an 
individual's self-image as a member of a group in relation 
both to other groups and to members of other groups' image 
of the individual's group, self-categorization refers to how 
individuals categorize themselves. This is a subtle but 
important distinction. Turner's emphasis on the individual's 
cognitive processes telescopes consensual beliefs about the 
structure of society (Level 4) and the relations between 
groups (Level 3) into the individual's cognitive system of 
social categories (Level 1) and processing information from 
relevant others (Level 2).
This places severe constraints on the 'social- 
psychological perspective' advanced by self-categorization 
theorists. For example, Reicher (Turner et al.,1987) shows 
how self-categorization theory can provide an explanation of 
crowd behaviour; behaviour which is a spontaneously 
collective, meaningful and complex reaction to unprecedented 
circumstances without overt directions. However, he also 
points out that the original 'social identity' theorists were 
committed to producing a social psychology of social change. 
With it's focus on intrapersonal and intragroup 
(interpersonal) processes, self-categorization theory does 
not provide a framework in which to conceptualize or 
understand social change. Although it stresses the 
interaction or interdependence between individual and group 
determinants of behaviour, it fails to consider the 
ideological representation of or consensual beliefs about the 
structure of society and about political and economic 
realities. As such, it fails to give an account of the 
historical evolution of (inter or intra) group relations or 
the social creativity of groups. Thus, self-categorization
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theory fails to maintain the social- psychological 
perspective advocated by Tajfel.
In effect, self-categorization theory reinstates the 
division between intrapersonal and interpersonal explanations 
of social behaviour on the one hand and positional and 
ideological explanations on the other. This division is also 
reflected in the work of Billig, be it in the opposite 
direction. Ideology has received scant attention in social 
psychology, largely remaining within the confines of
sociology and political science. Billig (Billig,1984;1988) 
has explored the social psychological aspects of ideology, 
which is seen as a product of social conflict and thus deeply 
rooted in intergroup relations. Like self-categorization 
theory this work originated in the study of intergroup 
relations, in association with Tajfel. Unlike Turner and his 
colleagues, Billig maintains Tajfel's multi-disciplinary 
orientation, drawing on the work of sociologists such as 
Mannheim and Marx. Not surprisingly, his analysis 
concentrates on the positional and ideological levels of
explanation. Unfortunately, the study of ideology has become 
increasingly divorced from 'social identity' theory and, in 
some ways, is antagonistic to the more recent developments of 
self-categorization.
The final area of research which I shall examine is the 
social psychology of language. Like ideology, the study of 
language has largely been excluded from the province of 
social psychology. This is due, in part, to the
individualistic or interpersonal orientation of the
discipline. Speech and language are emergent properties of 
interactions which depend upon collective phenomena and 
cannot be understood in terms of independent individuals. 
The recent development of a social psychology of language is 
closely associated with the emergence of Taj fel's theory of 
intergroup relations. It explicitly deals with the mediation 
of motivations, beliefs and identity between social structure 
and individual language behaviour. Emphasis is placed on the 
social members rather than on the content of speech and 
language. In particular, language variation and speech styles 
convey information about the speakers' and listeners' social
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status and social group membership in the specific context of 
communication. Furthermore, the existence and functions of 
social markers depends upon a framework of shared meanings 
and consensual beliefs.
Two related theories in the social psychology of 
language need to be discussed. These are *ethnolinguistic 
identity theory' (Ball,Giles and Hewstone,1984) and 'speech 
accommodation theory' (Giles,1984). Ethnolinguistic identity 
theory employs the social identity perspective to integrate 
socio-structural factors of ethnic groups with actual 
language use. The relation between ethnolinguistic groups can 
be characterized in terms of status, demography and 
institutional support. The way in which members of 
ethnolinguistic groups strive for a positive social identity 
will depend upon their social beliefs about the nature of 
intergroup relations. Giles and his colleagues differentiate 
between beliefs in social mobility and social change, in 
order to account for the diversity of interethnic relations 
and the variety of language stratagems employed by different 
groups. For example, consensual beliefs in social mobility 
encourage 'linguistic assimilation' or 'language suicide'. 
The ingroup language gradually becomes redundant and 
perishes. Conversely, consensual beliefs in social change 
might encourage the resurrection of an ethnic language.
Speech accommodation theory focuses on communications 
between individuals from different groups rather than the 
role of language in the dynamics of large-scale intergroup 
relations. It might be expected that the positional and 
ideological factors would not feature so prominently in this 
analysis. However, speech accommodation fulfils an identity 
function and, in the context of an intergroup orientation, it 
will be influenced by the perceived social relations between 
the groups. Social mobility beliefs encourage convergent 
accommodation whereas social change encourages divergent 
accommodation between the speakers and listeners. Similar 
analyses have been made of second-language acquisitions and 
sex differences in speech. It is clear that these 
developments have maintained and developed an integrative
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framework that incorporates all four levels of explanation in 
social psychology.
7.4.5 The group is alive and well
Social psychologists who were asked to identify and 
describe influential contributions to the psychology of 
groups suggested that Henri Taj fel* s theory of intergroup 
relations laid the foundation for a reorientation in group 
psychology, advocating a more social, group-orientated 
approach, which inspired further research in the area. Our 
examination of historical and contemporary developments in 
the psychology of groups supports these claims. Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations provides a social- 
psychological perspective which goes beyond an intrapersonal 
and interpersonal analysis of group membership and social 
categorization, social identity and social comparison to 
incorporate positional and ideological aspects in terms of 
superior and inferior groups and consensual beliefs. His 
major theoretical achievement was to integrate explicitly the 
social-psychological processes of individuals with the social 
realities of society. The analysis of the Social Science 
Citation Index indicated the impact that this work has had, 
especially within the field of European social psychology. 
The study of group relations is now a burgeoning field of 
study in social psychology which, more often than not, is 
associated explicity with the work of Tajfel. Furthermore, 
extensions of the theory have addressed various intragroup 
processes and the social psychology of language.
The qualitative analysis of this extensive body of 
research and theorizing reveals two distinctive forms of 
reorientation in the psychology of groups. This applies both 
to re-presentations of the theory and to its subsequent 
developments. Firstly, there has been an increased 
recognition of the group as a theoretically distinctive 
entity. The group provides individuals with a social identity 
which influences social behaviour in both intergroup and 
intragroup relations. This constitutes a major advance on the 
more traditional, individualistic, approaches to social 
phenomena. Secondly, the social dimensions of social 
psychology, relating to the positional and ideological levels
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of explanation, have received greater attention in the study 
of intergroup relations and language.
In the history of group psychology, both Lewin and 
Sherif attempted to construct a framework which integrated 
psychological processes with social studies, such that 
individuals and society were conceived of as parts of an 
interdependent social system. However, the individualistic 
perspective in social psychology continued to dominate the 
study of groups. Tajfel's theory provides us with another 
opportunity to develop and sustain a social-psychological 
perspective which takes the social dimensions into account. 
The following chapters examine the development of Tajfel's 
work, illuminating how and why the social dimensions became 
an integral part of the social psychology of groups. This 
not only provides an opportunity to study, in detail, the 
transformation of social representations in social 
psychology, but also that the social dimensions constitute 
an essential component of social psychology.
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CHAPTER 8
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAJFEL'S THINKING
8.1 PHASE I: PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT 1957-1959
8.1.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.1.2 Description of the field: social perception
8.1.3 Theory: accentuation of differences
8.1.4 Domain of application
8.2 PHASE II: STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION
1959-1964
8.2.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.2.2 Description of the field: perception of people
8.2.3 Theory: polarization of judgments
8.2.4 Domain of application
8.3 PHASE III: PREJUDICE 1965-1969
8.3.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.3.2 Description of the field: Intergroup relations
8.3.3 Theory: categorization, assimilation and 
coherence
8.3.3.1 The cognitive process of categorization in 
relation to the physical and social 
environment
8.3.3.2 Assimilation of evaluations and social 
information
8.3.3.3 Search for coherence
8.4 PHASE IV: NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT 1966-1972
8.4.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.4.2 Field
8.4.3 Theory: attitudes
8.4.4 Domain of application: experimental studies
8.5 PHASE V:INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL 
CATEGORIZATION 1970-1973
8.5.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.5.2 Description of the field: intergroup behaviour
8.5.3 Theory: social categorization and social norms
8.5.4 Domain of application: experimental studies
8.5.4.1 Social categorization
8.5.4.2 Generic group norm
8.5.4.3 Fairness norm
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8.6 PHASE VI: INTERGROUP RELATIONS, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 1972-1979
8.6.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.6.2 Description of the field: intergroup relations
8.6.3 Theory
8.6.3.1 The definition of intergroup behaviour
8.6.3.2 The specification of four continua
8.6.3.3 The principles of explanation
8.6.4 Domain of application
8.6.4.1 Relative deprivation
8.6.4.2 The various forms of intergroup 
differentiation
8.7 PHASE IIB: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1961-1964
8.8 PHASE VII: REFLECTIONS AND REINTERPRETATIONS
In this chapter I shall present the content and
structure of Tajfel's work during the various phases of its 
development. This provides a basis from which to examine the 
transformation of social representations involved in the
emergence of a new perspective in social psychology.
Tajfel divides his intellectual career into three
distinct periods (Cohen,1977) . In the first of these his 
concern was with problems of perception and judgment and, in 
particular, the effect of value and categorization on 
perceptual judgments of physical objects. During the second 
period, Tajfel focused on social perception and social 
judgment, applying the emergent theoretical principles to 
the problems associated with stereotypes and prejudice. The 
third and final period, by far the longest, and one which 
was sustained until the end of his career, centred on
intergroup relations and the consideration of social 
psychology in general.
The division of Tajfel's intellectual career into these 
three periods is warranted, in some respects, by an 
examination of his published works. However, to provide a 
detailed explication of the development and transformation 
of his work, these divisions are far too broad. For the 
present purposes, I shall refer to six identifiable phases 
which are outlined below.
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Phase I. Perceptual iudament: (1957-1959)
This phase is in line with Tajfel's first period concerning 
problems of perception and judgment of physical objects. 
Phase II. Stereotypes and social perception: (1959-1964)
This demarcates the phase in which Tajfel applies the 
principles of accentuation of differences emerging from Phase 
I to social phenomena and in particular to social 
stereotypes.
Phase III. Prejudice; (1965-1969)
The work on social stereotypes is expanded with reference to 
prejudice. This can be considered a transition phase between 
social perception and intergroup relations.
Phase IV. National attitudes and their development; (1966- 
1972)
This body of research focuses on the formation of national
attitudes in children and gives rise to many of the questions
or problems addressed in Tajfel's subsequent work.
Phase V. Interaroup behaviour and social categorization; 
(1970-1973)
In the early stages of the development of a theory of 
intergroup relations, Tajfel examines the role of social 
categorization in producing differential intergroup 
behaviour.
Phase VI. Interaroup relations, social identitv and social 
change; (1974-1979)
Tajfel explicates the significance of social identity in 
intergroup relations. This is developed and extended to 
encompass social beliefs concerning both the structure of 
society and the legitimacy and stability of intergroup 
relations in society.
These six phases are not intended to demarcate distinct 
periods in the historical development of Tajfel's work. 
Firstly, there is considerable chronological overlap between 
adjacent phases, both in terms of publication dates and the 
actual sequence in which the work was carried out. Secondly, 
and more importantly, there is continuity in the progressive 
development of concepts, principles and research which 
extends across phases. In this respect, it may be considered 
a mistake to impose any form of boundaries or markers on this
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development. However, there are clear shifts in the focus of 
research and theorizing; the phenonema which are studied, the 
problems addressed, the concepts and principles employed to 
provide a theoretical understanding and the general approach 
adopted within social psychology. A delicate balance between 
the continuities and discontinuities in Tajfel's intellectual 
career is required. The identification of a number of phases 
not only facilitates the current research but also provides 
a convenient and necessary framework in which to present and 
explicate the development of Tajfel's work.
These six phases can be associated, loosely, with the 
dimension of time. The framework of analysis also employs a 
second dimension; that of tiers. The content of each phase 
will be structured in terms of four tiers. These can be 
conceived of as either tiers of inclusion or as tiers of 
abstraction. As tiers of inclusion they can be represented 
by a pyramid horizontally divided into four sections (Diagram 
8.1). The metatheory subsumes a number of fields each of 
which contain a number of theories which, in turn, subsume a 
body of research.
Diagram 8.1: Tiers of Inclusion
Metatheory
Field
Theory
Research
Conversely, as tiers of abstraction they can be represented 
by an inverted pyramid. The design and interpretation of 
research assumes a body of theoretical knowledge which is 
made explicit at the higher level. The theory can be located 
in a field and each field within a meta-theory. The implicit 
frame of each tier is made explicit at a higher tier of 
abstraction , which is constituted by a broader or more 
far-reaching set of principles or concepts. The notion of
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tiers employed here is adopted from Humphrey et al.'s (1987) 
systems analysis. It provides an analytic tool by which to 
structure the material at each phase.
Tier 1 refers to the principles of social psychology: 
that is to the meta-theoretical assumptions which are either 
explicitly challenged or advocated in Tajfel's work. These 
concern the relationship between social psychology and other 
disciplines, the perspective or approach adopted within 
social psychology, and the conceptions of the individual in 
relation to society. Tier 2 consists of a description of the 
field, indicating the extent of its domain and the various 
theoretical approaches within it which have been advocated. 
Tier 3 focuses on theoretical statements which include a 
description of the phenomenon, principles of explanation and 
emergent hypotheses or predictions. Finally, Tier 4 refers to 
the domain of application; that is, the material to which the 
theory is applied. This material falls into three classes: 
Tajfel's own research, the research of others and social 
issues arising in society.
Four tiers of analvsis
Tier 1: The principles of social psychology 
Tier 2: Description of the field 
Tier 3 : Theory
Tier 4: Domain of application
The identification of a passage within a text with a 
particular tier is done with reference to the main theme of 
that passage. Where there are one or two sentences within a 
particular passage which may be construed in terms of a 
different tier, greater emphasis is placed on the context of 
use, rather than on the specific content of the sentences. 
This is justified by the assumption that the same issue can 
be expressed at different tiers. Although the issue may have 
implications for the content and structure of other tiers, in 
this initial phase of the analysis it is necessary to reflect 
the structure within the actual texts. A further point to 
consider is the relationship between the different tiers. In 
part, their ordering reflects the general structure of the 
chapters and articles themselves, although this is by no 
means true in all cases. More importantly, it reflects the
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increasing breadth of concern in each tier from the domain of 
application, that deals with particular instances, to the 
principles of social psychology which are abstract.
8.1 PHASE I; PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT 1957-1959
During Phase I, Tajfel's research focuses on the effects 
of value and categorization on perceptual judgments of 
physical objects. It is evident from the very earliest 
publications that this research is located within the field 
of social perception, being concerned with the impact of 
social factors on the perception and judgment of the physical 
environment. The following four publications are considered 
to fall within this phase of Tajfel's intellectual career
1)Tajfel (1957): Value and the perceptual judgment of 
magnitude. Psychological Review 64, 192-204.
2)Tajfel (1959a):Quantitative judgment in social perception, 
British Journal ofPsvcholoav. 50, 16-29.
3)Tajfel (1959b):The anchoring effects of value in a scale 
of judgments, British Journal of Psvcholoav 50. 294-304.
4)Tajfel & Cawasajee(1959): Value and the accentuation of 
judged differences: a confirmation. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psvcholoav 59, 436-9.
The contents and developmental relationships of these four 
articles will be discussed in later sections. For present 
purposes, the 1959(a) article will be presented as it 
provides the most complete and explicit depiction of Phase 
I. Furthermore, it also frames the transition from Phase I 
to Phase II.
8.1.1 Criteria for social psvcholoav
The content of Taj fel's writings in Phase I have a 
number of implications concerning the principles of social 
psychology. In the first phase of Tajfel's work there is no 
explicit consideration of the principles of social 
psychology. That is, there is no mention of the proper 
content and function of social psychology or of the 
appropriate methodologies for research. Implications for this 
tier of concern can be drawn from the content of other tiers 
in this phase. These will be illuminated in the following 
chapters. For our current purposes, it is enough to note that
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the principles of social psychology were not discussed by 
Tajfel in this phase.
8.1.2 Description of the field; social perception
The first section of the paper clearly situates 
Tajfel's research and theoretical framework within the field 
of social perception. At this level, Tajfel does not present 
a review of theories or research within this field. Rather, 
the main purpose of this section is to locate his own 
particular sphere of interest within a general description of 
the field. This is done in two successive stages.
Firstly, although Tajfel acknowledges that the main 
concern of the study of social perception is with the ways 
in which people perceive, judge, and interpret the social 
objects and events which together amount to what is called 
their 'social environment', he, himself, is more concerned 
with the effects of the social environment on the perception, 
judgment, and interpretation of the physical environment
(p.16).
Secondly, within this, Tajfel delineates a body of 
research in which the shifts induced by social factors are 
not unidirectional and claims that these have not been 
satisfactorily explained within a wider theoretical context. 
Tajfel adopts and develops a theoretical framework which 
focuses on the 'general judgmental or perceptual processes' 
which can be considered 'independently of their social 
character' (p.17).
8.1.3 Theorv; Accentuation of differences
The presentation of the theoretical framework involves 
the description of a particular phenomenon, the explication 
of theoretical principles and the use of two bodies of 
research as evidence of the phenomenon and justification for 
the principles. It should be noted that these three aspects 
of the theory are intricately interwoven. The description of 
the phenomenon depends upon the theoretical principles and 
the presentation of the evidence is essentially within the 
terms of the theoretical framework. Along with the 
explication of a series of predictions the major part of the 
paper falls within the tiers of theory (Tier 3) and the 
domain of application (Tier 4) . Tajfel focuses on the
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phenomenon of shifts in judgment and, in particular, shifts 
in judgments of the physical magnitude of stimuli which occur 
within a series- that is which are intraserial. Under certain 
conditions * differences between the stimuli of a series will 
be perceived as larger than the objectively equivalent 
differences'. Tajfel draws on two distinct literatures of 
experimental research which demonstrate these phenomena and 
elaborates an explanation in terms of the accentuation of 
perceived differences.
In most of these experiments stimuli are presented 
individually such that perceptual and judgmental processes 
depend on the subject's construction of a series or system 
of categories against which the stimuli are judged. Shifts 
in judgment are therefore a function of the range and 
frequency of presentation of the various stimuli within a 
series, of their magnitudes, of points of anchor within a 
series and the perception of a stimulus belonging to that 
series. The crucial point is that judgment must be seen in 
terms of the relationships between stimuli rather than the 
relationship between the response and the individual stimuli.
Firstly, the accentuation of perceived differences 
accounts for the phenomenon of perceptual over-estimation, 
where value changes concurrently with the physical magnitude 
of the stimuli. For example, in a series of coins, larger 
coins are associated with a higher value and hence are 'seen' 
by subjects as larger than stimuli of the same size which are 
not associated with value, (cf. Tajfel 1957). Secondly, 
Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956) found that prejudiced subjects 
accentuated differences in skin colour between negroes and 
whites more than non-prejudiced subjects. Skin colour is a 
continuous physical dimension superimposed by a discontinuous 
classification. distinguishing whites from negroes. 
Furthermore, this classification has a greater emotional or 
value relevance for prejudiced subjects. Skin colour provides 
a cue to the valued classification - negro or white - and 
hence judgments exhibit shifts which accentuated the 
differences between the classes.
The over-estimation of the size of coins is not, in 
principle, different from the accentuation of differences in
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skin colour between negroes and whites. For both, a physical 
attribute varies concurrently with value. This both permits 
and supports the integration of laboratory studies on the 
perceptual judgment of the physical characteristics of
physical objects and of the physical characteristics of 
social objects. That is, perceptual over-estimation and 
perceptual stereotypes are integrated within the same
theoretical framework, centring on the accentuation of 
differences. Tajfel provides a new perspective on the problem 
of the social perception of physical objects. Rather than 
focusing on the physical stimulus itself and its direct 
perception (S-R), he considers the physical dimension which 
describes a series of stimuli. The significance of value (v)
related to this physical dimension is apparent from the
experimental results on perceptual overestimation. 
Furthermore, the only difference between perceptual judgment 
of coins and of skin colour is that the former relates to 
individual stimuli whereas the latter relates to groups of 
stimuli. The influence of classification thus emerges from 
the experimental research on perceptual stereotypes.
Tajfel avoids pointedly the distinction between 
perception and cognition by juxtaposing consistently the two 
terms 'perception* and 'judgment'. Similarly, the distinction 
between physical perception and social perception is obviated 
by claiming that the general processes of perception and 
judgment are as applicable to social as they are to physical 
stimuli.
The series of predictions which emerge are presented in 
a highly formalized fashion, being both explicit and 
comprehensive. These predictions deal with all possible 
combinations of the three factors to emerge from the 
theoretical discussion:
i) physical dimension (p) 
ii) value differential (v) 
iii) classification (c)
Tajfel's Table, copied from Tajfel's article, lists and 
describes the various possible series.
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Taifel's Table
T able 1
Series Characteristics of the series
1. p  Ordered change in a physical dimension
2. pv  Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with a change in value
3. pC; Ordered change in a physical dimension consistently related to a classification in terms
of another attribute
4. pc. Ordered change in a physical dimension; a classification in terras of another attribute
superimposed on the scries bears no consistent relationship to the change in the  
physical dimension
5. (po)c, Ordered change in a phj^ical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms
of another attribute consistently related to the change in the physical dimension is 
superimposed on the scries
6. (p f)(\ Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms
of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to the 
changes in physical dimension
7. p(c,u) Ordered change in a physical dimension is consistently related to a classification in terms
of another attribute; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance 
to the subject
8. p(c,v) Ordered change in a physical dimension; a classification in terms of another attribute
superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to the change in the 
physical dimension; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance 
to the subject
9. (pv) (CjV) Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms
of another attribute superimposed on the series is related to change in the physical 
dimension ; this classification is of inherent value or o f emotional relevance to the subject
10. (pv) (c,u) Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms
of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to 
change in the physical dimension ; this classification is of inherent value or of em otional 
relevance to the subject
11. (pv{) (CfV) Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value in one class of stimuli, not
correlated with value in another class; a classification in terms of another attribute 
superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to change in the physical 
dimension; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance to the 
subject
(Copied from Tajfel,1959a,p.22)
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As an example 3.(pci) is more fully defined below.
When a classification in terms of an attribute other 
than the physical dimension which is being judged is 
superimposed on a series of stimuli in such a was 
that one part of the physical series tends to fall 
consistently into one class, and the other into the 
other class, judgments of physical magnitudes of the 
stimuli falling into the distinct classes will show 
a shift in the directions determined by the class 
membership of the stimuli, when compared with 
judgments of a series identical with respect to this 
physical dimension, on which such a classification 
is not superimposed
(p.20)
8.1.4 Domain of application
By identifying these three separate factors, Tajfel is 
able to develop a predictive framework which permits the 
explanation of a variety of previous research findings.
(2)The PV series: This series provides the explanation for 
positive results in Tajfel's own area of expertise, that of 
perceptual overestimation. Furthermore, conversion of the 
data from various studies (Bruner and Goodman,1947; Carter 
and Schooler,1949 ; Bruner and Rodrigues,1953) show that 
relative increases in the perceived differences of size 
correspond to their differences in value.
(3)The pel series; The findings of Secord et al. (1956) for
non-prejudiced subjects are explained by the pci series.
Tajfel's main concern is to make clear that the physical
dimension provides cues for assigning the stimuli to one
class or the other, although it is not the primary basis for
classification. Once the stimulus is identified with a class,
this identification, in turn, serves as a cue to the judgment
of physical magnitude. Thus a man, once classified as 'negro*
or 'white', will be seen as more black or more white
respectively.
Classification of people into ethnic,or sometimes 
other, groups often imply consistent differences 
between the groups in terms of some physical 
features.
(p.23)
(5.7.and 9)The fpv^ cl.pfclv) andfpvWclv) series; In these 
series there is an interaction between all three factors - 
physical dimensions, value and classification. Series 5 and 
7 converge empirically towards a series in which value
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differentials are associated with both the classification 
and the physical dimension series. This provides the 
framework of explanation for the prejudiced subjects in 
Secord et al.'s experiments (1956). The accentuation of 
differences between skin colour (physical dimension) of 
individuals identified as negro or white (classification) is 
greater for prejudiced subjects (value) than for 
non-prejudiced subjects. This facilitates the emotionally 
relevant discrimination between negroes and whites.
A second example cites the study of Pettigrew, Allport 
and Barnett (1959), conducted in South Africa. If it is 
assumed that Afrikaners are more prejudiced than the other 
groups Tajfel's scheme may be usefully applied to the 
results. For Afrikaners the classification ('white' and 
'non-white') has greater value relevance and hence results 
in a greater accentuation of differences between the racial 
groups.
(8)Thepfc2v) series: This should not differ from a p series. 
Tajfel's scheme explains some of the 'negative' results found 
in the perceptual over-estimation literature. For example, 
Klein, Schlesinger, and Meister (1951) compared judgments of 
size of disks bearing a swastika sign and judgments of disks 
bearing a 'neutral' sign. No overestimation of the swastika 
disk was found. Klein et al. concluded that this invalidated 
other results in this field. However, in that one would not 
expect the emotional relevance of a swastika to vary 
concurrently with its size these 'negative' results are to be 
expected. It should be noted that these explanations often 
involve the re-analysis and re-interpretation of the research 
of others within Tajfel's own theoretical framework.
The prediction series are also suggestive of further 
experimental research. The most obvious of these is a 
comparison between the cl and the c2 series where the 
classification is or is not relevant to the physical 
dimensions respectively. For example, in the pc2 series, 
classification is not expected to have any effects on 
judgments of physical magnitudes. The classification of books 
into subject domain, (physics, biology, psychology) would not 
be expected to affect judgments of their size. Judgments on
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a pc2 series should thus correspond to judgments on a simple 
p series. Similarly, the (pv)c2 series should not differ from 
a pv series as the classification has no relationship with 
the physical dimension.
Consideration of the various series also leads Tajfel 
to propose a number of theoretical and hypothetical 
extensions. which are open to experimental investigation. 
Firstly, shifts in judgments of stimuli at the end of a 
series should be less than shifts in the 'zone of 
uncertainty* when classification provides useful information 
in the judgment of ambiguous cases. This is conceptualized in 
terms of 'redundancy of information*.
A further hypothesis relates to past experience, pci
series and pc2 series can be seen as two extremes of a
continuum running from perfect correlation between physical
magnitude and classification to a complete lack of any such
correlation. This correlation will be a function of the
degree of consistency between (p) - physical magnitude and
(c) - classification experienced in the past. Tajfel relates
this to the general problem of stereotyping.
The fact that stereotypes are essentially 
consequences of sharpened or accentuated 
classifications has not been sufficiently exploited 
in the laboratory. Judgments of almost any aspects 
of objects which are stereotyped are not made in a 
vacuum, they are always comparative.
(p.24)
What is important is not the stereotype per se, but the 
impact of the classification. Tajfel's formulation suggests 
a traceable relationship between the strength of a stereotype 
and the nature of past experience. This could be 
experimentally investigated by varying the correlations 
between the continuous dimensions and discontinuous 
classification, and also the consistency of this correlation.
Finally, the domain of application is extended within 
the same theoretical framework to consider judgments on 
abstract continua. The effects of classification and value 
should also apply to abstract judgments which imply the 
existence of a continuous attribute or dimension.
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This kind of judgment can hardly be considered 
•perceptual*; But there are no a priori grounds to 
assume that principles which are found helpful in 
the prediction of judgments made under certain 
conditions, and concerned with the physical aspects 
of stimuli, should not be capable of application to 
judgments of abstract attributes made under similar 
conditions.
(p.28)
For example, objects in the social environment are often 
rated along some quantitative abstract continuum such as 
beauty, pleasantness, intelligence etc; these are often 
correlated with value and may also be superimposed by a 
classification. Razran (1950), in an experiment on 
stereotypes, asked subjects to rate photographs of faces in 
terms of their pleasantness. Judgments of the same 
photograph, presented later with an ethnic label, tended to 
show displacements which would relate to a value 
classification. Tajfel points out that this example, like 
many others, relates to the preceeding theoretical argument.
TABLE 8.1 SUMMARY OF PHASE I
TIER FOCUS COMMENTS
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
FIELD Social perception social factors in the
perception and judgment of 
the physical environment
THEORY Accentuation of 
differences
accentuation of 
differences in size, 
weight or colour within a 
series of stimuli 
(physical dimension) due 
to their associated value 
and/or a superimposed 
discontinuous 
classification
DOMAIN OF 
APPLICATION
Perceptual over- 
Stereotypes and 
accentuation
-estimation
perceptual
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8.2 PHASE II: STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION 1959-1964
By examining Tajfel's article on Quantitative Judgment
in Social Perception, we have seen how the theoretical
principles involved in the accentuation of differences,
which were first developed in the field of perceptual
overestimation, are applied theoretically to physical
stereotypes. In Phase II, Tajfel shifts the main orientation
towards their application to social phenomena, that is,
towards social stereotypes and abstract continua. This phase
can be considered to encompass the following four articles:
Tajfel,(1959c): A note on Lambert's evaluational reactions 
to spoken language. Canadian Journal of Psvcholocrv. 4,86-92.
Tajfel & Wilkes, (1963a): Classification and quantitative 
judgment. British Journal of Psvcholoav 54, 101-114.
Tajfel & Wilkes, (1963b): Salience of attributes and
commitment to extreme judgments in the perception of people. 
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psvcholoav 3 (1),
40-49.
Tajfel,Sheikh & Gardner, (1964): Content of stereotypes and 
the inference of similarity between members of stereotyped 
groups. Acta Psvcholoaica. 22, 191-201.
The main article in this phase might be considered to be 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963a). However, in many respects, this 
is a reiteration and direct application of the transitional 
article of Tajfel (1959a) which has already been presented. 
Furthermore, Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) and Tajfel, Sheikh 
and Gardner (1964) indicate more clearly the problems 
peculiar to the social perception of social objects. The 
examination of these articles has the added advantage of 
providing an opportunity to present an experimental report. 
The content and structure of the other articles will be 
considered when we examine the evolution of Tajfel's work in 
the following chapters.
8.2.1 Criteria for Social Psvcholoav
As in Phase I, there is no discussion concerning the 
principles of social psychology.
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8.2.2 Description of the Field; Perception of People
Phase II remains within the field of social perception 
but, in comparison to Phase I, Tajfel et al.* widen the span 
of concern to encompass the ways in which people perceive, 
judge and interpret social objects and events.
One of the continuing trends in the field of person 
perception has been the investigation of shifts and biases 
which occur in the assessment of individuals or specified 
groups of people. Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) apply the 
principles and hypotheses emerging from the field of 
quantitative psycho-physical judgment to problems associated 
with the 'perception' of people, supporting the argument that 
there are common principles underlying shifts and biases in 
both fields. The description of the field serves largely to 
justify the application of perceptual judgment principles to 
the field of person perception. In the previous phase this 
was done on grounds of the similarities between physical and 
social perception at the theoretical level (Tier 3) . In Phase 
II, this is done in terms of the field of social perception 
(Tier 2).
The common characteristics between judgments regarding 
physical dimensions and the 'perception' of people are 
apparent when one considers the intermediate case in which 
subjects assess the physical attributes of other people. In 
each case, attributes are comparative rather than absolute; 
that is, a line is shorter or longer than other lines, just 
as a person is shorter or taller than other persons. A 
further justification refers to previous research in the 
field of social perception. Investigations of person 
perception frequently employed rating scales, a quantitative 
method comparable to the laws of quantitative judgment.
However, Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) recognize that
research in this field is confronted by significant
difficulties.
Experimental work on perception of people is beset 
with difficulties inherent in the nature of the 
problems studied.
(p.40)
* When 'Tajfel et al.' is used with a date it refers to a particular publication. Where the date is 
omitted it refers to all publications identified with a given phase.
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The difficulty of identifying the relevant determining 
variables in real situations means that the generalizations 
and consequent predictions apply more successfully to other 
controlled situations rather than into natural phenomena. 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) acknowledge this problem and see 
the solution in increasing the number of experiments which 
relate to both 'general psychological theory' and direct 
applications regarding the naturally occurring phenomenon. 
No consideration is given to the use of other methods of 
research.
8.2.3 Theorv; polarization of judgments
The 'accentuation of differences' employed in Phase I 
is frequently substituted by the term 'polarization'. When 
judgments of differences are made on dimensions which have 
acquired an emotional or value significance for the subject, 
(subject involvement) there will be a tendency to make more 
extreme judgments, towards the poles of the (continuous) 
dimension (Tajfel and Wilkes,1963b). This emphasizes the 
bidirectional nature of shifts in judgment as opposed to 
'over-estimation' which is unidirectional. The effect of 
classification is more precisely defined in terms of 
minimization and maximization of differences. When judgments 
of differences are made on dimensions which are correlated 
with a classification differences between stimuli belonging 
to the same class will be minimized, whilst differences 
between stimuli belonging to different classes will be 
maximized (Tajfel et al.,1964). This theoretical framework is 
used to explain a variety of research findings in terms of 
general psychological principles applying to any kind of 
judgment. As in the previous phase, the description of the 
phenomena and the evidence are presented in terms of the 
theory. Tajfel and his collaborators draw on research 
carried out within Phase I as well as research literature 
relating to more social phenomena.
Firstly, Tajfel (1959b) showed that polarization 
occurred in the judgment of physical objects, in this case 
a series of weights, when the heaviest or lightest of the 
series were associated with a reward (value). Tajfel and 
Cawasjee (1959) found similar effects for judged differences
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in the size of coins. Evidence for the maximization and 
minimization of differences is given by Tajfel and Wilkes 
(1963b) in which judgment of the length of lines was directly 
related to arbitrary labels associated with the shorter and 
longer lines in a series.
Secondly, Pettigrew, Allport and Barnett's study (1958) 
showed a polarization in the judgment of physical attributes 
of groups of people. Afrikaner subjects, who may be assumed 
to be more involved, make up a larger percentage of 'African* 
and a smaller percentage of 'Coloured' judgments than other 
groups, when identifying race in pairs of stereoscopically 
presented photographs. Also, both Hovland and Sherif (1952) 
and Manis (1960) found that subjects who were highly involved 
in a social issue tend to judge relevant statements to be 
more extreme.
Polarization is seen to occur wherever value is 
associated with a continuous dimension, be it a physical 
dimension of a physical object, a physical dimension of a 
social object or an abstract dimension of a social issue. 
This provides the context in which the same principles are 
applied to abstract dimensions (personal attributes) of 
social objects (people).
Taj fel et al.'s experimental research tests the
prediction that
judgments of subiectivelv important attributes 
should tend to cluster more in the regions of 
extreme responses than judgments of attributes which 
are less important to the individual
(Tajfel and Wilkes,1963b,p.42, my italics)
In the case where a classification exists, such as in
steroeotyped judgments
individuals of an ethnic group are perceived as 
being more similar with regard to traits which form 
a part of the stereotype concerning that group than 
with regard to traits which are not considered to be 
characteristic of that group.
(Tajfel et al.,1964,p.193)
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8.2.4 Domain of application
We assess other people on a variety of attributes such
as 'intelligence*, 'kindness' or 'honesty' which can be
conceived as continuous dimensions (eg. honest- dishonest).
However, these are considerably different from the physical
dimensions dealt with in Phase I. For a physical dimension,
such as weight, size or colour there is both a high degree of
consensus regarding the relevant dimensions as well as
objective measures of variations within a series. In
contrast, for social dimensions, different attributes have
different connotations and different subjective values for
different individuals.
'Intelligence' or other such attributes cannot by 
definition be specified in a priori objective terms 
when one is concerned with the subjective aspects of 
their use, with the private connotations which 
determine the extent of their salience for an
individual.
Tajfel and Wilkes,1963b,p.42)
Tajfel and his collaborators see this problem in terms 
of designing valid empirical tests which, in one case, are 
overcome by 'identifying and isolating for each subject an 
equal number of salient and non-salient attributes defined 
in his own terms' (Tajfel and Wilkes,1963b,p.43). They are 
extremely rigorous in the presentation of their experimental 
research. These articles often report more than one 
experiment, exploring assumptions which are made for the main 
experiment or an hypothesis emerging from the findings of 
previous experiments. The conventional report format is 
adopted with comprehensive and precise sections on
experimental design and procedure, and analysis of results 
which constitute a major part of the article. It is not 
necessary here to present a detailed description of these 
reports. However, it is worth examining the summary and 
discussion of results. For this purpose, we will look at the 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) article. Although the particular 
content of the summary and conclusion are peculiar to this 
article its more general features, especially regarding style
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and interpretation, are also found in other experimental 
reports.
The summary of results is both precise and clear and 
they are stated in terms of the experimental procedure rather 
than in terms of the theoretical principles and assumptions 
regarding subjective importance.
1. Attributes which appear early and which are 
repeated frequently in free descriptions of other 
people tend to be assigned more extreme ratings than 
attributes which have low frequency and priority.
2. This is an overall finding. It conceals the fact 
that a significantly higher frequency of such 
extreme ratings was found only for the distribution 
of the unfavourable judgments.
3. Attributes which have high ranks in terms of 
frequency and priority tend to be judged as 'more 
important in a person* than the low-ranking 
attribute.
4. The ratings made by our subjects show a 
consistent preponderance of favourable judgments 
about other people.
(Tajfel and Wilkes,1963b,p.47)
Despite their 'pure' presentation, the interpretation 
of results is clearly framed by the theoretical principles. 
Although finding (1) is not quantitatively impressive it is 
taken to support the conclusion that attributes which are 
subjectively salient show greater polarization than 
attributes which are not. However, the preponderance of 
favourable ratings (4) and the minimal shift in favourable 
judgments for salient attributes (2) are explained in terms 
which lie outside the theoretical framework. Finding (4) is 
interpreted or explained in terms of the photographs 
themselves, their similarity to the subject group and the 
social acceptability of responses. Finding (2) is explained 
in terms of a skewness of extreme choices in relation to the 
subjects' own position, in line with findings reported by 
Hovland and Sherif (1952).
In no way is it suggested that these results challenge 
the theoretical principle of polarization. Despite 
discrepancies in the results and the problems associated with 
the subjectivity of person perception, Tajfel and Wilkes 
still claim that the results can be explained in terms of a 
general judgmental phenomenon.
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TABLE 8.2 SUMMARY OF PHASE II 
TIER FOCUS COMMENTS
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
FIELD Social perception social factors in the 
perception and judgment of 
the social environment ie. 
people
Research-experimental 
research should be founded 
in psychological theory
THEORY Polarization polarization of judgments on 
person attributes (social or 
abstract dimension) due to 
their associated subjective 
value and/or a superimposed 
discontinuous classification, 
Classification results in a 
maximization of differences 
between groups and a 
minimization of differences 
within groups
DOMAIN OF Physical dimensions of physical environment 
APPLICATION Physical attributes of social environment
ie. people 
Social/Abstract attributes of people
8.3. PHASE 111; PREJUDICE 1965-1969
This phase can be considered to be a transition between 
social perception and intergroup relations. In itself, it is 
not marked by a large number of publications or research 
projects but it comprises a vital phase in the re-orientation 
and expansion of Tajfel's intellectual career. The main 
article which will be summarized below is 'Cognitive Aspects 
of Prejudice' (Tajfel,1969b), which was published in four 
separate locii; The Journal of Social Issues; The Journal of 
Biosocial Sciences, a book edited by Harrison and Peel 
(1969), and in Tajfel,s own book Human Groups and Social 
Categories (1981). (Page numbers in the text below refer to
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the latter publication.) Prior to the article, Tajfel had 
published a book with Dawson entitled Disappointed Guests 
(1965). This an informal analysis of essays written by 
foreign students in England on their experiences of 
prejudice.
8.3.1 Criteria for social psychology
For the first time, Tajfel presents an issue which 
relates directly to social psychology as a discipline. This 
concerns the implicit conception of the nature of man in the 
social environment.
Tajfel considers changes in the image of man evident 
in the writings of anthropologists and ethnobiologists from 
a belief in a 'primitive mind' to a belief in man as an 
exploring and rational being. However, this model has been 
applied only to individual human minds. Psychological 
theories of man in his social environment, and especially 
relations between large human groups, do not reflect any of 
the ideas of exploration, meaning, understanding or rational 
consistency.
We have a rational model for natural phenomena: we 
seem to have nothing but a blood-and-guts model for 
social phenomena
(p.128)
In contrast to the dominant approaches, Tajfel argues that 
the rational model of man adopted in individual psychology 
applies equally well to social phenomena and, in particular, 
to intergroup relations.
8.3.2 Description of the field: Interarouo relations
In contrast to Phases I and II, which were both
concerned with social perception. Phase III addresses the
field of intergroup relations.
The psychological aspects of intergroup relations 
include the study of behaviour in intergroup 
situations, of behaviour related to these 
situations, and of beliefs and attitudes concerning 
an individual's own group and various other groups 
which are relevant to him
(p.128)
These psychological aspects might, in part, be construed 
in terms of social perception. However, from their more 
detailed description at Tier 3, it will be seen that the
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ground which they encompass has a much broader range than 
that which is covered in the two previous phases. Again, 
Tajfel does not attempt to provide a review of other theories 
and research within the field. Rather, they are mentioned in 
order to emphasize the distinctive features of Taj fel * s own 
perspective.
Tajfel stresses the 'adaptive cognitive functioning' of
man in intergroup situations. This is related closely to the
argument for a rational model of man at Tier 1 and is
consistently reflected throughout the theoretical
presentation.
A psychological theory of intergroup relations must 
provide a two-way link between situations and 
behaviour, and it can do this through an analysis 
of the motivational and the cognitive structures 
which intervene between the two.
(p.129)
This perspective has a number of implications, both for 
the understanding of intergroup relations and for related 
research within social psychology. He suggests other theories 
within this field have often been conceptuated as no more 
than projections and rationalizations of powerful 
motivational forces. Little consideration has been given to 
cooperation between groups, or to the possibility that 
hostility may arise from attempts to explain to oneself the 
causal sequence of relations between groups. Extrapolations 
from animal behaviour to human behaviour in complex social 
situations and theories of unconscious motivations both deny 
the autonomy of cognitive functioning. But a person's 
understanding of the intergroup situation will influence the 
content and animosity of attitudes towards a particular group 
as well as his behaviour. Furthermore, modification of 
perception and understanding is the greatest adaptive 
advantage of the human species and this is equally so in 
intergroup situations.
Tajfel argues that this approach, in contrast to others 
within the field, has the scientific merits of 'economy, 
credibility and testability of explanation'. Furthermore, 
this approach also has a number of implications for social 
action. Inferences from ethnology and psycho-analysis have
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diffused into society, and, along with the blood-and-guts
image of social man, have influenced public opinion such that
they 'buttress and justify certain political opinions and
actions' (p.129). The acquistion of knowledge about
intergroup relations is 'perhaps the most urgent and ominous
task confronting us' (p.128). It is, moreover, 'patently
obvious' that widespread beliefs and views about causes of
social events are more easily accessible to change than
motives, and may assist the management of conflicts, in
conjunction with legislation preventing public forms of
discrimination against minorities.
It is therefore important and useful, for the 
purposes of science as well as for those of the 
society at large, that a consideration of prejudice 
as a phenomenon in the minds rather than in the guts 
of people should take precedence over views which 
are, on the whole, not only untestable, but also 
useless in the planning of any form of relevant 
social change.
(p.142)
The descriptions of the field in Phases I and II are, 
no doubt, implicitly cognitive, since they were concerned 
with how people perceive, judge and interpret physical and 
social objects or events. We can see that, in Phase III, 
Tajfel makes the cognitive and functional perspective more 
explicit. An even more significant difference is apparent 
when we consider the role of social factors in Tajfel's 
thinking. Phases I and II are about social perception, the 
social factors involved in the perceptual judgment of 
physical and social objects. These social factors are 
conceived in terms of value and classification. Phase III is 
about intergroup relations and prejudice which are more 
obviously inherently social phenomena. Here, the emphasis is 
on the cognitive factors involved, although, as it will be 
seen in Tier 3, these are by no means a-social. Furthermore, 
unlike Phases I and II, Phase III explicitly and emphatically 
addresses social issues of the 'real world'. It is both 
informed by, and attempts to inform, the very real problems 
of intergroup conflict and discrimination.
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8.3.3 Theory
In comparison to Phase II, the theoretical framework 
is much more complex, covering a more extensive range of 
inter-related issues. Phase II concerned the polarization of 
judgments on social dimensions in relation to subjective 
value and classification or stereotyping. In Phase 111, 
Tajfel discusses those cognitive aspects which shape and 
facilitate people's understanding of their social environment 
and, in particular, their understanding of intergroup 
relations. These are categorization, assimilation and the 
search for coherence.
The theory is not so much concerned with prejudice per
se but rather with the etiology of prejudice in intergroup
relations. Prejudice itself is not even mentioned until the
autonomy of cognitive structures in the field of intergroup
relations is established. Nor is the theoretical framework
confined to the phenomenon of prejudice. Rather, a wide range
of factors relating to intergroup attitudes and behaviour are
considered as essential for a proper understanding of this
phenomenon. Tajfel locates the phenomenon of prejudice firmly
within the field of intergroup relations. An extensive
quotation from Klineberg (1968) provides a general definition
of prejudice as
an unsubstantiated prejudgment of an individual or 
group, favourable or unfavourable in character, 
tending to action in a consonant direction.
(Klineberg 1968,p.439 from Tajfel,p.131)
Tajfel focuses on the cognitive aspects of prejudice; on the 
constant readjustment of our understanding of changing 
relations between groups and on the constant causal 
attributions about why and how social conditions of life 
change.
8.3.3.1 The cognitive process of categorization in relation 
to the Physical and social environment; In Phase 11, Tajfel 
focused on the principle of classification which emerged from 
studies in psychophysical perception (Phase 1) and applied it 
to the social phenomenon of stereotyping. In Phase 111 the 
emphasis is reversed. Tajfel considers first the nature of 
stereotypes and then broadens the discussion to
361
categorization in general. Stereotypes are here defined as 
'the attribution of general psychological characteristics to 
large human groups' (p.132). The importance of stereotypes to 
be found is not so much in their content, originating in 
cultural traditions, but rather in their structure and 
function. In particular, they arise from a process of 
categorization which introduces simplicity and order (G. 
Allport,1954). Tajfel describes stereotypes as a set of 
attributes which vary along continuous dimensions but are 
superimposed by discontinuous classifications.
Although the terms 'classification' and 'categorization' 
are, to some extent, interchangeable, the adoption of a 
different term, ie. categorization, in Phase III serves to 
mark the difference between physical and social phenomena. It 
is also more in tune with the general cognitive literature. 
Tajfel identifies the similarities between physical and 
social classification but he then goes on to point out their 
essential differences. These are supported by three empirical 
statements based both on common experience and experimental 
evidence in social psychology.
Firstly, personal characteristics, such as intelligence 
or honesty, are empirically equivalent to physical dimensions 
such as height or weight. Both are dimensional, such that 
comparative judgments, rather than absolute statements, are 
made. Secondly, there is a tendency to exaggerate differences 
on relevant dimensions between items falling into distinct 
classes, and to minimize differences within classes. Thirdly, 
personal and cultural experience result in the subjective 
association of dimensions or attributes with classifications 
of people into groups. In the absence of specific knowledge 
about individuals the ambiguity of social situations means 
that it is always easier to find supporting evidence for 
these class characteristics. More importantly, 'confronted by 
the need to interpret behaviour en masse of members of a 
particular group',(p.133) there is rarelv anv clear negative 
feedback following the attribution of class characteristics.
In Phase II, Tajfel argued that the principles of 
perceptual judgment could be applied to social phenomena. In 
Phase III no such claim is made. Rather, he considers that
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there are substantial differences between judgments of lines 
and judgments of people. The latter are much more rigid and 
resistant to contradictory information. This is, in part, 
because they are much more uncertain and ambiguous. But it is 
also due to the different consequences of incorrect 
judgments. Inaccurate judgments regarding physical properties 
of the environment can lead to dire consequences. In 
contrast, inaccurate judgments regarding people can be
self-rewarding, preserving emotionallv invested
differentiations between one's own group and other groups. A 
spiral interplay of these two features can lead to the 
entrenchment of powerful social myths.
8.3.3.2 Assimilation of evaluations and social information; 
In this section, Tajfel focuses on the preferences or social 
values held by different groups. However, rather than 
focusing on the effect of value on the judgment of social 
attributes, as in Phase II, he concentrates on the 
individual's assimilation of cultural evaluations. Tajfel 
examines two aspects of assimilation which indicate the 
autonomy of cognitive functioning in attitudes towards other 
groups (p.134). These are the learning of evaluations, 
preferences or social values and a balance between 
identification with one's own group and socially accepted 
notions about one's own and other groups, assimilated in 
early childhood.
Tajfel suggests that, unlike ordinary cognitive and 
moral developments, described by Piaget (1932), whereby the 
child learns to take, conceptually, the role of the other 
(conceptual reciprocity), in intergroup situations the child 
is exposed to only one source of information. As a 
consequence, group evaluations become 'incontrovertible 
statements of fact', much as judgments of an object's size. 
Furthermore, group identification should not be considered 
a universal process, irrespective of the social order. 
Children of groups assumed to be inferior by society will be 
exposed to a conflict between the acquisition of their own 
group identity, (affecting the formation of their own social 
self) and the ordering that is generally accepted by and 
socially transmitted within, that society.
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It can be seen that, by focusing on the assimilation of 
social values, greater attention is paid to the social 
context of prejudice and to the interrelationships between 
groups within the social order. Moreover, the social context 
is not conceived of purely in terms of social variables: 
rather, it's impact is conceived in terms of group 
identification. Thus, although 'assimilation' is concerned 
with values these are reconceptualized as social values 
emerging in a social context which have an impact through 
identification with groups.
Tajfel reviews, briefly, a number of studies which
clearly indicate children's sensitivity to the social
context. For example, Goodman's (1964) and Clark and Clark's
(1947) studies showed American negro children's preference
for whites. Norland (1966) and Vaughan (1964) found similar
effects whereby children of low status groups expressed a
greater preference for high status groups. The sensitivity of
children to the context of social influence in which they
live, despite identification with their own racial or ethnic
group, forms an enduring basis for future prejudice and
conflict. Furthermore, the psychological influence of
socio-cultural factors on prejudice continues to be of
importance in later life, as shown by Pettigrew's study
(1958) carried out in South Africa and the U.S.A.
8.3.3.3 Search for coherence: Tajfel extends the discussion
beyond the process of categorization and of assimilation to
consider the search for coherence; that is, to consider how
individuals understand and react to specific or changing
intergrouD situations. This opens up new theoretical
territory which goes well beyond Phase 11. An individual must
make constant causal attributions and build a cognitive
structure which fulfils two criteria. Firstly, it must
provide a satisfactory explanation of the causes of change
which appears consistent to the individual, while tending
towards simplification. Secondly, it must preserve the
individual's 'self-image' or 'personal integrity'.
This need to preserve the integrity or the 
self-image is the only motivational assumption that 
we need to make in order to understand the direction 
that the search for coherence will take. (p.137)
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Tajfel focuses on social changes which relate to an 
individual's membership of different groups. Changes may be 
either intragroup - an individual's changing circumstances 
within her own group(s)- or intergroup - changing relations 
of her group(s) with other groups: these changes require
causal attributions which explain the consequent increase or 
decrease in affiliation with the ingroup. Firstly, Tajfel 
argues that, in the face of complex social events, causal 
attributions made in terms of inherent group characteristics, 
offer greater cognitive simolicitv. These attributions may be 
made to physical or situational causes, individual social 
agents or groups as social agents. It is already known that 
there is a tendency to make attributions to the stable 
characteristics of individuals as opposed to situational 
factors, as they provide greater simplicity and 
predictability. Causal attibutions to characteristics of 
groups offer even greater simplification and, in that the 
feedback is more ambiguous and difficult to interpret, also 
offers predictability. As a consequence, groups become 
personalized in terms of attributes relevant to the situation 
and common to the group as a whole, ignoring individual 
differences between the members of a group.
Secondly, attributions to inherent characteristics of 
groups also shift the locus of responsibility for change 
either from the individual to the group, or from the ingroup 
to the outgroup. Causal group attributions are therefore more 
likely when other types of attribution either conflict with 
prevailing values or beliefs, or else threaten an 
individual's self-image. In such situations, changes in the 
structure of intergroup relations often give rise to the 
creation of inherent ideologies (group characteristics). In 
a situation of tension a search for a satisfactory and 
distinctive definition of the ingroup is vital, and leads to 
the creation of inherent group attributions, both relating to 
ingroups and outgroups, in order to preserve personal 
integrity.
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An intensified affiliation with a group is only 
possible when the group is capable of supplying some 
satisfactory aspects of an individual's social 
identity. (p.140)
Thus, different solutions to intergroup situations may be 
found and used but Tajfel is at some pains to point out that 
the solutions that are found relate to the cognitive 
structures and personal integrity of group members.
TABLE 8.3 SUMMARY OF PHASE III
TIER FOCUS COMMENTS
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY Model of man Man as rational in social 
environment
Adaptive cognitive functioning
FIELD Intergroup 
relations & 
Prejudice
Theory
cognitive factors in the 
understanding of and behaviour 
in intergroup contexts
economy, credibility and 
testability as criteria for 
theory should be applicable to 
real world, social issues
THEORY the development of and
maintenance of intergroup 
relations due to
i) categorization
ii) assimilation of social 
values and group 
identification and
iii)search for coherence 
involving causal attributions 
which provide satisfactory 
explanations of changing 
intergroup relations whilst 
simultaneously preserving 
personal integrity
DOMAIN OF Social stereotypes
APPLICATION Intergroup attitudes and prejudice
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In conclusion, we can see that Tajfel's intellectual 
orientation has changed considerably between Phase 11 and 
Phase 111. There are, certainly, a number of essential 
similarities but there are also important and distinctive 
differences. In Phase 111, Tajfel is not so much concerned 
with the intricacies of social perception as with the social 
issues of the 'real world' which need to be addressed by 
social psychologists. As he examines the problems of 
intergroup relations he draws on empirical evidence from both 
experimental psychology and common experience. Furthermore, 
he is more concerned with the development of a comprehensive 
theory of intergroup relations than he is with the citation 
of evidence or the construction of precise predictions.
8.4 PHASE 4; NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT; 
1966-1972
A number of Tajfel's publications report various sections 
of an international research programme which examined the 
development of children's preferences for and knowledge about 
their own and other nationalities. Below is a list of some of 
the relevant publications:
1. Tajfel & Jahoda, (1966): Development in children of 
concepts and attitudes about their own and other nations: a 
cross-national study. Proceedings of XVI11th International 
Congress in Psvchiatrv. Moscow Symposium, 36, 17-33.
2. Tajfel, (1969c): The formation of national attitudes: A 
social psychological perspective. In M.Sherif (ed.) 
Interdisciolinarv Relationships in the Social Sciences. 
Chicago: Aldine.
3. Johnston, Middleton & Tajfel, (1970): The relationship 
between children's preferences and knowledge about other 
nations. British Journal of Clinical and Social Psvchologv. 
Vol.9, 232-240.
4. Tajfel, Nemeth, Jahoda, Campbell & Johnson,(1970):The 
development of children's preferences for their own country: 
a cross-national study.International Journal of Psvchologv.
5. 245-53.
5. Middleton,M.R.,Tajfel & Johnson, (1970): Cognitive and 
Affective Aspects of Children's National stereotypes. British 
Journal of Social Psychology.9(2^: 122.
6.Tajfel,Johnson,Nemeth,Kim & Johnson,(1972): Devaluation by 
children of their own national or ethnic group: two case 
studies. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology. 
11, 235-43.
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Tajfel and Jahoda (1966) was the first publication in 
this series, examining the relationship between preferential 
judgments and knowledge about other nations. The remaining 
experimental research report explored and further elaborated 
upon this relationship, focusing on the development of 
national preferences in children. In the presentation of this 
phase it is necessary to examine all the experimental reports 
as they portray different findings which are influential in 
the subsequent phases.
It should be borne in mind that Phases III and IV 
overlap in their chronological sequence. Although most of 
the articles identified with Phase IV were published in the 
early 1970's most of the research was actually conducted 
during the 1960*s, coinciding with the writing of Tajfel's 
1969 article on 'The Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice'.
Tajfel's chapter on the formation of national attitudes 
(1969c) is, in many respects, unrelated to the other 
articles. It is a theoretical chapter which introduces many 
of the notions developed later in Phase VI. This paper will 
be considered in more detail in the later chapters on the 
transformation of Tajfel's work.
8.4.1 Criteria for social psvcholoav
In this phase the experimental reports give little 
evidence of reflections on the criteria for social 
psychology. In some respects this is surprising since a 
number of relevant issues had already emerged at the level 
of social psychology and theory in Phase III. Moreover, this 
research broke new ground within the field of national 
stereotypes and cross-cultural research. However, this phase 
predominantly consists of experimental reports, within a 
developing research programme and, in this respect, it is not 
surprising that the more abstract and higher order aspects 
are not elaborated.
8.4.2 Field
There is a distinct poverty of discussion relating the 
phenomenon of national stereotypes and their associated 
attitudes to any particular field of theorizing or research. 
This may well be due to the problem of identifying the field
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in the first place. The lack of psychological theory which 
addresses large scale social phenomena, and in particular 
national attitudes, means that there is a dearth of material 
which might constitute the field.
8.4.3 Theory
The theoretical position presented in Phase IV is less 
elaborate than in Phase III. In the experimental reports 
there is little discussion of the phenomenon of national 
stereotypes and attitudes. Furthermore, in contrast to Phases 
I and III, the phenomenon which is examined is not located 
within a broader field of study.
In Phase III the various aspects of categorization
and assimilation were considered in relationship to social
phenomena and, in particular, to intergroup relations.
Categorization focused on the classification of people into
stereotyped groups along continuous dimensions. Assimiliation
focused on the learning of evaluation or preferences in
relationship to one's own and others' groups. In Phase IV
these two aspects of intergroup relations are translated into
the cognitive and affective components of attitudes towards
large-scale ingroups and outgroups. Furthermore, Tajfel et
al. concentrate on the developmental relationship between
these cognitive and affective components; that is, to
consensual preferences and their relationship with the
assimilation of factual information.
In brief, the main theoretical preoccupation of our 
research is the relation between development of 
affective and cognitive components of attitudes 
towards large-scale ingroups and outgroups.
(Tajfel and Jahoda,1966; p.207,Tajfel,1981a)
The research suggests an interdependence between cognitive 
and affective components (Tajfel and Jahoda,1966) and also 
that children develop preferences for their own country in 
comparison to others before they develop the relevant 
conceptual understanding regarding countries or nations, and 
other large-scale human groups. As a consequence, there is an 
increasing focus on the assimilation of social values or 
preferences.
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In Phase III it was noted that Tajfel suggested that 
group evaluations become 'incontrovertible statements of 
facts *. Here he goes on to suggest that the early
intervention of value judgments may result in a lack of 
conceptual flexibility and a failure to achieve * cognitive 
empathy!; that is, the value judgments prevent the
development of a capacity to decentralize one's own view and 
adopt the perspective of the outgroup (Tajfel and
Jahoda,1966).
Furthermore, that evaluations precede conceptual
development appears to be true regardless of the presence or 
absence of clear-cut physical or behavioural cues
facilitating discrimination (Tajfel,Nemeth et al.,1970b). 
Although not explicitly elaborated by Tajfel et al. it can 
be seen that this creates a distance between the social 
phenomena studied here and the classifications on physical 
dimensions studied in Phase II. Discrimination between 
classes occurs without 'direct perception' of the object and 
without any obvious distinguishing features or
characteristics.
Finally, Tajfel et al. also consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of cross-cultural research. In order to be able 
to draw any general conclusions about attitudinal problems it 
is necessary to study them in a variety of social or cultural 
contexts. However, this creates methodological problems
associated with controlling inter-cultural variables which
permit differing interpretations of the same results.
It can be seen that there is little development of the 
theoretical framework directly associated with the research 
programme. Furthermore, there is little reference in Phase 
IV to the search for coherence and the significance of 
personal integrity.
The research programme explored a number of related 
hypotheses or predictions. A number of these will be reviewed 
below in order to explicate the structure and development of 
the research programme. It will be seen that, in the early 
stages of the programme, research problems were conceived in 
an open and exploratory fashion. The results of these studies
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indicated a number of issues or phenomena which were then 
explored within a more precise and directive manner.
8.4.4 Domain of application; experimental studies
In all the experimental reports Tajfel et al. specify 
the method and results in a clear and precise form. However, 
there are particular features of the methodological 
procedures which contrast with those adopted in Phase II. 
Firstly, there is the obvious difference that most of the 
studies involve different groups of subjects from a variety 
of European cities. Secondly, in order to study the 
development of preferences and knowledge regarding various 
countries, children were always used as subjects. Thirdly, 
the developmental perspective demanded comparisons of 
different age groups ranging from ages six to twelve. It is 
clear that these studies, although still experimental, are 
comparative in nature. Furthermore, in order to examine the 
relationship between knowledge and preferences it was 
necessary to adopt different techniques.
The research reported in 1966 was an exploratory study
of the development of concensus in knowledge about and the
structure of preferences for foreign countries. The study
conducted in Britain and Belgium found that polarization of
evaluative judgments regarding foreign countries increases
significantly as a function of age. Furthermore, differences
between the two countries were found. In Britain, only,
children learn which foreign countries are good or 
bad before they learn practically anything else 
about them
(Tajfel,1981,p.209).
The Johnson et al. (1970) study explored further the 
relationship between knowledge and preferences using three 
age groups of English children only, and using England (ie. 
their own country) as well as foreign countries. This study 
found that there was roughly a U-shaped relationship between 
the cognitive and affective components suggesting that 
individual children know more about nations for which they 
have a strong liking or disliking. Although the results are 
congruent with the idea that preferences develop first, the 
causal relationship between the two components remained
371
unclear. Surprisingly, in the following study, Tajfel, Nemeth 
et al. (1970) suggest that the prior development of 
preferences has already been established by several studies. 
This study focuses entirely on the relationship between 
children's preferences for people (photos) from their own 
country in comparison to foreigners in six foreign countries. 
The findings of this study are described here in more detail 
as they show some unexpected features which indicated the 
impact of particular factors in the development of national 
attitudes.
The discussion of the general results is speculative 
and is mainly concerned with the various exceptions that were 
found. In general, children show a clear preference for their 
own national group, which decreases as the children get 
older. This is possibly due to younger children basing their 
preferences and nationality on the same affective criteria, 
whereas the older children start using separate cues or 
different criteria for the two tasks. There are some 
indications that older children develop physical national 
stereotypes. It is more probable that this is based on 
'ideal' stereotypes assimilated from the mass media of 
communication such as comics, cinema, television, 
advertisements etc. rather than on the distillation of cues 
from the 'real' social environment.
The two main exceptions to these general trends were 
found in Glasgow and Louvain. In Glasgow there was hardly 
any relationship between preference and nationality 
assignments; in Louvain there was a considerable increase in 
correlations between preference and nationality assignment 
with age. These results required a detailed and complex 
interpretation. In Louvain confusion with national labels of 
Flemish and Belgian and the high salience of the country's 
bi-nationality may interfere with affective reactions of the 
younger children whereas national concepts, assignments and 
preferences may be more firmly established for the older 
children.
In Glasgow children failed to show a preference for 
their own national group. This may be due to the devaluation 
of ingroup found to exist for minority or underprivileged
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groups. It 'exists in a rather unexpected context' as the 
Scots are not a minority in Scotland nor are there obvious 
tensions between the English and the Scottish.
Both exceptions were seen to indicate children's high 
degree of sensitivity to subtle aspects of social influence. 
The results of this study illuminated the subtle influence of 
social context on children's devaluation of their own group 
in non- conflictual intergroup situations, and was explored 
further by Tajfel et al.(1972). The study hypothesized that 
the absence of Scottish preference was due specifically to 
children's devaluation of Scottish identity in comparison 
with English identity. Similar studies were carried out in 
Britain and Israel, comparing English and Scottish, and 
European and Oriental groups, respectively. Both the studies 
showed that children assimilate negative ingroup evaluation 
even in conditions of low visibility of distinctiveness and 
in the absence of intense intergroup tension. These results 
indicate children's high sensitivity to the value systems of 
their societies.
The cross-cultural nature of the research was initially 
designed in order to allow generalizations across cultures 
or nations to be made. However, the unexpected finding that 
children devalue their own group, even in the absence of 
intergroup tension, served to highlight the influence of the 
social context and the impact of prevalent value systems in 
society on children's evaluations of their own and other 
groups.
We have already seen that the research programme was 
designed within a theoretical framework which addresses the 
cognitive and affective components of intergroup relations. 
However, the focus on the development of these components 
and the findings which emerged from the experimental research 
are not directly addressed by the theory. This applies, in 
particular, to the prior development of preferences and their 
impact on cognitive development, the high degree of 
children's sensitivity to the social context, and the 
devaluation of one's own group. These research findings 
require elaborate interpretations which are in terms other
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than those of the theory. Furthermore, within Phase IV, no 
adequate explanation of these findings is presented.
TABLE 8.4; SUMMARY OF PHASE IV;
TIER FOCUS COMMENTS
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
FIELD Nationalism
THEORY The assimilation of
consensual preferences for 
(effective component) and the 
cognitive differentiation 
between (cognitive component) 
nationalities by children
Cross-cultural research programme
DOMAIN OF
APPLICATION Large-scale human groups
8.5 PHASE 5;INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 
1970-1973
Phase III on prejudice and Phase IV on the development 
of national attitudes are seen to be closely related to, or 
even embedded in, the field of intergroup relations. Phase 
V focuses exclusively on the role of social categorization 
in intergroup behaviour. The relevant articles report a 
series of experiments which establish that social 
categorization is sufficient to produce intergroup behaviour.
(1) Tajfel, (1970) : Experiments in Intergroup discrimination. 
In Scientific American. 223 (5),96-102.
(2) Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy. (1971). Social 
Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour.European Journal of 
Social Psvcholoav. I, 149-78.
(3) Billig & Tajfel,(1973): Social categorization and 
similarity in intergroup behaviour. European Journal of 
Social Psvcholoav. 3, 27-52.
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(1) and (2) report the same set of experiments which are 
reviewed below and (3) reports an experiment which was 
designed to negate alternative interpretations of the 
results.
8.5.1 Criteria for social psvcholoav
Again, there is little or no discussion regarding 
social psychology as a discipline. Tajfel and his 
collaborators do not elaborate on the approach adopted; on 
the conceptualization of the relationship between the 
individual and society or on the relationship between social 
psychology and other disciplines. Nor is there an explicit 
consideration of methodology. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that this does not imply that the issues are not 
considered, but rather that they are not elaborated with 
direct reference to social psychology as a discipline. As in 
Phase IV, this is related to the fact that Phase V focuses on 
an experimental research programme.
8.5.2 Description of the field: interaroup behaviour
In contrast to Phase IV there is an extensive research
literature on phenomena associated with intergroup behaviour.
However, as in previous phases, Tajfel and his colleagues
refer only briefly to the various theoretical approaches in
the field of intergroup behaviour, in order to establish and
justify their approach. It is merely noted that
intergroup behaviour has been studied in the context 
of variables deriving from conflict, competition, 
cooperation, the nature of personal interaction 
within and between groups, ingroup and outgoing 
structure, the position of individuals in groups, 
their personality etc.
(Tajfel,Flament,Billig,Bundy,1971,pp.150-151). 
The literature is not explored in any more depth.
8.5.3 Theorv; Social categorization and social norms
Having briefly referred to the field as a whole Tajfel 
et al. (1971) argue that social categorization is inherent in 
all of these contexts, and that this aspect of intergroup 
behaviour has often been taken for granted. The social 
environment is categorized in terms of social criteria 
forming divisions between ingroups and outgroups. In
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comparison to Phases III and IV, Tajfel and his colleagues 
narrow the focus of their attention to the impact of social 
categorization per se and, to all intents and purposes, the 
role of value and assimilation are left in abeyance. However, 
the significance of the social context is not forgotten. This 
is reflected in the reconception of social categorization.
The role of social categorization in intergroup 
behaviour cannot be considered 'a priori* to be universal; 
rather, the principles of intergroup behaviour 'acquire 
meaning only against the social background which provides 
the canvas for their study *(p.150). It is possible that, in 
certain societies, norms, values and expectations reinforce 
differentiation between ingroups and outgroups when it has 
no utilitarian value to the individual or group and even when 
the categorization has little meaning or emotional 
investment. This is supported by studies concerning the 
adaptive cognitive functions associated with categorization 
(Allport,1954 ; Campbell,1967 ; Tajfel,1969).
Social conduct (ie. intergroup behaviour) is guided by 
a conceptualization of social causality and by the subsequent 
inferences regarding various aspects of groups and of the 
individuals that comprise them. These inferences may be a 
direct consequence of objective determinants of intergroup 
conflicts (eg.'rational conflict',Coser,1956) or they may be 
related to attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups which 
serve a 'psychological' function (eg. Coser's 'irrational 
conflict'). However, the permanent feature of all intergroup 
relations is the articulation of the social world in terms of 
a network of intergroup categorizations. This guides social 
conduct in situations where alternative guidelines for action 
are unclear. Moreover, intergroup categorization provides a 
differentiated, coherent and ordered environment which 
enables individuals to act in a way that is socially 
sanctioned or appropriate in many other situations.
It can be seen that certain aspects of a 'search for 
coherence' (Phase III) are absorbed into this re­
conceptualization of social categorization but also that 
there is no explicit reference to personal integrity or group 
identity. The focus of explanation is on social phenomena,
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ie. * norms*; and individual cognition, ie. categorization, as 
opposed to value systems or personal integrity.
A number of experimental studies on intergroup conflicts
show that short-lived competitive situations create
discriminatory behaviour and modify ingroup-outgroup
perceptions. However, there are also indications that
competition is not a necessarv condition for intergroup
discrimination (eg. Ferguson and Kelley,1964). Tajfel,
Flament, Billing and Bundy (1971) review experiments
conducted by Rabbie and Wilkens (1968) and Rabbie and Horwitz
(1969). These purported to show that anticipation of future
interaction determined bias in subjects' evaluation of their
own and of other groups. Results from the control condition,
in which there was no anticipation of future interaction,
were seen to suggest that 'Group classification per se
appears to be insufficient to produce discriminatory
evaluations' (Rabbie and Horwitz,1969, p.272). Tajfel et al.
(1971) reinterpret the latter finding, suggesting that
subjects in the control condition did not show intergroup
differentiation because the experimental manipulations failed
to make the quality of 'groupness' relevant to the situation.
Subjects were asked to evaluate other unknown, live
individuals solely on the basis of where they sat. In
contrast to the 'interdependence of fate' conditions
Nothing occurred that made the situation pertinent 
in any way to the social and cultural norms that 
normally guide intergroup behaviour (p.152).
The predictions of Phase V are in some respects similar
to, and in other respects very different from, those of Phase
IV. In contrast to Phase IV, the research problem is much
tighter, focusing on a specific, theoretically based,
expectation which does not demand initial exploratory
investigation. The research problem was to determine if
the very act of social categorization, as far as it 
can be identified and isolated from other variables,
(can) lead- under certain conditions - to intergroup 
behaviour which discriminates against the outgroup, 
and favours the ingroup. What are the baseline 
conditions in which this differential intergroup 
behaviour can be expected to occur?
(Tajfel et al. 1971,p.151)
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Phases IV and V are also different in that the latter 
is in no way a comparative study. There is no comparison of 
different cultures or different groups and, in this respect, 
there is no exploration of the impact of social context. It 
should be remembered, however, that the significance of the 
social context was something which emerged from the studies 
in Phase IV rather than being an initial problem. 
Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that the social 
context is not ignored in Phase V; as we have seen, it is 
fundamental to the theoretical principles of explanation. 
But, it is not a feature of the research design or of the 
experimental hypotheses. Phases IV and V are similar in that 
the various predictions are framed within a research 
programme. The results from the initial experiments form the 
basis and the rationale for subsequent experiments.
The experiment was designed to fulfil a number of 
conditions such that all of the other known variables of 
intergroup behaviour were eliminated. These include 
face-to-face interactions; previous hostility; an 
instrumental or a rational link between the criteria for 
intergroup categorization and the nature of the subjects' 
responses; and the utilitarian value of responses for the 
subject making them. Furthermore, the responses were made to 
appear important in terms of real decisions about the 
distribution of concrete rewards to others; and finally, 
responses in terms of maximum intergroup differentiation 
competed with other response strategies such as maximum 
benefit for all or maximum benefit for the ingroup.
8.5.4 Domain of application; Experimental studies
Tajfel et al. (1971) give a detailed account of the 
experimental design and procedure, the matrices employed and 
the analysis of the results. This is done in the conventional 
experimental report format as in all previous phases. 
However, in comparison to previous experiments, the design 
and the analysis of results is highly complex and tortuous to 
follow. This is, in part, due to the fact that Tajfel et al. 
(1971) attempt to explore the phenomenon of intergroup 
discrimination in competition with alternative response
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strategies. A more 'rational* response strategy would lead to 
maximum profits for all subjects, regardless of their own 
group membership. This would indicate that social 
categorization alone does not lead to intergroup 
discrimination. Another alternative strategy would lead to 
maximum profit for the ingroup, regardless of profits gained 
by the outgroup. The experiment is designed to give subjects 
the opportunity to adopt any of these rival strategies.
In contrast to Phase IV, where intergroup 
categorizations were based on cultural groups relating to 
nationality, in this phase of his research the intergroup 
categorizations are based on relatively arbitrary criteria. 
Intergroup categorization was induced on the basis of 
subjects' preferences for paintings by two modern painters, 
Klee and Kandinsky.
In order to avoid confounding variables related to 
individual gain or group interaction, subjects were put in 
cubicles and they allotted rewards or penalties to other 
subjects who were identified only as being a member 'of your 
group' or 'of the other group'. Three different types of 
matrices were employed in order to assess the relative pull 
of different response strategies. These were:
1. Maximum joint payoff (MJP) being the matrix term which 
results in the greatest common benefit.
2. Maximum ingroup payoff (MIP) corresponding to the highest 
number of points awarded to the ingroup member.
3. Maximum difference in favour of the ingroup (MD) being 
the matrix term which results in the greatest possible 
difference between points awarded to the two individuals in 
favour of the ingroup member.
Subjects made 3 different types of choices:
1. Ingroup choices, where subjects were choosing for two 
members of their own group.
2. Outgroup choices, where subjects were choosing for two 
members of the out group.
3. Intergroup differential choices, where subjects were 
choosing for one member of their own group and one member of 
the other group.
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The results showed that subjects act in terms of their 
ingroup membership and in terms of an intergroup 
categorization in situations devoid of other variables 
relating to intergroup behaviour. Subjects favour members of 
their own group despite the availability of an alternative 
strategy leading to the greatest common good (MJP). This 
occurs even though subjects' own individual benefit is not 
affected by their choice. Furthermore, even when MJP is 
combined with MIP subjects will sacrifice the advantages of 
maximum utilitarian gain in order to 'win*; that is, in order 
to create a maximum difference (MD) between the two groups. 
This gratuitous discrimination in favour of the ingroup is 
also shown by results in which ingroup choices are 
significantly closer to MJP than outgroup choices.
The discussion of the results is framed within the 
theoretical terms presented previously. Both sections 
consider the impact of social categorization in terms of a 
'generic' outgroup attitude and social norms.
8.5.4.1 Social categorization;
The norm of groupness may be expected to operate 
when the social world of an individual (at least in 
our society) is clearly dichotomized into 'us' and 
'them'. (p.174-5)
Where there is no such classification superimposed on 
a continuous dimension there would be no discriminatory 
intergroup behaviour. A related process was found in the case 
of judgments of simple physical magnitudes (Tajfel and 
Wilkes,1963b), and also in intergroup behaviour (M.Deutsch, 
1965). The perception and creation of such discontinuities 
is fundamental to the study of intergroup relations.
8.5.4.2 Generic group norm;
It will be clear that we interpret our results in 
terms of a 'generic' social norm of ingroup-outgroup 
behaviour which guided the subjects' choices. This 
was so because they classified the social situation 
in which they found themselves as one to which this 
norm was pertinent, in which social categorization 
ought to lead to discriminatory intergroup 
behaviour. This interpretation is consonant with an 
approach to intergroup behaviour recently presented 
elsewhere.
(Tajfel et al.,1971,p.174)
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8.5.4.3 Fairness norm;
The experimental results also lead Tajfel et al. (1971) 
to extend the theoretical framework by the introduction of a 
new principle. Ingroup choices and outgroup choices, while 
still discriminating significantly in favour of the ingroup, 
remained near the point of maximum fairness. Furthermore, 
choices combining all benefits might have been expected to be 
more extreme. Rather than questioning the impact of social 
categorization, Tajfel et al. suggest that a second and 
opposing norm of fairness influences subjects' responses. 
This allows all choices to be seen as a compromise between 
fairness and other variables, namely, the generic groupness 
norm.
Tajfel and his colleagues bolster their interpretation 
of the findings in two ways. Firstly, they carry out complex 
analyses of the results and also include a brief analysis of 
the pilot study. Secondly, they consider potential 
alternative explanations of the findings and argue that these 
are inadequate.
The results, for example, might be explained in terms 
of the experimenter effect (Orne,1962), whereby subjects 
conform to the expectations of the experimenter, based on 
his frequent use of the term 'group'. However, Tajfel et 
al.(1971) argue that this does not provide a theoretical 
alternative for the interpretation of their findings. The 
experimenter effect works only through the salience, for the 
subjects, of the relevant normative background and its 
consequent expectations ie. the subject effects. The 
theoretical problem as to why a few references to 'group' 
are sufficient to result in discrimination in favour of the 
ingroup, with the possibility of alternative strategies which 
are more rational, instrumental or utilitarian, is not 
satisfactorily explained by the experimenter effect.
Alternatively, the results might be explained in terms 
of the anticipation of future interactions. However Tajfel 
et al.(1971) argue that, in the experiment, this would only 
have had an effect if the 'groups' were expected to retain 
their meaning. Furthermore, in order for anticipation of
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future interaction to be influential subjects* views of how 
they ought to have behaved in the experimental situation must 
also be considered.
The findings are considered to have far-reaching 
implications for social issues such as our modes of 
socialization and education. In line with Phase III, Tajfel 
and his colleagues also claim that the findings suggest that 
discriminatory intergroup behaviour cannot be understood 
fully in terms of either an 'objective* conflict of interests 
or deep-seated motives. The most parsimonious explanations of 
the results involve both normative and cognitive 
considerations; the relevant normative background of social 
conduct and its relation to the demands of a particular 
social situation, as seen by the individual.
TABLE 8.5 SUMMARY OF PHASE V
TIER FOCUS COMMENTS
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
FIELD Intergroup
behaviour
THEORY Social categorization as a 
necessary and sufficient condition 
for intergroup discrimination due 
to the social norms of 'groupness* 
and 'fairness*
DOMAIN OF 
APPLICATION Intergroup discrimination 
Socialization
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8.6 PHASE VI: INTERGROUP RELATIONS. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND
SOCIAL BELIEFS 1972-1979
Phase VI constitutes the most significant achievement
of Tajfel's intellectual career. He explicitly addresses
issues relating to the discipline of social psychology in
general and he develops a coherent theory of large scale
intergroup phenomena which has come to be known as Social
Identity Theory.
Tajfel extends the theoretical framework established in
Phase III to address the theoretical problems which emerged
from the research in Phases IV and V as well as the broader
social issues associated with intergroup relations. He also
addresses issues associated with the general perspective
adopted in social psychological theorizing and research.
Several publications are identified with this phase:
Tajfel,H. (1972a): Experiments in a vacuum, in H. Tajfel
and J. Israel(eds.) The Context of Social Psvcholoav: a
critical assessment. European Monographs in Social 
Psychology, no.2 London Academic Press
Tajfel,H. (1972b): La Categorization Sociale: in Moscovici 
fed.)Introduction a la psvcholoaie sociale. Paris: Larousse.
Tajfel,H. (1974b): Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour: 
Social Science Information. Vol:24(2) 65-93.
Tajfel,H. (1975): The exit of social mobility and the voice 
of social change: Notes on the social psychology of
intergroup relations. Social Science Information. Vol: 14
(2) 101-118.
Tajfel,H. (1976a): Exit and voice in intergroup relations, 
in Strickland, Aboud and Gergen (eds.) Social psvcholoav in 
transition. New York: Plenum Press.
Tajfel,H. (ed. ) (1978a) : Differentiation between social groups: 
studies in the social psvcholoav of intergroup relations. 
European Monographs in Social Psychology, no.14. London: 
Academic Press.
Although Tajfel (1978a) is an edited volume, the 
introduction and the whole of Part I is written by Tajfel 
himself. This outlines the theoretical framework to which 
most of the other chapters in the book are directly related. 
Furthermore, Part I recapitulates and expands upon the 
content of the previously published articles in Phase VI. 
Tajfel's contribution comprises four chapters:
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1. Introduction (Tajfel,1978b).
2. Interindividual behaviour and intergroup behaviour 
(Tajfel,1978c).
3. Social categorization, social identity and social 
comparison (Tajfel,1978d).
4. The achievement of group differentiation (Tajfel,1978e). 
These chapters focus on the development of an alternative 
theoretical and research approach to the social psychology 
of human groups in conflict. An examination of these chapters 
will provide the main source of material for the presentation 
of this Phase.
A wider coverage of the discipline is presented in 
Tajfel and Fraser's (1978a) Introducing Social Psvcholoav 
and this source provides some of the material presented here, 
especially with regard to Tiers 1 and 2. Again, Tajfel's 
contribution to this edited volume comprises several 
chapters.
1. Social psychology as social science (Tajfel and Fraser, 
1978c).
2. The structure of our views about society (Tajfel,1978f).
3. Intergroup behaviour I: Individualistic perspectives 
(Tajfel,1978g).
4. Intergroup behaviour II: Group perspectives (Tajfel, 
1978h).
Further publications reflect different emphases but deal with
substantially the same issues. These include:
Tajfel (1978i) : The social psvcholoav of minorities. Minority 
Rights Group: London.
Tajfel (1979a): Individuals and Groups in Social Psychology:
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psvcholoav.18: 173-9.
Tajfel and Turner (1979): An integrative theory of intergroup 
conflict. In Austin & Worchel (eds.)
The Social Psvcholoav of Interaroup Relations.
Monterey, California: Brooks-Cole.
8.6.1 Criteria for social psvcholoav
In Phase III, Tajfel propounded a rational, or 
cognitive approach to the study of man in the social 
environment. In Phases IV and V, which were largely concerned 
with research programmes, he did not allude to the principles
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of social psychology. In contrast to all previous phases, in 
Phase VI Tajfel discusses in depth the issues surrounding the 
discipline of social psychology and presents a very clear 
conception of what social psychology is, or should be. He 
elaborates on the contemporary issues confronting social 
psychologists, the perspective that needs to be adopted and 
the relationship between social psychology and other 
disciplines.
Firstly, the discipline of social psychology must 
address issues arising in the social realities of the 
contemporary world. The issue which Tajfel selects for 
special attention is the diversification and differentiation 
between large-scale human groups. Furthermore, it is claimed 
that social psychology can provide important and 
indispensable insights into the world of real conflicts 
between real social groups.
Secondly, in order to achieve this, social psychology 
must adopt a level of encfuirv and explanation that is 
directly related to the problems of social behaviour in 
intergroup contexts. This demands a social perspective which 
addresses
those aspects of the interaction between people and 
their social environments, which contribute to the 
social sharing of behaviour and experience, and of 
the meaning of both.
(Tajfel and Fraser,1978b,p.13)
and
how the various social structures, social systems 
or groups affect an individual's way of viewing the 
world in which he lives and of acting in it: and how 
his 'nature' will in turn affect his functioning in 
groups and the relations between groups
(Tajfel and Fraser,1978b,p.13).
In order to provide an understanding of the relationship 
between individuals and society, social psychological 
theories must not attempt to establish universal laws, nor 
be so specific as to fail to provide general principles. 
Rather, it must attempt to determine the relationship between 
the wider social and cultural context and certain 'basic' 
psychological processes which shape the individual's 
understanding of, and actions in, their social environment.
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Thirdly, it is this perspective which distinguishes 
social psychology from other disciplines. The phenomenon of 
intergroup relations itself is the concern of many 
disciplines, from evolutionary biology and psychology to 
sociology, economics and social history. However, a social 
psychological perspective forms an indispensible part of the 
analysis of intergroup relations. The origins and contents of 
social beliefs cannot be conceived of outside the 'objective' 
social and economic conditions leading to intergroup 
conflicts. But, nor can they be conceived independently of 
the social psychological processes which intervene between 
'objective' intergroup conflicts and the construction of 
widely diffused systems of beliefs about the respective 
ingroups and outgroups. Moreover, once established, these 
belief systems become causal factors in their own right. The 
aspects of intergroup relations and the particular problems 
which social psychology addresses cannot be reduced to any 
other discipline. Social psychology fills both the social 
void inherent in psychological perspectives and the 
psychological vacuum inherent in sociological or economic 
perspectives.
Tajfel also elaborates explicitly on the nature and role 
of experimental research in social psychology. Some issues 
relating to methodology have already been discussed by Tajfel 
in the previous phases of his work, but this is the first 
time that they are addressed at the level of social 
psychology. Furthermore, Tajfel expresses a different view of 
the role of experimentation in social psychology. 
Experimentation is considered to have a number of advantages 
over other methods, associated with the explicit 
identification of variables, of causal relationship and of 
predictions which can be tested. It also has a number of 
disadvantages in that the social sciences are concerned with 
the self-conscious and reactive nature of human beings. These 
disadvantages cannot be overcome by increasing experimental 
sophistication; rather, the solution lies in deriving 
experiments from clear theoretical principles and conceiving 
them as social situations. Experimental results cannot 
provide definitive answers, rather, they provide 'hints'
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about social life which must be integrated into our 
theoretical knowledge. Finally, Tajfel adopts an eclectic 
perspective with regard to the use of other methods in social 
psychology, including survey research and participant 
observation.
The methodological strength and sophistication of 
social psychology lies not with any single method 
of research, but with the variety of differing 
methods available for use.
(Tajfel and Fraser,1978b,p.52)
8.6.2 Description of the field; interaroup relations
Tajfel has, by now, been working in the field of 
intergroup relations for several years. However, it is not 
until Phase VI that he examines the field as a whole to any 
great extent. His only concern in Phase III was to establish 
the legitimacy and importance of the cognitive aspects which 
intervene between the social situation and intergroup 
behaviour. In Phase VI, Tajfel develops a theoretical 
framework which redefines the boundaries of the field. This 
explicates the characteristics which distinguish
interpersonal from intergroup behaviour and examines the 
social conditions in which individuals will act as members 
of a group (see Theory below). The field of intergroup 
relations is described within this framework, contrasting the 
approach advanced here with the more conventional approaches 
which dominate the field. Tajfel's main argument is that 
other theoretical perspectives tend towards the 
interindividual end of the continua described in the next 
section (Theory) and are limited to conditions of social 
mobility. Furthermore, they fail to portray the dialectic 
conception of the relationship between group membership and 
social situations propounded by Tajfel.
The indivualistic perspectives which are examined most 
frequently by Tajfel include the work of Adorno et al. (1950) 
on the authoritarian personality and the frustration 
-aggression hypothesis of Bollard et al (1939) , both of which 
find their roots in Freud's theory of intergroup behaviour. 
It should be made clear that Tajfel does not claim that the 
social context is ignored by these theories. However, it is
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argued that they maintain an individualistic perspective in 
so far as explanations of intergroup behaviour are given in 
terms of general laws of psychological processes which apply 
to individuals 'tout court', operating independently of 
social interactions and their social context. For example, in 
the frustration- aggression literature, the emphasis is on 
the individual's motivational state and intergroup behaviour 
becomes no more than a collection of various individuals 
acting in synchrony due to the social situation. Similarly, 
much of the literature on prejudice provides an understanding 
of intergroup relations in terms of individual patterns of 
prejudice and the individual's ability to create intergroup 
distinctions.
Taj fel also reviews two chapters in The Handbook of 
Social Psvcholoav (Lindzey and Aronson,1969) on social 
movements and group problem solving and two, then recently 
published books, on intergroup prejudice and discrimination. 
Tajfel's review of Toch and Milgram's chapter (1969) on 
'Collective behaviour; Crowds and Social Movements' 
illuminates the dearth of literature on the social psychology 
of social movements. Tajfel also notes that Kelley and 
Thibaut's chapter (1969) on group problem solving focuses on 
individuals within their own group, that is, intragroup 
problem solving. Again, the lack of an equivalent review on 
intergroup problem solving illuminates the distinct lack of 
literature
concerned with the solving by social groups at large 
of the psychological problems set to them by their 
immersion in a social environment composed of other 
social groups
(Tajfel,1978c,p.48).
Ehrlich (1973) and Kidder and Stewart (1975) are 
similarly interpersonal, focusing on interaction between 
individuals in terms of general psychological processes. As 
such, they fail to provide any theoretical links with the 
antecedent conditions of prejudice and discrimination; that 
is, with the social conditions and the existence of various 
kinds of conflicts between large-scale social groups within 
a social system.
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In comparison to Phase III, Tajfel's comments and review 
of the field are much more sophisticated and elaborate. As 
has already been noted, in the previous phase, Tajfel's prime 
concern was to establish that the cognitive aspects of 
intergroup relations constitute determining factors in the 
link between social situations and social behaviour. His 
critique of the field largely addresssed the motivational 
theories which failed to take into account these cognitive 
determinants of intergroup behaviour. By Phase VI, the 
critique is developed such that it also addresses a number of 
cognitive theories of intergroup relations which have 
emerged. This critique is founded in a more detailed 
specification of the social-cognitive factors involved, of 
their role in intergroup relations, and of the essential 
features of a theory that purports to provide an 
understanding and explanation of intergroup phenomena.
Generally speaking, Tajfel maintains that dominant 
theoretical perspectives provide valid and fruitful 
approaches to the problems addressed. That is, they either 
provide useful explanations of individual and interindividual 
phenomena or they provide valuable insights into the
individualistic aspects of intergroup phenomena. However,
Tajfel's major concern is that the dominance of these
individualistic perspectives in social psychology has led to
the neglect of important aspects of intergroup relations. He 
argues cogently that these approaches, in and of themselves, 
are inadequate. They fail to address the essential 
characteristics of, and the problems associated with, the 
social psychological aspects of large-scale conflicts or 
social movements. They fail to consider the social 
psychological aspects of changes in intergroup relations and 
the long-term processes of positive feedback between social 
situations and subjective group membership. Furthermore, they 
fail to demarcate the particular form which intergroup 
behaviour will take, in both conflictual and non-hostile 
intergroup relations.
For Tajfel, in order to provide an adequate 
understanding of these phenomena, it is essential to develop 
a group (social) perspective which offers a theoretical
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integration of the social conditions and the psychological 
processes involved in intergroup relations. Individuals must 
be considered as members of a group in a multi-group setting; 
that is, individual processes must be conceived directly in 
relation to the social and psychological interdependence 
within and between groups. In order to achieve this, it is 
necessary to consider the consensual interpretations of 
events, the social sharing of ideas about their social 
causation and the consensus regarding appropriate actions.
It can be seen that the social-psychological approach 
propounded by Tajfel (Tier 1) is consistently reflected in 
his analysis of the field. To reiterate; social psychology 
must address intergroup relations in the social reality of 
the contemporary world; in order to do this it is necessary 
to develop a social perspective which illuminates the 
interrelationships between the social conditions and the 
psychological processes involved. Tajfel argues that the 
various individualistic theories which dominate the field 
fail to fulfil these requirements.
8.6.3 Theorv
The theoretical structure in Phase VI is elaborate and 
complex. In view of the stated requirements for an adequate 
theory of intergroup relations this is scarcely surprising, 
as it must not only describe the social context and the 
psychological processes but it must also provide a 
theoretical and explanatory integration of these 'social' 
and 'psychological' aspects. Furthermore, Tajfel's wider 
theoretical framework locates the present theory within, and 
yet distinguishes it from, the contemporary field of 
intergroup relations. It thus extends beyond the bounds of 
purely intergroup behaviour.
Some of the theoretical concepts presented in Phase VI 
find their antecedents in Phase III. Both phases address the 
phenomenon of intergroup relations and focus on people's 
understanding of changing relationships between groups. 
However, the research conducted in Phase IV on children's 
national attitudes raised a number of theoretical problems 
associated with children's high degree of sensitivity to the 
social context and to social values. Similarly, the results
390
of research in Phase V showed that social categorization was 
both necessary and sufficient to produce intergroup 
behaviour. This latter finding was interpreted, originally, 
in terms of social norms. More recently, Tajfel himself 
suggested that such a general explanation is theoretically 
inadequate. The theoretical concepts elaborated in Phase VI 
are founded on the ideas and problems which emerged in these 
previous phases. Together with the impact of other 
intellectual and social influences, Tajfel is able to 
establish a comprehensive and well-structured framework for 
the understanding of intergroup relations. In order to 
achieve this, it will be found that the cognitive theory 
advanced in previous phases is transformed into an explicitly 
social-psychological theory in every respect. The theory 
divides neatly into three sections: (A) definition of
intergroup behaviour; (B) the specification of four continua; 
and (C) principles of explanation. The first section provides 
a social-psychological definition of group membership and 
explicates its dialectic relationship with the social 
context. The second section delineates the characteristics of 
and social conditions for interindividual behaviour in 
contrast to intergroup behaviour. The third section specifies 
the social-psychological processes which are involved in 
intergroup behaviour.
8.6.3.1 The definition of interaroup behaviour: Tajfel
provides a social-psychological definition of group 
membership which, being both flexible and open, is applicable 
to large social categories as well as to small groups. As 
such, it is a definition which encompasses the whole field of 
intergroup relations, including both individualistic and 
social perspectives (Tier 2). In its simplest form, a group 
is a body of people who feel that they are a group; who 
categorize themselves with a high degree of consensus as a 
group, and who are consensually categorized by others in the 
same manner. It can be seen that this does not constitute a 
description of the phenomenon from the perspective of an 
observer, but rather, provides a phenomenological definition 
of group membership from the point of view of the actors or 
participants. In line with Tajfel's views concerning the
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relationship between social psychology and other disciplines 
(Tier 1), the emphasis on social consensus is clearly a 
social psychological one. Historical, political, social and 
economic events are crucial in the establishment of the 
consensus and, once established, interact with it. But it is 
the social consensus which represents the social 
psychological aspects of social reality which, in turn, play 
a determining role in the fate of the group and its relations 
with other groups.
Furthermore, group membership may involve three 
components; a cognitive component referring to knowledge or 
awareness of belonging to a group; evaluative components 
referring to positive or negative value connotations of the 
group; and an emotional component directed towards one's own 
and other related groups. It should be noted that in order to 
be effective in producing social uniformities in intergroup 
relations the first component must be cognitive- social, that 
is, knowledge of belonging must be consensual. The
spectre of tautology as a methodological problem that might 
arise from this definition is dealt with extensively by 
Tajfel. In brief, the identification of group membership can 
precede the analysis of social behaviour on the grounds of 
both internal and external criteria. Internal or 'subjective' 
criteria denote the self-identification with and the 
psychological reality of the group for its members. These can 
be related to external or 'objective' criteria of group 
membership as used by an outside observer. However, an 
outside observer, including a social scientist, who lacks 
sufficient knowledge of the culture, may use criteria for the 
purpose of social categorization which have no social 
significance, ie. which are irrelevant to social behaviour 
(eg. eye colour). External criteria which are consistently 
used in relation to a particular group by other groups in a 
multi-group social organization are more likely to correspond 
to the internal criteria. Furthermore, consensus regarding 
internal criteria within a group may often originate from 
the external criteria used by other groups or from 
manipulations imposed by an experimenter.
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Given this social-psychological definition of group 
membership, Tajfel's major concern is to conceptualize and 
to explicate the reciprocal or dialectic relationship between 
social situations and the expression of subjective group 
membership in social behaviour. As propounded at Tiers 1 and 
2, it is not sufficient to consider the psychological 
processes and the social conditions as two independent 
entities. Rather, they are interdependent aspects of 
intergroup relations. Not all situations will lead to 'group* 
behaviour; nor do the characteristics of the situation alone 
determine whether or not it will lead to group behaviour. 
Similarly, an individual does not possess a stable group 
identification that is invariably expressed in behaviour. 
Rather the relationship is governed by three interdependent 
principles.
a) The number and variety of social situations which an 
individual will perceive as being relevant in some way to 
his group membership will increase as a function of the 
clarity or intensity of the cognitive, evaluative and 
affective components of his or her group memberships.
b) . Some social situations will force most individuals 
involved to act in terms of their group membership, when 
their initial group identification is weak.
c). There is positive feedback between the first two
principles. That is, social situations which force group 
behaviour will enhance the significance of, or even create, 
new group identifications. In turn, many people will perceive 
a greater number and variety of social situations as relevant 
to their group membership.
8.6.3.2 The specification of four continua: In this section
of the theory, Tajfel attempts to establish the
empirical and theoretical distinctions between
social situations in which individuals behave
towards each other as individuals and those in which 
they behave as members of separate groups which 
stand in certain kinds of relations towards each 
other
(Tajfel,1978b,p.7).
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This is done in terms of four continua, which describe 
and contrast interindividual behaviour with intergroup 
behaviour.
(a) Interpersonal-intergroup continuum:
Tajfel elaborates first on the distinction between social 
behaviour which is inter-individual and social behaviour 
which expresses an individual's group membership. Tajfel 
constructs a continuum running from 'purely* interpersonal 
to 'purely' intergroup. The interpersonal pole denotes social 
encounters between two or more people in which all 
interactions are determined by their personal relationships 
and individual characteristics. The extreme of this pole is 
a hypothetical absurdity in that no instance can conceivably 
be found in real life. The assigning of social categories, 
together with their associated expectations , will play a 
role in even the most personal relationship. The intergroup 
pole denotes any behaviour involving two or more people which 
is wholly determined by their membership of different social 
groups or categories. This pole corresponds to real life 
situations such as opposing armies in wartime which have had 
no personal contact. It also corresponds to the 'minimal' 
group experiments (Phase V) which, in terms of the continuum, 
might be considered a 'maximal' group in that the imposed 
anonymity of the outgroup enforced a depersonalization (or 
deindividualisation) of the outgroup members.
(b) Variability-uniformity continuum:
A second continuum, relating to the first, addresses the 
variability or uniformity of the attitudes and behaviour of 
the ingroup. Towards the interpersonal pole there will be 
greater variability of ingroup members' behaviour towards 
the outgroup. Conversely, towards the intergroup pole there 
will be greater uniformity.
(c) Individual-social category continuum:
A third continuum addresses the ingroup's conceptions and 
treatment of the outgroup members as distinct individuals or 
as undifferentiated items in a social category. This is 
simultaneously reflected in all three components of group 
membership, cognitive, evaluative and emotional.
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(d) Social mobility-social change continuum:
The fourth continuum describes the social situations which 
are likely to promote intergroup behaviour in terms of the 
subjective structure of beliefs about or consensual 
interpretations of a particular social system. This continuum 
relates to Tajfel's earlier ideas concerning the role of 
cognitive structures in the search for coherence presented in 
Phase III. In Phase VI, Tajfel is less concerned with the 
attributions which individuals make in order to reach an 
understanding of the changing relationships between groups 
and more concerned with the role of consensual belief systems 
in relation to the structure of society in promoting social 
change. Furthermore, the notion of social creativity 
introduced in Phase III is developed extensively in relation 
to these belief systems. An analysis of the consensual 
beliefs is essential if Tajfel's aims, to provide a social- 
psychological theory which addresses the social conditions 
of intergroup behaviour, are to be fulfilled, (see Tiers 1 
and 2).
In situations of 'social mobility' subjective 
conceptions of easy and flexible individual movement from 
one group to another promote interpersonal behaviour. In 
situations of 'social change' the boundaries between groups 
are sharply drawn and immutable, such that individual 
movements between groups are believed to be restricted or 
impossible, thus promoting intergroup behaviour. It can be 
seen that this continuum describes the social psychological 
conditions which have a causal function in relation to the 
other three. The structure of beliefs on the social 
mobility-social change continuum is a powerful determinant 
of acting towards members of outgroups on an interpersonal 
or intergroup basis respectively.
Other theories in the field of intergroup relations have 
failed to take these consensual beliefs into account and, as 
a reflection of their own American cultural context, have 
assumed the conditions of social mobility. Their relevance is 
thus restricted to interpersonal social behaviour and does 
not transfer to conditions of social change.
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Table 8.6: Summary of the principles of distinction
Continuum 1:
Interindividual Behaviour
Continuum 2 : 
Variability
Continuum 3 :
Outgroup as distinct 
individuals
Characteristics :
Continuum 4 :
Social mobility 
(structure of beliefs 
promoting interpersonal 
behaviour)
Characteristics ;
Intergroup Behaviour
Uniformity
Outgroup as members of 
social category
Independent of 
personal relationships, 
temporary motivational states 
and individual differences 
Dependent on shared ingroup 
affiliation of individuals 
and shared interpretation of 
relations between groups
Social Change/Social Movement 
(structure of beliefs 
promoting intergroup 
behaviour)
Legitimacy-Illegitimacy
Stability-Instability
Rigid stratification of social 
system. Creation of social 
movements. Psychological 
functioning creating 
differentiations. Conflict of 
objective interests.
Drawing on the work of Heberle (1968), Toch (1965) and 
Goldhamer (1968), Tajfel elaborates on the social 
psychological characteristics of social change and social 
movements. In these situations individuals believe that they 
are restricted by the inflexible boundaries between social 
groups. In order to improve or change his/her social position 
or conditions of life, the individual must act together with 
his or her group as a whole. This gives rise to social 
movements which are defined in socio- psychological terms as
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efforts by large numbers of people who define 
themselves and are also often defined by others as 
a group, to solve collectively a problem they feel 
they have in common; and which is perceived to arise 
from their relations with other groups
(Tajfel,1987c,p.46).
Thus, wherever there are changes in the nature of relations 
between large scale groups there will also exist social 
movements aiming to promote or to restrict such change.
However, Tajfel does not leave the analysis of the 
structure of beliefs here. The structure of beliefs about 
the social system have at least two social psychological 
attributes that determine different forms of social 
behaviour. These refer to the perceived leoitimacv- 
illeaitimacv and the perceived stabilitv-instabilitv of the 
social system. Social movements will arise when the social 
system is perceived by one or more groups as illegitimate 
and/or unstable. These social movements will aim either to 
create or to prevent social change. For example, a society 
in which the rigid social stratifications are perceived as 
both illegitimate and unstable by some groups provides the 
conditions in which the 'social change' structure of beliefs 
will develop.
Tajfel also examines three other variants of social 
reality in which the 'social change' structure of beliefs 
develops and, as a consequence, leads to intergroup 
behaviour, as described above. Firstly, even when social 
mobility is possible, social groups, such as the Welsh 
nationalists, may create a social change structure of 
beliefs, such that their group membership becomes relevant 
to a greater variety of social situations. Secondly, when an 
individual's interests and way of life are threatened by an 
outgroup they may create clear-cut and impenetrable social 
dichotomies, as was the case in the conception and treatment 
of Jews in pre-war Germany. Both these situations involve a 
discrepancy between social reality and social beliefs and 
therefore demand a considerable degree of 'social 
creativitv'. Once these new ideologies are created they may 
well become established in social reality, forming a rigid
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and objective social stratification. Thirdly, there may be an 
explicit conflict of interest between groups which does not 
relate to the social structure or to enduring differences 
between the groups, as is the case in competitive sport.
This application would not have been possible in terms 
of the rudimentary ideas presented in previous phases. This 
section of the theory constitutes a major development in 
Tajfel's thinking. The brief consideration of the differences 
between intragroup and intergroup behaviour in Phase III is 
elaborated to form a major part of the theoretical framework 
in Phase VI. It can be seen that these continua describe a 
space in which the various theories of intergroup behaviour 
can be located; they serve to describe the dimensions of the 
field as perceived by Tajfel. As previously discussed (Tier 
2), the dominant theories in the field tend towards the 
interindividual poles of the continua. In contrast, Tajfel 
attempts to establish a theory which addresses the intergroup 
poles of the continua. Consequently, the emphasis throughout 
Phase VI is placed on the characteristics, social conditions 
and psychological processes of intergroup behaviour.
8.6.3.3 The principles of explanation: The previous section 
was concerned with the characteristics of, and the social 
conditions for, intergroup behaviour. In this section, the 
social-psychological processes pertaining to intergroup 
relations will be presented. This fulfils Tajfel's second 
criteria for an adequate theory of intergroup relations. It 
is also associated more closely with the theoretical concepts 
presented in the previous phases of Tajfel's work. In Phase 
VI, Tajfel integrates and develops extensively the 
theoretical framework which directly addresses problems 
emerging from research findings in Phases IV and V, as well 
as the social realities of the contemporary world. This is 
done in terms of four interlinked concepts: social
categorization, social identity, social comparison and 
psychological distinctiveness.
In order to achieve a clear presentation of these 
concepts, it is necessary to look at each concept separately. 
It will then be possible to examine the interrelationships 
between social categorization and social identity, social
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identity and social comparison, and finally the achievement 
of group differentiation.
(a)Social categorization:
This is here defined as
the ordering of (the)social environment in terms of 
groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense 
to the individual. It helps to structure the causal 
understanding of the social environment and thus it 
helps as a guide for action
(Tajfel,1978d,p.61).
The general cognitive mechanisms of categorization is 
used by individuals in order to systematize and simplify the
social environment in much the same way as they do the
physical environment. For example, the accentuation of
perceived or judged differences between physical objects is 
equivalent to the general features of social stereotyping. 
However, categorizations of the social environment are more 
often related to value differentials. The cognitive and 
behavioural effects of social categorizations must be 
considered in relation to the socially derived values 
associated with the criteria for categorization. Positive or 
negative evaluations tend to enhance the subjective
differences between categories and the subjective 
similarities within categories on certain dimensions. This 
is of particular importance in the context of intergroup 
relations in that social categorizations form distinctions 
between 'us * and 'them'.
(b) Social identity:
This is defined as
that part of an individual's self-concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership
(Tajfel,1978d,p.63).
This concept is limited intentionally to those aspects of an 
individual's view of himself or herself which are constituted 
by the membership of certain social groups or categories and 
which are relevant to social behaviour in intergroup 
situations.
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(c)Social comparison:
Tajfel uses Festinger's theory of social comparison processes 
(1954) as a starting point and he then proceeds to make 
explicit the differences and similarities between Festinger's 
use of the concept and his own use of the concept in the 
context of intergroup relations.
Tajfel does not elaborate on the actual process of 
social comparison beyond restating Festinger's hypotheses - 
that
there exists, in the human organism, a drive to 
evaluate his own opinions and abilities (which is 
done) by comparison respectively with the opinions 
and abilities of others
(Tajfel,1978d,p.64-65).
His main concern is to argue that this comparative principle 
has a wider range of application than Festinger suggests and 
that it is fundamental to intergroup relations. Festinger 
limits the employment of social comparison processes to 
situations in which objective, non-social means of comparison 
are not available, and focuses his discussion on individuals 
comparing themselves with other individuals. The theory thus 
addresses within group effects of social comparison where no 
objective means of comparison are available. Furthermore, 
Festinger suggests that intergroup comparisons may be made on 
a phantasy level, but rarely in reality.
Tajfel takes issue with the assumptions and restrictions 
adopted by Festinger. Firstly, 'objective, non-social' means 
of comparison are social in that they only acquire 
significance in relation to their social setting. Secondly, 
social reality can be as objective as non-social reality. 
Objectivity cannot be defined in terms of 'social' or 
'non-social'. Rather it is defined in terms of the awareness 
that alternatives exist or, conversely, that there is high 
social consensus concerning the nature of a phenomenon. 
Certainty is no doubt more easily attained through physical 
than through social means of testing. The latter, however, is 
not as subservient to the former as Festinger assumes. A high 
social consensus will often actually obviate the need for a 
physical means of testing. Thirdly, social comparisons with 
regard to group characteristics are made on the basis of an
400
'objective' social reality comprising a multi-group 
situation. The characteristics of any group achieve 
significance mostly in relation to perceived differences from 
other groups, and the value connotations of these 
differences.
d)Social categorization and social identity:
Given the above definition of social identity, social
categorization serves
as a system or orientation which helps to create and 
define the individual's place in society.
(Tajfel,1978d,p.63)
Social Identity can only be defined through the effects of 
social categorizations which structure an individual's social 
environment into his own group and other groups. This 
conception of social categorization and social identity 
allows Tajfel to elaborate on several consequences of group 
membership. Individuals will maintain and seek membership of 
groups which contribute to the positive aspects of their 
social identity. Individuals will leave groups which do not 
contribute to the positive aspects of their social identity 
(in conditions of social mobility) unless leaving the group 
is impossible for 'objective' reasons or unless it conflicts 
with important values which are themselves an important part 
of the individual's self-image (ie. in conditions of social 
change). In these circumstances, individuals may change their 
interpretation of the attributes of the group and/or engage 
in social actions which would lead to desirable changes in 
the situation.
e) Social identity and social comparison:
Social comparison is the comparative principle which links
social categorization with social identity. An individual's
social identity, his or her reinterpretations and his social
actions only acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparison
with, other groups.
No group lives alone - all groups in society live 
in the midst of other groups.
(Tajfel,1978d,p.64)
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The characteristics of one's own group as a whole nearly 
always acquire significance through comparison with other 
groups within the social system. Value connotations, positive 
or negative, of group membership can only be derived through 
comparisons with other relevant specific groups. 
Consequently, an individual's social identity is defined 
through the effects of social comparisons made between the 
individual's own group and other groups. And these groups are 
delineated by the system of social categorization employed to 
structure the social environment. This approach to social 
identity presents a dynamic conception which is derived, in 
a relational or comparative manner, from an individual's 
group membership within a multi-group social system,
f) Psychological group distinctiveness or group 
differentiation:
The concept of psychological group distinctiveness cannot be 
considered in isolation from social categorization, social 
identity and social comparison. In order for the social group 
to contribute to aspects of the individual's social identity 
which are valued positively, it is essential that positively 
valued psychological distinctions from other groups are 
either maintained or created. Social comparisons between 
groups focus on establishing this psychological
distinctiveness. The social group must protect the social 
identity of its members by maintaining, creating or enhancing 
its positively valued distinctiveness from other groups.
Tajfel draws on evidence from both the 'minimal' 
intergroup experiments and from analyses of 'real' social 
contexts in order to establish the legitimacy and prevalence 
of psychological group distinctiveness. This reflects 
Tajfel's assertion, expressed at Tier 1, that psychological 
theory must relate both to experimental research and to 
social reality. His emphasis on experimental research, as 
opposed to research employing other methodological
approaches, is a reflection of his own sphere of research. He 
reviews first the experiments reported in Phase V
(Tajfel,Flament,Billing and Bundy, 1971), which found that 
the most significant form of intergroup behaviour was the 
achievement of a maximum difference in favour of the ingroup.
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He also reviews subsequent experiments employing the same 
methodological paradigm (Billig,1972 ; Billig and 
Tajfel,1973). These demonstrated, further, that social 
categorization into groups, as opposed to interindividual 
similarity, result in intergroup behaviour which achieves 
positive differentiation in favour of the ingroup. Tajfel et 
al.(1971) originally explained these results in terms of 
social norms (Phase V) . However, by Phase VI such an 
explanation is considered too general and lacking in 
heuristic value in that they could also 'explain* the 
adoption of different response strategies. The theoretical 
framework developed in Phase VI explains why these particular 
norms are chosen by subjects in this particular set of 
conditions to guide intergroup behaviour. Group 
differentiation constitutes, under some conditions, the major 
outcome of the sequence social categorization-social 
identity-social comparison.
The importance of group differentiation is also found
in a variety of social situations. Tajfel examines the
notions of race and, drawing on the work of Rex (1969) ,
suggests that it is a shorthand expression which is used to
create, reflect, enhance and perpetuate the perceived
differences in value between human groups or individuals. It
thus serves to increase the psychological distinctiveness of
the relevant social categories. This establishment of
psychological distinctiveness is also found in various other
features of cultural and social relations. Fishman's (1968)
analysis of language showed that 'ideological positions' can
either magnify minor differences or minimize major
differences in the realms of language, religion, culture,
race etc. Similarly, nationalism, which has become one of the
forces towards change, can be seen as the drive of smaller
ethnic groups to establish a clear and distinctive social
identity. Tajfel's theoretical framework argues that
the reasons for this cognitive, behavioural and 
evaluative intergroup differentiation is in the need 
that the individuals have to provide social meaning 
through social identity to the intergroup situation, 
experimental or any other; and that this need is 
fulfilled through the creation of intergroup 
differences when such differences do not in fact
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exist, or the attribution of value to, and the 
enhancement of, whatever differences do exist.
(Tajfel,1978e,p.86)
In comparison to Phase V, Social Categorization 
continues to play an essential role in intergroup relations, 
but is re-integrated with the concepts of evaluation and 
personal integrity employed in Phases III and IV. This is 
done in terms of socially derived value differentials and 
social identity. An important development in Tajfel's 
thinking is the introduction of the concept of social 
comparison which provides the link between social
categorization and social identity. The integration of these 
concepts provides a framework within which the function of 
psychological group distinctiveness can be explained and 
understood more clearly.
8.6.4 Domain of application
8.6.4.1; Relative deprivation: Having established the
social-psychological conditions for intergroup behaviour, 
and the social-psychological processes involved, Tajfel 
integrates the various theoretical concepts by applying this 
theoretical framework to the issue of relative deprivation. 
This idea would not have been possible in terms of the
rudimentary ideas presented during the previous phases.
This application offers a suitable exemplar as the
conceptual problems encountered are also relevant to the more 
general problems of intergroup behaviour. In Tajfel's view, 
they require a social psychological theory of the social 
uniformities of intergroup behaviour. Tajfel draws heavily on 
the work of Gurr (1970) , who offers a sociological 
perspective on relative deprivations, in order to elaborate 
on its social psychological aspects. In other social sciences 
the concept of relative deprivation often serves as an 
independent variable in the study of social processes and 
social movements. In accordance with Tajfel's views on the 
relationship between social psychology and other disciplines 
(Tier 1) it is the job of social psychology to reach an 
understanding of its genesis and functioning. This is done by 
linking the concepts of social identity and social
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comparisons with the inter-individual- intergroup
continuum.
a)The interindividual pole:
At the extremity of the individual end of the continuum 
relative deprivation is both interpersonal and intragroup. 
In this instance, Festinger's version of social comparison 
is directly relevant; individuals compare themselves with 
other individuals who are similar to themselves and hence 
are more likely to be members of their own group.
b) The transition between interindividual and intergroup: 
Tajfel takes the middle of the interindividual-intergroup 
continuum to reiterate his criticisms of other theoretical 
perspectives on intergroup behaviour and to illuminate the 
social issues which his theory addresses (Tier 2) . In the 
transition between largely interpersonal and largely 
intergroup relative deprivation, social comparisons which 
are interpersonal and intragroup can be assumed to serve as 
independent variables for intergroup behaviour. For example, 
interpersonal and intragroup social comparisons lead to 
certain forms of intergroup behaviour through the existence 
of assumed individual motivational states. Such an 
explanation of intergroup behaviour can be applied to some 
people who display hostile intergroup behaviour in a great 
variety of situations but is still open to the theoretical 
criticisms iterated in the earlier section (Tier 3). 
Moreover, this explanation has also been applied to 
intergroup behaviour involving large numbers of people over 
long periods of time; that is, to those conditions in which 
most people display hostile intergroup behaviour. Tajfel 
examines the work of L. Berkowitz (1972) in some detail in 
order to illuminate the difficulties encountered by this 
'social mobility' explanation of intergroup behaviour and 
suggests that it has led to a narrowing of the focus of 
attention and to a restriction in the scope of social 
psychological theories concerned with large-scale problems of 
intergroup behaviour and social change.
c)The intergroup pole:
Tajfel examines the group extreme of the continuum in order 
to make explicit a theoretical alternative. At this extreme,
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relative deprivation involves intergroup social comparisons 
leading to intergroup behaviour. This is illustrated using 
two very different examples in which the social conditions 
restrict individual mobility and which cannot be easily 
framed within an interindividual approach. The first refers 
to studies conducted in South Africa by K. Danziger (1963) 
and Geber (1972), on the aspirations of African boys. Both 
studies found that the awareness of a common group fate 
determined by race focused schoolboys' aspirations away from 
individual goals and interindividual comparisons towards 
group aspirations and intergroup comparisons. The second 
example refers to the Protestant-Catholic relationship in 
Northern Ireland. The social and political conditions are 
very different from the previous example in that the people 
of both groups are very similar. In this case, the salience 
of ingroup affiliations can only be explained with reference 
to comparisons made with the outgroup in their social and 
traditional context.
We have seen that in the case of interpersonal relative 
deprivation social comparisons are made with individuals who 
are subjectively similar. In the case of intergroup relative 
deprivation comparisons are more often made with groups which 
are highly dissimilar. This is necessary, in some conditions, 
in order to maintain or create a positive and distinctive 
image of the ingroup and hence a positive social identity.
Tajfel then relates these social comparisons at the
group extreme of the continuum with the social conditions in
which intergroup behaviour occurs. Where the perceived
intergroup relations are perceived as legitimate and stable
comparison groups will tend to be similar to the ingroup.
Where intergroup relations start to be perceived as
illegitimate and unstable new dimensions of comparability
with highly dissimilar groups emerge. This demands a
'dynamic', as opposed to a 'static', view of similarity and
comparability which depends upon
shifting patterns of social conditions, contexts, 
influence, ideology, beliefs and attitudes in a 
constantly changing social environment
(Tajfel,1978d,p.76).
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These comparisons do not only exist at the phantasy level as 
Festinger claimed, but can be powerful determinants of 
intergroup behaviour and social action. Returning to the 
African studies, the development and diffusion of group 
oriented political ideologies become at one and the same time 
the social psychological process of 'social change* and a 
powerful determinant of 'objective' social change.
8.6.4.2 The various forms of interarouD differentiation; 
Tajfel elaborates further on the various forms of intergroup 
behaviour which are likely to emerge in conditions of social 
change. Other theories in this field have not been able to 
provide a comprehensive framework that indicates the 
direction or mode of intergroup behaviour which will emerge, 
given certain conditions. Similarly, although Tajfel claimed 
that the forms of intergroup behaviour depend upon the 
cognitive structures and personal integrity of group members, 
these ideas were not developed sufficiently in Phase III to 
indicate the particular modes of intergroup behaviour that 
might occur. Within Tajfel's current theoretical framework in 
Phase VI it is possible to identify the particular 
psychological problems which confront social groups in their 
relations with other groups and to identify the possible 
psychological solutions which can be adopted by the 
individuals concerned. Although this is perhaps the weakest 
part of Tajfel's thinking, his theoretical framework provides 
some indications of the particular forms of social behaviour, 
which individuals and groups will adopt when it is applied to 
particular intergroup situations. In conditions of social 
mobility, if the group fails to provide a positive social 
identity, the individual will leave the group. In conditions 
of social change, in which the individual is aware that he or 
she cannot easily leave the group, a positive social identity 
can only be acquired by changing the relationships between 
groups or preserved by resisting such changes. In the former, 
an individual acts as an individual; in the latter, an 
individual acts as a member of the group.
This analysis becomes more complicated when Tajfel 
considers the differences in the psychological problems 
confronting consensually superior and consensually inferior
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groups. In conditions of social change, however, there are 
various solutions which depend upon the groups relative 
status and the particular psychological problems which 
confront the group.
a) Consensually superior groups in conditions of social 
change:
Tajfel first considers the conditions in which the group's 
superior status is threatened by another group. In these 
circumstances, the superior group will intensify the existing 
distinctions and will attempt to create new conditions, which 
enable it's group members to preserve and enhance their 
psychological distinctiveness. Secondly, the superior status 
of the group may also be threatened by a conflict of values; 
its superiority is seen by some members as being, in some 
ways, illegitimate. In this case, new justifications and 
ideologies must be created and diffused in order to maintain 
the status quo.
b) Consensually inferior groups in condition of social 
change:
Conditions of social change may be associated with 
psychological conflict of values inherent in leaving the 
group and/or fear of powerful social sanctions. In these 
conditions, the problems of social identity confronting the 
inferior group will only express themselves in social 
behaviour if there is some awareness that alternatives to 
the existing social structure are conceivable or attainable. 
Tajfel explores three possible solutions to these problems. 
Firstly, the inferior group may attempt to gain the 
consensually positively valued attributes of the superior 
group. This would involve actions and reinterpretations which 
break down the group differentiations in such a manner that 
the inferior group is assimilated into the superior group. If 
this is not possible, the inferior group may attempt to 
re-evaluate the inferior characteristics so that they 
contribute to a positive social identity. An example of this 
second type of solution is the re-evaluation of black as a 
negative attribute in terms of 'black is beautiful'. Thirdly, 
the inferior group may participate in social action that 
creates new ideologies and group characteristics with
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positively valued distinctiveness. One recent example is the 
re-creation of a 'Welsh social identity*. As social identity 
is dependent upon social comparisons, these solutions will 
only be successful if the superior group accepts them. It is 
in these conditions that conflict between comparative social 
identities may lead to intense hostility in intergroup 
attitudes and intergroup discrimination.
TABLE 8.6: SUMMARY OF PHASE VI 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Address social realities of the contemporary world
Social level of inquiry and explanation which provides an understanding of the relationship between 
the social and cultural context and the psychological processes of the individual 
The relationship between social psychology with other disciplines and the indispensable role of 
social psychology in the study of intergroup relations
The role of experimental research in relation to theoretical knowledge in social psychology 
FIELD
Intergroup Relations:
The limitations of individualistic theories of intergroup behaviour
The requirements of a social-psychological theory of intergroup behaviour; integration of the 
social conditions and psychological processes involved in intergroup relations
THEORY
Group membership - a social psychological definition - dependent on subjective and objective social 
consensus which has cognitive, evaluative and emotional components 
Dialectic relationship between social situations and subjective group membership
Characteristics of social behaviour:
InterpersonaI-1ntergroup cont i nuum 
Variability -Uniformity continuum 
Individual-Social category continuum
Conditions for social behaviour:
Social mobility-Social change continuum of belief systems 
legitimacy-illegitimacy continuum 
stabiIi ty-i nstabiIi ty cont i nuum
Forms of social behaviour:
individual movement-social movement
social creativity of new conditions, ideologies and group attributes 
intensification and justification of group differentiations 
reinterpretation and réévaluation of group attributes
Social psychological processes:
social categorization 
social identity 
social comparison
psychoIogicaIgroup distinctiveness
DOMAIN OF APPLICATION 
Relative deprivation
Social movements and Intergroup conflict:
consensually superior groups 
consensually inferior groups/minority groups 
real world intergroup relations
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8.7 PHASES IIB; INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1961-1964
During the same period in which Tajfel was studying 
the role of classification and value in the perception of 
people he also conducted research which examined differences 
in the style of judgment adopted by individuals. The 
following three publications can be identified with this 
'phase':-
Bruner,J.S. and Tajfel,H: (1961): Cognitive risk and
environmental change. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psvcholoav 62, 231-241.
Tajfel,H. Richardson,A. and Everstine,L.(1964a): Individual 
consistencies in categorizing: A study of judgmental
behaviour. Journal of Personality. Vol. 32(1), 90-108.
Tajfel,H: Richardson.A. and Everstine,L.(1964b): Individual 
judgment consistencies in conditions of risk taking. Journal 
of Personality. Vol: 32(4), 550-565.
The first paper published by Bruner and Tajfel (1961) 
distinguished between narrow categorizers and broad 
categorizers. This was also found to be associated with 
intelligence and led to the following two papers which 
examined correlations with personality.
Not surprisingly, some features of these papers display 
consistencies with the main body of Tajfel's work. It is also 
worth noting that categorization style was identified through 
subjects' responses to changes in the stimulus situation. 
However, the main purpose of this research reflects a 
transient concern with individual differences, personality 
and judgmental style. These issues were soon left to one 
side and subsequently dropped as Tajfel turned to address 
the more social and large- scale issues of prejudice and 
intergroup relations.
8.8 PHASE VII: REFLECTIONS AND REINTERPRETATIONS
During the period in which Tajfel establishes and 
consolidates the theory of intergroup relations following 
Phase VI some of his writings are also of a reflective 
nature. These illuminate the role of his personal 
experiences and professional associations in relation to 
his academic work. They also contain material regarding 
Tajfel's own reflections on the evolution of his thinking.
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These tend to focus on the continuities which can be traced
through the various phases of his intellectual career. The
following publications can be included within this "phase*
Cohen, D:(1977) Interview with Henri Tajfel in Psvcholooists 
on Psvcholoav. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Tajfel,H:(1980a) The 'New Look* and social differentiations: 
A semi- Brunerian perspective. In Olsen, D. (ed. 1980).The 
social foundations of language and thought: Essavs in honour 
of J.S.Bruner. New York: Norton.
Tajfel,H: (1981a) Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies 
in Social Psvcholoav. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel,H:(1981b) Social stereotypes and social groups. In 
Turner,J.C. and Giles,H. (eds.) Interarouo Behaviour. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
In 1977, Cohen published a series of interviews with 
eminent psychologists, which attempted to reveal the 
differences between and the assumptions underlying their 
different approaches and beliefs. He also wanted to relate 
these to the psychologists* personality. In his interview 
with Tajfel, the questions asked and, more importantly, 
Tajfel's responses, are highly germane to the present study. 
Furthermore, in later comments, Tajfel suggests that this 
interview initiated further reflections on the intellectual 
influences which had shaped his own work 
(Tajfel,1980a,1981a). The second article (Tajfel,1980a) was 
published in an edited volume of essays in honour of J.S. 
Bruner. Tajfel here acknowledges his debt to Bruner and 
traces Bruner's influence, not only during the period of 
their early association, but also throughout his whole 
intellectual career. Tajfel highlights three main aspects of 
his approach in this respect; his functional and comparative 
or relativistic approach, the role of differentiation in 
'physical* and 'social* perception, and the interrelationship 
between individuals and their social context.
In 1981(a), Tajfel published the only book for which he 
was the sole author. It comprises, very largely, previously 
published articles or chapters, the majority of which were 
easily accessible. Tajfel justifies the book on both personal 
and academic grounds as fulfilling three aims: to reflect and 
to make explicit the convergence of his personal experiences
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with the direction of his academic work; to expose the 
emerging unity and a widening of perspective that might be 
useful to others; and to locate this progression alongside 
parallel developments in European social psychology.
Not surprisingly, this book contains many of the most 
important articles written by Tajfel. However, there are some 
notable differences between the edited versions presented in 
the book and the original publications. Moreover, Tajfel does 
not arrange the material in chronological order. Rather, he 
sets the emergent perspective (1972a,1979a) on social 
psychology and social processes in Part 1. Part II is a 
selection of material published between 1957 and 1981, 
tracing the shift of emphasis from studies on perceptual 
judgment to studies of social stereotypes. Part III includes 
the experience of prejudice and studies on the attitudes of 
children. Finally, the emergent theory of intergroup 
relations is presented in Part IV. The organization of the 
material is based on both the subject matter and the 
chronological sequence of the publications. To some extent, 
it actually disguises important factors in the evolution of 
Tajfel's perspective by setting the goal and providing the 
solutions before asking the questions, and stating the 
initial problems from which this perspective emerged.
Furthermore, the book is necessarily a selection of 
articles covering twenty-five years of Tajfel's academic 
career. As such, it identifies major stages in the 
development of Tajfel's thinking, but does not always provide 
the links by which the development can be traced. It is, 
essentially, an incomplete picture, which both disguises the 
problems and omits the emergence of solutions. This having 
been said, Tajfel does give an introduction to each of the 
four parts which highlight the continuities in his work and 
which outline the background context in which the studies 
were conducted. The first chapter of the book- 'The 
development of a perspective' also discusses some of the 
personal issues which influenced the direction of his 
research and theorizing as well as the emergence of the 
'social dimension' in European social psychology.
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The fourth article, 'social stereotypes and social 
groups' (1981b), examines the phenomenon of stereotypes and 
illuminates essential features of the changes in Tajfel's 
perspective. These changes, in Tajfel's own terms, represent 
a widening of perspective from a purely cognitive approach to 
an explicitly social one. The emergent social perspective 
offers a radical alternative to traditional approaches, while 
simultaneously incorporating the cognitive aspects of 
Tajfel's earlier framework.
These four publications contain material which shed light 
on the evolution and transformation of Tajfel's work. They 
refer to both the work itself and to the personal and 
intellectual influences which Tajfel thought to be important. 
They are germane, therefore, to the present analysis taken as 
a whole. As such, this material will be incorporated into the 
following chapters on the continuities and discontinuities, 
problems and solutions, and the cultural, social and 
intellectual influences in the development of Tajfel's 
thinking.
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CHAPTER 9
CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES:
PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS
9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES
9.1.1 Object of study
9.1.2 Method, theory and social reality
9.1.3 The comparative or relative perspective
9.1.4 The functional approach
9.1.5 The transition from psychological reductionism to 
social psychology
9.1.6 Objectivity and values in the social sciences
9.1.7 The locus of explanation
9.1.8 The cognitive component
9.1.9 The evaluative component
9.1.10 The motivational component
9.2 PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE
9.2.1 From perceptual over-estimation to the accentuation 
of differences (Phase I)
9.2.2 Social perception: From the physical to the social 
environment (The transition from phase I to phase
I I )
9.2.3 Maintaining a reductionist perspective (Phase II)
9.2.4 First steps towards a more social social psychology 
(Phase III)
9.2.5 From social perception towards intergroup relations 
(The transition from phase II to phase III)
9.2.6 New problems for a theory of intergroup relations 
(Phase IV)
9.2.7 Finding the base-line conditions for intergroup 
differentiation (Phase V)
9.2.8 Problems in search of a theory (The transition from 
phase V to phase VI)
9.2.9 Phase VI
9.2.9.1 Social categorization, social values and the 
psychological processes of intergroup 
behaviour
9.2.9.2 Social conditions and social beliefs
9.2.9.3 The discipline of social psychology and the 
field of intergroup behaviour
Studying the transformation of social representations 
is a complex affair. It involves, necessarily, a
preoccupation with change, whilst simultaneously recognizing 
the importance of stability over time. In the current 
context, this involves studying the dynamic relationships
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among the principles of social psychology, the field and
object of study, the theoretical principles and their domain
of application.
In the previous chapter, I presented a detailed account
of the content of Tajfel's work in terms of six phases. In
this Chapter, I shall identify the major continuities and
discontinuities across these phases and go on to explore the
problems and solutions that characterize the development of
Tajfel's thinking. In Chapter 10, I shall examine the
interdependence of these developments with the intellectual
and social context of which Tajfel was a part.
A preliminary assessment of Tajfel's work may be
constructed to stress either the continuity of themes on the
one hand or the shifts in perspective on the other hand. This
is illustrated by the quotations below, which are taken from
the research interviews
I don't know that there were any major changes 
....it was one thing he (Tajfel) often said, that 
there was an underlying question behind all his work 
and this was in the early work on social perception 
and later in intergroup relations. It is the same 
question, which is how is genocide possible? And so 
all of his work, I think, was in some way or other 
addressed to that problem-the problems of prejudice, 
the problems of the prejudice of one group, group 
members, against another group.
(Billig, Interview)
I think he always saw his work as social (and) 
therefore related to group processes.
(Turner, Interview)
He has always been very clear that he regarded a 
cognitive perspective as essential to social 
psychology, with an emphasis on the social; in order 
to understand the complexities of human social 
behaviour it had to be cognitive and, at the same 
time, stressing (it's) social determination.
(Turner, Interview)
First of all, (Tajfel's work) became more social.
And the way it became more social was in the work 
on minimal categorization paradigm. And then, 
subsequently, it became concerned explicitly with 
intergroup phenomena, which was only implicit in the 
early work. He says in his '81 book that he can see 
strands in some of the major intergroup work in the
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early experiments. But, if you actually read those 
things, they're really about individuals 
categorizing the world and even the stimuli are 
pretty asocial, the lines, the coins, etcetera. He 
did some stuff in the 60's on immigrants and so on, 
and perception of nationalities, but he really 
didn't get into what it means to be in a group and 
how that affects your behaviour towards other groups 
until those minimal categorization experiments.
(Brown, Interview)
Both Billig and Turner stress the continuity in Tajfel's 
work. Whilst Billig argues that a single question dominated 
all of Tajfel's work. Turner emphasizes the cognitive and 
social themes. In contrast. Brown stresses the 
discontinuities between Tajfel's early studies on social 
perception and his later work on intergroup relations, the 
latter being construed as more social.
However, in order to understand the transformation of 
social representations within Tajfel's work, it is necessary 
to construct a more detailed analysis that highlights and 
integrates both the continuities and discontinuities. This is 
facilitated by examining the similarities and differences 
between the six phases of research presented in Chapter 8. It 
will be recalled that, in Phase I, Tajfel focused on the 
accentuation of differences in the perceptual judgment of 
physical objects. In Phase II, he was explicitly concerned 
with stereotyping and with the role of categorization and 
value in the perceptual judgment of the social environment. 
In Phase III, Tajfel elaborated his framework with reference 
to prejudice, making the important transition between the 
study of social perception and the study of intergroup 
relations. In Phase IV he concentrated on the development of 
national attitudes in children. In Phase V, he and his 
collaborators examined the role of social categorization in 
producing a differential response to members of one's own 
group and to members of another group. Finally, in Phase VI, 
a comprehensive theory of intergroup relations is developed, 
which makes explicit the roles of social categorization, 
social identity and social comparisons in the context of 
social change, and which expands his initial framework to 
include social beliefs concerning both the structure of
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society and the legitimacy and stability of intergroup 
relations in society.
In the first section of this Chapter I shall educe ten 
themes concerning stability and change in Tajfel's work 
across these six phases. The identification of continuities 
and discontinuities, however, is but one step in the analysis 
of how a theory is transformed. In order to construct an 
understanding of the evolution of a social representational 
system we must go beyond a disjointed or linear 
representation of change in which one set of statements is 
simply compared to another. In order to understand the 
transformation of social representations it is necessary to 
embrace a dynamic or spiral representation of change which 
allows one to examine the interdependent evolution of their 
content and structure. This is achieved by focusing on the 
problems addressed by Tajfel and the construction of their 
solutions. Thus, in the second part of this chapter, I 
examine the problems and provisional solutions which 
characterize each phase, together with the transitions 
between successive phases in the development of Tajfel's 
theory. It will be seen that the problems he tackled are not 
isolated tasks but, rather, that they are constructed within 
the system of social representations. Similarly, the 
solutions do not simply resolve the problem but, rather, they 
require the gradual reconstruction of the social 
representational system as a whole.
9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES
In the first section of this Chapter I identify some 
general continuities and discontinuities in the development 
of Tajfel's thinking. This is presented in terms of ten 
themes which reflect both stability and change across the 
six phases. These include the object of study; the 
interrelationship between method, theory and social reality; 
the comparative or relative perspective; the functional 
approach; a transition from psychological reductionism to 
social psychology; objectivity and values in the social 
sciences; the locus of explanation; and the cognitive, 
evaluative and motivational components of intergroup 
relations.
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These themes provide an overview of Taj fel * s 
intellectual career and serve to indicate the central aspects 
of the various transformations which need to be explained. 
This requires not only an analysis of problems and their 
solutions but also an analysis of the intellectual and social 
influences in Tajfel's career.
9.1.1 Object of studv
The most obvious series of changes concerns the 
phenomena which the various theories and research projects 
address. The object of study changes quite dramatically from 
the perceptual judgment of specific physical objects under 
tightly controlled laboratory conditions to various forms of 
intergroup behaviour and social action that abound in 
society.
9.1.2 Method, theorv and social realitv
The change in the object of study is accompanied by a 
shift of emphasis in regard to the roles of method, theory 
and social reality in social psychology. Tajfel's early paper 
on the perceptual judgment of physical dimensions epitomises 
the experimental tradition with little or no reference to 
either theory or social reality. It is followed shortly by a 
series of papers in which there is a greater emphasis on the 
importance of theory. In his study of person perception and 
stereotypes, for example, he advocates the need for good 
theory in both the design and the interpretation of 
experimental studies. By Phase III, he argues that social 
psychological theories of prejudice and large-scale 
intergroup phenomena should address, directly, the social 
issues that arise in modern society. Although the research 
programme on the development of national attitudes (Phase IV) 
is theoretically weak, the results highlight the significance 
of the social context in the study of psychological processes 
relating to large-scale phenomena. Such considerations are 
almost entirely absent in the experimental studies of Phase 
V, which attempt to determine the minimal condition for 
intergroup discrimination. These experiments are conducted 
in a societal vacuum of sorts. However, by Phase VI, Tajfel 
advocates the need for a social psychological theory that 
addresses the social realities of intergroup conflict and
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social change. Furthermore, one of the strengths of social 
psychology is seen to be its methodological pluralism as 
opposed to an adherence to any single revered method of 
investigation such as the experiment.
9.1.3 The comparative or relative perspective
The comparative perspective which Tajfel adopted is 
one of the most significant features of his work and is 
evident in nearly every phase of his theorizing and research. 
The perception or judgment of a phenomenon, be it a physical 
object, an abstract attribute or a social group, is always 
relative to other phenomena. An object is not perceived in 
isolation or in any absolute sense; rather, it is perceived 
or judged in comparison to other relevant objects. This 
approach to the problems of social perception and intergroup 
relations is fundamental to the representation of the 
phenomena concerned and to the construction of theoretical 
explanations of the substantive issues involved.
The comparative perspective is evident in Taj fel ' s early
publication on the role of value in perceptual judgments of
magnitude (Tajfel,1957).
Perceptual judgments of physical objects are 
affected....by the background of perceived 
relationships between a particular stimulus and all 
other stimuli in the same series.
(Tajfel,1957,p.l95)
The principle of 'accentuation of differences' developed in 
the field of perceptual overestimation (Phase I) is an 
essentially comparative criterion.
The application of this principle to the problems of 
social perception and stereotypes (Phase II) was justified 
on the grounds of their comparative nature. Furthermore, it 
provided a framework for their subsequent reinterpretation. 
Comparison begins to take on a new significance in the 
considerations of prejudice (Phase III) and national 
attitudes (Phase IV) . Social categorization is dependent upon 
distinguishing between one's own group and another group. 
Similarly, preferential evaluations for one's own group are 
made relative to other groups.
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It is somewhat surprising, then, that the significance 
of comparisons was not immediately apparent in the social 
categorization experiments (Phase V) . The emphasis on the 
cognitive process of social categorization per se and the 
explanation of results in terms of social norms obviated the 
need for any theoretical principle of comparison. However, 
the comparative perspective re-emerges in Phase VI and, 
moreover, is recognised quite explicitly within the 
theoretical framework itself. The process of social 
comparison is described and constitutes an essential 
component of the structure of the theory of intergroup 
relations. It affords the integration of the psychological 
processes of social categorization and social identity, which 
together provide an understanding of the human potential for 
differentiating between groups. Furthermore, it facilitates 
identification of the distinguishing characteristics of 
interindividual and intergroup behaviour.
9.1.4 The functional approach
Another feature of Tajfel*s work is the adoption of a 
functional perspective. This perspective considers the 
relationship between the organism and its environment as one 
in which the organism actively reconstructs the environment 
for its own purposes. Perception is thus an active 
interaction between the organism and its environment. 
Discriminating between physical objects or between social 
groups does not just happen; it serves to orientate 
individuals in their physical and social environments.
Neither the perceptual overestimation of size nor the 
behaviour of groups are considered, by Tajfel, to be 
maladaptive or irrational manifestations of individual needs 
and motivations. Shifts in the judgment of magnitude 
facilitate the ability to distinguish between coins of 
greater or lesser value (Phase 1) . Discrimination between 
groups of people (Phase 11) is facilitated by accentuating 
differences in regard to some physical attribute such as skin 
colour. In both cases the physical attribute serves as a cue 
to distinguish between objects of greater or lesser value. 
The attributes acquire meaning only in the context of the
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classifications to which they relate. This also applies to 
the studies in Phase II that use abstract continua.
The functional perspective is extrapolated when Tajfel 
considers prejudice and intergroup relations (Phase III) . 
Firstly, social categorizations serve to organize and 
simplify the complexities of the social environment. 
Secondly, similarities and differences in the social 
environment are accentuated in order to serve current 
requirements of social adaptation and to preserve emotionally 
invested differentiations between one's own group and other 
groups. The causal attributions that individuals make in 
order to understand the constantly changing relationships 
between groups must fulfil these two functional requirements. 
They must provide simple and coherent explanations, and they 
must preserve an individual * s personal integrity or system of 
values.
However, the research conducted in Phases IV and V was 
only minimally informed by a functionalist perspective. They 
clearly demonstrated discrimination both between large-scale 
groups (Phase IV) and experimental groups (Phase V). Social 
categorizations order the social environment whilst social 
norms serve to guide social conduct. The psychological 
functions of these respective discriminations, however, were 
not elucidated any further.
By contrast. Phase VI constitutes a functional theory 
of intergroup relations. The psychological processes are 
integrated by reference to their functional interdependence. 
Intergroup discriminations serve to create psychological 
distinctions which, in turn, provides a positive social 
identity. An individual's social identity locates him or her 
within society. The social group provides a positive social 
identity for its members. Social comparisons enable 
individuals to compare and evaluate themselves in relation to 
others. Group members distinguish their group from other 
groups along salient dimensions that have a clear value 
differential and, hence, which afford them a positive social 
identity. Furthermore, the psychological processes are 
functionally related both to the systems of belief and to 
their manifestations in social action and in social
421
movements. Social beliefs are related, on the one hand, to 
the psychological processes, and, on the other hand, to 
social reality, so that they both direct and sustain the 
social differentiation between groups and, in turn, are also 
created in order both to achieve and to maintain these 
differentiations. These systems of belief or group ideologies 
serve both to justify and to explain various social actions 
and social movements.
9.1.5 The transition from psychological reductionism to 
social psychology
Both the functional approach and the comparative 
perspective constitute continuous threads in the historical 
development of Tajfel*s thinking. However, this having been 
said, there is a shift in his functional perspective away 
from individual functions such as the accentuation of 
differences, stereotypes or prejudice to an increasing 
emphasis on the social functions served by various aspects 
of intergroup relations. The comparative perspective shows 
a similar shift away from comparisons between physical 
objects, to comparisons between groups of people and, 
finally, to an emphasis on the relevance of these comparisons 
to the individual as a member of a group. These shifts are 
accompanied by a dramatic change in Taj fel* s perspective 
concerning the role of psychological processes in the 
explanation of social phenomena.
Throughout Phases I and II Tajfel adopts a position of 
psychological reductionism whereby social phenomena can be 
explained in terms of general cognitive principles. This 
reductionist perspective is transformed in Phase III. The 
main thrust of this phase is that principles of cognition 
are needed to explain social phenomena. However, these 
principles are related to the broader issues of assimilation 
and to a search for coherence in regard to change in the 
relationships between groups. The alternative perspective is 
not fully achieved until Phase VI. Here, Tajfel advocates 
that social psychology must encompass an analysis of social 
phenomena over and above an analysis of individual cognitive 
processes. The latter are necessary but not sufficient for 
explaining and understanding social phenomena. It is also
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necessary to include an analysis of social beliefs in 
relation to the social realities of intergroup relations.
9.1.6 Objectivity and values in the social sciences
The change of perspective described above is closely 
related to Tajfel's 'convictions' (1981,p.7) about the nature 
of social psychology as a science. For the first decade of 
his intellectual career his publications maintain an aseptic 
aura of neutrality and objectivity. They are restricted to an 
analysis of the findings of experimental research and to the 
construction of theoretical explanations with little or no 
reference to issues relating to the discipline of social 
psychology. Phase III sees the emergence of an explicit and 
ardent concern for the relationship between social 
psychological theories and the crucial issues confronting 
modern societies. This is followed by an increasing awareness 
of the cultural values inherent in social psychological 
theorizing reflected in the social mobility-social change 
continuum.
9.1.7 The locus of explanation
These shifts and changes are reflected in, and 
accompanied by, a change in the locus of explanation. In 
Phases I and II, the explanation of social phenomena is 
located within the individual. In Phases III and V, 
explanations are given in terms of the individual located 
within a social context. However, the individual and social 
aspects of social psychological explanation are maintained 
in important respects as two juxtaposed, yet separate, 
domains of explanation. It is not until Phase VI that they 
are fully integrated into a truly social-psychological 
approach, which prescribes the interrelationship between 
individual and society as a dialectic one. These shifts and 
changes are developed through and related to transformations 
in the conception of the cognitive and evaluative components 
of social interactions.
9.1.8 The cognitive component
From the outset of his intellectual career, Tajfel 
expended considerable energy in determining and making 
explicit the role of cognition in various social phenomena. 
However, in Phases I and II, the individual cognitive
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processes of classification and of the accentuation of 
differences were considered a necessary sufficient 
explanation of phenomena associated with the perceptions of 
both the physical and the social environment. In contrast, 
by Phase VI, the individual cognitive process of social 
categorization was considered to be insufficient to provide 
an explanation of social phenomena such as social stereotypes 
and intergroup relations; it was also necessary to examine 
the consensual systems of belief in relation to the social 
context. Furthermore, priority is given, during this phase, 
to social aspects of cognition. Social categorizations can 
only be properly understood in relation to differentiation 
between social groups within the context of widely diffused 
beliefs or understandings, and the justification of social 
actions and social movements as exemplified by ideologies.
This shift of emphasis can be traced through various 
intermediatory phases. The study of large-scale social 
phenomena, such as nationalism, and widespread prejudice 
(Phase III) extended the cognitive component to include, not 
only the role of social categorization in the structuring of 
the environment but also, the nature of attributions 
regarding the causes of large-scale social events. However, 
the focus was still on individual cognitive processes. In the 
early research on the development of national attitudes 
(Phase IV) , greater attention was given to the content of 
cognition, to knowledge and beliefs which were widely 
diffused within society. By contrast, the experimental 
research in Phase IV reverted to the earlier emphasis on 
individual cognition and to the process of social 
categorization. The influence of the social context on these 
individual cognitive processes was conceived in terms of 
social norms with the consequence that the individual and 
social aspects of intergroup relations were separated out 
into two distinct realms.
By Phase VI, developments associated with the 
specification of an interpersonal-intergroup continuum, along 
with an analysis of various forms of intergroup behaviour, 
led to the development of a theoretical framework in which 
individual cognitive processes were not conceived of as being
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more fundamental or basic than the social variables which 
influenced them; rather, they were conceived of in terms of 
their dialectic interdependence with shared interpretations 
of social reality.
9.1.9 The evaluative component
The evaluative component undergoes a similar shift from 
the influence of an individual's values on social perception 
to social values which are widely diffused in society. Values 
associated with a physical dimension (Phase I) tend to be 
highly consensual. Values associated with a physical 
dimension (Phase I) or a social dimension (Phase II) cause an 
accentuation of differences which facilitate differentiation. 
Concern with the social phenomena of widespread prejudice 
(Phase III) and national preferences (Phase IV) led to an 
examination of the role of stereotypes and of prejudice in 
defending or preserving an individual's system of values. 
These aspects of intergroup relations are all but ignored in 
Phase V. However, by Phase VI, the evaluative component 
constituted an integral part of the theory of intergroup 
relations, at both the individual and the social levels. 
Evaluative aspects of the psychological processes were linked 
to the systems of values in a society relating to value 
differentiation between groups. Social change and intergroup 
conflict are to be understood in terms of the creation and 
preservation of positively-valued social identities.
It is worth noting here that Tajfel is often considered 
to be a cognitive social psychologist. However, this can be 
misleading. Firstly, it understates the central role of 
values in his theoretical understanding of social perceptual 
phenomena and of intergroup relations. Secondly, it 
underestimates the social aspects of cognition. The contents 
and processes of cognition involved in intergroup behaviour 
can only be understood with reference to the consensual 
systems of belief which pertain to social reality, ie. what 
Moscovici would call social representations.
9.1.10 The motivational component
We have seen that the cognitive and evaluative 
components display a continuous yet changing significance 
within the various theoretical structures and constitute a
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major part of those theories. The motivational component has 
a different history and plays a different role within the 
emergent theory of intergroup relations. In the studies of 
social perception, the motivational component was significant 
for not being included within the theoretical explanations. 
This allowed the development of a purely cognitive 
explanation of perceptual phenomena. Similarly, in Phase III, 
Taj fel argued against motivational explanations of prejudice. 
However, in order to understand both the direction and the 
contents of the search for coherence, it was necessary to 
postulate a need to preserve the self-image. This constitutes 
a motivational assumption, as opposed to an explanatory 
principle. By Phase VI, the need to preserve or to create a 
positive social identity provided the link by which the 
psychological processes were integrated with the subjective 
social realities of intergroup relations. In this respect, it 
constitutes a highly significant, if relatively simple, part 
of the theory.
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Table 9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES: PHASES 1. I I  & I I I
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III
Object of study perceptual judgement of physical 
envi ronment
perceptual judgement of social 
envi ronment
intergroup relations and 
prejudice
Method, theory and social 
reality
experimental research experimental research and good 
theory
theories should address issues 
in society
Comparative perspective comparisons between objects on a 
physical dimension
comparisons between people on a 
social or abstract dimension
comparisons between one's own 
group and other groups
Functional approach accentuation of differences 
facilitates discrimination of 
valued objects
polarization facilitates 
discrimination of groups
causal attributions provide 
explanations and preserve 
personal integrity
Psychological reductionism to 
social Dsvchologv
social phenomena explained in 
terms of general cognitive 
principles
social phenomena explained in 
terms of general cognitive 
principles
cognitive principles are 
necessary for explanation of 
social phenomena
Objectivity and values in social 
sciences
objective, experimental 
psychological research
objective, experimental 
psychological research
social psychology and values in 
society
Locus of explanation individual individual individual and social context
Cognitive component classification and accentuation 
of
classification and polarization social categorization and causal 
attribution
Evalutive component values associated with physical 
dimensions
values associated with physical 
and social dimensions
preservation of individual's 
system of values
Motivational component explicit rejection of 
motivational accounts
preservation of self-image
to
Table 9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES: PHASES IV. V & VI
PHASE IV PHASE V PHASE VI
Object of study development of national attitudes intergroup behaviour and social 
categorization
intergroup relations
Method, theory and social 
reality
experimental research- and social 
context
experimental research on minimal 
conditions for discrimination
socio-psychological theory 
theory addressing social 
realities of intergroup 
relations using many methods
Comparative perspective comparisons between child's own 
nation and other nations
social comparisons (1)between 
individuals and (2}between 
individuals as group members
N)
00
Functional approach psychological processes are 
interdependent with belief 
systems and social actions
Psychological reductionism to 
social psychology
cognitive principles are 
necessary but not sufficient for 
explanation of social phenomona
Objectivity and values in social 
sciences
cultural values are inherent in 
socio-psychological theories
Locus of explanation individual and social context individual and social context dialectics between individual 
and social context
Cognitive component content of cognition social categorization and social 
norms
social categorization and 
consensual beliefs
Evalutive component preservation of individual's 
system of values
evaluative aspects of 
psychological processes linked 
with value systems in society
Motivational component preservation or creation of 
positive social identity
9.2.PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS; TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE
The continuities and discontinuities identified above 
are related, in part, to the problems addressed by Tajfel 
and the construction of possible solutions. This is not a 
simple process of problem-solving, in its restricted 
psychological sense. Recognizing and taking up a problem 
crystallizes a long history of development; possible 
solutions emerge from perceiving and understanding the 
problem from a particular perspective. Furthermore, in the 
development of a new point of view, no one particular problem 
or solution can be said to be crucial; each plays its part in 
the evolution of an 'organic whole'. The assimilation of new 
ideas into a coherent framework is a constructive process 
which requires a delicate balance between generalization and 
differentiation, between conflict and integration. This 
becomes clear as we re-examine the problems and solutions 
that emerged during different phases in the development of 
Tajfel's thinking. The content and structure of each phase 
illuminates the interdependence of interpretative ideas; 
their interdependence with previous ideas which structure the 
problem and guide observation; and the modification of the 
system as a whole in response to changes at a single point 
in the structure.
9.2.1 From perceptual over-estimation to the accentuation of 
differences (Phase I)
In comparison to Tajfel's later contribution to the 
social psychology of intergroup relations, the first phase 
of his work is highly technical and rather orthodox, 
focusing, as it did, on detailed problems in the perceptual 
judgment of physical objects. Moreover, it was a late 
contribution to the field of perceptual overestimation, which 
had already passed its peak in the mid 50 ' s with the 
controversy surrounding the 'New Look' in the study of 
perceptual phenomena. (Blake and Ramsey). By this time, many 
inconsistencies had appeared within the research literature. 
Some studies showed that the association of value with a 
physical object resulted in the over- estimation of the 
object's size in comparison to neutral stimuli or objective
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measures. Others did not show this effect. Furthermore, the 
motivational explanation in terms of needs was inadequate.
By distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions of perceptual judgment and, more importantly, 
between interserial and intraserial comparisons, Tajfel 
(1957) was able to develop a functional and cognitive 
explanation in terms of the accentuation of differences which 
appeared to resolve the inconsistencies in previous research 
findings.
9.2.2 Social perception: From the physical to the social
environment (The transition from Phase I to Phase II)
I think the shifts came about because he was looking 
for good ideas.
(Turner, Interview)
Q. (Was there anything that was innovatory about 
Tajfel's work?)
A. To start with, the importance of categorization
in social perception..... This was really Tajfel's
discovery: he was the first to put it explicitly.
(Turner, Interview)
Q. (What do you consider the most important aspects 
of his work?)
A. Firstly, there is his early work on 
categorization.
(Brown, Interview)
Taj fel's innovation was to apply the general principles 
of perceptual judgment developed in Phase I to those aspects 
of social perception relating directly to the social 
phenomena of stereotypes and prejudice (Tajfel,1959). In 
order to do this, it was first necessary to establish the 
similarities between the social perception of physical and of 
social objects. Tajfel emphasizes the comparative or 
dimensional nature of both whilst dwelling on the 
transitional case where stereotypes are based on the physical 
features of people eg. colour. Furthermore, he adopts a 
reductionist stance, whereby the problems of social 
perceptions and prejudice are, in principle, reducible to the 
cognitive processes involved in perceiving the length of 
lines and sizes of coins. This is so, despite the fact that, 
initially, he draws on anthropological and cultural studies 
to establish the significance or social relevance of these
430
studies. Secondly, the inclusion of research on stereotypes 
and prejudice within the explanatory domain led to a much 
greater emphasis on classification.
The development of a predictive framework for
accentuating differences which specified the impact of value
and classification on the perceptual judgment of physical (or
social) dimensions was a significant achievement. It provided
a unified explanation for research findings on perceptual
overestimation, perceptual stereotypes and prejudice. It also
opened up avenues for further research, introduced a number
of theoretical elaborations and suggested an extension to the
study of abstract dimensions. Its theoretical elegance
sustained its use as an explanatory framework in the face of
subsequent research findings that did not clearly support its
predictive hypotheses. With hindsight, the most significant
aspect of this work was the theoretical specification of the
cognitive processes involved in social perception.
9.2.3 Maintaining a reductionist perspective (Phase 11^
He started off talking about the accentuation of 
judged differences. There was almost immediately an 
important development where he started to talk about 
the role of classification. He produced an 
accentuation of similarities and differences in the 
•83 article with Wilkes...He has already moved now 
from just the accentuation of differences of 
peripheral cues, to a specific idea of 
categorization: that was one shift,.... As soon as 
he did that, ...he is already immediately thinking 
about the role of values in stereotyping. He has 
seen immediately the implications, so he is already 
moving in the social direction.
(Turner, Interview)
Turner identifies the shifts from the accentuation of 
judged differences and the role of classification in the 
perceptual judgment of physical objects to the idea of 
categorization and value in stereotyping. However, the shift 
was by no means immediate. The application of principles 
developed in Phase I, when applied to social objects of 
perception, presented its own particular problems. These were 
resolved, initially, by making minor adjustments in the 
systems of social representations.
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The * accentuation of differences* principle was 
developed, initially, in regard to stimuli lying on a 
continuous dimension that was associated with value. In Phase 
II, the study of the effects of a categorization superimposed 
on a continuous dimension led to the adoption of the term 
polarization. Classifications identified groups of stimuli 
that could be distinguished from each other. This requires 
differences between groups to be maximized and differences 
within groups to be minimized (ie. similarities to be 
maximized) (Tajfel and Wilkes,1963a).
Tajfel and Wilkes continued to explore these 
predictions, as well as those relating to salience and past 
experience, by conducting experimental research on the 
perception of physical objects. Eventually, they studied 
perceptual judgments of social phenomena, ie. people (Tajfel 
and Wilkes,1963b). At this stage, the cognitive theoretical 
framework established in Phase I persists alongside a 
reductionist approach to social perception. The similarity 
between perceptual judgments of physical and of social 
objects is justified, further, in terms of the quantitative 
research procedures applied to both domains. However, 
conducting research on perceptual judgments of the social 
attributes of people highlighted important differences 
between the two domains. Perceptual judgments of physical 
attributes are characterized by a high consensus and, 
furthermore, they can be compared to objective measures. In 
contrast, perceptual judgments of social attributes display 
a low consensus or greater subjective variability and it is 
thus more difficult to identify the variables concerned. 
Tajfel and Wilkes argue here that these problems can be 
overcome by the integration of experimental research with 
sound theory and methodological sophistication.
9.2.4 First steps towards a more social social psvcholoav 
(Phase III)
By the time Tajfel wrote his article on 'The Cognitive 
Aspects of Prejudice* (Tajfel,1969a), greater priority is 
given to the social domain and much of the theoretical 
framework emphasizes its differences from the physical 
domain. Categorizations of the social environment are more
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rigid and resistant to change. This is explained in terms of 
the paucity of clear negative feedback from social phenomena. 
Firstly, the social environment is more ambiguous. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the preservation of social 
categorizations is self-rewarding, as it maintains the 
associated value differentials between one's own and other 
groups.
This latter insight is an important one. Social 
categorizations not only simplify and organize the social 
environment. People are also members of those social 
categories. The implications of this are far-reaching and 
they are not fully developed until Phase VI. This being said, 
their initial exploration leads Tajfel to consider the 
assimilation of social values by children, as well as the 
identification of a child with his or her own group in a 
multi-group context. These ideas are barely more than 
mentioned. Much of the section on the attribution of social 
values reviews research whose findings demonstrate the 
child's devaluation of his or her own group. Conflict arises 
between the individual's identification with his or her own 
group and the social values which are prevalent and socially 
transmitted in society. This serves to emphasize the point 
that identification with one's own group is not a universal 
process, but rather is influenced by the wider social 
context.
If Tajfel had simply applied the cognitive and
evaluative principles developed in the field of social
perception to the social issue of prejudice, his theoretical
analysis might very well have stopped here. But Tajfel
explicitly locates the phenomenon of prejudice within the
wider context of large-scale intergroup relations.
He started with a cognitive theory of prejudice but 
already in that article he is talking about things 
like the way we look out, the way we think, the way 
we categorize - the stereotype of others is a 
function of social realities. It's a function of 
large scale theories and attributions ....He's 
always thinking not only about the distinctive law 
of social psychology but acknowledging that there 
is something called society.
(Turner, Interview)
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His theoretical focus shifts from the technical problems 
of social perception to the wider social realities and to an 
analysis of the conflicts apparent in various societies. His 
writings, here, reveal a passionate concern for intergroup 
prejudice in its various manifestations, both explicitly and 
also implicitly in the free use of examples drawn from the 
'real world*. These include colonialism and slavery, social 
class, conflicts in South Africa, and prejudice in Nazi 
Germany. Moreover, these examples illustrate Tajfel's belief 
that social psychology can and should provide an 
understanding of these social issues (which, in turn, sustain 
new forms of social action). For Tajfel, in order to achieve 
this, it was essential to examine the role of people's 
beliefs and views about the causes of social events. How do 
individuals react to specific intergroup situations and how 
do they come to understand the continual changes in these 
situations? Individuals must continuously make constant 
causal attributions to account for the changes. The question 
then arises as to why these causal attributions are made in 
terms of the inherent and immutable characteristics of 
large-scale groups.
Tajfel addresses this problem by drawing on the well- 
established literature on attribution theory and transposing 
it to the level of the group, as opposed to the individual. 
Explanations in terms of groups not only provide greater 
simplicity. They also avoid conflict with prevailing values 
and beliefs and facilitate the preservation of personal 
integrity and the individual's self-image. In other words, in 
order to preserve their self-image and to avoid a conflict of 
values and beliefs, individuals will find or create 
explanations for social events in terms of the relations 
between groups.
So far, we have looked at the theoretical problems which
Tajfel attempted to resolve during Phase III. However,
further problems arose in relation to the traditional
perspectives which dominated the field.
The most important (aspect of his work) is not so 
much what it argues for, but what it argues against.
He was arguing against a psycho-dynamic or 
instinctual view of aggression and prejudice, which
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was quite popular in the 50*s and 60*s ....(But) it 
wasn't just a refutation. It was putting up, if you 
want, a more cognitive, or a cultural, view of 
agression and prejudice.
(Turner, Interview)
Traditional explanations of prejudice and of intergroup 
phenomena stressed motivational and personality factors. By 
propounding an alternative perspective, Tajfel was forced to 
confront the conventions of the field. His adoption of a 
cognitive (and social) perspective needed to be justified. It 
was necessary, first, to establish the reality of a rational 
model of man in relation to the social environment and to 
establish the legitimacy of cognitive explanations of 
large-scale social phenomena. This he achieved in two ways. 
Firstly, Tajfel drew evidence from other fields in social 
psychology and also from anthropology in order to establish 
the legitimacy of a cognitive model of man. Secondly, its 
appropriations in this particular context is justified in 
terms of its scientific credibility and its application to 
social action. This having being said, Tajfel does not 
suggest that it provides a complete explanation of prejudice. 
Even the title of the article restricts its claims to a 
theoretical analysis of the Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice 
(emphasis added).
This phase of Tajfel's intellectual career marks a
transition between his early work in psychophysics and his
later work on intergroup relations.
The *69 article is a very good one, precisely 
because it looks to the past and points to the 
future; it's very much a transition article...(It) 
is actually completely firmly rooted in the first 
work, it is about accentuation....
(Turner, Interview)
And there you see also - I think you see the first 
glimmer of the social identity.
(Turner, Interview)
In the first phase, he developed a cognitive perspective 
in order to address problems within the study of the social 
perception of the physical environment. By the end of Phase 
II, he had established the role of value and of
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categorization in perceptual judgments of both the physical
and social environments. Addressing the phenomena of
prejudice and of intergroup relations within this framework
created a number of substantive problems associated with the
explanation of uniformities in social behaviour.
9.2.5 From social perception towards interaroup relations:
(The transition from phase II to phase III)
In 1969, Tajfel also published a chapter on Social and
Cultural factors in Perception in the Handbook of Social
Psvcholoav (Aronson and Lindzey,1969). The contents of this
chapter give some indication of the broad range of research,
including group research, which Taj fel considered relevant to
social perception. Over three-quarters of the text focuses on
the influence of social groups and cultural differences in
perception. Of this, twenty-six pages are explicitly
concerned with social groups as sources of information.
If you read it, you'll find that there are pages and 
pages on social influence. He saw research and 
conformity studies, basically ideas about social 
influence, as relevant to social perception. So, in 
fact, in that sense, I don't think he would have 
made too rigid a distinction.
(Turner, Interview)
From this, it is clear that, by 1969, Taj fel had gone 
some way towards integrating his work on social perception 
with others' research on group influence. But, constructing 
a coherent, theoretical integration of social perception and 
prejudice as a phenomenon of the relations between groups was 
more demanding. The incorporation of new phenomena within the 
original framework highlighted the differences between the 
perception of the physical and of the social environments. 
The most significant of these was the individual's 
identification with a social category. It also exposed the 
fundamental assumptions underlying conventional perspectives 
within the field. Furthermore, Tajfel's intellectual horizons 
now broadened to address the social issues and real world 
problems of various societies. It was necessary to consider 
how people understood changes in the relationships between 
groups within their own society. The assimilation of these 
problems into an established framework led to the emergence
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of new solutions. These solutions involved the transformation 
and elaboration of the original framework. Classification 
becomes social categorization; values now include the 
assimilation of social values; and an individual's 
identification with a particular social category confers a 
new significance on both social categorization and value 
differentials. Also, new factors emerged that needed to be 
integrated within the overall theoretical framework. These 
include the form and content of causal attributions; the role 
of personal integrity or the individual's self-image; and the 
creation and maintenance of belief systems and social myths.
The new framework provided a novel understanding of the 
phenomena it addressed. Prejudice and intergroup behaviour 
were no longer simply due to an individual's motivations, 
either in terms of the unconscious or in terms of animal 
instincts and the evolutionary past of the species. Prejudice 
and intergroup behaviour can be conceived of as the products 
of rational and cognitive processes, influenced by the 
concepts, values and beliefs held by individuals and shared 
within a particular group or society at a given historical 
time. In this sense they are very similar to social 
representations.
These transformations took time. They did not form as 
soon as the original framework was applied to the new
phenomena, nor, for that matter, were the problems which 
initiated these changes immediately apparent. This is seen 
most clearly in Phase II, where stereotypes and prejudice 
are anchored within a framework of the accentuation of
differences. These phenomena are accommodated within the
framework so that similarities in the perception of the 
physical and social environments are emphasized, and the
structure of the framework is maintained. Firstly, the 
problems confronted in explaining social phenomena are 
located at the experimental or methodological levels, rather 
than at a theoretical or meta-theoretical level. Secondly, 
discrepancies in the research findings forced post hoc 
explanations involving elements from outside of the 
theoretical framework. This is how the reductionism, that 
characterised Tajfel's thinking during the early phases of
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his work, remained unchallenged. Similarly, the inclusion of 
new factors within the framework does not result in an 
immediate restructuring of its form and content. Most of 
these concepts are only mentioned at this stage. It is not 
until Phase VI, some nine years later, that they are more 
fully elaborated and integrated within a comprehensive 
framework.
9.2.6 New problems for a theory of interaroup relations; 
(Phase IV)
During the 1960 *s, Tajfel was also involved prominently 
in a European research project that examined, in a number of 
European countries, the development of national stereotypes 
and attitudes. Its primary focus was to examine the 
developmental relationship between the affective component 
(ie.evaluation) and the cognitive component (ie.social 
categorizations and knowledge) of large-scale intergroup 
relations.
This research has received little public acclaim (see
Chapter 7) . In part, this is due to Taj fel *s own disaffection
with the research.
Then there was the period which in fact he described 
as his most mediocre and depressing work.... which 
was looking at things like ethnicity - sort of 
rather descriptive work — things like cross-national 
comparisons between children in their sort of ethnic 
preferences.
(Turner,Interview)
Furthermore, Tajfel rarely refers to this research in his 
later work.
Despite this, it played an important part in the 
development of Tajfel's thinking. The research results 
presented a number of anomolies that had to be integrated 
into the general theoretical framework. The research findings 
suggested that consensual preferences for one's own nation 
develop before children possess any detailed knowledge about 
other nations or countries. Children differentiate between 
nations in the absence of contact with other nationalities as 
well as in the absence of physical or behavioural cues. This 
was referred to by Tajfel et al. in terms of 'nominal 
realism' in young children. Children differentiated between
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nations on the basis of the countries' names. This also 
highlighted the essential role of assimilation, social 
influence and the mass media of communication. Children 
assimilated the social and cultural values prevailing in 
their own societies. Furthermore, even though evaluative 
differentials tended to decrease with age, preferences for 
one's own nation continued to be found in older children. 
Tajfel and his collaborators suggest that the early 
intervention of value judgments results in a lack of 
cognitive empathy with other large-scale groups.
A further set of problems to emerge concerned 
differences between cultures in the relationship between the 
cognitive and affective components of attitudes. This, in 
itself, indicated the significant role that the social 
context played in intergroup relations. Furthermore, the 
unexpected results in Louvain, where preferences for one's 
own nation increased with age, and in Glasgow, where children 
showed no preference for their own nationality, indicated 
children's high sensitivity to the social context.
It can be seen that many of the emergent problems and 
questions remained unanswered at this stage. Discussion of 
the results provide tentative generalizations as opposed to 
explanations derived from theory. It was still necessary to 
explain children's sensitivity to the social context and also 
variations in the findings across cultures; and to understand 
the assimilation of social values and the role of 
preferential differentiations in intergroup relations. 
Furthermore, the devaluation of one's own group in situations 
where there was no overt conflict remained a theoretical 
mystery. These were findings in search of a theory. Such a 
theory might illuminate the psychological processes involved 
in an individual's affiliation to a large-scale social group 
(such as a nation) in situations where there is no conflict, 
no direct contact with or even knowledge about other such 
groups.
The evolutionary background to the experiments conducted 
in Phase V, which later came to be known as the minimal group 
experiments, will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that the
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theoretical framework of Phase III and the research findings 
of Phase IV triggered a search for the base-line conditions 
leading to a differentiation between groups. Research on the 
developmental relationship between the cognitive and 
affective components of attitudes suggested that 
categorization (nominal realism) and value (preferences) 
might be sufficient to produce intergroup differentiation in 
situations where there was no overt conflict. However, the 
nature of the experimental studies meant that many other 
variables were also involved in shaping the children's 
responses, not least the historical context of the relations 
between the relevant groups.
9.2.7 Finding the base-line conditions for interaroup
differentiation: (Phase V)
The second major contribution was the minimal group 
paradigm, and that was essentially a methodological 
innovation and it led to a lot of interesting 
speculation. But it wasn't initially the springboard 
for Social Identity Theory ....they are not quite so 
closely connected as everyone seems to imply... It 
was just a clever idea.
(Brown,Interview)
While I agree that the minimal group paradigm and Social 
Identity Theory are not as closely interrelated as many 
people imply in their re-presentations of this work, the 
experiments were more than just a clever idea. The 
experimental results led, at least initially, to a greater 
emphasis on social categorization and to a withdrawal from 
'value' as a distinct theoretical principle.
Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy designed a series of 
experiments which either controlled for or eliminated all 
variables other than social categorization. The experimental 
results showed that social categorization on its own was 
sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination. Subjects 
acted in favour of their own group in a situation where there 
was no benefit to the individual. Furthermore, their choices 
tended towards maximum differentiation between the ingroup 
and the outgroup at the cost of forfeiting maximum gain for 
the ingroup. These results were totally unexpected. In the 
initial experiments (not described in 'Phase V  above) Tajfel 
had hypothesized that social categorization, on its own,
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would not produce intergroup discrimination. Only in 
situations where the categorization was evaluative (eg. more 
or less accurate estimators of the number of dots) would 
intergroup discrimination occur. Within the experimental 
design social categorization with an explicit evaluative 
condition formed the experimental conditions whilst social 
categorization alone constituted the control condition. In 
contrast to the hypothesis, it was found that subjects 
discriminated in favour of the ingroup in both conditions and 
that there was no significant difference between the two. The 
following experiments (described in detail in Phase V above) 
were designed to distinguish between three possible response 
strategies; maximising joint profit; maximising ingroup 
profit; and maximising the difference between groups.
Once again, the research posed a definite problem in 
terms of providing an adequate theoretical explanation. Why 
should subjects choose a strategy of maximum differentiation 
between their own group and groups of others purely on the 
basis of some arbitrary social categorizations? The 'post 
hoc' explanation (Tajfel,1978b, p.10) presented at the time 
by Tajfel et al. 1971 was stated in terms of social norms. 
Social norms constituted the social context of intergroup 
behaviour, the influence of which had become plainly apparent 
from the research in Phase IV. The findings in Phase V were 
attributed to a generic norm of discrimination against 
outgroups. This alone, however, could not explain the 
particular pattern of the findings. It was also necessary to 
postulate a social norm of fairness that moderated the 
principle of creating a maximum differentiation between the 
ingroup and outgroup.
The results posed a further problem. Previous research 
by Rabbie and his colleagues had found that social 
categorization per se (control condition) was not sufficient 
to produce intergroup discrimination. A further condition 
required was anticipation of future interactions with the 
ingroup. The results from the control conditions conflicted 
with Tajfel et al.'s findings (1971). This required the 
reinterpretation of findings from the research of Rabbie and 
his collaborators. Tajfel et al. (1971) argued that, given
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the particular features of the situation in the control 
condition, the group categorization was never made salient 
and consequently subjects did not employ the social norms 
appropriate to intergroup situations.
The unexpected nature of the results led Tajfel et al. 
(1971) to explore other possible interpretations. These 
included anticipation of future interaction, experimenter 
effects and subjects' expectations concerning the behaviour 
of other subjects. The two former interpretations were 
considered to be inadequate on both situational and 
theoretical grounds. The latter was explored in a further 
experiment which showedd that subjects' expectations did not 
match subjects' behaviour in this intergroup situation 
(Doise,Tajfel and Billig,1972).
9.2.8 Problems in search of a theorv: The transition from
Phase V to phase VI
At the time, the inadequacy of alternative explanations
for the experimental findings lent further support to a
theoretical interpretation in terms of social norms. However,
they still left some important questions unanswered. As
Tajfel himself reflected
Rather than providing answers to certain crucial 
problems of intergroup behaviour, they highlighted 
some crucial questions and suggested directions of 
future theorizing and research
(Tajfel,1978b,p.10).
Why should subjects choose the social norm of groupness
in this particular situation in preference to any other? What
are the psychological processes involved in intergroup
discrimination on the basis of social categorization? These
questions arose directly from the research conducted in Phase
V. Furthermore, it still left unanswered many of the issues
emerging during Phase IV.
The generic norm was a bit of a loose concept, and 
Tajfel withdrew from it very early on, because the 
generic norm suggested that there was a universal 
norm for ingroup favouritism. Why this was 
unsatisfactory is because of the evidence from, say,
Dave Milner's work, and much earlier evidence that 
certain members of minority groups didn't favour 
their own groups.
(Billig, Interview)
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While Billig points to the research of other people, the same 
questions are raised by the cross-national studies which 
Tajfel identifies in Phase IV. How are variations across 
cultures and the impact of the social context on personal 
preferences to be explained? What is the role of preferences 
and of differential evaluations in a situation of real 
intergroup conflict? Why do people devalue their own group in 
relation to other groups, even in situations where there is 
no obvious conflict?
Solutions to these problems emerge slowly in the form 
of an elaborate and comprehensive theory of intergroup 
relations. An initial outline of these developments was 
already in evidence by 1969, in both The Cognitive Aspects 
of Prejudice and Taj fel* s theoretical chapter on The 
Formation of National Attitudes. The research findings of 
Phases IV and V, as well as a desire to understand conflicts 
between large-scale groups in society provided the stimulus 
for and directed the evolution of this framework. Both the 
form and the content of this evolving framework diverged from 
conventional theories and perspectives within the field of 
group psychology. This created further problems which could 
only be resolved by re-defining the boundaries of social 
psychology. However, these developments did not occur 'over 
night'. We have already seen that they are rooted in a 
substantial history of theorizing and research. Moreover, 
many of the subsequent experiments within the 'minimal group 
paradigm' continued to employ a social norms framework of 
explanation. It was only through the painstaking theoretical 
work undertaken during the early period of Phase VI that the 
theory of intergroup relations in all its complexity came to 
be established by 1978.
9.2.9 Phase VI
The form and content of this theory is shaped, not only 
by previous theoretical ideas and research, but also by an 
examination of various forms of intergroup relations extant 
in society. One of the striking characteristics of intergroup 
relations is their dynamic nature. This is reflected in a 
concern with social change. Social conflicts, social unrest.
443
social movements and social creativity are all salient 
features in today's society and require an analysis that goes 
beyond the level of individuals. Tajfel was not satisfied 
with the micro- psychology of intergroup behaviour. It was 
not sufficient to extrapolate from basic psychological 
processes to large-scale social interactions. Nor was it 
sufficient to look at the macro-structure of society and the 
objective conditions of intergroup relations. An absolutely 
essential feature of Tajfel's work, and one which is 
frequently underestimated or ignored, is the juxtaposition 
and integration of these two levels of enquiry. The social 
issues which Taj fel addressed demanded a social psychological 
approach, one which accounted for uniformities in social 
behaviour and widely diffused social beliefs concerning the 
characteristics of and relations between groups in society.
It can be seen from the presentation of Phase VI that, 
by 1978, the social psychological perspective and the various 
aspects of the theory are finally integrated to form a 
unified and comprehensive framework for the understanding of 
intergroup relations and social interactions. The general 
problem confronting Tajfel was to construct a social- 
psychological theory that provided an understanding of the 
evident realities of intergroup relations in society and the 
uniformities of intergroup behaviour. It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to identify any particular problems addressed 
by Tajfel and to extract their corresponding solutions from 
the framework as a whole. This reflects the actual nature of 
Tajfel's theoretical work. The various problems are not 
considered, nor are the solutions constructed, independently 
of each other. The interrelationships between the various 
problems and their resolutions play a crucial role in the 
construction of an elaborate and well-structured framework. 
This having been said, it is also necessary to identify the 
building blocks that constitute elements in the framework 
while remembering that their significance and meaning is 
defined by the role they play in the scheme as a whole. The 
presentation of Phase VI goes some way towards identifying 
the interrelationships between the parts. The following 
analysis attempts to elucidate these aspects further whilst
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identifying, simultaneously, particular sets of problems and 
their corresponding solutions. This is done in three 
sections:
(1) social categorization, social values and the
psychological processes of intergroup behaviour;
(2) social conditions and social beliefs;
(3) the discipline of social psychology and the field of
intergroup relations.
9.2.9.1 Social categorization, social values and the 
psvcholoaical processes of interaroup behaviour: One of the 
major problems confronting Tajfel, following the minimal 
group experiments, was why social categorization alone should 
lead to intergroup discrimination. As we have seen above, the 
original explanation of this phenomenon was in terms of 
social norms. In Phase VI, Tajfel argues that such an 
explanation fails to distinguish between different possible 
response strategies. Its generality fails to serve as a point 
of departure for new insights and new directions for research 
on intergroup processes. Whatever role the social norms were 
playing needs to be specified in terms of the psychological 
processes involved in intergroup situations. This applied 
equally well to assessing the impact of social values and 
preferences which was apparent from research undertaken in 
Phase IV, as it did to assessing the impact of social norms 
in the research of Phase V. The influence of the social 
context, social norms and social values needed to be 
translated into concepts that were directly relevant to the 
individual. Tajfel's single most significant innovation was 
to construct and to specify the role and dynamics of social 
identity in intergroup relations.
Social identity can be seen as the continuing process
of self definition in society.
in any complex society an individual confronts from 
the beginning of his life a complex network of 
groupings which presents him with a network of 
relationships into which he must fit himself. One 
of the most important and durable problems that is 
posed to an individual by his insertion into society 
is to find, create and define his place in these 
networks.
(Tajfel,1974b,p.67)
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The problems of self-definition within society underlie the
process of identification with a group or social category
and, as a consequence, leads to intergroup discrimination.
in order for the members of an ingroup to be able 
to hate or dislike an outgroup,or to discriminate 
against it, they must first have acquired a sense 
of belonging to a group which is clearly distinct 
from the one they hate, dislike or discriminate 
against.
(Tajfel,1974b,p.66)
The 'complex network of groupings' in society is 
directly comparable to the social categorizations within the 
experimental set-up. The principle of social categorization 
was already well established within the theoretical framework 
and is maintained in almost an identical form to Phase III. 
Social categorizations not only provide a system for 
organizing and simplifying the social environment, they also 
provide a system of orientation in which an individual 
locates and defines himself or herself. The significance of 
this, however, was not fully realized in the earlier Phase; 
nor was it applied or developed in Phase V. The possible 
reasons for this will be discussed later. Having realized its 
significance, the problem was to create a link between social 
categorization and social identity. Social categorization 
provided the framework for an individual's insertion in 
society and his or her self-definition. But this, alone, 
could not explain why people, having identified with a group, 
should engage in behaviour which differentiated between their 
own group and that of others. The theoretical principle which 
Tajfel adopted was the process of social comparison. This had 
already been well established in Festinger's Theory of Social 
Comparison (Festinger,1954), which was similarly concerned 
with issues of self-image. An individual evaluated her 
attitudes, opinions and abilities by comparing herself with 
others. Schachter had also extended this theory to the study 
of emotions. However, the application of this theory within 
the context of intergroup relations presented its own 
problems.
Applying a well-developed theory to a new realm of 
phenomena gave rise to a number of difficulties. These were
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associated with the differences between social comparisons 
involving individuals and social comparisons involving 
individuals as members of large-scale groups. Comparability 
in the former depends upon similarities between individuals 
(the focus of Festinger's theory) whereas in the latter it 
focuses on the differences between groups (the focus of 
Tajfel's theory). They were also associated with Festinger's 
specifications concerning the situations in which social 
comparisons are made. For him, they are only made when 
non-social, objective, criteria are unavailable. Tajfel could 
have accepted this limitation - there are rarely such 
objective criteria on which to make comparisons between 
large-scale social groups. However, there are also other 
situations where social comparisons between groups are not 
made; in which there is a high social consensus across groups 
about the specific characteristics of the intergroup 
relations. For this reason, objectivity had to be re-defined 
in social terms.
The interrelated concepts of social categorization, 
social identity and social comparison provides an integrated 
explanation of why individuals differentiate between their 
own group and other groups. Individuals acting in terms of 
their own group or social category will discriminate against 
the other group. This either maintains or creates a 
differentiation between their own group and other groups so 
that social comparisons afford a positive social identity. It 
also provides a framework within which the cognitive and 
affective components of the development of national attitudes 
can be integrated, and the sensitivity of children to their 
social context can be better understood. It specifies the 
psychological motivation for and the processes by which 
intergroup relations are established and maintained.
The psychological processes involved in intergroup 
behaviour demanded a definition of groups that focused on 
the individual's awareness of being a member of a group in 
relation to other groups rather than the 'objective' 
relationship between a number of people. It also had to 
encompass large-scale social groups, such as nations, which 
might have little or no direct contact with each other.
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Tajfel*s social psychological definition of group membership 
fulfilled these various requirements.
It should be pointed out that value no longer 
constitutes a separate principle. The role of preferences 
and evaluations is an integral part of the psychological 
processes. It is interesting to note that the significance 
of value first emerged in the study of perceptual judgments 
of physical objects (Phase I) and the effects of 
categorization became apparent from studies of stereotypes 
and social perception (Phase II). In Phase III, social 
categorization and the assimilation of social values are 
virtually treated as two distinct issues. Here the 
theoretical structure is altered radically. Social 
categorization becomes prominent, along with social identity 
and social comparison, whilst the role and significance of 
value becomes diffuse. Value differentials are nearly always 
associated with categorizations of the social environment. 
Evaluations are made through the process of social 
comparisons; and a positive social identity is derived from 
the value significance of the individual's membership of 
various groups and his or her psychological distinctiveness. 
All three aspects relate directly to the system of social 
values in society. Individuals, as members of a group, will 
attempt to claim, as their own, those characteristics which 
are valued positively by society.
9.2.9.2 Social conditions and social beliefs; The previous 
section looked at how the influence of the social context in 
regard to social norms and social values is explained in 
terms of the psychological processes involved in intergroup 
relations. Both common-sense and everyday experience make it 
obvious that not all social interactions are examples of 
intergroup behaviour. There are many occasions in which 
social interactions are not directed primarily by our social 
identities and group memberships. This also became apparent 
from a series of experimental studies conducted by Turner 
(Turner,1975).
On the whole, I have not detailed the social and 
intellectual influences on Tajfel's work as these will be 
covered in Chapter 10. However, by this time. Turner's
448
contribution constitutes a major input into the development
of a theory of intergroup relations and it is impossible to
go further without considering his work.
I think it was very much John's collaboration with 
Henri, John asking very precise and direct questions 
about what was actually going on in these 
experiments, and that brought up the idea of trying 
to achieve some positivity. And it was out of these 
debates between him and John and the discussions, 
and then he gave the lectures and got the research 
proposal together. So I see it very much as a sort 
of collaboration between him and John Turner.
(Brown, Interview)
In the 1970-1971 experiments reported in Phase V the
only means by which individuals could express their need to
achieve a positively valued identity was in terms of their
group ie. through their social identity. Turner designed a
series of experiments which allowed individuals to express
their ubiquitous tendency towards differentiation either
through 'self' versus an anonymous 'other', or through a
minimal ingroup versus a minimal outgroup.
The social categorization data was interesting and 
I was looking for something to do. I needed some 
experiments for my Ph.D. So we thought - what about 
having self and other? The main condition in the 
1971 experiments was that you couldn't act in terms 
of self, but what if you could? So I did an 
experiment that had self-other as well as 
ingroup-outgroup.
(Turner, Interview)
Not all conditions lead to intergroup differentiations. 
In some conditions, individuals acted in terms of self as 
opposed to their group membership. In other conditions, 
subjects displayed a balance between individual gain and 
ingroup gain; that is, the bias towards self was moderated by 
their group membership/social identity. Thus, social 
categorization per se does not produce intergroup 
discrimination. It also depends on the particular situation, 
on the opportunity to gain positively valued differentiations 
from others in terms of either individuals or one's group, 
and on the balance between the two.
It was these experiments that led to the distinction 
between interpersonal behaviour and intergroup behaviour and.
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in turn, was linked to the psychological processes in terms
of a distinction between personal and social identity.
It (interpersonal-intergroup continuum) started out 
as in terms of group or self from my experiments, 
but went through a number of developments, depending 
on what we were doing. As it was applied to a 
different issue, it changed form slightly. It became 
the interpersonal- intergroup... I then sort of 
turned it round to personal identity and social 
identity to distinguish between when we behave as 
individuals and when we behave as a member of a 
group.
(Turner, Interview)
I suppose it was out of the stimulus provided by 
John. . and John is a very tight and tough-minded 
experimentalist, gave a kind of methodological 
rigour to the thinking of what's going on in these 
studies, that Henri hadn't yet come to grips with.
I think that is where the idea of the distinction 
between personal and social identity - all those 
things, started to come together.
(Brown, Interview)
The expression of social identity is thus, in part, 
dependent upon the conditions in which the social 
interactions occur. Again, this is consonant with the 
dialectic nature of intergroup behaviour emphasized by 
Tajfel. The expression of subjective group membership in 
social behaviour is interrelated with the social situation.
The experimental manipulation in Turner's studies 
indicates the conditions in which intergroup behaviour, as 
opposed to interpersonal behaviour, will occur. However, 
these relate only to the social vacuum of the minimal group 
paradigm in which groups are devoid of any history, social 
contact and the wider context of multi-group relations. If 
social psychology was to have any impact on the social issues 
confronting society it's theories must also take into account 
and be applicable to the social realities of the day. What 
are the social conditions in which individuals will behave in 
terms of their subjective group membership? When does an 
individual's social identity become the primary motivational 
force directing his or her social behaviour?
A preliminary requirement is obviously the construction 
of social categories, which has already been discussed in
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some detail. But, in order to provide an answer to the above 
questions, two further interdependent propositions are 
required. Individuals may behave as members of a group when 
they believe that there is no possibility of their moving 
from one group to another and when the boundaries between 
groups are sharply drawn. These conditions restrict severely 
the possibility of achieving a positive self-image through 
interpersonal interactions. Instead, individuals will attempt 
to achieve a positive social identity by acting as a member 
of their group and by maintaining or creating positively 
valued differentiations from other groups.
The form of social interactions and its relation to the 
conditions in which it occurs is clarified by the 
construction of two related continua. An individual can act 
in terms of self, or purely in terms of their group 
membership or somewhere in-between. This is described by the 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum of social interaction. The 
social conditions are commensurately described by the social 
mobility-social change continuum. It is largely under 
conditions of social change that individuals will act in 
terms of their group membership in order to achieve a 
positive social identity.
However, this is only a partial answer. It establishes 
the potential for intergroup behaviour but it does not 
specify the conditions in which intergroup behaviour will 
actuallv occur nor does it distinguish between the various 
forms of intergroup behaviour to be found in society. 
Firstly, the 'objective' conditions of social change do not 
necessarily lead to social action in terms of group 
membership and social identity. For example, the ancient 
caste system in India constituted a social system in which 
individual mobility was impossible and group boundaries were 
well defined, but this did not, in itself, bring about social 
change. Social systems in which some groups exhibit ingroup 
devaluation and negative social identities can persist for a 
long time. Secondly, relations between consensually inferior 
and consensually superior groups can lead to a variety of 
forms of social action. These relate to the social realities 
of a particular society, to its economic, historical and
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political structures. However, Tajfel was not prepared to
leave these problems entirely in the realm of other
disciplines. Already in 1969 he was concerned with how
individuals come to understand the constantly changing
relations between groups. At this stage, his analysis was
limited to the attributional processes involved. However, in
order to address social uniformities in intergroup behaviour
and the dynamics of social change in society, it was
necessary, first of all, to shift the analysis to a more
societal level. This involves an analysis of systems of
belief and the consensual interpretations of intergroup
relations. The perception of the relations between groups as
being capable or incapable of change and as having legitimate
or illegitimate principles of social organization cannot be
ignored. Similarly, the existence of shared cognitive
alternatives is necessary for large-scale social action to
be undertaken.
A combination of these shared interpretations of 
social reality with the location of social groups 
within the system as perceived by their members 
provides the possibility of formulating a number of 
hypotheses.
(Tajfel,1979a,p.187-189)
A knowledge of these social beliefs is essential for a 
social-psychological understanding of the various forms of 
intergroup behaviour and of social action found in society 
today. Furthermore, the interrelationship between these 
systems of belief and the psychological processes involved 
in the differentiation between groups goes some way towards 
an understanding of the construction and maintenance of such 
widely diffused beliefs about 'other* groups.
9.2.9.3 The discipline of social osvcholoav and the field of 
interaroup relations: Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations 
had to be located within the field of group psychology whilst 
simultaneously bringing out its distinguishing features. It 
was not that Tajfel had found a new object of study. Many 
theories had been applied to the same general phenomenon. 
Rather, Tajfel had asked different questions and, in so 
doing, had developed and elaborated a new perspective. The 
primary focus of his theory was to explain large-scale
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uniformities in intergroup behaviour and the existence of 
social movements and social change. To achieve this, it was 
necessary to examine not only the psychological processes 
involved in the construction of social groups but also their 
interrelationship with social reality and with systems of 
belief about the structure of society. This explicitly social 
perspective may well have been construed as falling outside 
the realm of social psychology. On the other hand, it may 
also have been construed as saying little more than theories 
which already existed in social psychology. In order to 
overcome this dilemma, Tajfel redefines the dimensions of 
social behaviour and simultaneously redefines the boundaries 
of group pscyhology. The interpersonal-intergroup continuum, 
constructed at the theoretical level to distinguish between 
social interactions which do and others which do not relate 
to group membership, is transposed to the level of the field 
as a whole.
It became the interpersonal-intergroup continuum 
because we were trying to explain it to the 
Americans and thinking of a way we might put it to 
people who had never really thought about it.
(Turner, Interview)
This facilitates a re-description of the field such that 
the more conventional theories are located at the 
interpersonal pole and apply generally under conditions of 
social mobility. In contrast, Tajfel's theory transcends 
conventional theories focusing on the intergroup pole which 
applies more generally in conditions of social change. In 
effect, this creates a space for Social Identity Theory 
within the field, while establishing simultaneously the 
novelty of the approach. Furthermore, it does not deny the 
relevance of the more traditional perspectives in situations 
of social mobility.
Finally, the approach to intergroup relations developed 
here is legitimized by propounding a social psychology which 
addresses the inter-relationship between the individual and 
society. That is, a social psychology which encompasses the 
social and cultural context as well as the psychological 
processes and provides an understanding of their dialectic 
relationship.
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CHAPTER 10
CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES
10.1 TAJFEL'S CULTURAL BACKGROUND
10.2 TAJFEL'S EDUCATION IN PSYCHOLOGY
10.3 THE TRANSITION TO A NEW PERSPECTIVE
10.3.1 Developments in European social psychology
10.3.2 The emergence of culture
10.4 A RETURN TO EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
10.5 THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
10.6 THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND 
SOCIAL CONTEXT
10.7 A THEORY ESTABLISHED
10.8 A COLLABORATIVE AFFAIR
In the previous two chapters we have examined the 
content and structure of Tajfel's work, the continuities and 
discontinuities in its history of development and the 
problems and their solutions which characterize the 
transformations in the system of social representations. To 
date, there have only been cursory references to the 
historical context of this work and the cultural, social and 
intellectual influences which have shaped these 
transformations. In this chapter I shall demonstrate that 
these dialectical aspects are an integral part of the process 
by which social representations are transformed. Thus, they 
should neither be construed in terms of independent variables 
or as though they provided an appropriate context for the
independent evolution of a new perspective in social
psychology.
Much of the material for this chapter is drawn from 
Tajfel's own writings. This includes not only his research
publications but also his retrospective accounts of his
academic career. The interviews with his colleagues also 
illuminate many of the issues dealt with in this chapter.
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Ideally, I should have liked to examine all the original 
sources employed by Tajfel but such a task would not only 
have been onerous but beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis. 
The boundaries of any study must be set in relation to its 
aims and its constraints. The aims of this research are to 
demonstrate that social representations permeate the whole of 
social psychology and to explain how social representations 
are transformed. A general overview of a vast literature or 
a detailed examination of a single influence would not have 
illuminatd the dynamics of social representations or the 
corresponding interrelationship between the individual and 
his/her culture.
The historical context and the cultural, social and 
intellectual influences refer to Tajfel's cultural history 
and to the various institutions with which he was associated; 
to the social and intellectual influences of other social 
psychologists, and to the influence of other theories in 
social psychology and the social sciences more generally. 
These are ultimately indistinguishable aspects in the 
transformation of social representations. For this reason, 
rather than presenting categorical examples of the various 
forms of influence, this chapter is presented in a narrative 
style (Zukier, 1986) . This provides a more suitable vehicle by 
which to convey the diversity of 'contextual' influences on 
Tajfel's work and to reflect on their interdependence and 
concatenation.
10.1 TAJFEL'S SOCIAL BACKGROUND
Everyone's social background is relevant to what 
they do. That's trivial.
(Tajfel in Cohen,1977,p.298)
We all have some kind of intellectual history. I 
know now that mine has been deeply enmeshed with the 
traumatic events of long ago.
(Tajfel,1981a,p.3)
Tajfel had a wealth of social and cultural experiences 
before he ever came to psychology at more than thirty years 
of age. Born and brought up in Poland, he went to live and 
to study chemistry in France. As a member of the French Army,
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he was taken prisoner in the *great debacle* of June 1940, 
and spent the next five years as a prisoner-of-war in Austria 
and Germany. He was liberated in 1945 and spent the next six 
years working for various international organizations on the 
rehabilitation of children and adults after the War. This 
work took him to Paris, Brussels and North-West Germany. It 
was not until 1951 that Tajfel came to England for the 
express purpose of studying psychology at Birkbeck College. 
Working during the day and studying during the evening, he 
graduated with one of the two best First Class Degrees in the 
University of London that year before being appointed 
research assistant at the University of Durham in 1955.
During his early years in a semi-fascist Poland, 
Tajfel's life was shaped by his Jewish background. Although 
he was an agnostic from an early age, his experience as a 
member of an extremely discriminated-against minority stayed
with him throughout his life. During his years as a
prisoner-of-war the life-or-death significance of his Jewish 
identity was further pressed upon him: his life was in
danger, not for anything that he, himself, believed or had 
done, but simply because he was a Jew. Liberated in 1945, he 
returned to Paris to find only four of his relations left 
alive.
The association between Tajfel's early life, in a
particular social, political and historical context, and his
later academic achievements in the field of intergroup
relations, are obvious.
There was an underlying question behind all his 
work....It is the same question, which is how is 
genocide possible?
(Billig, Interview)
Intellectually, he was generally concerned to try 
and understand why members of different groups did 
such horrible things to each other. And I think that 
goes back to his own ethnic culture as an emigre 
Jew, coming from Eastern Europe.
(Brown, Interview)
My own observation would be that he was a very, very 
creative person, because he had an independent mind, 
and so he wasn't somebody who was completely 
immersed in, like, a North American social 
psychological culture. He came late and with a very
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distinct cultural background. He came having seen 
several cultures, he was a marginal person, oh, yes, 
a marginal person.
(Turner, Interview)
He was absolutely sincere about this, the idea that 
social psychological knowledge could make a new 
contribution to improving human life. He believed 
that, and so he thought there was a moral obligation 
to study social conflict, important to develop the 
theory of social conflict.
(Turner, Interview)
His burning ambition was to understand the genocide of 
the war years and to ensure that it would never happen again; 
to find, and to remove, the causes underlying the 
discrimination against, and the persecution of, millions of 
people on the basis of their ethnic identity: and eventually 
to create a psychology of social conflict that addressed the 
social-psychological processes and the cultural and political 
conditions which produced such large-scale uniformities in 
social behaviour. His interests were in political phenomena, 
in social and cultural history, in the history of art and of 
political and social movements, but these interests did not 
enter, explicitly, into his social psychology until the 
mid-1970's (ie. during Phase VI). They were there, 
implicitly, in his study of Prejudice (ie.Phase III); in the 
examples of intergroup relations drawn from Jewish experience 
in various historical and cultural contexts; and in the shift 
from the study of social perception per se to the study of 
prejudice and intergroup relations. But it was not until 
Phase VI that Tajfel was able to integrate his profession as 
a psychologist, his interests in social and cultural 
phenomena and his life experience as a Jew before, during 
and after the war. This chapter traces the cultural, social 
and intellectual influences which both restrained, encouraged 
and shaped this integration.
Tajfel began first to nurture an interest in psychology 
during the years in which he was involved in the 
rehabilitation of children and adults, who had become 
refugees as a consequence of the War. He envisaged psychology 
mainly as an applied field of endeavour to do with helping
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people - as do most of us as naive undergraduates - and took 
a 'certificat* at the Sorbonne and a diploma in educational 
sciences in Brussels before enrolling at Birkbeck College.
At the same time his involvement with international 
organizations gave him a multi-cultural experience, a broad 
European background, and a dedication to international 
cooperation. These factors, along with an ability to 
communicate in several European languages, played a highly 
significant role in the founding of the European Association 
of Experimental Social Psychology. Furthermore, the 
establishment of a European Social Psychology was absolutely 
crucial; it provided the social and intellectual milieu in 
which a social social psychology could be constructed and a 
theory of intergroup relations could evolve.
10.2 TAJFEL'S EDUCATION IN PSYCHOLOGY
Tajfel's formal education at Birkbeck is notable for 
three reasons. Firstly, during his years as an undergraduate 
he wrote an essay entitled 'Prejudice' which won an award 
from the Ministry of Education for a mature student 
scholarship. Secondly, he was influenced by one of his 
teachers, Richard Peters, the philosopher, who, together with 
Tajfel, wrote an article entitled 'Hobbes and Hull- 
metaphysicians of behaviour' (1957a). In it they argue 
against reductionism and against any hypothetico- deductive 
over-simplifications which attempt to reduce human action to 
motion, with no regard for the rules, conventions, criteria 
and canons of human social behaviour. Whilst physiological 
and mechanical principles may be necessary , they can never 
be sufficient to explain complex rule-following actions. The 
style of this critique, with its insistence on both the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for social action, and 
its anti-reductionist stance, along with an early academic 
interest in the topic of prejudice, are reflected in Tajfel's 
thinking from Phase III through to Phase VI. Thirdly, he 
developed an interest in cognition and perception, the field 
in which he immersed himself for the first few years of his 
academic career.
Given his social background, his interests and the 
influence of Peters, it is difficult to understand how Tajfel
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became enmeshed in the highly technical and esoteric problems 
of perceptual judgment, and why he should have adopted such 
a reductionist stance on the issues of social perception 
(Phases I and II). Already in 1958/9 he was aware that his 
interests lay in 'the effects of social and cultural milieu 
in which an individual lives on the way in which he looks at 
the world. ' (Tajfel in Cohen, 1977,p.297) and the need for a 
broader framework than cognitive psychology at that time 
supplied. Yet, despite this, it took ten years or so for 
these ideas to come to fruition in his professional 
publications.
This can only be explained in terms of the social
difficulties Tajfel experienced in confronting the issue of
genocide. These difficulties related both to the social
context and to the intellectual context. Billig emphasizes
the social constraints.
The major problem is one which faced so many people 
of his background, as a survivor of the holocaust.
His whole thinking was marked, obviously, by the 
events of this period. But so deep were the scars of 
people of that generation that they couldn't speak 
openly.... Given that the question which concerned 
him arose directly out of those experiences, there 
was a constraint in looking at it directly. It was 
because of the pain, the intensity of the 
experience. So the question often had to be 
approached indirectly.
(Billig, Interview)
The delay in addressing directly the problems of
intergroup relations can also be explained with reference to
the established conventions and institutions of the academic
psychology community.
The ivory towers, more solid that they are now, had 
a way of smothering one with their benevolent warmth 
and comfort. Very soon, first briefly in Durham and 
then in Oxford, I was talking a new language. I 
learned a new jargon and discovered 'problems' which 
I never knew existed. The academic psychology took 
full hold of me.
(Tajfel,1981a,p.2).
Tajfel was socialized into a well-established culture 
with its own language and values, its sets of legitimate 
problems, its methods of research and its criteria for 
acceptable solutions. During his two years at Durham in the
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fifties, Tajfel*s interests focused on the relationship 
between motivation and perception and, as we have seen, on 
the issues of perceptual over-estimation. This was the vogue 
topic of research amongst the *new look* perceptionists in 
America.
His earliest research adopted the standard experimental 
procedures and hypothetico-deductive rationale along with the 
canons of confirmation and refutation. It explored the 
established problem of the perceptual judgment of physical 
magnitude associated with value. Most typically, this 
involved the perception of the size of coins, in comparison 
to objects of similar size with no associated value. Other 
experiments had used weight, colour, number or brightness. 
Numerous psychologists had produced a substantial literature 
on the subject. Tajfel*s 1957b article refers, explicitly, to 
no less than twenty articles which address, directly, the 
link between perception and value; these, in turn, refer to 
a broader literature including experimental research reports, 
theoretical explanations, reviews and critiques.
In 1947, Bruner and Goodman published a paper entitled 
*Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception*. Tajfel 
(1980a), later describes this paper as the * original white 
elephant* which initiated a new research endeavour that 
explored distortions in perception. The article itself did 
little more than demonstrate the existence of a then 
*peculiar* phenonmenon. But it was a crucial first step in 
the establishment of the *New Look* in perception. In 
contrast to traditionalists who assumed an invariant 
relationship between stimulus and perception, this approach 
emphasized the role of motivation in perception. Distortion 
in perception tended to be associated with the subjective 
needs of individuals. This *New Look* in perception was 
itself associated with a broad interest within social 
psychology in the social factors that influenced perception 
of the physical environment. With further examination and 
theorizing of these issues * distortions * in perception were 
reinterpreted in terms of shifts and biases. However, there 
continued to be confusion in interpreting the variety of 
findings in the field. Furthermore, there was considerable
460
confusion surrounding the distinction between perception and 
judgment.
Both Carter and Schooler (1949) and Klein, Schlesinger 
and Meister (1951), amongst others, had found that the 
association of value with a physical object did not always 
lead to perceptual over-estimation. Without the discovery of 
these negative results it would not have been necessary to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant dimensions. 
Perceptual over-estimation only occurred when value was 
associated with the changes in the physical dimension, ea. 
magnitude, on which the object was being judged. Larger coins 
tended to be associated with a larger value, but the size of 
a swastika (Klein et al.,1951) or the size of poker chips 
(Lambert,Solomon and Watson, 1949) made no difference to their 
value or significance.
The emergence of the distinction between intraserial 
and interserial perceptual judgments is more subtle. Carter 
and Schooler (1949) had already noted that larger coins were 
overestimated and smaller coins underestimated in size. 
Similarly, Bruner and Rodrigues (1953) had introduced the 
notion of 'relative increase in overestimation*. Furthermore, 
the original results from Bruner and Goodman's study showed 
that the perceived differences (extension of the scale of 
judgments) is much larger for coins than for neutral discs. 
The idea that it was not simply a 'mysterious' process of 
perceptual overestimation was already emerging from the 
experimental results of others and their interpretation of 
the data. Furthermore, Dukes and Bevan (1952) had included 
comparisons between stimuli within the value series as well 
as comparisons between the value and neutral series in their 
study.
Even at this early stage in his academic career, Tajfel 
exhibited an unusually clear understanding of the impact of 
experimental procedures as well as of subjects' prior 
experience on research results. Hochberg (1957) had noted 
that subjects responded in terms of dimensions that give the 
most information about a stimulus series, and not necessarily 
those expected by the experimenter. Tajfel applied this point 
to the field of perceptual over-estimation. Even when the
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experimenter’s interest was confined to comparisons between 
the value and neutral series, relationships within the series 
would influence subjects' perceptual judgments. These 
relationships were made salient by the experimental 
manipulations themselves or by previous familiarity, as in 
the case of coins.
The confusion surrounding the distinction between 
perception and judgment was more easily overcome. Tajfel, in 
effect, circumvented this problem by employing the term 
perceptual judgment throughout his early publications. It 
was an issue which he was not to address directly until 1969 
in his review of 'Social and Cultural Factors in Perception', 
for the Lindzey and Aronson Handbook of Social Psvcholooy and 
even then the relationship between perception and cognition 
remained an uneasy one.
As far as I am aware, Tajfel was the first to coin the 
phrase 'accentuation of differences'. However, Dukes and 
Bevan (1952) had previously employed the term 'accentuation' 
to describe shifts in perceptual judgments. Moreover, the 
functional significance of these shifts in perception had 
already been illuminated by others in the field. Erikson and 
Hake (1955) had discussed its role in increasing the accuracy 
of discrimination; McCurdy (1956) had argued, in terms of 
schemata, that exaggerating differences between coins can be 
considered a 'good error'. Accuracy of perception per se was 
unimportant, what was important was the ability to 
distinguish between valued objects by sharpening their 
relevant distinctive features.
Tajfel made explicit what was already implicit in the 
work of others in this field. I am not suggesting, here, that 
the distinction between relevant and irrelevant dimensions, 
or between interserial and intraserial comparisons were 
simply a by-product or restatement of the work of others or 
that the functional significance of the accentuation of 
differences was obvious; Tajfel's work involved the 
imaginative and creative restructuring of elements in the 
field that resulted in a re-presentation of the central 
issues. Moreover, he provided labels or terms of distinction 
that identified significant features of the research problem
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and that characterized the emergent theoretical structures. 
These structures emphasized certain aspects of previous work 
at the expense of others. This transformation cannot be 
conceived of in terms of a simple cause and effect 
relationship, or even a series of such causes and effects. 
Nor is it conceived, accurately, in terms of a feedback loop, 
where A affects B, affects A. etc. Rather, there is a social 
dialectics of transformation, a set of independent dynamic 
relations between experimental research, interpretation and 
theory involving a whole community of psychologists who are 
interested in the same problems and who 'talk* the same 
language.
This applies also to the shifts from perceptual
judgments in psychophysics to the study of social perception
and stereotypes. Tajfel was not the only psychologist to
extend the domain beyond the problem raised by the phenomenon
of overestimation. For example, Hochberg (1957) argued that,
although greater attention had been paid to social factors in
perception (psychophysics) the same principles may also apply
to the perception of the social environment (stereotype). Nor
was this an unusual practice in psychology. In this specific
context, Hochberg argued that the judgmental effects of value
could be generalized to the perception of social objects and
events. Prejudice and Stereotyping were no more than
'inescapable tendencies of the cognitive processes'
(Hochberg,1957,p.130) . It is interesting to note that Tajfel
selected a short passage on groups from Hochberg's article
for quotation -
If a group of individuals is perceived as different 
from the non-group individuals the perceived 
differences between those within the group and those 
outside the group will automatically be sharpened, 
and the differences perceived between the members of 
the group (ie. intergroup differences), and between 
those outside the group will be lessened.
(Hochberg,p.130, quoted 
by Tajfel,1957b,p.202)
Before moving on, a few more words need to be said about 
the influence of Jerome Bruner. We have seen already that 
Tajfel's early research on problems of perceptual judgment
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followed directly from Bruner's work on the 'New Look' in 
perception.
He used to tell me that Bruner was an important 
influence ... .certainly his first major publication, 
which was a psychology review article on social 
judgment, published in 1957, was shortly after 
Bruner's own article on a somewhat related topic.
And certainly his early work on social cognition 
drew very heavily on the kind of 'New Look' 
psychology that Bruner was a dominant part of in the 
early 50's.
(Brown, Interview)
His first research was addressed to the problem that 
Bruner and his colleagues had created....He did 
actually contact Bruner in England, to talk about 
his work, to see what he thought about it. It was 
under Bruner's influence, I think, that he first 
published his review paper. He met Bruner through 
later years, and always regarded him very much as a 
friend, as an early influence.
(Turner, Interview)
But Bruner's influence extended well beyond this.
Tajfel's first publication (1957b) on the subject owed much
to the encouragement and advice given to him by Bruner.
Tajfel visited Harvard, Cambridge (Massachusetts) in 1958-9
and worked, together with Bruner, on the use by individuals
of 'broad' and 'narrow' categories. This led Tajfel, on his
return to Oxford, into the research on individual
differences, which has been discussed earlier in IIB. Despite
the fact that, in this particular respect, Bruner's influence
led to one of the major discontinuities in Tajfel's
intellectual career, it is associated also with some of the
major continuities. Firstly, Bruner was a functionalist-
I am a functionalist and I believe that there are 
autonomous psychological explanations that are 
neither biological nor cultural, though dependent 
upon both biological and cultural processes.
(Bruner,1980,p.12)
This perspective is evident throughout Tajfel's works 
and is associated, closely, with the comparative or relative 
perspective. Secondly, Tajfel's understanding of 
categorization and differentiation owes much to Bruner's work 
on cue utilization and categorical identity. Thirdly,
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Bruner*s work emphasizes the social context in which
cognitive mechanisms function - a theme which prevails
throughout Tajfel's work.
(Tajfel) is always saying social psychology, and 
let's say social perceptions, is a matter of a 
distinctive social psychological contribution to 
perception.... Bruner was and still is doing 
that....Well, he always was. When he says social 
perceptions he means social determination of 
perception, not just looking at social stimuli. I 
think that is the fundamental influence.
(Turner, Interview)
even Bruner, if you read his stuff, he always says 
that we mustn't forget that these real things 
determine and affect people.
(Brown, Interview)
The potential for extending the domain proposed in 
1957(b) became the major focus of Tajfel's 1959 article on 
'Quantitative judgment in social perception'. The development 
of such a comprehensive predictive framework would not have 
been possible without the methodological developments and 
research on social perception undertaken by other 
psychologists in the field. The development of experimental 
methods employing rating, ranking, and paired comparisons 
meant that it was not essential to know the physical 
dimensions which corresponded to the dimensions of experience 
as it had been in classical psychophysical methods. This 
allowed the quantification or metrication of stereotypes and 
the perception of social objects. These methods were employed 
by numerous research psychologists to examine problems of 
social perception. We have mentioned already the study by 
Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956). Another study by Pettigrew, 
Allport and Barnett (1958) employed a more complicated 
technique involving stereoscopic presentations of various 
South African races. Both studies highlighted the 
significance of classification (stereotype) and value 
(prejudice) in social perception. As discussed previously, 
the significance of classification emerged in part from these 
studies on social perception, as opposed to the traditional
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research in psychophysics, or any research conducted by 
Tajfel himself.
Furthermore, the influence of past-experience was by no 
means new to the field. The 'New Look' in perception 
recognized explicitly the significance of memory and past 
experience in perception. It was also evident in the work of 
Tresalt (1948) on judgment of different weights by 
weight-lifters and watch-makers, and the influence of 
linguistic labels on the perception of colour or shape. 
Similarly, the application of these principles of judgment 
to abstract continua was grounded in the burgeoning body of 
research literature on shifts in judgment associated with 
stereotypes and prejudice.
In particular, the writings of Gordon Allport had had
a major impact in this field, and on Tajfel's work.
I don't know who influenced him, but I can remember 
one or two thinkers and writers whom he greatly 
respected- there was Gordon Allport, definitely, 
although he disagreed with large sections of the 
nature of prejudice, he did think it a work of great 
influence.
(Billig, Interview)
It can be seen that Taj fel ' s work in Phase I was 
embedded in, and dependent upon, a vast psychological 
literature with all its concomitants of general approach, 
theory, method and research findings. Tajfel's agenda was 
that of the community in which he was situated and the shift 
from psycho-physics to social perception reflected and 
embodied the general concerns of that community. This is 
accentuated further by the nature of the research conducted 
by Tajfel himself.
Tajfel's first published research examined the effect 
of value (experimentally manipulated using paper bonuses) on 
the perceptual judgment of weight (using a series of ten 
weights). These experiments were conducted whilst Tajfel was 
still at Durham and fell well within the conventional bounds 
of psychophysics. He was given a lectureship at Oxford in 
1956 in the Department of Social and Administrative Studies. 
Despite the fact that Taj fel * s interests broadened to 
encompass issues of social perception and the cognitive
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processes involved in stereotyping, his research continued to 
use the traditional techniques of psychophysics. These 
included the study of value and the accentuation of judged 
differences using a series of coins (Tajfel and 
Cawasjee,1959), and the study of classification and its 
effect on quantitative judgments using a series of lines 
varying in length (Tajfel and Wilkes,1963a). Although his 
theoretical framework relates these to social classification 
and stereotyping, Tajfel continued, until 1963, to examine 
the perceptual judgment of physical objects with limited 
social relevance. Furthermore, the format, style and language 
of his experimental reports were highly conventional, 
consisting generally of a brief introduction, followed by a 
detailed presentation of method and results, and a relatively 
brief discussion. One would not have expected anything else.
With reference to Tajfel's early work on social
perception, Billig suggests that the publishing conventions
themselves may have been a major factor in shaping Tajfel's
published work.
I don't think it was actually that limited. The 
official publications of these may be limited but 
the thinking behind it, I cannot believe that.
(Billig, Interview)
From the current discussion, however, it can be seen 
that the impact of social convention in the academic 
community goes far beyond the restraints of publishing. 
Secure in the 'New Look' approach to the problems of 
perception, his work characterized an orthodox and 
reductionistic perspective. Whereas in 1957 the phenomenon 
of perceptual over-estimation was considered to be a special 
case of social perception, by 1959 the problems of social 
perception could be reduced to principles of perception of 
the physical environment - the simplest case. Furthermore, it 
met with the scientific canons of the Oxford community. 
Although the interests of this community were varied, there 
was considerable social pressure to conduct 'good science', 
such that psychology would be accepted by other disciplines 
as a 'bona fide' natural science. This kind of pressure 
placed some restrictions on the development of social
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psychology and, in particular, the development of a more 
social approach to the problems of social perception and 
stereotyping.
If you look at the early work, it wasn't too 
different from other things going on, how people 
thought and perceived the work, the classic problem 
within psychology. And he published, remember, in 
the British Journal of Psychology, so it was very 
orthodox - methodologically, and so on. But I think, 
perhaps, given his position as a Professor there (in 
Bristol), he got a lot of research money in, he got 
a huge grant from the Ford Foundation, and the SSRC, 
and various other sources. He just then had the 
resources to mount big research projects.
(Brown, Interview)
Even when Tajfel addressed these problems, directly, in 
his experimental research (Phase II) he continued to maintain 
a 'scientific* reductionist stance. As in Phase I, Tajfel 
draws on research from other fields in social psychology to 
bolster the claim that the principles of classification and 
value are general cognitive principles which apply to the 
perception of social phenomena. This included the work of 
Sherif and Hovland (1961) on attitude change, Hovland and 
Sherif (1952) on personal involvement in social issues and 
Manis (1960) on the strength of views concerning college 
fraternities, all conducted in the U.S.A. Similarly, the 
research methodology employed by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) 
was by no means uncommon. Photographs of people were used 
frequently in social perception research to elicit 
descriptive categories and perceptual judgments. They draw 
also on work by Hastorf, Richardson and Dornsbusch (1958) to 
overcome the problems associated with the perception of 
social objects. This involved the use of frequency and 
sequence as measures of salience of the various descriptive 
attributes.
Taj fel's next piece of research was more unusual 
(Tajfel,Sheikh and Gardner,1964). Although it involved the 
standard procedure of ratings on semantic differential 
scales, the 'stimuli' comprised of interviews conducted in 
front of the subjects. Furthermore, the experiment attempted 
to demonstrate that specific individuals of an ethnic group 
were actually attributed traits which form part of the
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stereotype concerning that group. This hypothesis was 
commensurate with Tajfel's predictive framework. Moreover, 
this was the first time he had conducted research on social 
stereotypes. However, Tajfel did not make the transition on 
his own to studying groups in the social environment. The 
research was conducted on a visit to Ontario, Canada, and was 
associated closely with previous work conducted by Lambert, 
Sheikh and Gardner.
This was so, despite the fact that Tajfel had published
previously a paper (1959c) presenting a reinterprétâtion of
Lambert and Klineberg's findings (1960) on national
stereotypes and group evaluations. Tajfel had employed his
predictive framework concerning the accentuation of
differences to explain the unexpected results of Lambert et
al. They had found that English subjects evaluated English
speakers more favourably than French speakers on seven of
fourteen traits, as expected, but that French subjects
favoured English speakers on ten traits. That is, they were
not ethnocentric. Tajfel explained this in terms of value or
relevance in situations of intergroup conflict such that
attributes associated with socio-economic class were more
highly valued by the French. This commentary on, and
association with, Lambert and others was also significant in
terms of its effect on the future direction of Tajfel's work.
Lambert and his associates had been concerned with the
origins and development of national stereotypes (1959) and
with children's views of foreign peoples (1967), addressing
issues and employing methodologies which Tajfel was later to
adopt in Phase IV of his own work.
10.3 THE TRANSITION TO A NEW PERSPECTIVE
I think it wasn't until he was then a Professor in 
Social Psychology that he felt that he was in a sort 
of position to launch forth in rather a radical 
direction.
(Brown, Interview)
In 1968, Tajfel was appointed Professor of Social 
Psychology in the Department of Psychology, University of 
Bristol. By this time, his reputation was well established. 
He had published a series of articles in the field of social 
perception which had advanced the understanding of cognitive
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processes and established a theory of social judgment which 
had initiated and stimulated a whole field of research. His 
standing in the field is confirmed, further, by the fact that 
he was asked to produce the review for The Handbook of Social 
Psychology (2nd Edition; Lindzey and Aronson (eds.)) on 
'Social and Cultural Factors in Perception' (Tajfel,1969b). 
With this security of status and with a change of working 
environment, Tajfel used his new- found freedom to address a 
range of issues and gradually to develop of a more
explicitly social perspective.
However, it is highly unlikely that this, alone, could 
have radically transformed his whole approach. Two related 
events were also highly significant: these were the 'crisis' 
in social psychology and the establishment of the European 
Association of Experimental Social Psychology. These two 
'events' cannot be considered properly as 'factors' in, or 
even as the 'social context' of, developments in his
thinking. The transformation of Tajfel's thinking, the 
broader 'crisis' in social psychology and the origins and 
characteristics of the European Association were all part and 
parcel of the same general movement in social psychology. Nor 
are these various changes divorced from changes within the 
wider society.
10.3.1 Developments in European Social Psychology
In the post-World War II period, European social 
psychology was dominated by the orientation, research 
problems, methods and theories developed and sustained in 
the United States of America. Although European countries 
had their own distinctive schools of psychology, the national 
and linguistic barriers severely restricted communication and 
cooperation within Europe. As a consequence, there was often 
a greater association with what was going on in American
social psychology than with what was going on in neighbouring
countries within Europe.
It was not until the early 1960's that cooperative 
attempts by both American and European social psychologists 
led to the establishment of a European "centre* for the 
development of social psychology. Two separate initiatives 
in this direction joined forces in 1964. One was a small
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group comprising two visiting Americans, J. Lanzetta and J.
Thibaut, and three Europeans, M. Mulder (Utrecht), R. Pages
(Sorbonne) and H. Tajfel (Oxford), who aimed to 'identify*
social psychologists in Europe. The other was the American
S.S.R.C. Committee on Transnational Social Psychology, headed
by Leon Festinger, along with Keekebakker, Moscovici and
Rommetveit, with the aim of developing and promoting
international activities and communication. The latter, with
the help of the Ford Foundation, provided funds for a series
of 'unofficial meetings', exchange visits, seminars, summer
schools and plenary conferences all over Europe. These led to
and were facilitated by the establishment of the European
Association for Experimental Social Psychology in 1966. The
principle aim of the association was
to encourage and investigate communication in 
Europe, to create a milieu of social psychologists 
which would become a breeding ground for more 
research, more training and more inventiveness in 
what was being done.
(Tajfel,1972c,p.309)
The Association was not simply an organization: it
involved the progressive creation of an actively interacting 
community of people; the creation of mutual contacts and 
awareness of an intellectual basis for social psychology in 
Europe; and the creation of new cross- currents of thought 
and controversy that stimulated a variety of new research 
developments. It was, in effect, a European community of 
social psychologists, however diverse in its social and 
political perspectives.
Tajfel was a highly prominent figure in this European 
Association.
It seemed to me that one of his main priorities was 
to establish, and have some control over, the 
development of European social psychology. And that 
is what I mean by power. I mean he was instrumental 
in setting up the Association, in setting up the 
Journal, and he spent an awful lot of time going 
round different European centres and trying to get 
people doing work he thought was interesting....he 
talked a lot about it too, about the establishment 
of a European social psychology, and I think I mean 
that was really his major ambition in a way.
(Brown, Interview)
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Eminently well qualified, given his European background, 
his facility with several European languages, and his prior 
experience in international cooperation, he was involved from 
its inception and he continued to play an extremely active 
role in its development. It was this European Association 
with which Tajfel identified, providing a network of 
friendships and communications, both personal and 
intellectual. Furthermore, the transforming of his own 
outlook and the emergence of a new perspective in social 
psychology was co-terminous with the emergence of a European 
Social Psychology community.
But, let us not push too far ahead of ourselves. We will 
return to further issues concerning the inter- dependence 
between Tajfel's work and the European Association. For now 
it provided a social milieu in which Tajfel was able to 
explore new issues in an imaginative and creative manner 
which broke with some of the conventional ideas prevalent at 
the time.
10.3.2 The emergence of culture
In 1965, Tajfel edited a volume with Dawson which 
contained a number of essays on 'the colour problem' written 
by African, Asian and West Indian students visiting Britain. 
These essays highlighted, for Tajfel, the very real effects 
of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. For the first 
time since his initiation into the academic world Tajfel 
'stepped out' of the ivory towers to take on board the 
existence of problems in society at large. It also brought 
with it an awareness of the relationship between psychology 
and the social and economic factors in their historical and 
political context. Further, and for the first time in his 
academic career, he considered the possible role of 
institutional and social policy in alleviating at least some 
of these problems.
The insidious effects of national and cultural 
stereotypes was also evident from various studies of 
children's views of foreigners and children's lack of 
ethnocentricism in particular social contexts (Clark and 
Clark,1947; Goodman,1964 ; Vaughan,1964 ; Norland,1966).
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Moreover, Tajfel's own experience in society as a 
member of a discriminated-against minority predisposed him 
towards the pursuit of an understanding of large-scale 
intergroup relations and of the etiology of intergroup 
conflict and hostility. These large-scale social problems 
had by no means diminished since the War. Confrontation 
between groups, the emergence of national identities, and 
the existence of minority groups in the minds of members of 
dominant groups were prevalent in the various societies of 
the world.
These issues had not been totally ignored by
psychologists. Well-founded theories of inter-personal
behaviour had been extrapolated to encompass large-scale
social issues. But these tended to provide purely
motivational explanations of stereotypes, prejudice and
intergroup relations. They did not provide a means of
understanding his own past experience as a Jew nor an
understanding of genocide.
That was a sort of driving force....and I think he 
really did want to understand that and he really did 
genuinely feel that the kind of available models 
that, mainly coming out of the U.S., were just 
inadequate to understand this kind of phenomena.
(Brown, Interview)
Tajfel's previous work in the field of social perception 
provided the ground on which to explore the cognitive aspects 
of these social phenomena. His interest in politics and in 
social change brought him to consider the consequences and 
implications of social psychological theories. Examination of 
people's cognitions and beliefs was far more promising in 
planning any form of social change than attempting to alter 
their motivations.
Nor did Tajfel's work on cognitive aspects of prejudice 
and intergroup relations occur in an intellectual vacuum. 
Sherif and Sherif (1969) had devoted much of their academic 
careers to the problems of intergroup relations and social 
change. They were, in effect, well ahead of Tajfel in 
claiming this field to be part of the discipline of social 
psychology. Interest in the cognitive aspects of various
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psychological and social psychological phenomena had come to 
dominate the general perspective in the discipline 
(Gardner, 1985) . This was due, in the main, to the influence, 
in America, of the gestalt psychologists (Farr, ) . Allport 
(1954), amongst others, had elaborated extensively on the 
role of stereotypes in simplifying and ordering the social 
environment. Bruner (Bruner,Postman and Rodrigues,1951) and 
the 'New Look* had emphasized the greater ambiguity in the
perception of people and social situations. Piaget had worked
extensively on the cognitive process of assimilation. 
Furthermore, there was a growing theoretical belief in social 
psychology of the pivotal role played by personal consistency 
(Sherif and Sherif,1969). Finally, Attribution Theory 
provided much of the material for understanding the search 
for coherence.
This, in no way, is intended to devalue Tajfel's
imaginative and highly creative ability in drawing together
diverse strands of his own experience and knowledge to
address a particular problem or to describe a particular
phenomenon. Billig highlights Tajfel's ability to integrate
diverse strands of knowledge and experience with reference
to his monograph on minority groups (1978) but it is also
relevant here:
it ties together interesting social issues and 
prejudice of why reading about history and
anthropology and the sufferings of different groups, 
integrated with a knowledge of social psychology and 
a creativity in social psychology.
(Billig, Interview)
But this would have been impossible without the social 
context, both of the wider society and of the European Social 
Psychology community, or without the intellectual context of 
which he was, himself, a part. The research programme on the 
development of national attitudes in children in several 
European countries was more obviously a collaborative affair.
The research programme was carried out in connection 
with a Summer School of the European Association of 
Experimental Social Psychology. It involved a series of 
studies conducted in England, Scotland, Belgium, Italy,
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Austria and Israel. Cross-cultural research on such a large 
scale would be almost impossible for any one social scientist 
to conduct. The research project itself was coordinated by 
Tajfel with the direct involvement of a least ten other 
European social psychologists including N.C. Barbiero, J.D. 
Campbell, G. Jahoda, J. Jaspars, N.B. Johnson, M.B. 
Middleton, C. Nemeth, Y.Rim, M.D. Simon and J.P. van de Geer. 
Such a venture required good communication and convergence of 
interests which were interdependent with the growing 
awareness of a European community of social psychologists and 
the establishment of the European Association. It also 
required a common theoretical framework. Value and 
categorization were translated into the dominant language of 
the three component model of attitudes, being consistently 
referred to as the effective and cognitive components. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that such research would have taken 
place outside Europe, with its plurality of nations and 
cultures. Tajfel also wrote the introduction to a book
on national attitudes in children edited by N.B. Johnson, 
which was reprinted in Sherif and Sherif's edited volume on 
Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences 
(1969) . The title of this chapter was 'The Formation of 
National Attitudes: A Social-Psychological Perspective'.
Although this chapter is rarely cited (see Chapter 7) , I 
believe it to be of great significance in the development of 
Tajfel's thinking and therefore I will discuss it here in 
some depth.
Various features of this development led to the 
asking of many new questions - no more than implicit 
at the time - about the psychological processes 
involved in the individual's affiliation with 
large-scale social groups and in the conflict 
between such groups.
(Tajfel,1981a,p.4)
It is in this chapter that Taj fel elaborates on his 
theoretical framework to address the theoretical problems 
which had emerged from the cross-cultural research. And it 
is in this chapter that may of the ideas developed in Phase 
VI are first introduced and explored. Furthermore, its lack 
of recognition has resulted in an over-emphasis on the
475
minimal group experiments (Phase V) , which are frequently 
given an over-stated significance as the foundation for the 
theory of intergroup relations (Social Identity Theory).
The first problem was to find an adequate definition of 
nationalism beyond its mere description as 'an attitude 
shared by millions of people in a large variety of cultural 
contexts' (Tajfel,1969c,p.137), a description which ignores 
the complexity and important difficulties associated with 
nationalism. Tajfel examines a variety of definitions which 
have been used in sociology, history and political science 
as well as those adopted in psychology. Included are Zangwill 
(1917) and Doob (1964) in psychology; Pye (1962) , Inkeles and 
Levinson (1954), and Inkeles (1963) on national character; 
Shafer (1955) and Kohn (1962) who were historians of national 
ideology; Emerson (1960) a political scientist, Rosenblatt 
(1964) ,and Klineberg (1964), who is a social psychologist. 
Tajfel draws together these various definitions and concludes 
that
nationalism is an attitude displayed by a body of 
people who are a nation because they feel that they 
are a nation. Nationalism as an attitude implies 
some conception of a nation of which one is a 
member; an emotional significance given to that 
membership; and the sharing of these conceptual and 
emotional identifications by large masses of people
(Tajfel,1969c,p.141).
This definition of nationalism is very similar to the 
definition of groups which Tajfel propounds in Phase VI. The 
point to be emphasized here is that this definition emerged 
from a wide reading of the literature on nationalism, not 
only in psychology, but also from the other social sciences. 
Furthermore, it was fundamental to the development of an 
alternative social-psychological perspective, and to his 
critique of traditional approaches to group phenomena in 
psychology.
Studies of nationalism in other social sciences had 
examined its historical determinants, its role as a causal 
factor in political action and the connection between various 
conditions for, and characteristics of, political movements. 
Tajfel was familiar with these writings, and it is here that
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he begins to bring them to bear on social psychological 
issues.
My genuine interests have always been, well, in 
political phenomena, social history, cultural 
history. As I became more and more a social 
psychologist, - explicitly, as distinct from being 
a psychologist, I think I was seeking how to marry 
these various interests....What I am saying is that 
really the influences were cultural influences. I've 
also been interested in the history of art and the 
history of political movements. What is coming now 
is some attempt to bring it all together.
(Tajfel,in Cohen,1977,p.298)
He always liked to read history, historical works, 
and I know one work of history which he had a lot 
of respect for, and a lot of respect for the 
academic, Lang Poliatoff's history of anti-semitism.
He also, as another historian of antisemitism , very 
much respected Norman Colmes, in *A Warrant for 
Genocide*, though he disagreed with the last 
chapter.
(Billig, Interview)
All these writings, in one form or another, referred to 
nationalism as an attitude shared by large masses of 
individuals, but remained highly speculative as to the social 
and psychological processes by which individuals came to 
identify with national groups. It was left to social 
psychologists to provide a description of these features; to 
consider the psychological functions of the cognitive and 
emotional components of nationalism in relation to their 
contextual social variables; and to examine the psychological 
and social pressures responsible for their wide-spread 
diffusion within society. Tajfel, more than any other social 
psychologist, took up this challenge. But the challenge was 
not set by psychologists; it was set by social scientists in 
general and by a desire, on his own part, to understand the 
large-scale social processes that had dominated his own life 
and which, more than ever before, were such a prominent 
feature of contemporary society.
Traditional, as well as more contemporary, approaches 
in psychology had attempted to grapple with the development 
of national attitudes; how an individual comes to identify 
with his national group and how these identifications become
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the common property of large numbers of people in different 
countries. The understanding of nationalism, developed from 
the social sciences in general, gave Tajfel an alternative 
perspective from which to construct a critique of traditional 
psychological approaches to the topic. This critique does not 
simply expose the failings of other theories. It also serves 
to bring to light or to clarify outstanding questions; to 
identify useful and less useful concepts which are either 
modified or abandoned; and to provide a foundation on the 
basis of which a new account of large-scale social phenomena 
can be negotiated.
Biological and pseudo-biological approaches, which 
explain an individual's national affiliation in terms of 
instinct or inheritance, could be rapidly dismissed as
neither tended to be taken very seriously by the academic 
community. Theories of personality functioning in relation 
to social structure presented more of a problem. Founded on 
the work of Freud (1922) they continued to be used by social 
scientists and to be developed by psychologists in an attempt 
to explain large-scale social phenomena. This includes a vast 
literature on national character (eg. Erkison,1953) used by 
political scientists (eg. Greenstein, 1965; Pye,1961,1962), 
the work of Adorno et al. (1950) on the authoritarian
personality and Campbell and LeVine's research (1961) on 
ethnocentrism. The main problem with these theories is that 
they assume, rather than explain, cultural uniformity and 
that they are too dependent upon outgroup hostility as the 
cause of social affiliation.
But other studies, including those by Pettigrew (1958) 
and Campbell (1965), as well as the combined studies on the 
development of national attitudes in children, showed that 
national identification was not limited to ethnocentrism or 
to situations of intergroup conflict. It was necessary, 
therefore, to look for other factors involved in group 
identification. Furthermore, Pettigrew was already developing 
a cultural theory of prejudice which challenged the 
psycho-dynamic approaches.
It was a theory addressed to why the ordinary
person, the ordinary reasonable thinking moderate
person, can behave immoderately and unreasonably.
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In one sense, this was a continuation of some of the 
ideas of Pettigrew, with his cultural approach to 
prejudice, that's a criticism of psycho-dynamic 
approaches.
(Billig, Interview)
The tradition of research in group dynamics pitted the 
'personality and social structure' school of thought against 
the study of small group processes. However, researchers in 
this tradition also adopted the orthodox position whereby 
nationalism or in-group affiliation arises as a result of 
outgroup hostility. In this case, the latter results from an 
individual's perception of a threat which applies directly to 
him and which is shared by other members of his group. Tajfel 
was not the only one to criticize these experimental studies. 
Others, such as Deutsch (1966), noted how the absence of any 
long-term unifying processes and a stable starting point of 
group integration created the need for outgroup hostility and 
artificially supported the 'crisis' version of nationalism.
Perhaps the most famous study in this field is Sherif's
Robbers' Cave Experiment (1966).
Sherif, for example,- it is a classic case, in some 
ways. I don't think Tajfel could have mounted his 
whole theory had it not been for the work that 
Sherif had done before him. It was, as I said, the 
idea that groups' interests determine their mutual 
behaviour.
(Brown, Interview)
He had a lot of admiration for the Sherifs and their 
work. I think he was impressed by the field studies, 
but it was like a laboratory experiment to see group 
prejudices being created from nothing, to show how 
ordinary, non-hostile, non-psychoanalytically 
damaged individuals, could hate members of another 
group.
(Billig, Interview)
Without going into too much detail, this experimental 
field study of intergroup relations created real 
ethnocentrism, real stereotypes and real hostility between 
two 'camps' of eleven year old boys on a three week summer 
camp. Group affiliation was crucially intensified in the 
second week when the two groups were brought into direct 
competition with each other. However, even during the first 
week of the study, independent group activities resulted in
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the formation of group affiliations. Tajfel suggested that
groups with a long history of common goals, activities,
norms, distinctive patterns of behaviour and sets of values
developed and shared for a long time, may achieve strong
group affiliation without any intervention of acute conflict
with an out-group.
The large-scale issue of nationalism forced Tajfel to
take his analysis beyond the individual cognitive mechanisms
that had dominated his earlier work. Furthermore, Sherif*s
work on intergroup relations, by this time, was well known.
It provided the background and legitimization, within social
psychology, for Tajfel's own work on intergroup relations.
This is evident in the frequent references to Sherifs work
as well as in his re- analysis of the Robbers' Cave
experiments. Tajfel's approach differed in that he was
directly concerned with large-scale social phenomena and that
he did not accept the high profile given to intergroup
conflict and hostility. The traditional focus on motivational
factors and outgroup hostility which intensify group
affiliations had resulted in an ignorance of previously
existing structures of beliefs and systems of values
(cognition and preferences) in the creation of large-scale
group affiliations. The significance of belief systems in
intergroup relations was evident to Tajfel both from his own
experience as a Jew in pre-war Poland and also from the
research on the development of national attitudes in
children. It was, therefore, also necessary to examine
patterns of social communication and social influence which
result in the social and cultural diffusion of national
attitudes and beliefs. These were issues which were by no
means ignored by other social psychologists or, for that
matter, by Sherif. Moreover, Tajfel draws together the
various aspects of social influence around the concept of
identification. This builds on Sherifs definition of
intergroup behaviour:
whenever individuals belonging to one group 
interact, culturally or individually, with another 
group or its members in terms of their group 
identification, we have an instance of intergroup 
behaviour.
(Sherif,1966,p.12)
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There was a vast literature on social influences in
small group research which had identified normative
(motivational) and informational (cognitive) sets of factors.
Festinger*s theory of social comparison processes (1954)
provided a synthesis of these two sets of factors. It is
within this context that 'the drive for self- evaluation*
emerged as a central theoretical construct. And it is here
that Tajfel first introduces the role of social categories
into the construction of social identity. Conditions
determining national affiliations are found in systems of
social communication; in their effectiveness in the processes
of social influence; and in the acquisition of an
individual's social identity which is national through the
process of social comparison.
Tajfel develops this discussion in relation to the
formation of the relevant cognitive structures and value
systems, drawing on the work of Deutsch (1966) on social
communication, Fishman (1968a) on linguistic categories, and
Barbichon and Moscovici (1965) on simplification. It is also
here that Tajfel first discusses group distinctiveness
whereby differences are not only perceived, accentuated and
generalized but also either manufactured or eliminated. These
ideas by no means represent, at this stage, a coherent
theoretical framework. But they helped to set the agenda and
provided the roots from which a full-blown theory of
intergroup relations is constructed in Phase VI.
10.4 A RETURN TO EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
The collaborative research on the development of
national attitudes in children and Tajfel's theoretical
analysis of nationalism, which, as we have just seen, drew
on a wide literature in the social sciences, both posed the
same question. What factors, other than intergroup conflict,
would produce intergroup discrimination?
This question was also posed, in some respects, from
the results of Sherifs field experiments.
There were already signs, as various people had 
pointed out, already in Sherifs own writings, you 
didn't actually need competitive goals, that the 
hoys were only too ready to get stuck in there. And 
so the ohvious methodological point is in fact; if
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Sherif had been a better methodologist, in some ways 
he should have had a control condition, which would 
have anticipated, in some ways, the minimal group 
studies, where you just put people into two groups, 
and let's see what happens.
(Brown, Interview)
Tajfel then became aware of European research which was
applicable to this question, most notably the experimental
investigations by Rabbie (Rabbie and Wilkens, 1968; Rabble
and Horwitz,1969; see also Rabbie and Wilkens, 1971). Rabbie
had, in effect, already asked the same question and had
conducted experimental research which attempted to identify
factors other than intergroup conflict.
He just asked the fundamental questions which in 
fact....Rabbie, in some ways, had asked first. 
Rabbie had said - wait a moment-. What would happen 
if you didn't have the conflict there with 
competitive goals?
(Brown, Interview)
Rabbie and his collaborators had suggested that the mere 
anticipation of future interaction between and within groups 
was sufficient, in itself, to produce intergroup 
discrimination. It should be remembered that the control 
condition, in which the quality of groupness was not made 
relevant to the situation, did not produce intergroup 
discrimination.
Tajfel addressed the same research question, but rather
than looking at social influence and interdependence as the
cause of competition, he examined the roles of value and
categorization.
And I think Tajfel saw that this could relate to his 
earlier ideas on categorization. If you categorize 
an object you cease to look at it in a neutral way. 
You've already made some sort of evaluation. And so 
he thought, well, if you just categorize people in 
groups, would this lead to a difference in the way 
they thought about members of their own group, and 
members of the other group?
(Billig, Interview)
It was just a clever idea and, in some ways, Rabbie 
had already, to some extent, initiated the idea of 
the minimal group in his study with Horwitz in '69.
I mean , he and Rabbie are founder members of the 
European Association. (But) Tajfel was always in the 
limelight. He was a better kind of politist and a
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better wheeler-dealer. And that is true in his 
experiments, too.
(Brown, Interview)
Rabbie did a study first, that was published in '69, 
wasn't it? They were doing it from a Lewinian point 
of view- common fate. They did a study where they 
got the wrong answer.
(Turner, Interview)
Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy together set out 
to create a base-line intergroup situation, from 
which all the usual 'reasons' for discrimination 
between the groups would be removed
(Tajfel,1978b,p.10)
and then to assess the impact of other theoretically relevant 
variables on the development of discrimination (Phase V). I 
have discussed, previously, the development of these 
experiments (see Chapter 9) and the unexpected finding that 
social categorization, alone, produced intergroup 
discrimination. And I have discussed also the explanation of 
these results in terms of social norms. But why social norms? 
The theoretical discussions in Phases III and IV of Tajfel's 
work provided an explanatory framework much closer to that 
which was eventually developed in Phase VI, yet the notions 
of personal integrity or social identity, social comparison 
and differentiation are not used in Phase V.
The reasons for this are not completely clear but a 
combination of factors may be suggested. Firstly, the 
research was an experimental study which set up, explicitly, 
the minimal conditions for intergroup discrimination. This, 
on its own, created a gap between theory and research which 
proved difficult to bridge. Phase IV was, both theoretically 
and conceptually, far in advance of the actual research 
conducted in either Phases IV or V. Secondly, the fact that 
value associated with the group was not a necessary condition 
for intergroup discrimination further removed the 
experimental results from previous theoretical discussions. 
Thirdly, the unexpected results required a clear and definite 
response; Tajfel's theoretical ideas were not, as yet, well 
structured or integrated and would not have provided a 
convincing explanation. In contrast, the normative and
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informational aspects of social norms were well established
theoretical conceptions which had emerged out of small group
research. Social norms provided a widely accepted conceptual
framework and theoretical explanation for the research
results. Furthermore, it was possible to anchor the research
in Sherifs work on intergroup relations, while
simultaneously highlighting the novelty of Tajfel's findings.
Given that here we had this data to be explained, 
social categorization data , and given, too, they 
seemed to be raising quite interesting questions and 
novel theoretical implications, you had to start 
looking at existing ideas....in fact, when you look 
at Sherif, we find that we have a very nice theory 
of intergroup behaviour, where you can draw a nice 
contrast between this realistic competition and what 
we then called social competition. So, it was really 
a way of just making a point and trying to show how 
what Henri had discovered was novel.
(Turner, Interview)
Furthermore, the discussion of alternative explanations 
in the 1971 paper, forms part of the negotiation of 
explanations. Tajfel et al. present, and then dismiss, both 
the experimenter effect, and the anticipation of future 
interactions as adequate theoretical explanations (Chapter 
8). The possibility that 'expectation of reciprocity' 
produced intergroup discrimination was not so easily 
dismissed. Negotiation regarding the explanations actually 
required a further experiment to be conducted (Doise,Tajfel 
and Billig,1972).
The process of negotiating an account of unexpected 
findings extends well beyond the original papers. Firstly, 
the results were replicated in a number of experimental 
studies both at Bristol and elsewhere (eg. Deutsch,Thomas 
and Garner,1971; Doise and Sinclair,1973). Secondly, 
experiments were designed to address alternative explanations 
presented by other social psychologists. For example, Billig 
and Tajfel (1973) designed an experiment which would separate 
out the effects of perceived similarity between group members 
from the effects of social categorization on intergroup 
discrimination. Similarly, Tajfel and Billig (1974) 
distinguished the effects of familiarity from social 
categorization. However, even as late as 1974, Gerard and
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Hoyte attempted to explain discrimination in the minimal
group situation as an experimental artefact in terms of
demand characteristics. Thirdly, these subsequent studies
were, themselves, a point of departure for further
theoretical discussion regarding the role of social
categorization in intergroup relations. The most significant
of these was Turner's experiments on self versus group in
social category situations (Turner,1973) (see Chapter 9).
10.5 THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Then came the crisis. One became less and less 
satisfied, both intellectually and socially, with 
what social psychology was doing.
(Tajfel,in Cohen 1977,p.299)
It is difficult to define and identify the various 
elements in the crisis. Frequently, it is referred to in 
inverted commas, denoting some uncertainty as to what it 
actually was, but also a common awareness of its existence. 
Here is not the place to explore the origins and development 
of this crisis, or its implications - this would constitute 
a thesis in its own right. But it is worth reviewing some of 
its most salient characteristics. Not least of these was the 
lack of confidence within the community as to the validity 
and social relevance of various endeavours. Research and 
theorizing were by no means paralysed but a considerable 
number of publications, both books and articles, posed 
questions about methodology and challenged the theoretical 
and philosophical assumptions governing research in social 
psychology. There was widespread debate regarding what social 
psychology was, or should be, about. Moreover, there was a 
common consensus that such debate was legitimate.
As early as 1963, Koch had expressed considerable 
dissatisfaction with the achievements of psychology in his 
epilogue to Psvcholoav; A studv of a Science. Nowhere was 
this more severely felt than in social psychology. Problems 
with the use of experimental methodology first emerged into 
public awareness with the publication of Orne's paper on 
demand characteristics (1962) and Rosenthal's book on the 
experimenter effect (1966). The initial response focused on 
methodology with the design of unobtrusive measures arid
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non-reactive research methods (for example, Webb et al., 
1966). However, continued concern with the external validity 
and the triviality of much experimental research in both 
laboratory and field settings, as well as questions regarding 
the ethics of social research, shifted the focus of doubt to 
the whole * enterprise' of social psychology (eg.Ring,1967 ; 
Kelman,1968 ; Smith,1972).
Dissatisfaction with a positivistic science psychology 
was expressed in many critiques of and blueprints for social 
psychology, especially in Europe. These addressed not only 
issues of methodology but also the substance of social 
psychology; the problems and theories, its inherent values, 
the models of human kind adopted, and the nature of 
explanation (Mixon,1971; Harré and Secord,1972; Israel and 
Tajfel,1972; Gergen, 1973; Shotter,1975; Gauld and Shotter, 
1977,etc.). Moreover, that this represented a major shift is 
evidenced by books such as 'Reconstructing Social Psvcholoav' 
(Armistead,1974) and 'Social Psvcholoav in Transition' 
(Strickland et al.,1976).
It is likely that the 'crisis' within the community of 
social psychologists was associated with social movements in 
society and with developments in other disciplines. Kuhn's 
(1962) thesis on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and 
other critiques of positivistic and hypothetico-deductive 
philosophies of science have had, no doubt, an impact on the 
social sciences. Nor has Sociology been entirely free from 
some turbulence (eg. Gouldner,1970). Moreover, the student 
movement of the late 1960's, changes in society's attitude 
towards science and general trends in the style of thought 
(Capra,1983) constituted a wider social context amenable to 
the crisis within social psychology.
The European Association was closely involved in the 
articulation of the crisis. This is nowhere more clearly seen 
than in the contents of the second European Monograph in 
Social Psychology edited by Israel and Tajfel, with 
contributions from Moscovici, Tajfel, Israel, Rommetveit, 
Asplund, Janousek, Wiberg, Von Cranach, Flament, and Harré 
who were based in Scandinavia, France, Germany, England or 
Czechoslovakia. The book originated from the 1969 plenary
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conference of the Association where a * complex and 
conflicting collective state of mind* (Israel and Tajfel, 
1972,p.2) became evident. The conflict was between a respect 
for the well-established traditions, ideas, theories and 
associated experimental research on the one hand and a 
general dissatisfaction with the social, scientific and 
philosophical assumptions on which these were based on the 
other. This raised questions as to the nature of theory, the 
adequacy of methods, the unstated assumptions, values and 
presuppositions, and the relevance of research in social 
psychology, and its relationship to the natural sciences. 
These issues were further discussed in a small working group 
and eventually were published under the title of *The Context 
of Social Psvcholoav; A Critical Assessment*.
This book has probably been highly influential in
various strands of European Social Psychology and is still
relevant to the continuing debate. But, even if this were
not the case, it is an expression of the ideas and concerns
which were prevalent in the European Social Psychology
community during the early 1970*s. Furthermore, Tajfel was
intimately involved in these discussions and debates. His
contribution to the volume entitled * Experiments in a Vacuum*
not only argues the case for experimental research in social
psychology but also elaborates on a social psychology which
goes beyond individual and interindividual behaviour.
The major preoccupation at that time, though, was 
more general than the theory, was the whole debate 
about social psychology, and all the debate around 
the context book of *72. He was still passionately 
engaged, wherever he went, and saying that this is 
what social psychology should be all about. And 
these experiments in a vacuum - the whole thing - 
and he was still really publicising those ideas, and 
engaging in a spirited way with what he saw as the 
overpowering dominance of American social psychology 
with its very limited methodological, theoretical 
perception of what people were and the kinds of 
things they did. And that*s an irony, too, because, 
despite his wider concerns about social psychology, 
his actual own work is rather orthodox. His 
experiments are very traditional, and control 
variables and all that sort of thing were very 
vacuous in some ways.
(Brown, Interview)
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While others, such as Harré and Secord (1972), were 
pronouncing that experimental methodology was not suited to 
the exploration of social psychological phenomena and could 
never provide the proper foundation for a science of social 
behaviour, Tajfel did not wish to abandon the experimental 
tradition. In some respects, this is not surprising. 
Throughout his academic career he had worked within the 
experimental tradition of social psychology. All the research 
with which he had been directly involved was experimental. In 
this respect, Tajfel remained an active proponent of the 
orthodox, and he remained unconvinced by arguments 
proclaiming the greater value of other methods.
This having being said, he was critical of experimenters 
who extrapolated from the behaviour of subjects in a 
laboratory context to social conduct in natural settings 
without an examination of the social context. The 
significance of the social context emerges, in part, from his 
research in Phases IV and V. Experimental situations can be 
considered to be caricatures of social reality. This means 
that an analysis of the social context of the experiment and 
the situations to which they apply must be made. Furthermore, 
features of the social context and their interaction with 
psychological processes must be tested experimentally. Good 
experimental research depends upon both good theory and good 
cultural analysis. This can either be of the sequence Theory- 
Experiment-Cultural analysis or, as in the case of the 
experiments on social categorization and intergroup 
behaviour. Experiment leads to Theory leads to Cultural 
Analysis. In this respect, Tajfel criticized a wide range of 
experimental research in social psychology. This included 
modelling experiments in Game Theory; simulation experiments, 
such as Sherifs on the emergence of social norms 
(autokinetic effect) and his own experiments on social 
judgment (Phase II); and some naturalistic experiments such 
as Argyle's work on dyads and small groups.
Tajfel's faith in the experimental tradition was not 
only evident in these theoretical debates. Firstly, during 
the formative years of the European Association there were 
heated discussions and disagreements over the most suitable
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name for the association. Eventually, it was named the 
European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, a 
name which Tajfel had advocated strongly. Secondly, Tajfel's 
own research had always been experimental, and this 
'orthodoxy* proved to be very powerful. He had argued that 
experiments could never be conducted in a social vacuum and 
that it was also necessary to examine the social context. 
But, in his actual research, Tajfel himself never did so. 
Furthermore, in the 1972 chapter on 'Experiments in a vacuum' 
he mentions a number of open-ended individual interviews 
which supported the social norms interpretation of the social 
categorization experiments. He goes on to suggest that such 
interviews should be used more frequently in experimental 
research. But these interviews were never published as 
legitimate research findings. It was left to his students and 
collaborators to design and conduct research which examined 
the social context of social behaviour and intergroup 
relations.
While others were arguing that social psychology must 
adopt a model of 'homo' which recognizes the 'autonomy' of 
the individual (eg.Harré), and, as a consequence, that 
experimental methodology was untenable, Tajfel advocated the 
case for experimental research. He also advocated a social 
model of 'homo' which recognized the lack of individual 
autonomy and the lack of independence from social conditions 
and social norms. It was this latter aspect of his model 
which was responsible for large-scale uniformities in social 
behaviour.
In the context of the crisis, Tajfel, for the first 
time, explicates his view on the perspective of social 
psychology. He argues that questions about human social 
behaviour have been reduced to the biological, psychological 
or sociological levels in their research and analysis. 
Theories in social psychology are basically about individual 
or inter-individual behaviour since their explanations of 
social behaviour are founded in individual motives and 
cognitions. Theories of aggression, of interindividual and 
small group competition and cooperation, of judgments, 
stereotypes, attitudes and beliefs about ingroups and
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outgroups, and of the genesis of prejudice (including
Tajfel's own work in Phase II, and, in some respects. Phase
III) reduce social behaviour to the presocial or asocial
aspects of 'homo'. This approach is epitomized by Berkowitz
(1962) in his statement that
Dealings between groups ultimately become problems 
of the psychology of the individual. Individuals 
decide to go to war; battles are fought by 
individuals; and peace is established by 
individuals... Ultimately it is the single person 
who attacks the feared and disliked ethnic minority 
group.
(Berkowitz,p.167, quoted in 
Tajfel,1972a,p.95)
This passage, along with Harré's claim for the autonomy 
of individuals, must have incensed Tajfel in its denial of 
his own experience as a Jew and the experience of many other 
minority peoples. When it came to large-scale interrelations 
between groups such a view was clearly untenable. The 
psychology of the individual, or even of inter-individual 
behaviour, could not be simply extrapolated to explain the 
social uniformities. This required a different perspective on 
the relationship between the individual and the social. 
Individuals feel, think and behave in terms of their social 
identities which are determined, to a large extent, by the 
relations between the groups to which they belong. The social 
setting of intergroup relations contributes to making 
individuals what they are and they, in turn, produce the 
social setting in a symbiotic relationship of development and 
change.
It is here, also, that Tajfel begins to stress the 
importance of social change. 'Change is the fundamental 
characteristic of the social environment, and, as such, is 
the most basic problem presented by this environment to the 
human organism' (Tajfel,1972a,p.108). The crucial problem of 
social psychology, which requires thinking in terms of 
'organizational wholes', is that of the relations between 
Man and social change. Social change includes large-scale 
social, political, economic and technological transformations 
as well as the everyday changes in an individual's life. We 
have already noted that Sherif had been concerned with social
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change. So, too, was Moscovici. Tajfel was also influenced
and supported by Piaget from whom he extended his
understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the
organism and its environment; between the individual and the
social environment.
Indirectly, though I have not met him more than one 
or two times, Piaget must have been quite important.
I'm not really conscious of it. But there is his 
influence.
(Tajfel,in Cohen,1977,p.297)
The individual must create change, resist it, adapt to it or 
prepare for it. The system of shared expectations, beliefs 
and evaluations must be changed, or the environment must be 
changed to preserve them.
It was also Piaget who introduced the notion of
decentration adopted by Tajfel to emphasize the significance
of shared beliefs and evaluations. This "sharing* is defined
in terms of an individual expectation about, and evaluation
of, other people's behaviour as members of large-scale
groups. In both these cases, Tajfel transposed the ideas of
Piaget on cognitive development to the realm of social
behaviour and large-scale inter-group relations.
It is because of the socially derived, shared, 
accepted and conflicting notions of appropriateness 
of conduct, because of the social definition of the 
situations to which they apply, and of the social 
origin of their manner of changing and of relating 
to one another, that individual and inter-individual 
psychology cannot be usefully considered as 
providing the bricks from which an adequate social 
psychology can be built. The derivations used to be 
in the opposite direction.
(Tajfel,1972,p.104)
This reflects a more sociological perspective, contrasting 
with traditional social psychology, and was no doubt 
influenced by Tajfel's cross-disciplinary reading, for 
example:-
He was also very impressed by Berger and Luckmann's 
'Social Construction of Reality' which he considered 
a very, very important work. He had a lot of 
admiration, I can remember him, for Lévi-Strauss's 
work.
(Billig, Interview)
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Although this perspective was at odds with some of the 
social psychological community it was also in alignment with 
others. Most notable of these is Moscovici*s discussion of 
society and social psychology (1972) and his work on social 
representations and minority influence, both of which were, 
by then, well established in France. Also, Rommetveit's 
perspective on social communication, meaning and language 
similarly stresses that social interaction requires an 
analysis that goes beyond individual behaviour. That other 
Europeans with whom Tajfel was in direct association, both 
academically and as friends, were thinking the same way and 
talking the same language was absolutely vital to the 
development of a new perspective in group psychology and 
social psychology in general. So, too, were the divergences 
in perspective, both with traditional social psychology and 
within the European community. These divergences gave rise to 
controversy and debate which stimulated and facilitated the 
exposition and clarification of particular issues.
Tajfel's emphasis on the social context not only applied 
to experiments conducted within social psychology. It also 
applied to the social context of the discipline as a whole. 
The establishment of a European Social Psychology almost 
inevitably brought with it a contrast with American Social 
Psychology. This was most explicitly proclaimed by Moscovici 
in his contribution to the 1972 volume entitled 'Society and 
Theory in Social Psychology'. American Social Psychology had 
implicitly been directed towards issues of its own society 
but these were not necessarily the most pressing issues in 
Europe. Both Moscovici and Tajfel, along with other social 
psychologists in Europe, emphasized the need to establish a 
second cultural base for social psychology, which addressed 
the issues confronting European societies, not least of which 
were the large-scale social phenomena associated with social 
change.
This was, in part, a recognition of the growing 
conviction that social psychology, along with the other 
social and human sciences, could never be value-free or 
independent from their cultural and social context. But 
Tajfel frequently reminded his readers that *European* social
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psychology did not set out to be in opposition to American 
social psychology (Tajfel,1971; Tajfel,1972c; Tajfel,in 
Cohen,1977; Tajfel 1981a) In itself, it contained a diversity 
of social, political, cultural and economic perspectives. But 
it was this pluralism, along with the communication networks 
and controversies, which created the most promising social 
milieu for the future development of social psychology.
10.6 THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND SOCIAL 
CONTEXT
During the next four years, Tajfel worked with others 
on developing a social psychology of social change which 
addressed the relationship between the psychological 
processes and the social context of social interaction. This 
development had two interdependent strands - findings from 
experimental research led to the specification of intervening 
psychological processes and the continuum from 
interindividual to intergroup behaviour; readings in the 
political sciences and reference to intergroup relations in 
society facilitated the elaboration of the social context in 
terms of social change and social mobility.
It was previously mentioned that Turner's experimental 
studies on social categorization were highly significant in 
the development of the theoretical framework (Turner,1973 ; 
1975). These experiments were designed within the minimal 
group paradigm first used by Tajfel, Flament, Billig and 
Bundy (1971) , and were supplemented by a questionnaire 
designed to find out how subjects perceived their choices 
and the experimental situation. The major difference in the 
experimental design was that subjects were able to distribute 
money or 'points' directly to themselves or others as well as 
to other ingroup members and outgroup members and that the 
salience of the group was varied. In certain conditions 
subjects displayed self-favouritism, rather than 
ingroup-favouritism. These results showed that an explanation 
of intergroup discrimination purely in terms of social 
categorizations associated with a 'generic group attitude' 
was inadequate. Perception of an ingroup-outgroup dichotomy 
does not alone result in intergroup discrimination; that is.
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social categorization per se does not promote social 
conflict.
This led to the whole issue of intergroup discrimination 
within a minimal group context being reappraised. Drawing on 
the theoretical ideas which had emerged in Phases III and IV 
a subject's behaviour was assumed to be an expression of his 
or her ubiquitous tendency towards self-evaluation 
(Festinger,1954). Within the experimental situation 
individuals could act in terms of their intergroup categories 
or in terms of self in order to gain a positive 
self-evaluation. The former requires identification with the 
group and the achievement of a positively valued 
distinctiveness from the other group through the process of 
social comparison. In this way the group contributed to a 
member's positive self-image through the process of social 
comparison. Turner refers to this in terms of social 
competition between groups for positively valued attributes.
These experiments were also influenced by related
theories of intergroup conflict and, in particular, realistic
group conflict theory (Sherif,1967).
A phrase he used to me almost immediately in the 
first year was something like - we need a way of 
thinking about conflict or discrimination which 
distinguishes between competition and conflict in 
the sense of hostility. So he was already getting 
there- already there. That was my first article, was 
to make that distinction clear.
(Turner, Interview)
By using abstract dimensions of evaluation for social 
comparisons, as opposed to monetary rewards. Turner showed 
that intergroup differentiations were not dependent upon a 
conflict of group interests over monetary rewards, but were 
dependent on an individual's identification with a group. 
Social competition could be distinguished from economic or 
realistic competition. Turner also describes two situations 
in which social competition and realistic competition 
overlap. Firstly, the material reward can serve as a symbol 
of a value-differential associated with social comparison 
between groups. Secondly, social competition can give rise 
to a conflict of interest.
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The experiments also illuminated the role of social 
conditions in determining the form of social interactions in 
which subjects engaged. In the previous chapter on problems 
and solutions we have already seen how this facilitated the 
conceptual creation of a continuum from interindividual to 
intergroup behaviour. We have also seen how this continuum 
was related to the continuum from social mobility to social 
change.
The interrelationships between social categorization,
social identity, social comparison and psychological
distinctiveness are elaborated on and explicated in Tajfel's
publication entitled 'Social Identity and Intergroup
Behaviour'(1974). These ideas were first presented in the
Katz-Newcomb lectures and Tajfel used this opportunity to
develop a theoretical position.
- the idea of people's social identity being bound 
up in their group and the need for them to see the 
group in a positive light. And all these things 
started to come together and he really launched 
those ideas in the unlikely platform of the 
Katz-Newcomb lectures, where in a sense he was given 
a space to sort of speculate about the world. So he 
did.
(Brown, Interview)
But this cannot be construed as the intellectual achievement 
of Taj f el alone. It was rather the culmination of an 
intellectual and research community primarily based at 
Bristol University with close connections to other European 
centres of social psychological research.
The main point of departure from the traditional 
literature on intergroup relations was that identification 
with a group (group affiliation) occurs prior to any 
intergroup conflict. That is, an individual's sense of 
belonging to a group is acquired prior to the perception of 
threat or competition with an outgroup. The centrality of 
identification is expressed in the concept of Social 
Identity, by which an individual finds, creates and defines 
his or her place in society. It is in this article that 
Taj fel elaborates on the psychological processes with an 
extended discussion of social comparison and psychological 
distinctiveness, as presented in the exposition of Phase VI.
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Furthermore, the interrelationships between social 
categorization, social identity, social comparison and 
psychological distinctiveness are explicated to create an 
integrated and coherent exposition of the psychological 
process and functions of social behaviour in intergroup 
relations.
This article also elaborates on the societal conditions
in which intergroup behaviours will arise and the form which
they will assume.
The other thing where this is distinctly European - 
he's always thinking, not only about the distinctive 
law of social psychology, but acknowledging that 
there is something called society, society proper; 
so he is always thinking about that, too.
(Turner, Interview)
It seemed in line with the semi-Marxist or left-wing 
ideology about class relationships and so on. And 
so, when I first read the social identity ideas, 
what Henri was suggesting was that people would be 
motivated to do things, good things, bad things, in 
the name of their group, for reasons other than just 
the group's material interests, things like the 
group's name or the language or its culture.
(Brown, Interview)
As we have seen in Phase VI, the societal conditions are 
considered in terms of the social mobility-social change 
continuum in relation to consensually superior and inferior 
groups. This contrast provided a structure in which to 
explore intergroup relations between consensually superior 
and inferior groups.
The ideas expressed by the social mobility-social change 
continuum developed slowly. Tajfel was concerned that 
theories in social psychology should address issues relating 
to social change and to large-scale social phenomena. 
Furthermore, from the above experiments it was clear that 
individuals acted in terms of their group membership when 
they couldn't achieve a positive self-image as an individual. 
These were related to the social conditions in society in 
which individuals could not move easily from one group to 
another. In order to achieve a positive self-image it was 
necessary to change the image, position or circumstances of
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his or her group as a whole. Social change thus referred to 
the changes in relationships between groups and their 
associated expectations, intentions and actions. This was 
then contrasted with conditions of 'social mobility' in which 
individuals could move freely between groups and did not have 
to rely on their group membership in order to achieve a 
positive self-image.
This contrast provided a structure within which to 
explore intergroup relations between consensually superior 
and inferior groups. This appears to be a logical analysis 
of the implications of the psychological processes, given 
certain social conditions. Examples from intergroup relations 
in society are used to provide 'intuitive support' for this 
analysis of the various forms of intergroup behaviour, 
expecially with regard to the actions of inferior groups 
under conditions of social change. These include American 
blacks and the emergence of 'black is beautiful', Negro music 
and dance, African traditions, accents and dialects, etc. as 
positively valued attributes; the emergence of new 
nationalisms such as the Welsh; and the reassessment of 
Jewish Identity. Other examples are drawn from social 
psychological research. For instance, Lemaine's field studies 
showed that the 'inferior' group of boys given less adequate 
materials for building a house engaged in social activities 
which created new criteria of comparison.
Although intergroup relations in general stimulated this 
discussion, the specific examples did not influence the 
general structure of the analysis. This relied entirely on 
the specification of the psychological processes, the 
distinction between conditions of social mobility and social 
change and the distinction between inferior groups in 
relation to superior groups and vice versa. What the examples 
did do was to promote a discussion of the various solutions 
that could be found, given the same social conditions. They 
also made apparent the importance of social creativity in the 
maintenance and creation of intergroup differentiation.
The style of this analysis can be contrasted with 
Tajfel's earlier work in Phases I and II. In the latter, the 
general discussion and theoretical structure revolved around
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the findings of experimental research conducted within social 
psychology. This stands in contrast to Phase VI in which the 
theoretical discussion is extended to encompass examples 
drawn from society itself, in terms of general descriptions 
of intergroup relations and social identities.
These ideas were developed further by drawing on the 
work of Hirschman on Exit. Voice and Lovaltv (1970). Tajfel 
met Hirschman while visiting Harvard and realized the 
congruence between their ideas. Hirschman was himself an 
economist who had been influenced by theories in political 
science. His thesis focuses on the use of 'exit* -leaving an 
organization -and 'voice'- expressing dissatisfaction to 
management etc. - as ways of dealing with institutional 
problems. Hirschman's analysis related directly to social 
mobility and social change with some implications for the 
social psychology of intergroup relations. But it largely 
addressed an individual's exit or voice in organizations in 
response to decline. This had to be transposed to, or 
integrated with, the interindividual-intergroup continuum 
(Tajfel,1976). Firstly, the contrast between social mobility 
and social change could be conceived of as a continuum which 
involved a transposition from individual exit to group voice. 
Secondly, the use of group voice could serve as a powerful 
force working towards the maintenance of the status quo as 
well as towards the implementation of change under conditions 
of social change.
It is also in this context that Tajfel defines the 
relationship between social psychology and other social 
sciences, as was presented in Phase VI. The juxtaposition of 
economics, political science and social psychology made it 
apparent that Tajfel was encroaching on the territory of 
these other disciplines. Furthermore, the inclusion of social 
conditions, traditionally the domain of sociology, into a 
social psychological theory needed to be justified. We have 
already seen how the influence of the social context (social 
variables) was translated into the process of social 
identity. We have also seen that the specification of the 
psychological processes alone does not provide an adequate 
understanding of the variety of forms of intergroup
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behaviour. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to 
examine the consensual status of the groups and the social 
conditions in which intergroup behaviour occurred. These 
social conditions are shifted into the domain of social 
psychology in terms of systems of beliefs about the structure 
of society. Furthermore, these belief systems, once 
established, acquire an autonomous function in directing 
intergroup relations. This is also affected by the perceived 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the structure of intergroup 
relations. The significance of perceived legitimacy had 
already been realized within the frustration-aggression 
literature. By introducing this conceptual construct into his 
analysis of intergroup relations, Tajfel was able to clarify 
the transition from acceptance to rejection of minority 
status and the creation of social change out of social 
stability (Tajfel,1978i).
Thus a social psychology of intergroup relations and 
especially changing intergroup relations and social movements 
requires an analysis of systems of belief and their social 
diffusion through society; the perceived legitimacy of 
intergroup relations; as well as the psychological processes 
of social identity and social comparison.
The contrast between systems of belief in social 
mobility and social change was not only used by Tajfel as 
part of the theoretical framework of intergroup relations. 
It was also applied to the social context of social 
psychology as a discipline. In the section on problems and 
solutions, 1 discussed Tajfel's use of the 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum to redefine the boundaries 
of social psychology and to distinguish his approach from 
more traditional approaches which had originated 
predominantly within American social psychology. This focus 
on interindividual relations was related to the shared belief 
in social mobility within American culture. Hirschman pointed 
out that this was one of the most powerful images of the 
American myth. This myth of individual mobility within 
society was not so strong in European cultures. By creating 
a second cultural base for social psychology it was possible 
to develop a social psychology of intergroup relations and
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social change, which was no longer restricted by the past 
dominance of American influence and tradition. The 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum also provided a means by 
which to present these ideas on intergroup relations, within 
the bounds of social psychology, to the academic community in 
the U.S.A.
10.7 A THEORY ESTABLISHED
The interdependent representations of the discipline of
social psychology, of social behaviour and social change, of
the psychological processes and social beliefs, and of the
differentiation between social groups were brought together
and integrated into a well structured theoretical framework
in Tajfel's contribution to the 1978 volume on
Differentiation between Social Groups. This theoretical
framework extended from experimental data to societal
realities; from psychological processes to consensual systems
of belief, and from experimental research to the metatheory
of social psychology. The difficulty encountered in
presenting a summary of this theoretical framework in Phase
VI was due, in large part, to the interdependence and
integration of these various aspects. Furthermore, it would
have been difficult , if not impossible, to analyse the
construction sequentially on the basis of these chapters
alone. The strength of these writings is to be found in
Tajfel's ability to relate a diverse literature to the
large-scale social uniformities in intergroup relations and
to explicate the relationships involved.
They provide a coherent set of interrelated ideas 
that have to do with a specific problem that you are 
concerned with.
(Tajfel in Cohen,1977,p.303)
By the time Tajfel came to write his contribution in 
the 1978 volume on Differentiation between Social Groups much 
of the theoretical framework had already been constructed. 
The social-psychological definition of groups and of group 
membership was developed as early as 1969 in the article on 
the formation of national attitudes. Most of Chapter 4 on 
'The Achievement of Group Differentiation' and a large 
section of Chapter 3 on 'Social Categorization, Social
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Identity and Social Comparison' were taken directly from the 
1974 text. Chapter 2 on 'Interindividual behaviour and 
Intergroup behaviour' draws largely on his previous work.
The distinction between interindividual and intergroup 
psychology was a well-established feature of Tajfel's 
writings by 1972 when he contributed to the volume on The 
Context of Social Psvcholoav (Israel and Tajfel,1972a). It 
is here, also, that the social psychological perspective was 
constructed and elaborated. The chapter on 'Categorizatione 
Sociale' (1972b), together with the article on 'Social 
Identity' (1974b), explicated the psychological processes 
involved in intergroup behaviour, drawing on earlier ideas 
first presented in 1969(a). The contrasting conceptions of 
social change and of social mobility were also evident by 
this time. The latter was further developed, in conjunction 
with Hirschman's notions of 'exit' and 'voice', in terms of 
consensual belief systems. Tajfel's concern with social 
movements, minority groups and social creativity also came to 
the fore during this period.
This having been said, there are a number of 
developments which further illuminate the social and 
intellectual influences on Tajfel's work. Firstly, Tajfel 
discusses extensively and argues against criticisms of 
different aspects of the theory advanced by other social 
psychologists. One of these relates to the so-called 
tautological or circular definition of groups. He overcomes 
this by considering the internal and external criteria of 
group membership. Internal criteria refer to the subjective, 
self-identification of group membership. External criteria 
refer to the identifications made by other groups or the 
experimenter and also to the observation of a consensus 
regarding the cognitive, affective and emotional components 
of group membership. Tajfel demonstrates the validity of 
these criteria by referring to experimental studies using 
natural groups, creating 'natural' groups (eg.Sherif,1966), 
imposing the minimal conditions for groups (eg. Tajfel et 
al.,1971), or explicitly avoiding any imposition of groups 
(Ferguson and Kelley,1964).
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Another criticism involved the reinterpretation of the 
various experimental results in terms of 'experimenter 
effect' or 'demand characteristics' (Hornstein,1972 ; 
Deutsch,1971; Gerard and Hoyt,1974). These were particularly 
relevant to the minimal group paradigm experiments which 
lacked any cross-validation from internal or external 
criteria of the experimentally manipulated behaviour. This 
criticism is countered both in terms of theoretical 
explanation and on the grounds of experimental research. 
Experimental results in Billig and Tajfel (1973) could not be 
parsimoniously explained in terms of 'demand 
characteristics'. Furthermore, the 'experimenter-effeet' was 
itself a phenomenon that required a theoretical explanation 
in terms of 'subject effect' and shared beliefs or 
expectations.
Secondly, Tajfel places greater emphasis on social 
movements and extends the discussion of this phenomenon 
drawing on the work of Toch (1965) on The social psvcholoav 
of social movements. For Toch, social movements are 
relatively enduring of collective behaviour, involving large 
groups of people, aimed at promoting or resisting change in 
society at large, in order to resolve, collectively, a
problem they feel that they have in common and which is
perceived to arise from their relations with other groups. 
Tajfel extends this discussion by emphasizing the role of 
shared systems of beliefs as described previously.
Thirdly, as described in Phase VI, Tajfel presents an 
extensive argument for the distinction between 
interindividual and intergroup behaviour and identifies the 
particular psychological processes involved in each of these 
with reference to relative deprivation. This is dependent, in 
certain respects, on the literature addressing relative
deprivation in sociology and political science, and in 
particular Gurr's volume on Whv Men Rebel (1970). Gurr
provides a subjective or cognitive definition of relative 
deprivation and describes a continuum from personal to group 
relative deprivation. Tajfel adopts the continuum and 
considers the social psychological processes involved at the 
two poles and in the transition between personal and group
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relative deprivation. He also draws on research by Danziger
(1963) and Geber (1972), both psychologists, and Birrel 
(1972) , a sociologist, to illustrate the intergroup pole.
Fourthly, certain aspects of the theory are less clear 
than others. The difficulties encountered in providing a 
clear specification of the various theoretical principles 
can be seen to be related to the wider social and 
intellectual context. In particular, the social psychological 
perspective and the psychological processes are clearly 
defined and well explicated. The comprehensive theoretical 
discussion is elaborated and clarified by exposing the 
weaknesses of other theoretical approaches and by drawing on 
experimental research within social psychology. In contrast, 
the discussion of the form, content and role of social 
beliefs systems, and of legitimacy does not achieve the same 
degree of lucidity. Similarly, there is little discussion 
concerning communication processes, social influence and the 
diffusion of these consensual beliefs systems. Furthermore, 
although the diverse forms of intergroup relations found in 
society can be located within the theoretical structure, it 
by no means provides a comprehensive or definitve framework 
for the specification of their distinguishing 
characteristics. This is due, in part, to the fact that these 
issues constitute the most recent developments in the 
evolution of the theoretical framework. It is also due to the 
lack of research and theoretical debate in social psychology 
which directly addresses these issues.
10,8 A COLLABORATIVE AFFAIR
I have discussed some of the social and intellectual 
influences on the evolution of a Theory of Intergroup 
Relations and on the emergence of a Social Psychological 
Perspective. One of the most important types of influence 
has been the collaboration with other social psychologists. 
Much of Tajfel's research and many of his publications 
involve the efforts of more than one person. Frequently, 
Tajfel's research was conducted with the assistance of his 
students or vice versa. Other research enterprises were 
conducted in collaboration with social psychologists who were 
eminent in their own right. This is particularly true of his
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work with Bruner and the cross-cultural research on national 
attitudes. However, that the construction of theory and the 
conduct of research is a collaborative enterprise is nowhere 
more evident than in the construction of the theory of 
intergroup relations.
The main centre for research and theoretical discussion
relating to these developments was at Bristol University,
where Tajfel held his chair. Unlike many psychology
departments in Britain, where there is only one social
psychologist, in Bristol there was a group of people who had
worked together for several years on the same problems; who
exchanged ideas, discussed and debated relevant issues,
designed, conducted and interpreted research and constructed
a theory of intergroup relations together. As Tajfel
commented in the Preface to the 1978 volume
it is very difficult (and also quite unimportant) 
to know at the end who was the initial * owner' of 
one idea or another, who has been the first to 
formulate a useful hypothesis, or to push us in a 
new direction.
(Tajfel,1978a,p.vii)
Tajfel moved to Bristol in 1968. He was shortly joined
by Michael Billig and Dick Eiser and later by Jonathan Turner
and Glynis Breakwell, who were initially Ph.D. students under
his supervision. Billig had been involved in the experimental
research social categorizations and intergroup
differentiation (Phase V) and completed his thesis entitled
Social Categorization and Interarouo Relations in 1972.
Although he left Bristol and went to Birmingham in 1973, he
continued to work in this area for a number of years. In
1976, he published his first book on Social Psvcholoav and
InterarouD Relations, which had initially been a joint
project between Tajfel and himself. He then went on to study
and publish a book on Fascists: A Social Psvcholoaical View
of the National Front , which he also sees as being closely
related to Tajfel's work.
My Ph.D. was running those experiments and I was 
centrally involved in them. And my book on 
Intergroup Relations arose out of that work quite 
directly, so that I owe much to Henri's influence, 
without which I would probably never have come into
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academic life, if it had not been for his 
encouragement and his help.
(Billig, Interview)
..in a way the Fascists were related because, having 
said that, the central question behind Henri's 
question was how was genocide possible? It's the 
sort of question behind the work on Fascism, but, of 
course, I was looking a a very unimportant bump in 
European history, as opposed to what actually 
happened in the last War.
(Billig, Interview)
Eiser was also an early figure in the Bristol group, 
involved in research on social categorization. However, his 
work tended to focus on accentuation and the role of social 
categorization in social judgment and attitude formation, 
rather than intergroup relations per se, and, in 1972, he 
published a book with W. Stroebe on Categorization with 
Social Judgment. Breakwell, in contrast, focused on the 
mechanisms of social identity in intergroup behaviour, and 
completed her thesis in 1976. She went on to study, and 
publish, work on threatened identities and social movements.
Turner joined the research group at Bristol after the 
minimal group experiments had been completed. His thesis was 
on 'Social categorization and social comparison in intergroup 
relations' (1975) and, as we have seen, he played a highly 
prominant role in the development of the theory of intergroup 
relations.
We worked very closely togeather. Henri would have 
ideas that he told me and I would have ideas that I 
told him and we were very aware that it was 
difficult to say whose ideas were whose.
(Turner, Interview)
It was also Turner who coined many of the labels which 
are frequently associated with Tajfel's work. In his 
writings, Tajfel tended to express his ideas in a precise 
but verbose style. For example, he referred to the theory of 
intergroup relations, the experimental studies on intergroup 
behaviour, and to individuals' acting as members of a group. 
In some respects, this is an admirable discipline in that it 
reduces the possibility of misinterpretation and 
misrepresentation. On the other hand. Turner wanted a means
505
of identifying work in his Ph.D. without having to employ 
long and cumbersome descriptions. For this reason, he 
employed terms such as minimal group experiments, social 
competition, and, later on. Social Identity Theory, all of 
which have come to be adopted in the wider community.
In 1974 Tajfel submitted a successful research proposal
on 'Social Identity, social categorization and social
comparison in intergroup behaviour' to the social Science
Research Council (S.S.R.C.). The research grant was of
paramount importance. Under the leadership of Tajfel, it
provided the finances for a comprehensive research programme,
attracting other psychologists to Bristol, and supporting
exchange visits and conferences in Europe.
He got a lot of research money in, he got a huge 
grant from the Ford Foundation and the SSRC and 
various other sources. He just then had the 
resources to mount big research projects.
(Brown, Interview)
He got a research grant from the SSRC , and it was 
a lot of money, to do intergroup research on 
conflict. There was a lot of work done at Bristol 
and we had money to go abroad and invite others 
over.
(Turner, Interview)
Bill McGuire told me something of the background to the 
unusually large research grant. The National Science 
Foundation (NSF) supported most research in the U.S.A. Under 
the influence of the Marshall Plan, which encouraged
international cooperation between North America and Western 
Europe, some of the research money was given to other 
countries, including the SSRC. Furthermore, rather than 
giving small amounts to a large number of people, it was 
decided to fund two or three excellent projects on a large
scale. One of these was Tajfel's.
Other social psychologists were attracted to the
'Bristol School', as it was frequently referred to. In 
particular Rupert Brown, originally as a Ph.D. student, 
Howard Giles, a psychologist, and later on Jennifer Williams, 
joined the team. Others who were actively involved in 
research meetings and discussions included Anthony
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Agathangelou, Richard Bourhis, Brian Caddick, Fred Ross, 
Suzanne Skevington and Philip Smith. Others who were directly 
involved included Donald Tyler from Canada and Graham Vaughan 
from Auckland who were long-term visitors.
It is impossible to get a feel for how a research group 
works from the publications that they produce. The only 
indication of this highly significant aspect of scientific 
life is given by the multiple authorship of articles and in 
the brief prefaces and acknowledgments in books. Indeed, many 
of those who worked with Tajfel frequently refer to the 
influence and encouragement of Henri Tajfel. For me, the most 
important thing which emerged from my interviews with John 
Turner, Rupert Brown and Mike Billig was at least some 
insight into the immediate social environment at Bristol.
Tajfel gathered a group of individual psychologists at
Bristol University who together created an environment, not
only to carry out research, but also to discuss, argue and
debate about theoretical and meta-theoretical ideas.
He really did like this idea of providing an 
environment where all these people would come and 
talk about his ideas and, if they do produce an 
article, so much the better.
(Brown, Interview)
a lot of the development of any social scientific 
tradition is, in some ways, bound up with the kind 
of people and their relationships that were involved 
with it. (Tajfel) was passionately involved with 
issues that interested him and he was researching.
And I think that kind of thing is important in 
influencing other people, and perhaps also in the 
generation, the momentum of things.
(Brown, Interview)
One example, which highlights the importance of these
debates, is given by Brown and Taylor's article in 1979
Towards a more social social psvcholoav?. This arose directly
out of discussions between Taylor and the post-graduate
students at Bristol. In this paper, they suggest that the
difficulty with social social psychology was more
methodological than theoretical.
Don Taylor was visiting, as a visiting scholar, and 
he eventually spent the whole summer staying at 
Bristol. He's not the kind of person who can stay 
around people very long before engaging them in
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discussion and debates and so on...and he just said 
one day 'look, it sounds like this is interesting 
work, we could try and put this together in an 
article'.
(Brown, Interview)
We wanted to point out to people that this kind of 
social psychology wasn't all that different from 
other kinds of social psychology.
(Brown, Interview)
Tajfel did not agree with their analysis and, after further
discussions, he wrote a lengthy reply entitled Individuals
and Groups in Social Psvcholoav (1979a).
I spent a long time arguing and talking with 
(Tajfel) about it, and he was bothered by what he 
thought was this misunderstanding about the theory 
and how we misconceived it. So he wanted to put it 
right.
(Brown, Interview)
Tajfel was obviously a central figure in these
discussions, both indirectly and directly, but perhaps his
greatest strength lay in providing an environment which
simultaneously focused and coordinated research and debate
without imposing obtrusive restrictions. The focus was
provided by his social social psychological perspective and
the integration of theory and research to address societal
issues. It was an approach which was explicitly
anti-individualistic, and an approach which was intolerant
of research without theory.
Personality was boring and we were both against 
individualism. We always assumed the individual was 
social. And, of course, we were both cognitivists.
(Turner, Interview)
the other big thing which I was most attracted to 
was that it essentially dispensed with most of the 
kind of individualistic ideas which I found very 
little sympathy with.
(Brown, Interview)
And he was manifestly impatient with people when we 
had seminars, people would come and give a seminar 
and when he thought that it was uninteresting, or 
just doing another type of American style research, 
he would make it very clear about this.
(Brown, Interview)
He still believed in general scientific theory - 
social scientific theories about human behaviour.
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he believed that it was important to test those 
against reality.
(Brown, Interview)
He wanted very much to do work on fundamental 
theoretical ideas in empirical research: he was
contemptuous of people that just did the odd study, 
here, there and everywhere - he thought that was 
complete and utter rubbish*.
(Turner, Interview)
He also coordinated the research on intergroup
relations, but, while much of his own research had been
within the orthodox experimental tradition, the research
programme involved a variety of laboratory and field studies.
The project was a major programme of research. There 
were four or five research workers employed in three 
years - that's big money, even nowadays. It was a 
major project and there was a sort of experimental 
half which John Turner and I were working on, then 
there was the field side which Suzanne Skevington 
and initially somebody like Tony Agathangelou and 
Richard Bourhis were associated with. But, at the 
same time, Richard and Howard Giles were doing their 
stuff on linguistic differentiation, some of which 
was in semi-field context.
(Brown, Interview)
Brown's own story is an interesting one. He had been
employed as a research assistant in 1972 but left, only to
return, two years later, to do his Ph.D.
And I said that one of the things I was most 
disenchanted with was the idea that I was supposed 
to go and do three or four experiments for my Ph.D.
And he said 'that's absolute rubbish. You could do 
anything'. It was just that I had picked out that as 
the way to do a Ph.D. All my role models around me 
were doing experiments....
(Brown, Interview)
I had some meetings over my research. And I just 
talked to him about going into this factory and it 
seemed all very interesting. He said 'oh,yes, go and 
do it'. He was very laissez-faire as a supervisor.
(Brown, Interview)
Billig similarly highlights the fact that Tajfel 
actively encouraged an open approach in his post-graduate 
students, with particular reference to cross-disciplinary 
reading.
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Henri always encouraged all of his post-graduate 
students to read widely. He never had nit-picking 
view that you should only read social psychology.
In fact, he wasn't very much interested in the 
majority of social psychology. I think he taught me 
good academic habits, in that respect. It did lead 
me away, obviously, from the experimental approach.
(Billig, Interview)
Indeed, Billig's book on the social psychology of intergroup 
relations, reflects his reading of Marx and Mannheim on 
ideology. Similarly, his later work on rhetoric as an 
intellectual tradition arose out of his reading of Plato and 
Aristotle.
The community of social psychologists involved in the 
development of Tajfel's work extended well beyond Bristol. 
The Bristol group was associated closely with several other 
centres in Europe. Firstly, Tajfel spent some time at the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, where 
he worked on and discussed his ideas with Moscovici and 
others. Secondly, ties with the Netherlands were established 
in some joint research on status differences, comparative 
relevance and intergroup relations by Ad van Knippenberg, 
John van de Geer and Henri Tajfel. Thirdly, brief exchange 
visits between Bristol (England), Paris (France), Geneva 
(Switzerland), and Gronigen (Netherlands), and three research 
conferences in Paris and Bristol, encouraged and facilitated 
the exploration of new ideas and new research departures. 
These were, in large measure, dependent on the administrative 
support and funding offered by the Fondation de la Maison des 
Sciences de l'Homme together with the S.S.R.C.
Furthermore, the work at Bristol was closely related to 
research teams in Paris and Geneva, each with their own 
history of development. Moscovici and Paicheler (Paris) had 
been working on processes of identification; Lemaine, 
Kastersten and Personnaz (Paris) were working on social 
differentiation; and Deschamps, Doise and Meyer (Geneva) 
continued to work on social categorization and accentuation 
in intergroup relations. While these centres displayed their 
own distinctive style of research and divergences in their 
theoretical approach, many of the theoretical concepts and
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research issues were closely related to the theory of 
intergroup relations of the 'Bristol School'.
The collaborative nature of this work is reflected in 
the books which Tajfel edited. The only book which Tajfel 
published as sole author is Human Groups and Social 
Categories; studies in social psvcholoav (1981). This, it 
will be remembered, is a collection of Tajfel's previously 
published works, half of which were written in collaboration 
with other social psychologists. The other three major 
publications associated with Social Identity Theory were all 
edited volumes. Differentiation between social groups: 
Studies in the social psvcholoav of interarouo relations 
(1978) had sixteen contributors. The book is divided into 
five major sections. The first section was Tajfel's 
contribution, which presented the social psychological 
approach, the theory and research. The second section, on 
social categorization and intergroup differentiation, was 
written by Turner, Deschamps, Doise and Meyer. This is 
followed by contributions from Van Knippenberg, Turner, 
Brown, Moscovici and Paischeler on status, legitimacy and 
stability in intergroup relations. Lemaine, Kastersztein, 
Personnaz and Breakwell focused on differentiation and the 
final section, which explored different social context, is 
written by Vaughan, Giles, Brown and Williams.
The publication was followed, three years later, by 
Interarouo Behaviour, a volume edited by Turner and Giles 
(1981) , and then by Tajfel's edited volume on Social Identitv 
and Group Relations (1982) , with no less than twenty-two 
contributors, eighteen of whom had not contributed to the 
first volume. By this time, the field of intergroup relations 
was well-established, and many social psychologists, from all 
over Europe, were working with the ideas which continued to 
be developed.
The Bristol centre and its connections with other 
centres in Europe was a part of the 'social milieu' endorsed 
and cultivated by the European Association. I have already 
discussed the role of the European Association in the 
development of the theory of intergroup relations. Its 
influence continued to be of importance in providing a
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European community which engaged in conferences, working
parties, and summer schools. Many of the papers were first
presented at these conferences and reviewed in the light of
the ensuing discussions and debates. Equally important was
the establishment of The European Journal of Social
Psvcholoav. in April of 1971. This provided a new medium for
the publication and communication of research and the
development of theory. Similarly, the series of European
Monographs provided another means by which to draw together,
diffuse and stimulate developments in European Social
Psychology. Together these became the main publishing outlets
for work on intergroup relations.
A lot of the early seminal articles, particularly 
the minimal group studies and the more theoretical 
work, was actually published in the European Journal 
of .... in offshoots of the European Association, 
which he saw as an outlet for developing and 
promoting a different kind of social psychology.
(Brown, Interview)
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CHAPTER 11
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
11.1 THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW
11.2 SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE PROCESSES
OF TRANSFORMATION
11.2.1 Assimilation and accommodation in systems of social 
representations
11.2.2 Identifying the various processes of transformation
11.3 THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
11.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
In this concluding chapter, I shall assess the 
implications of my research on the origins and development of 
Taj fel's theory of intergroup relations for the theory of 
social representations and, more generally, for the 
discipline of social psychology. Four complementary and 
general claims are made on the grounds of the material 
presented in this thesis.
Firstly, the dynamics of social reality can only be 
explained by reference to an organism/environment/culture 
system which takes account of interactions among social 
individuals, their material environments and their cultural 
context through time. An examination of the research in 
relation to the theory of social representations shows that 
the nature, functions and processes of social representations 
are evident in the transformation of knowledge within the 
scientific community. Secondly, the theoretical principles 
that specify the processes of transformation need to be 
revised. The transformation of social representations can 
only be understood by reference to both assimilation and 
accommodation within systems of social representations. 
Furthermore, changes in the structure and content of these 
systems involves not only the processes of anchoring and 
objectification but also the processes of discovery,
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inclusion/exclusion and integration. The force of the thesis, 
however, goes beyond the immediate implications of the 
research for the theory of social representations.
The third claim is that the theory of social 
representations and Taj fel's theory of intergroup relations 
are both compatible with the Hegelian paradigm and their 
potential integration offers an opportunity to establish a 
firm basis on which to develop a social psychology of social 
change which takes account of both the cultural and 
historical dimensions.
Fourthly, and finally, the thesis challenges traditional 
distinctions between common-sense and science. Like common- 
sense understanding, scientific knowledge is constructed 
through human activity within particular historical and 
cultural contexts.
11.1 THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY; AN OVERVIEW
In Part One of this thesis I elaborated the historical, 
cultural and dynamic nature of social representations with 
particular reference to the role of social individuals in the 
construction of a social reality. The transformation of 
social representations depends upon the inter-relations 
within an organism/environment/culture system in which 
individuals participate actively in the maintenance, 
expression and creation of social reality. From the research 
presented in Part Two it can be seen that social 
representations are intrinsic, in all their aspects, to the 
psychology of groups. The development of Tajfel's work can 
only be explained with reference to his historical and 
cultural milieu, to the scientific community of which he was 
a part and to the object of study itself. Similarly, the 
dynamics of group psychology, as a field of study, can only 
be understood by reference to the particular object of study, 
to the activity and creativity of individuals and to the 
community of social psychologists as a whole.
Taj fel ' s work was shaped by his social background to an 
ever increasing extent throughout his academic career. His 
experiences as a member of the Jewish community, both during 
and after World War II, underlie the questions he addressed,
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from the social factors in perception to the etiology of 
intergroup conflict. His disenchantment with purely 
motivational and individualistic accounts and his alacritous 
endeavour to address the cultural aspects of large-scale 
social phenomena, arose from a desire to remain true to the 
principles of social psychology while simultaneously 
remaining true to his own experiences (and those of others) 
in social life. His location within the historical and 
cultural milieu of Europe directed his creative energies 
towards the issues he addressed, the approach he adopted and 
the establishment of a European community of social 
psychologists. Tajfel's whole career epitomizes the meaning 
of ' social individual ' : an individual who is at once a
product of his cultural environment and a creative force 
within that environment.
The dialectic relationship between the individual and 
culture is also manifested in the interdependence between 
Tajfel and the scientific community. The community of social 
psychologists reveals the dynamics of stability and change, 
serving as both a conventional and prescriptive force and an 
innovatory and creative force. The form and content of 
Tajfel's work, especially in the early phases of his career, 
demonstrates the effect of his initiation and socialization 
into the established community of social psychologists. 
Tajfel endorses the social reality which is expressed in the 
conventions of social psychological theory and research. This 
can be seen with regard to the problems which were 
investigated, the research which was conducted, the 
interpretation of his results and his style of reporting the 
studies. This is most apparent in his early work on social 
perception (Phases I and II) but is also true of the 
experimental research on national attitudes (Phase IV) and 
intergroup behaviour (Phase V). However, conventions are not 
only prescriptive: they also constitute the ground from which 
movement in a new direction emerges. For example, this can be 
seen in challenges to motivational accounts of prejudice 
(Phase III) and in the construction of the interpersonal- 
intergroup continuum which simultaneously differentiates and
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integrates Tajfel's approach to intergroup relations with 
alternative perspectives in social psychology (Phase VI).
The scientific community also provides the milieu in 
which new perspectives are developed. In particular, the 
emergence of a European community of social psychologists, 
which voiced its dissent from traditional orientations in 
social psychology, provided the context in which Tajfel and 
his associates were able to develop and communicate 
alternative approaches to social-psychological phenomena. 
Furthermore, the European Association offered both a means by 
which to establish a social identity which distinguished the 
members from their American counterparts and a journal which 
provided them with an important medium of communication with 
each other. This, in turn, played a highly significant role 
in the growing emphasis on the social dimensions in European 
social psychology.
The collaborative enterprise involved in the 
construction of Tajfel's social-psychological perspective is 
nowhere more apparent than in the exploration and 
representation of intergroup relations. This extended beyond 
the group of social psychologists working together at Bristol 
University to other research centres in Europe. This having 
been said, the cooperation among social psychologists who 
were interested in the same issues is evident throughout 
Tajfel's career. For example, Tajfel adopted Bruner's 
functionalist approach to the study of social perception. 
This was developed, in association with Wilkes, Lambert and 
others, in the study of social stereotypes. Similarly, the 
research on national attitudes demanded the synergy of social 
psychologists from all over Europe. An individual scientist 
never works in a social vacuum and Taj fel's most creative 
ideas emerged through the active collaboration of scientists 
addressing the same research issues.
The role of communication and social interaction in the 
dynamics of social representations within the scientific 
community is revealed not only in the collaboration between 
Tajfel and his associates but also in the assimilation and 
diffusion of research and theoretical ideas through the 
medium of academic publications. This is evident both in the
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assimilation of the ideas of others into Tajfel's work and in 
the communication of Tajfel's own perspective in relation to 
alternative approaches propounded within the community. One 
of the distinguishing characteristics of Tajfel's work is his 
consistent endeavour to read widely and his ability to 
integrate research and theory from diverse quarters. This not 
only provides support for his arguments but also encourages 
reorientations to the object of study and facilitates the 
elaboration of his theoretical perspective.
Firstly, Tajfel draws on the research and theoretical 
ideas developed by other social scientists working in the 
same field of study. For example, the role of past experience 
(Phase II), the function of the individual's self image in 
intergroup relations (Phase III), the explanatory power of 
social norms (Phase V) and the significance of perceived 
legitimacy (Phase VI) were concepts which were widely 
employed in their respective fields.
Secondly, Tajfel assimilates ideas developed in related 
fields of study in order to conceptualize and understand the 
particular phenomenon in which he is interested at the time. 
This serves to broaden his perspective and facilitates the 
transition from one phase to another. For example, the 
expansion of the theoretical framework in Phase III depends, 
to a large extent, on drawing together research and 
theoretical ideas relating to the cognitive simplification of 
the environment, the inherent ambiguity of social phenomena, 
the assimilation of social values and the role of causal 
attributions. Similarly, in Phase IV, Tajfel employs the 
conventional framework of attitude research but 
simultaneously incorporates the work of others concerning 
social influence and social communication. While the 
conventions of methodology, combined with his own research 
experience, led him back into the laboratory in order to 
determine the basic determinants of intergroup behaviour 
(Phase V) , he then goes on to develop a theory which goes 
well beyond the bounds of purely experimental research.
Thirdly, Tajfel's interest in politics and social 
movements provides the basis on which he explores conceptions 
of nationalism, relative deprivation and social change as
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these are elaborated in other social science disciplines. 
This liberates him from the conventional perspectives adopted 
within social psychology and provides the material with which 
to elaborate and communicate an alternative approach to the 
conceptualization of large-scale social phenomena.
The elaboration of Tajfel's social psychological 
perspective is also facilitated by explicating both the 
divergence from and the conflict with alternative approaches. 
For example, arguments for experimental research which takes 
account of cultural factors, for a perspective which gives 
priority neither to the individual nor to the culture, and 
for a social psychology that encompasses social change, 
emerged out of the meta-theoretical debates following the 
crisis in European social psychology. Similarly, the 
interpretation of research findings(Phase V) and the 
definition of group membership (Phase VI) had to be 
negotiated by examining and dismissing criticisms and options 
proposed by others.
On a broader scale, Tajfel indicates and emphasizes the 
significance of his own contribution by explicitly 
challenging the accepted representations within a given field 
of study. The latter provide frames of reference within which 
to address a particular issue and from which an alternative 
framework must be differentiated. This can be seen in Phases 
I-III in which Tajfel explicitly rejects motivational 
accounts of social perception and prejudice, in Phases IV and 
VI in which the inadequacies of purely individualistic 
explanations are emphasized; and, again, in Phase VI , where 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations is contrasted with 
realistic group conflict theory.
These examples demonstrate the dynamic interplay between 
the new and the old, between an emerging perspective and the 
established view, between accommodation of tradition and 
assimilation. At any point in the construction of Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations, the transformation of social 
representations involves the dynamic interdependence of 
stability and change in the course of communication and 
interaction among individuals within particular cultural and 
historical situations.
518
These transformations are also dependent upon the 
cultural environment which constitutes the object of study. 
The concept of social identity, for example, is not simply 
the imaginative creation of a few social psychologists: it is 
a concept constructed through the observation of and 
interaction with the environment. This is shown by the 
significant role that research plays in the development of 
Tajfel's ideas. For example, the experimental research on 
social perception, on the development of national attitudes 
and on intergroup behaviour, play a decisive role in the 
transformation of social representations. The research is not 
only shaped by the theoretical framework but also confronts 
that framework with specific problems. These problems may 
either challenge central theoretical components of the 
framework or may highlight the significance of factors which 
lie at its periphery. In either case, the framework must be 
adapted to accommodate reality. For example, the experiments 
in Phase V showed that categorization alone was sufficient to 
produce intergroup discrimination and led to a reconception 
of the role of values in intergroup relations. Another 
example is offered by the research on national attitudes 
which emphasized the significance of the social context in 
intergroup relations and instigated an expansion and 
reformulation of the theoretical framework. Thus, research is 
not purely a rhetorical device for justifying theoretical 
claims but, rather, constitutes an essential component in the 
evolution and construction of social representations.
The object of study, however, not only exists in the 
laboratory. Examples of intergroup relations, the activities 
of minority groups and the emergence of social movements in 
society also played a formative part in the elaboration of 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. This applies, in 
particular, to the specification of positional and 
ideological aspects of the theory. The analysis of 
interrelationships between superior and inferior groups, the 
role of legitimacy and stability and the various forms of 
social creativity are elaborated by reference to intergroup 
relations evident in society and not from laboratory 
research.
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The conventional reliance on experimental evidence in 
social psychology tends to underestimate the value and 
significance of analysing naturally occurring events in the 
evolution of scientific knowledge. We cannot hope to set up 
a society in the laboratory just as natural scientists cannot 
auspicate the global system within the confines of a 
laboratory. While experimental research can serve as a means 
to evaluate particular issues in a controlled environment an 
examination of phenomena in all their complexity may reveal 
interrelations among components not yet considered and may 
serve as an important stimulus in the genesis and evolution 
of a comprehensive theory.
So far, we have focused on the dynamics of social 
representations in the construction and elaboration of 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. It can be seen that 
the same processes are involved in the constructive 
assimilation of this theory into the psychology of groups. In 
particular, the research presented in Chapter 7 illustrates 
further the interdependence between tradition and innovation. 
On the one hand, group psychology has been radically 
transformed by the representations of the group as 
theoretically distinctive from purely individual processes 
and by the articulation of the positional and ideological 
levels of explanation. On the other hand, this transformation 
has been tempered by the established conventions of the field 
so that the theory of intergroup relations, established by 
Tajfel and his colleagues, has, itself, been transformed.
The interdependence of assimilation and accommodation is 
illustrated most clearly by the application of Tajfel's 
theory to the study of intragroup processes and the 
development of self-categorization theory. On the one hand, 
our understanding of intragroup processes has been 
transformed by giving priority to the process of 
self-categorization or social identification. While this 
approach still focuses on individual cognitive processes and 
the interaction between individuals it has introduced and 
established the significance of an individual's group 
membership in intragroup processes. On the other hand, 
self-categorization theory focuses on the conventional levels
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of explanation, namely the intrapersonal process of 
categorization and the interpersonal process of social 
identity, and fails to maintain the more radical or novel 
aspects of Tajfel's theory, namely the role of consensual 
beliefs and the relative status of different groups.
This selective assimilation of the more conventional 
aspects of Tajfel's theory is also seen in the general 
literature on intergroup relations and group processes. 
Emphasis is placed on the social-psychological processes of 
social categorization, social identity and social comparison 
without reference to systems of belief or status relations 
amongst groups.
In contrast, those spheres of group psychology which 
have maintained the social-psychological perspective in all 
its aspects have been directly concerned with intergroup 
relations. For example, the application of the theory to 
conflicts between established groups within an historical and 
cultural context has encouraged the further elaboration of 
power and status relations among groups and of systems of 
beliefs about the structure of society. Similarly, in the 
social psychology of language, language use is conceived in 
terms of ethnolinguistic group members striving for a 
positive social identity in ways that are dependent upon 
their belief systems. This has required the accommodation of 
group psychology to include those aspects of social- 
psychological phenomena which are most apparent in the study 
of large-scale social realities.
These differences can be explained by reference to the 
established social representations in each specialization. 
The review of the historical development of group psychology 
showed that this field of study had been dominated by a 
perspective which focused on interactions between individuals 
and intragroup processes. In order to address those problems 
which have been consensually accepted as legitimate and 
worthy of study it was necessary to emphasize particular 
features of Tajfel's theory. In that the established research 
problems were defined within an individualistic framework it 
is not surprising that Turner and his associates focus on 
those social-psychological processes which are commensurate
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with that approach. Thus, while self-categorization theory 
challenges individualistic theories of group processes it 
fails to provide an account of the historical evolution of 
groups, of the social creativity of groups or of the 
processes of social change.
Transformations which have occurred in the general 
literature on intergroup relations may be asociated more 
closely with the conventions of legitimate evidence. Most of 
the experimental research focuses on intrapersonal and 
interpersonal aspects of intergroup relations and provides 
convincing evidence for the social psychological processes. 
Unfortunately, relatively little experimental research has 
been conducted on consensual beliefs and the relative 
position of groups in society and the wider community of 
social psychologists have not been convinced of their 
significance. Thus, in contrast to the processes involved in 
the construction of Tajfel's theory, research can be viewed 
primarily as a rhetorical implement in the communication and 
diffusion of the theory.
This can be contrasted with those social psychologists 
who have continued to employ Tajfel's theory in the study of 
intergroup relations. Although individualistic theories have 
been extrapolated in the past to explain large-scale social 
phenomena, the study of actual intergroup relations 
constitutes a relatively new departure within the field. This 
is also true of the social psychology of language. As 
emergent topics of interest within social psychology there is 
greater scope for defining new problems and adopting 
innovatory approaches. Moreover, the social dimensions have 
been formulated with specific reference to intergroup 
relations and thus provide a conceptual framework which is 
particularly suited to their analysis. The social dimensions 
of Tajfel's theory can thus be assimilated and sustained with 
relative ease.
From the research we can see that the nature of social 
representations, their functions in social life and the 
social processes by which they are transformed are all 
evident in the evolution and diffusion of Tajfel's theory of 
intergroup relations. The dynamics of social representations
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in social psychology reveals their conventional and 
prescriptive nature as well as their changing and 
transforming nature. Furthermore, the form and content of 
social representations both structures and is, in turn, re­
structured by social communication and interaction. This 
refers to the collaboration amongst social psychologists, to 
such cultural artefacts of the community as academic 
publications and to the environment that constitutes the 
object of study. In particular, the research demonstrates 
the interdependence between the social individual and his or 
her historical and cultural milieu, with respect to both the 
expression and the maintenance of social representations and 
to their construction and transformation.
11.2 SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE PROCESSES OF 
TRANS FORMATION
In the previous section, I provided a general 
description of the dynamics of social representations in 
social psychology. We have seen how social representations 
constitute a social environment of thought, interaction and 
communication which is characterized by the dynamics of 
stability and change within the organism/environment/culture 
system. In this section, I will show that the case study 
presented in this thesis supports a more detailed 
specification of the means by which social representations 
are transformed.
Firstly, the familiarization of the unfamiliar provides 
an over-simplistic and misleading conception of the dynamic 
interrelations within systems of social representations. In 
Chapter 4, I elaborated the problems associated with the 
conception of 'the unfamiliar*. Social representations 
constitute our social reality such that anything that is 
completely unfamiliar is not only meaningless but is also 
destined to remain so. Furthermore, the transformation of the 
unfamiliar into the familiar focuses attention on the 
processes of assimilation without reference to the 
complementary processes of accommodation. The inadequacy of 
this conception is borne out by the historico-interpretative 
analysis which shows that the transformation of social 
representations is not brought about by the familiarization
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of the unfamiliar per se. Rather, it involves a continuous 
interplay between assimilation and accommodation as familiar, 
yet different, social representations are juxtaposed and 
adapted such that their contradictions and incongruities are 
minimized and their compatabilitis and interconnectednesses 
are maximized.
This analysis shows, simultaneously, how the positional 
and ideological levels of explanation in social psychology 
(Doise,1986) came to be articulated within a system of social 
representations which, intially, focused exclusively on the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of explanation. The 
system of social representations is extended gradually to 
include sociological as well as psychological aspects of 
large-scale intergroup relations and is integrated, 
creatively, in the construction of a social-psychological 
perspective.
Secondly, the processes of anchoring and objectification 
alone fail to provide a comprehensive explanation for the 
dynamics of assimilation and accommodation. In Chapter 4 I 
argued that, in order to understand the transformation of 
social representations, it was also necessary to elaborate 
the opposite processes of casting-off and de-objectification. 
However, changes in the content and structure of social 
representations in the construction and diffusion of Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup relations cannot be accounted for fully 
within this extended framework. This has led to the 
specification of a number of other processes including 
discovery, inclusion/exclusion and integration. All these 
processes are involved in the social construction of reality 
through people's interactions with their environment and 
their communication with other people.
11.2.1 Assimilation and accommodation in svstems of social 
representations
In Phase I, Tajfel explained experimental evidence on 
perceptual judgments of physical dimensions in functional 
terms of an accentuation of differences. Perceptual 
differences within a series of stimuli are accentuated due to 
their associated value and/or a superimposed discontinuous 
classification. This explanation was applied to both the
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phenomenon of perceptual over-estimation as well as to 
stereotypes describing the physical characteristics of groups 
of people. In so doing, Tajfel emphasized the similarities 
between the social perception of the physical and the social 
environments. At the same time, the study of social 
stereotypes gave rise to an increased emphasis on 
classification. At this stage, there was little conflict with 
the traditions and conventions of social psychology. While 
accentuation of differences provides a cognitive, as opposed 
to a motivational, explanation of social perception it is 
articulated at an intrapersonal level.
Tajfel then applied the general principles of cognition 
to social stereotypes and abstract continua. The accentuation 
of differences is redescribed in terms of polarization 
whereby differences between groups are maximized and 
differences within groups are minimized on the relevant 
dimensions. Here, the intrapersonal perspective is maintained 
such that the individual ' s cognitive processes are considered 
to be both necessary and sufficient explanations of phenomena 
in social perception.
Having said this, the research conducted in Phase II 
introduced problems which could only be understood by 
reference to other levels of explanation. In particular, 
polarization only occurred on dimensions which formed part of 
a group's stereotype (Doise's level 4) and were influenced by 
the relative socio-economic positions of the different ethnic 
groups (Doise's level 3) . At this point, however, these 
aspects were not elaborated within the theoretical framework 
itself. No explanation is given as to why particular 
dimensions are relevant, or as to why particular ethnic 
groups do or do not make ethnocentric perceptual judgments. 
Resolutions of these problems are constructed within the 
system of social representations in terms of developing more 
sophisticated experimental designs.
The general principles of cognition were then applied to 
the nature of prejudice in the context of intergroup 
relations (Phase III). On the one hand, social 
representations of prejudice were accommodated to the 
assimilated cognitive principles. On the other hand, the
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cognitive principles were accommodated in order to assimilate 
prejudice into the system of social representations. 
Categorization is still described at the intrapersonal level, 
but greater attention is now paid to the differences between 
perception of the physical and perception of the social 
environment. Furthermore, categorization is no longer 
considered to take priority over higher-order levels of 
explanation. Firstly, the impact of the social context on an 
individual's propensity to categorize groups is explained in 
terms of identification with his or her own group 
(interpersonal level). Secondly, the assimilation of social 
values by individuals is dependent upon their social context 
and, in particular, upon the relative positions of groups 
within the structure of society (positional level). Thirdly, 
these processes are related to people's beliefs and views 
about the causes of social events (ideological level). 
However, the latter level of explanation is not explicitly 
articulated in this phase of Tajfel's research. The search 
for coherence is discussed in terms of causal attributions 
about changing situations in the relations among groups 
(intrapersonal and interpersonal levels).
Fourthly, conflict with established representations of 
large-scale social phenomena gives greater prominence to the 
social representation of the individual within the system as 
a whole. Tajfel propounds a rational model of human behaviour 
in contrast to motivational and individualistic accounts of 
intergroup relations. Furthermore, although it is apparent 
from Tajfel's work during this phase that all these processes 
are interdependent the precise nature of their 
interrelationships is not, as yet, fully elaborated. The 
incorporation of the social representations of intergroup 
relations created a tension between explanations which focus 
on individual processes and explanations which focus on the 
social context.
This tension was increased by the research on national 
attitudes (Phase IV) . This research was not structured or 
initially interpreted within the system of social 
representations elaborated in Phase III. The principle of 
categorization and value were translated into the cognitive
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and evaluative components of attitudes. However, an explicit 
attempt to explore the developmental and consensual nature of 
preferences and of cognitive differentiations indicates some 
degree of concern for ideological aspects of national 
attitudes. Furthermore, the results of these investigations 
emphasized that while intrapersonal and interpersonal 
principles may be necessary for an explanation of national 
attitudes they were by no means sufficient. Only then was it 
possible to explain children's sensitivity to their social 
context, the assimilation of social values and the 
devaluation of one's own group in situations which lacked 
overt conflict it was also necessary to include the creation 
and the diffusion of belief systems and of social values. 
These were integrated with the cognitive and affective 
components of national attitudes through processes of social 
influence and group identification. Their assimilation 
into the system of social representations required the 
accommodation of social psychological principles such that 
the concepts of categorization and value were socialized. 
Once again, this synthesis contradicted traditional 
representations that concentrated on motivation, personality 
or outgroup hostility. It also allowed Tajfel to claim that 
nationalism could not be explained purely in terms of social 
structures but required an understanding of the social- 
psychological processes involved. Although the social 
representations of social psychology as a scientific 
discipline were always on the periphery these conflicts 
brought it to the fore. Social psychology gradually emerged 
as an issue of concern in its own right. As such, it came to 
have a major influence on the structure and integration of 
the system of social representations as a whole. Furthermore, 
divergent perspectives within social psychology were 
explained in terms of the cultural values inherent in social 
psychological theories. Social psychology had to take into 
account not only the social context of the object of study 
but also the social context of the scientists themselves.
This system of social representations gave rise to the 
central question addressed in the experimental research on 
intergroup behaviour. However, the research itself is
527
dominated by social representations of experimental 
investigations focusing, as it does, on the minimal 
conditions sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination. 
Tajfel and his colleagues attempted to create a cultural and 
historical vacuum thus focusing on the cognitive processes of 
individuals in group situations (interpersonal level). The 
experimental results showed that social categorization, 
alone, produced maximum differentation between groups. This 
was explained by reference to the social context and, in 
particular, by reference to a generic group norm and a social 
norm of fairness (ideological level). However, this 
explanation proved to be problematic and raised more 
questions than it answered. The lack of ethnocentricism shown 
by some minority groups (Phase IV) and Turner's experimental 
results, which showed that intergroup discrimination only 
occurred in situations where individuals could not act in 
terms of self, required a more elaborate explanation.
These problems were resolved by assimilating the 
research results to the system of social representations. 
Firstly, the influence of social values (positional and 
ideological levels) needed to be translated into concepts 
which were directly relevant to the individual (interpersonal 
and intrapersonal levels). This was achieved by transforming 
the notion of group identification and self-image into the 
process of social identity. The link between social identity 
and social categorization gave greater salience to the 
process of social comparison. In contrast to theories of 
realistic group conflict these social-psychological processes 
suggested that identification with one's own group occurs 
prior to, rather than in response to, intergroup conflict. 
This not only changed the social representation of the 
individual but also expanded the system of social 
representations. An individual's beliefs, actions and 
emotions could only be understood by reference to his or her 
social context.
The significance of the social context (positional and 
ideological levels), in which intergroup behaviour does or 
does not occur, needed to be defined in social-psychological 
terms (interpersonal level) . This is served by the
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description of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum and the 
distinction between personal and social identity. This, in 
turn, required greater precision in the definition of the 
social context. This is elaborated in terms of a continuum of 
belief systems from social mobility to social change 
(ideological level). Furthermore, the categorization of the 
social environment (intrapersonal level) is related to 
consensual beliefs about the structure of intergroup 
relations in society (ideological level).
By this time, transformations in the system of social 
representations were no longer instigated by incorporating 
related domains of concern. Rather, constructing links within 
the system itself became more prominent, such that the 
social-psychological processes, the relations between groups 
and beliefs about the structure of society were all 
interdependent aspects of intergroup relations.
Finally, the application of the system of social 
representations to various forms of intergroup relations in 
society not only preferred a new understanding of relative 
deprivation, minority groups and social movements but it also 
had an impact on the system itself. The role of consensual 
beliefs was elaborated in terms of the legitimacy and 
stability of intergroup relations. The various forms of 
social creativity in the context of social change were 
specified in relation to consensually inferior and superior 
groups. Also experimentation as a method of research was no 
longer conceived as the onlv means by which to test and 
develop theoretical propositions. Rather, experimental 
investigations provided hints about social life which must be 
integrated with theoretical knowledge and the use of other 
methods.
To summarize, the emergence of conflicts and 
contradictions within the system of social representations 
gives rise to shifts of emphasis and changes in meaning such 
that the content and structure of social reality is gradually 
transformed. This spiral of transformation is characterized 
by a dynamic balance between stability and change. For 
example, concepts such as value, classification/ 
categorization and differentiation are maintained throughout
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the development of Tajfel's thinking. At the same time their 
significance is changed as familiar representations are 
juxtaposed to and integrated with the system of social 
representations. This dynamic balance is facilitated by 
continuities in the underlying structure of the 
representations involved. For example, the comparative 
perspective is first applied to the perceptual judgment of 
objects on physical dimensions and is finally applied to the 
relations between members of one's own group and members of 
other groups. Similarly, the functional perspective 
illuminates the role of differentiation between valued 
objects through to the role of differentiation between 
groups. Other concepts which were first rejected are then 
re-integrated into the system. For example, motivational 
explanations of social perception and prejudice are dismissed 
in preference to cognitive explanations but then re-enter the 
system of representations in the form of a search for a 
positive social identity. Finally, concepts which, initially, 
lay at the periphery of the system gradually come to
constitute central components of the system. On the 
theoretical level this is exemplified by the role of social 
identity and consensual beliefs. On the meta-theoretical 
level it includes conceptions of the individual and of social 
psychology.
Whilst it is apparent that various social representations 
are involved in the evolution of Tajfel's theory of 
intergroup relations, including social representations of the 
individual, of the group, of social psychology and of
science, their interdependence makes it impossible to 
identify and demarcate any particular social representation 
for special attention. Furthermore, in that the structure of 
relations within the system is continually changing, it is 
impossible to specify the particular content and form of a 
given social representation. To provide a precise definition
of the object of study would require the imposition of
boundaries that do not exist. Such ambiguity can feel 
uncomfortable but as we are concerned here with the 
construction of social representations, it is important that 
they are not objectified.
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11.2.2 Identifying the various processes of transformation
It will be remembered that Moscovici defines anchoring 
in terms of classification and naming where classification 
may involve both generalization and particularization. All 
three processes of transformation are frequently found in the 
construction of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. The 
shifts between Phases I,II and III exemplifies generalization 
whereby the similarities among perceptual judgments of 
physical, social and abstract dimensions are emphasized such 
that the general principles of cognition can be applied to 
the social perception of the physical and social environments 
and to prejudice in the context of intergroup relations. 
Similarly, self-categorization theory generalizes the social- 
psychological processes of intergroup relations to intragroup 
processes. These shifts also involve particularization 
whereby the differences between each domain are accentuated. 
Particularization or differentiation is also used to 
construct the interpersonal-intergroup continuum and the 
social mobility-social change continuum; to identify
divergences in consensual belief systems; and to contrast 
Tajfel's social-psychological approach from both
individualistic theories in social psychology and other 
disciplines in the social sciences.
It can be seen that particularization is usually 
accompanied by naming or the use of new labels to identify 
those features in the social representation which have been 
differentiated. Generalization is more frequently associated 
with the re-naming of a particular concept or phenomenon. For 
example, perceptual over-estimation is renamed as
accentuation of differences and subsequently as polarization; 
classification is renamed as categorization and later as 
social categorization; and self-image is renamed as social 
identity. Similarly, social identity is renamed as self­
categorization in the theories application to intragroup 
processes. In each case, generalization and particularization 
change the meanings of concepts and the roles they play 
within the system of social representations. These changes in 
symbolic significance are stabilized and communicated, at 
least in part, by providing new labels or terms of reference.
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Generalization, particularization and (re)naming also 
describe the processes of transformation which occur in 
* casting-off *. In effect, 'anchoring* and 'casting-off* serve 
to locate the 'transformation* within a single social 
representation. However, following on from our previous 
discussion about systems of social representations such a 
move is often unwise as it undermines the interdependence 
among social representations and the reciprocity of their 
transformation.
The second process of transformation described by 
Moscovici is objectification. Objectification appears to be 
more apparent in the diffusion than in the construction of 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. This can be seen 
both in the application of Tajfel's theory to intragroup 
processes and in the assimilation of Tajfel's theory into the 
general literature on intergroup relations. In both cases, 
social identity and group processes become objects of study 
in their own right, without reference to the wider social 
context in which they emerge. In contrast, the construction 
of Tajfel's theory is more frequently characterized by the 
de-objectification of phenomena. This is facilitated by the 
functional perspective such that groups and social structures 
are elaborated in terms of social-psychological processes. 
This de-objectification not only plays an essential role in 
the integration of the theory but also offers a means by 
which to understand the constructive processes of social 
change.
The processes of transformation discussed so far 
accurately describe at least some of the changes in the 
system of social representations which has been studied. 
However, they by no means provide a comprehensive account of 
the evolution of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. In 
order to achieve this, three other processes need to be 
elaborated. These are discovery, inclusion/exclusion and 
integration. These processes occur in various combinations 
with generalization, particularization and (re)naming in the 
transformation of social reality.
Discovery involves the identification of anomolies 
within and between systems of social representations.
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Interactions with the environment create deviations which do 
not conform to accepted social representations. For example, 
the research on national attitudes and on intergroup 
behaviour resulted in the identification of phenomena that 
could not be explained in purely cognitive terms. Similarly, 
the juxtaposition of related but contradictory social
representations reveals gaps or anomolies in their respective 
explanations of phenomena. For example, neither
individualistic nor sociological representations of large- 
scale social phenomena accounted for the relationship between 
the social context and the individual's actions. These 
discoveries proceeded the explicit formulation of Tajfel's 
social-psychological perspective and its differentiation from 
other, more conventional, representations.
Following each case of discovery, the confrontation or 
contradiction is resolved by inclusion/exclusion and
integration. Inclusion/exclusion involves expanding or 
restricting the system of social representations and its 
domain of application. In the early phases of the development 
of the theory Tajfel excludes unidirectional shifts in 
perceptual judgements as well as individual differences in 
social perception. In Phase 111, the understanding of 
prejudice involved the inclusion of causal attributions and 
the assimilation of social values. Later on, the explanation 
of intergroup relations involved the inclusion of social
comparisons and consensual beliefs. Again, the social 
representation of social psychology is expanded to include 
both the study of interpersonal behaviour and large-scale 
social phenomena.
The inclusion of new components into the system of 
social representations is followed by the gradual 
construction of links which intergrate the system of social 
representations. The most obvious example is the integration 
of social categorization with social identity through the 
process of social comparison, so that all the processes 
become interdependent in differentiating between groups. 
These social-psychological processes are integrated with 
other aspects of the theory. Social categorizations are 
derived from consensual beliefs and social identity is the
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means by which the individual locates him or herself within 
the structure of society. Less obvious is the transposition 
of structuring conceptions from one sphere to another within 
the system. For example, the distinction between 
interpersonal and intergroup relations is transposed to 
describe the structure of society in terms of social mobility 
and of belief systems concerning social change. This is 
transposed, in turn, to describe alternative perspectives in 
the discipline of social psychology with reference to the 
values inherited from its cultural context.
The processes of discovery, inclusion and integration 
have been identified here with particular reference to the 
transformation of scientific knowledge. However, there is no 
reason to suggest that they are exclusive to the realm of 
science and that they do not also apply to the transformation 
of common-sense. For example, all three processes can be 
identified in the transformation of social representations of 
women. Through the active participation of women in sport and 
in society it was realised that women are capable of running 
marathons and that they are capable of engaging in a variety 
of professional careers. This resulted in the inclusion of 
elements from the social representations of men, including 
athleticism, intelligence and assertiveness, into the social 
representations of women. This has subsequently given rise to 
the integration of maleness and femaleness into the social 
representations which structure and are structured by 
people's social interactions. Ultimately, the justification 
of the claim that discovery, inclusion and integration are 
general processes which should be included in the theory of 
social representations depends upon future research that 
examines the transformation of social representations in 
other realms.
11.3 THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Despite the dominance of individualistic or Cartesian 
approaches in social psychology (Chapter 3) and, in 
particular, in the psychology of groups (Chapter 7), recent 
developments in Europe have seen the emergence of the social 
dimensions. In terms of Doise's framework these include the 
social-psychological concomitants of the structure of society
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and the ideological or consensual belief systems extant in 
that society. The research shows how these social dimensions 
ascended as indispensable components in both the study and 
understanding of relations between large-scale groups. 
Similarly, the theory of social representations focuses on 
those aspects of social life which elude explanation purely 
in terms of individuals. In particular, it addresses the 
symbolic and cultural nature of people's knowledge about the 
world.
It should always be remembered that the 'personal' and 
social dimensions are interdependent. In this thesis, I have 
shown how the social dimensions are dependent upon the 
personal dimensions with regard to the dynamics of social 
representations. I have also shown, in the research on the 
study of intergroup relations, how the personal dimensions 
are dependent upon the social dimensions. For example, social 
representations are not autonomous from the expressive and 
creative activities of individuals and an individual's 
cognition cannot be considered independently from consensual 
beliefs in society.
Doise (1986) has shown how all four levels can be 
investigated using the experimental method of research. 
Although I do not disagree, I have argued in this thesis that 
other methods of research can be employed to advantage, 
expecially with regard to the social dimensions (Chapter 6) . 
Analyses of social-psychological phenomena in society can 
play an equally important part in developing theories which 
take account of the cultural aspects of social life.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the social dimensions in 
the discipline of social psychology has far-reaching 
implications which are not elaborated fully by Doise's 
analysis. It is not simply a matter of giving greater 
attention to the social context of the activities of 
individuals. The social dimensions must be integrated with 
the personal dimensions and this integration cannot be 
supported by maintaining traditional representations of the 
latter. In other words, individualistic perspectives in 
social psychology are fundamentally incompatible with social 
perspectives.
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At the heart of this incompatability is the social 
representation of the individual. The integration of the 
individual and cultural aspects of social life necessitates 
a representation of the individual as inherently social 
whereby culture is embodied in the individual (see Chapters 
3 and 4). Such a representation excludes the possibility of 
purely intrapersonal phenomena. For example, there is no such 
thing as a purely individual representation, just as there is 
no such thing as a purely personal identity.
The emergence of the social or cultural dimensions in 
social psychology has been accompanied by the emergence of 
the historical dimension, a point that is not elaborated by 
Doise (1986), not least, I suspect, because this dimension 
cannot be investigated easily using experimental methods. The 
historical dimension is central to both Moscovici*s theory of 
social representations and Taj fel's theory of intergroup 
relations. Both theories are concerned with the processes and 
forms of social change, with how we understand and how we 
create change. Moscovici focuses on the transformation of 
social representations, whilst Tajfel focuses on the 
emergence of intergroup conflict.
The compatability of these two theories goes beyond 
their mutual concerns with the cultural and historical 
dimensions of social life. In some respects this is hardly 
surprising as Moscovici and Tajfel had strong links within 
the European community. Their theoretical frameworks show 
considerable overlap. Social representations are shared by 
groups and furnish individuals with a social identity. Social 
identity is dependent upon the social representations about 
relations between groups and about the structure of society. 
Furthermore, the social-psychological processes involved in 
the transformation of social representations and in the 
differentiation between groups are remarkably similar. These 
theories beg to be integrated not least because each theory 
is strong where the other theory is weak. The theory of 
social representations is strong on the communication and 
diffusion of belief systems yet tells us very little about 
how these representations are associated with groups or about 
the motivational and cognitive processes involved. The theory
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of intergroup relations is strong on the social-psychological 
processes involved in intergroup relations but is relatively 
weak on the communication of social beliefs and the processes 
involved in social creativity. Their integration would 
furnish an understanding of how the transformation of social 
representations is related to people's group memberships and 
social identities. For example, the diffusion of knowledge 
about AIDS, changes in people's sexual behaviour and changes 
in the relationships between homosexual and heterosexual 
groups can only be understood fully within a theoretical 
framework that elaborates and integrates the social processes 
and functions associated with social identity and those 
associated with social representations (Stockdale,1990).
A combination of Moscovici's theory of social 
representations and Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations 
provides an opportunity to establish and to develop the 
Hegelian paradigm in social psychology. Whilst there is still 
a danger that these theories will be desocialized by the 
community's conventional commitment to the Cartesian 
paradigm, this can be avoided by emphasising the 
interdependence of the individual and the cultural and by 
ascribing importance to the historical dimension.
11.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
The guiding motivation behind this thesis has been to 
apply the theory of social representations to the 
transformation of scientific knowledge. Despite 
contradictions with the original theory, the arguments 
presented in Part 1 and the material presented in Part 2 show 
that the social-psychological perspective, which has informed 
our understanding of common-sense, also enlightens our 
understanding of the processes of science.
In contrast to traditional positive-empiricist 
representations of science, this thesis elaborates the 
dialectics of scientific knowledge, the activities of 
scientists, the object of study and the cultural and 
historical milieu. Whilst this is commensurate with recent 
developments in the philosophy of science and the sociology 
of knowledge (Chapter 5) it also enhances our understanding
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of the social-psychological processes involved in the 
transformation of scientific knowledge.
Scientific knowledge is a cultural and historical 
product which is transformed through the active participation 
and collaboration of scientists embedded in the organism/ 
environment/culture system. Advances are not made by simply 
testing what we already know against reality but by re­
structuring systems of social representations through the 
social processes of communication and interaction.
This understanding of the processes of science has two 
major implications. Firstly, greater attention should be 
given to the construction of theories, to the assumptions and 
values that are implicit in scientific paradigms and to the 
social processes inherent in the conduct of scientific 
enquiry. Secondly, if science is similar to rather than 
different from, common-sense then the communication and 
diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense should 
not be so onerous. Deposing the myth of science as 'un monde 
autre' will encourage and facilitate the important task of 
'giving science away' to the general public.
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APPENDIX 6.1
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Thank-you for completing this questionnaire.
SECTION A:
1) Do you hold an appointment in an academic or research 
institution? __
YES Full-Time __
YES Part-Time __
NO __
IF NO GO TO QUESTION 4
2) Is your appointment in a __
University __
Polytechnic __
Research institute
Other ....................
(please specify)
3) What is your professional status?
(Please tick the appropriate box.) __
Professor_____________ __
Reader_________________ __
Senior lecturer______ __
Lecturer_________________
Post-doctoral fellow __
Research assistant __
Other .................
(please specify)
GO TO QUESTION 5
4) Please identify your occupation and professional status.
5) What is your B.P.S. membership status:
Fellow __
Associate __
Graduate __
Student __
6) Are you also a member of The Experimental Psychological 
Society?
YES __
NO __
7) When did you finish your first degree in psychology? 19..
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8) Please state briefly your predominant field of interest in 
psychology.
SECTION B:
Please answer all the questions below with regard to one of the
following: __
ATTITUDES __ (Tick as appropriate.)
GROUPS__________ __
1) Who do you consider to be the five most influential figures in 
the bletozy of this field? (Please list them in rank order.)
most influential 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
2) What do you consider to have been the major contribution of 
the person identified as the most influential in question (1).
3) What were the major consequences of this contribution?
4) Who do you consider to be the five most influential figures 
in contexBporary research in this field? (Please list them in rank 
order.)
most influential 1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
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5) What do you consider to be the major contribution of the 
person identified as the most Influential in question (4).
6) What are the major implications of this contribution?
7) What methods of research do you consider to have been most 
profitable in this field?
8) Please indicate any articles or books which you consider to 
have been of particular importance in this field.
Please give your name unless you wish to remain anonymous
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APPENDIX 6.2
CODING FRAME
1. Social/Cognitive Psychology: 1.1 Established/Started
1.2 Established/Maintained
1.3 Developed
1.4 Inspired
1.5 Founded
1.6 Reorientated/Refocused
1.7 Broadened/Integrated
1.8 Neglected/Inhibited
2. Physiology/Neuropsychology
3. Development of Computing and A.I.
4. Philosophy
5. Opposition to Traditional Approach
6. Theory/Framework:
Model:
Understanding/Explanation
Conception:
10.Individual-Social:
6.1 General
6.2 Started
6.3 Developed
6.4 Popularized/Established
6.5 Integrated
7.1 Constructed/Started
7.2 Developed
7.3 Popularized/Established
9.1 Definition/redefinition
9.2 Conception
10.1 Individualistic
10.2 Group
10.3 Reconception/Social
10.4 Focus on
11.Principle
12.Cognitive approach/aspects (Social fields only)
13.Research: 13.1 General
13.2 Tradition
13.3 Renewed/Inspired
13.4 Changed/focused
13.5 Started
13.6 Methods:
13.6.1 General
13.6.2 Experimental
13.6.3 Scales and 
Questionnaires
13.7 Materials
13.8 Findings
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14.Scientific
15.Applied Psychology:
16.Interdisciplinary 
17.Inter sub-disciplinary 
18.Publications :
15.1 Theory and Practice
15.2 Research
15.3 Practice
18.1 Articles/Chapters/Books
18.2 Tradition
Targets of Contributions in the field of Groups 
Historical:
LEWIN: (8)*
TAJFEL:(9)
Field Theory 
Group Dynamics 
Leadership
Social Interaction language
Social Identity Theory 
(Social) Groups 
Intergroup Relations 
Experimentation-minimal g.p.s. 
Theory
Inter-disciplinary
Contemporary: 
TAJFEL:(7)
TURNER:(6)
Social Identity Theory 
Intergroup Relations 
Self-categorization
Social identity theory 
Self-categorization theory:
MOSCOVICI:(6)Minority & majority influence 
Social change
* number of respondents viewing this contributor as the most important.
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APPENDIX 6.4
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The questions follow an historical progression, looking at 
social psychology, and in particular the psychology of groups 
before Tajfel's work, then the development of Tajfel's work 
in conjunction with various collaborators, and finally the 
assimilation of ideas emerging out of this work.
Briefly,
What place did the psychology of groups have in social 
psychology in the 1960*s and the early 1970's ?
How was the psychology of groups conceived and what research 
was being done at this time?
Which individuals do you think influenced Tajfel before the 
1970*s and in what way?
Tajfel has acknowledged Bruner. What do you think are the 
main ideas that Tajfel adopts, if any?
Tajfel's work started off in the field of social perception 
with a particular view of psychology. Throughout his academic 
career his work changed considerably and he is more generally 
recognised for his work on intergroup behaviour.
In general terms, do you consider that there have been any 
major shifts in his work? Why did these come about?
Are there any major continuities in his work?
What were his major concerns and aims in his academic career? 
How do you think these relate to his personal life, to Tajfel 
as a person?
What problems or difficulties did Tajfel face in developing 
his ideas?
What do you consider to be the most important aspects of his 
work?
Tracing the development of his work in more detail, it has 
been said that his early work in psychophysics, the notion 
of accentuation of differences and its application to 
stereotypes reflects a relatively restricted or traditional 
approach. By the time he wrote the 1969 article on Prejudice 
he seems to have expanded the framework considerably.
How did this come about?
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What impact, if any, did the studies on children's national 
attitudes have?
What about the European Association?
Why do you think Tajfel came to focus on intergroup 
relations?
He often cites the research of Sherif and Sherif on 
intergroup conflict. What impact did these have on Tajfel? 
Why and in what way were they important?
His early work provides the foundations for Social Identity 
Theory, developed in collaboration with others , including 
yourself, at Bristol. He came to criticize his earlier work, 
and that of others, reflecting a change of perspective.
How do you see this change and what were the reasons for it? 
Two of the most frequently cited articles are the social 
categorization experiments of 1970 and 1971, with which you 
were directly involved.
What was the background to these experiments?
Why do you think they were so influential?
How did the theory of social identity emerge out of this 
work?
Was there anything that was peculiar or innovatory about your 
collective approach at this time?
What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the 
theory?
What do you consider to have been its major strengths and 
major weaknesses?
Were there any major controversies with other social 
psychologists ?
How do you see your work in relation to Taj fel * s?
What were the positive influences Tajfel had on your work? 
Were there any negative influences?
*In 1979 Tajfel outlines three aspects of the theory of
intergroup relations
the construction of social groups
their psychological effects
their relation to social reality
How do you see these three aspects in your work?
* These questions addressed issues directly relevant to the work of each interviewee.
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Who else has been influenced directly by Tajfel?
What are the main features of their work?
What have been the reactions of other social psychologists? 
What ideas have been assimilated by social psychology and 
the psychology of groups in general?
Why did these * catch on' ?
What role do you think the European Association and Journal 
played ?
Which of his ideas have not been influential or readily 
accepted?
In what way has this whole school or tradition reshaped 
social psychology and our understanding of groups, and in 
what way has it not changed?
One of Tajfel's major concerns was that social psychologists 
should consider social reality and the social context as a 
necessary part of their field.
Do you think he has been successful in this ?
What are the major legacies that Tajfel has left to those 
beginning psychology today ?
Was there been any diffusion or impact in the U.S.A.?
Why?
What do you think about the current status or development of 
social psychology ?
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APPENDIX 7.1
The MOST Influential Figures in the History of 
Attitude Research
Name 
Allport 
Festinger 
Thurstone 
Likert 
Abelson 
Fishbein 
Freud,S. 
Heider 
Hovland 
La Piere 
Moses 
Piaget 
Prigogin 
Vygotsky 
Wolfenberger
Frequency Percentage
22.3
18.5
11.1
7.4
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7
APPENDIX 7.2
The MOST Influential Figures in Contemporary 
Attitude Research
Name
Fishbein
Moscoyici
Ajzen
Laljee
Miller
Petty
Piaget
Rogers
Snyder
de Vulpian
Wertsh
Ajzen and Fishbein
Frequency
6
4
3
Percentage
22.2
14.8
11.1
3.7
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APPENDIX 7.3
The MOST Influential Figures in the History of
Group Psvcholoav
Name Frequency Percentage
Tajfel 9 25
Lew in 8 22.2
Bales 4 11.1
Asch 3 8.3
Sherif,M. 3 8.3
Allport,G.W. 3 8.3
Bartlett 1 2.8
Bion 1 2.8
James 1 2.8
McDougall 1 2.8
Yalom 1 2.8
APPENDIX 7.4
The MOST Influential Figures in Contemporary
Name
Group Psychology 
Frequency Percentage
Taj fel 7 19.4
Moscovici 6 16.7
Turner 6 16.7
Asch 1 2.8
Bales 1 2.8
Belbuir 1 2.8
Billig 1 2.8
Blau 1 2.8
Cartwright 1 2.8
Cleese 1 2.8
Giles 1 2.8
Hosking 1 2.8
Latane 1 2.8
Pettigrew 1 2.8
Sherif,M. 1 2.8
Steiner 1 2.8
Yalom 1 2.8
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